JUDGMENT Mr. Mehinder Singh Sullar, J.: (Oral) - Assailing the impugned judgment of conviction dated 29.8.2002 and order of sentence dated 2.9.2002, by virtue of which, appellant-convict Balwant Singh s/o Bhagwan Singh (for brevity “the appellant”) was convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of seven years, to pay a fine of Rs.1000/- and in default of payment of fine, to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year, for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 307 IPC by the trial Court. 2. The matrix of the facts, material & evidence, unfolded during the course of trial, culminating in the commencement, relevant for deciding the instant appeal and emanating from the record, is that on 18.10.1999 at about 7/7.30 PM, as soon as, complainant-injured Jagsir Singh (PW6) reached near the gate of his house, in the meantime, the appellant raised a lalkara and fired a shot from his licensed .12 bore gun, which hit on the right side of his abdomen. The incident was also witnessed by his wife Sukhwinder Kaur (PW7). The motive of the incident was partition of the joint land. In the background of these allegations and in the wake of statement (Ex.P8) of complainant-injured Jagsir Singh, the present criminal case was registered against the appellant, vide FIR No.178 dated 19.10.1999 (Ex.P8/B), on accusation of having committed an offence punishable u/s 307 IPC by the police of Police Station Zira, District Ferozepur in the manner depicted here-inabove. 3. After completion of the investigation, the police submitted the final police report (challan) against the appellant to face trial for the indicated offence. Since, the case was triable by the court of Session, so, it was committed for trial by the Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Zira, vide his commitment order dated 24.1.2000. Consequently, he appeared before the Court of Session in pursuance of commitment of the case. 4. Having completed all the codal formalities, the trial Judge framed the charge against the appellant under Section 307 IPC, by way of order dated 16.2.2000. As he did not plead guilty and claimed trial, therefore, the case was slated for evidence of the prosecution. 5. 4. Having completed all the codal formalities, the trial Judge framed the charge against the appellant under Section 307 IPC, by way of order dated 16.2.2000. As he did not plead guilty and claimed trial, therefore, the case was slated for evidence of the prosecution. 5. The prosecution, in order to substantiate the charge framed against the appellant, examined PW1 Dr.Gian Singh, who has medico legally examined Jagsir Singh complainant-injured (PW6) and found the following injury on his person, vide MLR (Ex.P1):- “A lacerated wound 7 cm x 4 cm on the right side of the front side of abdominal area. Probing not done. Gut and momentum protruding out. Bleeding was present freshly and clotting inside of abdomen was present. Margins were inverted. 6.5 cm from mid-line.” 6. Injury No.1 was declared dangerous to life. PW2 Dr.Madan Lal, Medical Officer, SHC Kadarwala referred the complainant-injured to Civil Hospital, Ferozepur and informed the police, vide letter (Ex.P5). PW3 Kulbhushan, Draftsman prepared the site plan (Ex.P6) of the place of occurrence. PW4 C.Harnam Singh delivered the special report to the higher authorities, whereas PW5 C.Dilbag Singh is a formal witness and has tendered his affidavit (Ex.P7) in evidence. 7. Sequelly, next to note is the testimony of complainant-injured Jagsir Singh (PW6), who has stated that on 18.10.1999 at about 7/7.30 PM, as soon as, he reached near the gate of his house, in the meantime, the appellant raised a lalkara and fired a shot from his licensed .12 bore gun, which hit on the left side of his abdomen. Again said on the right side of his abdomen. The incident was also witnessed by his wife Sukhwinder Kaur (PW7). 8. Likewise, PW7 Sukhwinder Kaur has also toed the line of her husband Jagsir Singh (PW6) and maintained that the appellant fired a shot, which hit on the right side of abdomen of her husband. Instead of reproducing the entire statements of PW6 and PW7 and in order to avoid the repetition, suffice it to say that they have fully corroborated the prosecution version in its entirety. 9. Similarly, PW9 Joginder Singh, Reader to Tehsildar proved the gun licence (Ex.P11) of the appellant. PW8 HC Gurcharan Singh, PW10 HC Iqbal Singh and PW11 ASI Gurjant Singh (IO) have testified and corroborated their investigation. 9. Similarly, PW9 Joginder Singh, Reader to Tehsildar proved the gun licence (Ex.P11) of the appellant. PW8 HC Gurcharan Singh, PW10 HC Iqbal Singh and PW11 ASI Gurjant Singh (IO) have testified and corroborated their investigation. The prosecution has also placed reliance on diagram showing the seat of injury (Ex.P2), application of police (Ex.P3), endorsement (Ex.P4), memos (Ex.P9 & Ex.P10), recovery memos (Ex.P12, Ex.P14 & Ex.P17), site plan (Ex.P13) & memo of arrest (Ex.P15) in documentary evidence. 