Devendra Kumar Upadhyaya, J.— Heard Sri Ram Prakash Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners and Ms. Shikha Sinha, learned counsel appearing for opposite parties no. 3 to 10. Under challenge in the instant writ petition is an order dated 22.02.2001, passed by the Consolidation Officer, Belsar, District-Gonda, whereby the application moved under section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay by the petitioners in preferring objections under section 9-A of Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') has been rejected. The petitioners have also challenged the revisional order dated 27.04.2001, passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Gonda on a petition for revision preferred by the petitioners against the order of the Consolidation Officer dated 22.02.2001. By the said order the Deputy Director of Consolidation dismissed the revision petition. The petitioners appear to have sought review of the aforesaid order dated 27.04.2001 which, too, was dismissed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation on 13.09.2002. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that at the time notice in CH Form-5 was issued in the village, the petitioners were not living in the village, as such, they could not prefer the objections under section 9-A of the Act in time. He further states that the petitioners preferred the said objections as soon as they came to know from the extract Khatauni that the name of opposite party alone is recorded as the sole tenure holder. Along with the said objections under section 9-A of the Act, the application seeking condonation of delay was also preferred and the Consolidation Officer without assigning any plausible reason rejected the application seeking condonation of delay. He further states that in the consolidation proceedings a lenient view should be adopted by the consolidation courts in the matters relating to condonation of delay etc. taking into account the illiteracy and ignorance prevailing in our countryside. He further states that even otherwise, the courts should have a liberal approach in condoning the delay. In support of his contention he has placed reliance on the judgement of the Apex Court in the case of Ram Sumiran and others vs. D.D.C. and others; reported in (1985) 1 SCC 431 , wherein the delay of six years in moving the application seeking substitution of legal heirs of the deceased parties was condoned. In support of his contention he has placed reliance on the judgement of the Apex Court in the case of Ram Sumiran and others vs. D.D.C. and others; reported in (1985) 1 SCC 431 , wherein the delay of six years in moving the application seeking substitution of legal heirs of the deceased parties was condoned. He has further placed reliance on another judgment of this Court in the case of Smt. Prakaswati vs. Asst. Director of Consolidation, Ghaziabad and others, reported in [2003 (95) RD 348], wherein it has been held that in the matter of condonation of delay, a lenient view is to be taken by the courts keeping in mind the finality of the proceedings. Per contra, Ms. Shikha Sinha has vehemently opposed the writ petition primarily on two counts; first and foremost, she submits that objections intended to be filed by the petitioners under section 9-A of the Act itself were not maintainable for the reason that in the earlier consolidation proceedings which were held in the year 1961, the right and title pertaining to the land in question was already decided by the Consolidation Officer by means of an order dated 24.06.1961 and, as such, it was not open to the petitioners to file objections under section 9-A of the Act thereby attempting to reopen the issue which stood closed way back in the year 1961. Ms. Shikha Sinha has further submitted that the judgments cited and relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners have no application to the present case for the reason that son of one of the petitioners is also a practicing lawyer in Belsar, District-Gonda and hence, the grounds taken in the application seeking condonation of delay before the Consolidation Officers were of no avail to the petitioners. I have considered the respective arguments advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the parties. Submission of the learned counsel for the opposite parties that on account of a decision in the earlier consolidation proceedings which were held in the year 1961, the petitioners were prohibited from filing objections under section 9-A of the Consolidation of Holdings Act is absolutely misconceived and does not have any statutory support. Submission of the learned counsel for the opposite parties that on account of a decision in the earlier consolidation proceedings which were held in the year 1961, the petitioners were prohibited from filing objections under section 9-A of the Consolidation of Holdings Act is absolutely misconceived and does not have any statutory support. It may be stated that Section 9-A permits every one to file objections in case he is not satisfied with the extracts of records and statements published under section 9(1) of the Act in CH Form-5. Irrespective of the fact that in an earlier consolidation proceedings rights in respect of property in question might have been decided, that will not preclude the petitioners, and for that purpose, anybody else to exercise his statutory rights vested in him by virtue of section 9-A of the Act. Section 9-A permits objections, in respect of claim to land or partition of joint holding, to be filed before the Assistant Consolidation Officer who is empowered to settle the dispute, correct the mistakes and even give effect to partition on the basis of conciliation between the parties. The scheme of the said provision further provides that in case settlement of dispute or correction of mistakes etc. are not possible by conciliation between the parties, the case is to be referred for decision to the Consolidation Officer. The said provision does not make any exception and it is available to every person who intends to file objections in regard to his claim in the land regarding title and share. In this view, this submission of learned counsel for the opposite parties that since the matter allegedly stood concluded in the previous consolidation proceedings, therefore it was not open to the petitioner to have availed the remedy by filing objections and initiating proceeding under section 9-A of the Act is misplaced and is hereby rejected. So far as the other submission of the learned counsel for the opposite parties that since son of one of the petitioners is a practicing lawyer and, as such, the reasons indicated in the application seeking condonation of delay are not tenable, it would suffice to say that it was the objections filed by the petitioner and not by his son which was to be decided. Further, during consolidation proceedings, valuable rights between the parties are decided and considering the statutory bar on civil and revenue courts under section 49 of the Act to decide any matter which ought to have been adjudicated by the consolidation courts, it would be absolutely harsh to adopt a stricter view with regard to condoning the delay etc. in filing objections or appeal or revision before the consolidation courts, specially keeping in view the background in which the consolidation cases arise. Regard may be had to the decision of this Court in the case of Ziledar Singh vs. Prescribed Authority, reported in 1988 (6) LCD 51, wherein it has been held that this Court has laid stress on several occasions upon taking liberal view in the matters of condoning the delay so as to advance justice between the parties and not to shut out hearing on merits. It has further been held in this judgment that a Court should always be keen for doing substantial justice between the parties while deciding the case on merits. Regarding the law on condonation of delay a further reference can be made to another judgment of this Court in the case of Ram Nain Mishra and others vs. DDC and others, reported in 1988 (6) LCD 187, wherein it has been emphasized that while considering the application for condonation of delay, a lenient view deserves to be taken. It has further been observed in the case of Ram Baran vs. DDC, reported in 1984 (2) LCD 416, that the expression "sufficient cause" occurring in section 5 of the Limitation Act must ordinarily receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice. In view of above discussions, the Court is of the considered opinion that the order dated 22.02.2001, passed by the Consolidation Officer is not sustainable and hence is liable to be quashed. Consequently, the order passed by the revisional court dated 27.04.2001 and 13.09.2002 are also liable to be quashed. In the result, the writ petition is allowed and the orders dated 22.02.2001, passed by the Consolidation Officer, Belsar, District-Gonda and 27.04.2001 and 13.09.2002, passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Gonda are hereby quashed. The Consolidation Officer concerned is directed to decide the matter de-novo after affording an opportunity of hearing to the parties concerned. In the result, the writ petition is allowed and the orders dated 22.02.2001, passed by the Consolidation Officer, Belsar, District-Gonda and 27.04.2001 and 13.09.2002, passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Gonda are hereby quashed. The Consolidation Officer concerned is directed to decide the matter de-novo after affording an opportunity of hearing to the parties concerned. The said decision by the Consolidation Officer on the objections filed by the petitioners and the application seeking condonation of delay shall be taken within a period of two months from the date a certified copy of this order is produced before him. However, there will be no order as to cost. _____________