Sudhir Agarwal, J.— Heard Smt. Rama Goel, Advocate, for petitioner and Sri S.K. Srivastava, Advocate, for respondent no. 2 in WRIT-A No. 15391 of 2003 (hereinafter referred to as "First Petition) and Sri S.K. Srivastava, Advocate, for petitioner, and Smt. Rama Goel, Advocate, for respondents in WRIT-A No. 1250 of 2007 (hereinafter referred to as "Second Petition). 2. Petitioner in First Petition, claiming to be an occupant of the accommodation in dispute, namely, a shop owned by Sri Ram Mukhi Devi, respondent no. 2, is aggrieved by order dated 28.3.2003 whereby Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Mathura (hereinafter referred to as "RCEO") has held occupation of petitioner of the shop in dispute illegal and unauthorized, and, consequently, has declared vacancy therein. He has further directed for notification of vacancy so as to proceed for allotment thereof in accordance with provision of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as "Act, 1972"). 3. Second Petition has been filed by landlord, Smt. Ram Mukhi Devi, aggrieved by order dated 15.11.2003 passed by RCEO allotting shop in dispute to respondent no. 1, in Second Petition. 4. Since the question of facts and law engaging attention of this Court in both these matters are common arising out of same proceedings, and, are integrally connected, both these matters have been heard together and are being decided by this common judgement. 5. Petitioner of First Petition admitted that one Kishan Gopal (now deceased), son of Sri Dhuji Mai, was tenant and occupant of the shop in dispute. He had two sons. Both were in service and staying/posted out of Mathura District. Wife of Kishan Gopa had already died long back. Petitioner of First Petition claimed that he, being son in law of Kishan Gopal, was residing with him and looking after business in the shop in dispute along with Kishan Gopal. He, thus, claimed that he was occupying the shop in question since 1972 and, therefore, his possession cannot be said to be unauthorized or illegal. RCEO, however, found that rent receipts adduced before the Court below showed that tenancy of shop in dispute continued to be solely in the name of Kishan Gopal. 6. He, thus, claimed that he was occupying the shop in question since 1972 and, therefore, his possession cannot be said to be unauthorized or illegal. RCEO, however, found that rent receipts adduced before the Court below showed that tenancy of shop in dispute continued to be solely in the name of Kishan Gopal. 6. Further, landlady initiated ejectment proceedings by seeking release of shop in dispute under Section 21 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as "Act, 1972") i.e. P.A. Case No. 18 of 1981 which was dismissed on 4.3.1983. The landlady Smt. Ram Mukhi Devi also filed an ejectment Suit i.e. S.C.C. Suit No. 41 of 1985 against Sri Kishan Gopal which was also dismissed vide Civil Judge, Mathura's judgment dated 4.9.1986. The third proceedings were initiated by landlady Smt. Ram Mukhi Devi in P.A. Case No. 75 of 1987 which stood dismissed vide Second Addl. Civil Judge, Mathura's judgment dated 28.2.1990. In the appeal pending before the Appellate Court arising out of the order passed by Prescribed Authority dismissing landlady's application under Section 21 of Act, 1972 it is said that the same was decided in terms of a compromise dated 3.9.1990 wherein the landlady admitted petitioner of First Petition as tenant of shop in question observing the fact that he was doing business with Sri Kishan Gopal in the shop in question since January 1972. 7. RCEO, however, has found that in various evidence before it, namely, the rent receipts, record of Local Body, i.e., Nagar Palika, Mathura relating to house tax and water tax, everywhere name of Sri Kishan Gopal was shown as tenant and for the first time name of petitioner came to be noticed as tenant in 1993 in Municipal Record and in the receipts issued in August 1991 and thereafter. Thus upto 1991, as a matter of fact, petitioner failed to demonstrate that he was doing a joint business and was a joint tenant or tenant in common in the shop in question. This is a finding of fact recorded by Court below and has not been shown perverse or contrary to record. Petitioner could not show that on or before 5.7.1976 he entered the shop in the capacity of tenant or joint tenant or tenant in common in any manner, and, that too, with the consent of landlady. This is a finding of fact recorded by Court below and has not been shown perverse or contrary to record. Petitioner could not show that on or before 5.7.1976 he entered the shop in the capacity of tenant or joint tenant or tenant in common in any manner, and, that too, with the consent of landlady. In view thereof, the question of regularization of vacancy under Section 14 of Act, 1972 does not arise. This Court cannot and shall not interfere with the impugned judgement insofar as it has declared the occupation of petitioner in First Petition to be unauthorized and illegal. None of the authorities cited at bar in favour of petitioner in First Petition are applicable to the facts as discussed above. 