10. After the close of the prosecution case, statement of the appellant was recorded. The entire incriminating evidence was put to enable him to explain any circumstances appearing against him in the prosecution evidence as contemplated under Section 313 Cr.P.C. He has denied the prosecution evidence in its totality and pleaded false implication due to land dispute between him and complainant. 11. Taking into consideration the evidence on record, the trial Judge convicted and sentenced the appellant in the manner described here-in-above. 12. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant has preferred the present appeal, to challenge the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence. That is how, I am seized of the matter. 13. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, having gone through the record/legal position with their valuable help and after bestowal of thoughts over the entire matter, to my mind, the instant appeal deserves to be partly accepted in this context. 14. Ex facie, the argument of learned counsel that since the evidence brought on record by the prosecution falls short as is required to prove a criminal charge against the appellant, so, the appeal is liable to be accepted, sans merit. 15. As is evident from the record that complainant Jagsir Singh (PW6) has put the police machinery into motion and made his statement (Ex.P8), which formed the basis of FIR (Ex.P8/B). PW6 and PW7 have categorically maintained, on oath, that on the fateful day, the appellant fired a shot from his licensed .12 bore gun, which hit in the abdomen of Jagsir Singh. PW6 is an injured witness, whereas his wife Sukhwinder Kaur (PW7) is an eye witness. Her presence at the place of occurrence is very natural as the incident had taken place in front of gate of her house. They have duly corroborated the prosecution version on all vital counts. PW6 is an injured witness, whereas his wife Sukhwinder Kaur (PW7) is an eye witness. Her presence at the place of occurrence is very natural as the incident had taken place in front of gate of her house. They have duly corroborated the prosecution version on all vital counts. They were cross-examined at length but nothing substantial material could be elicited in the searching cross-examination to dislodge their testimonies and impeach their credibility. Not only that, the ocular version of prosecution finds further corroboration from the medical evidence of PW1 Dr.Gian Singh, who found lacerated wound on the right side of abdominal area of PW6 and maintained that it was caused by fire arm. 16. Thus, it would be seen that if the entire oral as well as documentary evidence brought on record by the prosecution, is put together as discussed here-in-above, then, the conclusion is inescapable and irresistible that the appellant has voluntarily caused fire shot injury to PW6 in the same manner as projected by the prosecution witnesses. Therefore, the contrary submissions of learned counsel for appellant “stricto sensu” deserve to be and are hereby repelled under the present set of circumstances. 17. Faced with this situation, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has fairly acknowledged that he will not be in a position to contest the conviction of appellant any more, in view of the acceptable ocular & medical evidence on record. However, he then urged that in any case, in view of vague opinion of doctor, no offence u/s 307 IPC is made out against the appellant. 18. Above being the position of evidence on record, now the next question, that falls for consideration, is what offence the appellant has committed in this relevant direction. 19. As indicated here-in-above, the appellant was charge sheeted for the commission of an offence punishable u/s 307 IPC. Section 307 IPC postulates that “whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to [imprisonment for life], or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned.” 20. A conjoint and meaningful reading of these provisions would reveal that in order to attract the provisions of section 307 IPC, the intention or the requisite knowledge to cause death are the essential ingredients. In other words, an act though sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, would not constitute an offence under this Section, if the necessary intention or knowledge on the part of the accused is lacking. Thus, for the purpose of this offence, what is material, is the intention or knowledge and not the consequence of the actual act done for the purpose of carrying out that intention. Intent essentially implies purpose and attempt is an actual effort made in execution of the purpose. Therefore, an attempt for purposes of Section 307 IPC should stem from a specific intention to commit murder. Intention and knowledge being a man’s state of