8. At this stage, it is contended by learned counsel for petitioner in First Petition that proceedings under Sections 12 and 16 in the present case have been initiated on an application filed by one Harish Agarwal in 2000 and, therefore, it was barred by time. 9. This argument also lacks substance. It is not the case of petitioner of First Petition that Sri Harish Agarwal, a prospective allottee, who moved application for allotment on 20.7.2000 whereupon proceedings were initiated by RCEO, had knowledge of petitioner's unauthorized occupation of shop in dispute and since that date of possession of petitioner over accommodation in question, period of limitation before moving the said application had already elapsed. 10. What in fact has been claimed by petitioner is that cause of action will be deemed to have occurred when petitioner came in possession of shop in dispute and the same must be construed from 1972. The submission is thoroughly misconceived inasmuch petitioner may have been working with his father-in-law, but the fact that he was occupying the shop in the capacity of tenant or joint tenant or tenant in common has not been proved. At the best, it can be said that tenancy rights of petitioners were recognized by landlord in 1990 and, therefore, from that date petitioner may be deemed to be tenant in the shop in dispute though without any letter of appointment having been issued under Act, 1972. At the best, it can be said that tenancy rights of petitioners were recognized by landlord in 1990 and, therefore, from that date petitioner may be deemed to be tenant in the shop in dispute though without any letter of appointment having been issued under Act, 1972. Even if this fact is taken to be correct, the judgements relied by petitioner to contend that the proceedings are barred by time have no application for the reason that application for allotment was made within 12 years. 11. Even otherwise, the plea of limitation has no application in the present case. On this aspect, the issue has been considered in detail by this Court in Uma Yadav (Smt.) Vs. A.D.M. (Supply)/RCEO, Varanasi and others 2012 (3) ARC 141 and having considered the various provisions of Act, 1972 as also various authorities on the subject, this Court in para 72 to 78 of the judgment has said as under: "72. Can it be said that cause of action would arise immediately as and when a person occupy an accommodation without any letter of allotment and in all cases this 12 years period will commence therefrom, I find that on this aspect, no issue has ever been raised in all the aforesaid decisions and therefore it has neither been argued nor decided as to when a "cause of action would arise" and "whether it would necessarily arise in any case only on the date when a person takes possession of a accommodation without any latter of allotment or there can be different dates". 73. In my view, this question is of much relevance so as to attract the aforesaid period of limitation or laches, whatever terminology one may use. Such illegal occupation/unauthorised occupation can be challenged/assailed by three sets of people: i. Landlord, whose accommodation is unauthorizedly occupied by someone. ii. Applicant, i.e. a prospective allottee who is in the need of an accommodation and has applied for allotment of an accommodation to RCEO. Here we will term him as "prospective allottee" for future discussion. iii. RCEO/District Magistrate, as the case may be, who has power to declare vacancy or to proceed to make allotment in case of a deemed vacancy of a particular premises. 74. Here we will term him as "prospective allottee" for future discussion. iii. RCEO/District Magistrate, as the case may be, who has power to declare vacancy or to proceed to make allotment in case of a deemed vacancy of a particular premises. 74. In respect to the first set namely, owner of the premises, normally he would get knowledge of occupation of his building by someone unauthorizedly as soon as such possession is taken and therefore, so far as landlord/owner is concerned in his/her case, cause of action may arise on the date of such unauthorised occupation. However where landlord can show that for certain reasons, namely landlord is residing elsewhere in different city or in different country or for any other reason, had no knowledge whatsoever about such unauthorised occupation, cause of action would arise and continue to arise on the date he acquired such knowledge for the simple reason that without such knowledge, one is not expected to take an action for ejectment/release from unauthorised occupant. 75. So far as the authorities are concerned, one cannot presume that they can get knowledge immediately as soon as a person is put in possession of a building unauthorisedly, i.e. without any letter of allotment. Such possession can be given in various ways namely, by outgoing tenant without any notice to the landlord and Rent Control Authorities and/or by inducting an outsider to the premises in question and thereafter vacating the premises by tenant already occupying it, or with the consent of landlord, possession of an accommodation is given to a person without informing the authorities and without making the building available for allotment under the statute. 76. Section 15 makes it obligatory upon tenant and landlord to inform the Rent Control Authorities i.e. District Magistrate about vacancy occurring or likely to fall within a specific time with the power to condone delay in giving such information. It is only when this provision has been complied with, it can be said that District Magistrate or Rent Control Authorities had the knowledge of vacancy and yet, if they do not take any action to evict an unauthorised occupant for such a long time, the laches can be applied. In my view, so far as Rent Control Authorities are concerned, in their case, cause of action would arise on the date, factum of unauthorised occupation by someone has come to their knowledge. In my view, so far as Rent Control Authorities are concerned, in their case, cause of action would arise on the date, factum of unauthorised occupation by someone has come to their knowledge. 77. Attributing knowledge of unauthorised occupation without any intimation to authorities may render redundant and virtually nullify the efficacy of the statute, and, the purpose and objective with which these provisions have been made. Probably for this reason, in respect to certain cases where action may not have been taken by Rent Control Authorities immediately, the legislature itself has made provision like Section 12 regarding "deemed vacancy" of building and such "deemed vacancy" would continue. Action for vacation of an unauthorised occupant can be conceived only when authorities concerned gather information/notice of such unauthorised occupation. Therefore, in case of Rent Control Authorities, again it is the knowledge of such unauthorised occupation wherefrom the said period of 12 years would commence and not otherwise. 78. Now coming to the third category namely prospective allottee(s). They also cannot be presumed to possess knowledge every time, whenever an individual has got possession unauthorisedly or otherwise i.e. without any letter of appointment or not. The position of vacancy can be gathered by prospective allottee only when vacancy in a premises is entered in the register maintained in the office of RCEO as contemplated in Rule 9(3) of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as "Rules, 1972") unless it can be shown otherwise by positive evidence that particular prospective allottee acquired knowledge of unauthorised occupation at a particular point of time even before entry of vacancy in the register under Rule 9(3) and in such case, cause of action may arise from that date. Therefore, in respect to the third category, either it is the date on which vacancy is entered in the register maintained under Rule 9(3) of Rules, 1972 or the date of knowledge acquired by the prospective allottee." 12. Therefore, in respect to the third category, either it is the date on which vacancy is entered in the register maintained under Rule 9(3) of Rules, 1972 or the date of knowledge acquired by the prospective allottee." 12. Applying the aforesaid dictum in the present case and in absence of any pleading either before RCEO or before this Court that prospective allottee had any previous information of petitioner's possession of shop in dispute, plea of limitation cannot be argued to have commenced from 1972 or from any other subsequent date unless it is pleaded and proved that the cause of action accrued to the prospective allottee from any date earlier to the date of application filed by petitioner and from that date, application is barred by time. In view of above, I find no error, legal or otherwise, in the impugned order dated 28.3.2003 assailed in first writ petition so as to justify interference therein. The First Petition, therefore, deserves to be dismissed. 13. Now coming to Second Petition, the Court finds that so far as the landlord-petitioner is concerned, she had information about possession of Sri Gopal Das over the shop in dispute for the last more than a decade and also entered into an compromise with him to settle the tenancy rights, hence proceedings initiated on an application of prospective allottee in 2000 cannot come to rescue to petitioner-landlady to wriggle out of her earlier commitment so as to justify release of shop in question in her favour. The landlady-petitioner in Second Petition repeatedly has failed in getting shop in dispute vacated from its erstwhile tenant. RCEO besides above has categorically recorded a finding in the impugned allotment order dated 15.11.2003 that she had several accommodations in her possession, and, one shop, which she got vacated, was again let out, which was adjoining to the shop in question. Besides, she also possess several shops in Jindal Market and these facts have not been shown incorrect or false. In the circumstances, I do not find any justification to interfere with the allotment order dated 15.11.2003. 14. In the result, both the writ petitions are devoid of merit. 15. Dismissed. 16. No cost. Sudhir Agarwal, J.—Heard. Allowed. Let substitution be carried out during the course of the day. _____________