mind, cannot be proved by direct evidence thereof except through his own confession. In the absence of such a confession, intention and knowledge can only be proved by circumstantial evidence. These are the matters of inferences from all the facts and circumstances available on record of a particular case. 21. The perusal of the evidence on record would reveal that the appellant is real uncle of complainant-injured Jagsir Singh (PW6). He fired a single shot, which hit in his abdomen. He did not repeat the injury. Even as per medical evidence, there was only one lacerated wound. PW1 Dr.Gian Singh, who medico legally examined the injured, has only mentioned in the MLR (Ex.P1) that injury No.1 was dangerous to life. In cross-examination, he deposed that the case property and other documents were never produced and have not seen the door of the Court. According to PW1, he did not operate upon the injured. There is no other medical evidence on record to corroborate the vague opinion of PW1 that the appellant has committed the offence punishable u/s 307 IPC. Meaning thereby, the medical opinion is as vague as anything and in the absence of any corroborative evidence, the mere opinion of ‘dangerous to life’ is equivalent to ‘endangering life’ and such acts, which squarely covered within the ambit of clause Eighthly of Section 320 IPC, which is punishable u/s 326 IPC. 22. Meaning thereby, the medical opinion is as vague as anything and in the absence of any corroborative evidence, the mere opinion of ‘dangerous to life’ is equivalent to ‘endangering life’ and such acts, which squarely covered within the ambit of clause Eighthly of Section 320 IPC, which is punishable u/s 326 IPC. 22. The distinction between the words “dangerous to life” and “endangering life” came to be determined by a Division Bench of this Court in case Atma Singh v. The State of Punjab, 1982(2) CLR 496 and it was ruled as under:- “Held, that the expression ‘dangerous’ is an adjective and the expression ‘endanger’ is verb. An injury which can put life in immediate danger of death would be an injury which can be termed as ‘dangerous to life’ and, therefore, when a doctor describes an injury as ‘dangerous to life’, he means an injury which endangers life in term of clause 8 of Section 320, Indian Penal Code, for, it describes the injury ‘dangerous to life’ only for the purpose of the said clause. He instead of using the expression that this was an injury which ‘endangered life’ described it as ‘dangerous to life’, meaning both the time the same thing”. 23. Sequelly, it was ruled that under these mitigating circumstances, no offence punishable u/s 307 IPC is made out and in that eventuality, the appellant can only be held guilty for the commission of an offence punishable u/s 326 IPC. The same view was again reiterated by this Court in case Mohinder Singh and others v. State of Punjab 2012 (4) RCR (Criminal) 214. Therefore, the ratio of law laid down in the indicated judgments “mutatis mutandis” is applicable to the facts of the present case and is the complete answer to the problem in hand. 24. Thus, seen from any angle, in the given facts & circumstances of the instant case, to my mind, the appellant cannot possibly be held guilty of an attempt to murder with the offence prescribed u/s 307 IPC. The act of appellant would fall within the ambit of clause Eighthly of Section 320 IPC, which is punishable under Section 326 IPC. To this extent, the trial Court appears to have gone legally wrong in this relevant behalf. 25. In the light of aforesaid reasons, appellant-Balwant Singh is acquitted of the charge framed against him under Section 307 IPC. The act of appellant would fall within the ambit of clause Eighthly of Section 320 IPC, which is punishable under Section 326 IPC. To this extent, the trial Court appears to have gone legally wrong in this relevant behalf. 25. In the light of aforesaid reasons, appellant-Balwant Singh is acquitted of the charge framed against him under Section 307 IPC. But, at the same time, he is held guilty and is hereby convicted under Section 326 IPC. It is not a matter of dispute that the appellant is real uncle of complainant. As per custody certificate, he has already undergone the substantive portion of his sentence of imprisonment for a period of 3 years, 1 month and 19 days out of total awarded sentence of imprisonment of seven years u/s 307 IPC. Therefore, to me, it would be in the interest and justice would be sub-served if the appellant is sentenced to imprisonment for a period already undergone by him for the commission of an offence punishable u/s 326 IPC. Ordered accordingly. 26. For the reasons recorded above, the instant appeal is partly accepted and the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence are modified accordingly, in the manner depicted here-in-above. 27. Needless to mention, the compliance and procedural consequences would follow.