Judgment : [A.B. Chaudhari, J.] 1. This petition was filed by the petitioner Digambar Haribhau Pajgade on 31st August, 2012 with a prayer to punish the respondents under the Contempt of Courts Act, and along with the amended prayer to take suo motu action against them. The contention of the petitioner is that the respondent nos. 1 to 10 had shown telecast on New Channel IBN Lokmat, Mumbai, from 30th to 31st August, 2011. The telecast flashed reads thus:- “In the matter of inquiry of the land of Jawaharlal Darda Education Society Trust, wherein Ex-Chief Minister Shri Ashok Chavan, M.P. Vijay Darda and Education Minister Mr. Rajendra Darda, is stayed. The High Court slapped the petitioner. High Court blamed the petitioner to have obtained the order from the Court of J.M.F.C., by keeping the Court in dark and submitting incorrect information to the Court.” Respondent nos. 2 to 9 also published said false news deliberately in their newspapers without verifying the correctness thereof intentionally and purposefully, and by twisting the correct facts while reporting the proceedings of the Court and, therefore, by doing so, they have scandalized the image and authority of the High Court which amounts to interference in the Administration of Justice. The publication in the newspapers and the telecast obviously was factually false and incorrect and thus they defamed the petitioner. 2. It is stated in the petition that petitioner had applied to the Advocate General of Maharashtra on 19th June, 2012 for consent contemplated by Section 15 (1) (b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, and though the same was received, there was no response. By amendment, it has been brought to our notice that the Advocate General of Maharashtra by his communication dated 15th October, 2012 has declined to grant consent for initiation of criminal contempt proceedings. In support of the petition, the learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently argued that the Advocate General has declined to grant consent on irrelevant considerations and the reasons given by him are wrong and illegal. He further argued that the said refusal by the Advocate General to grant consent cannot form the subject-matter of challenge in this petition. As per the decision of the Supreme Court in case of P.N. Duda Vs. He further argued that the said refusal by the Advocate General to grant consent cannot form the subject-matter of challenge in this petition. As per the decision of the Supreme Court in case of P.N. Duda Vs. P. Shiv Shanker & others [ (1988) 3 SCC 167 ], it is necessary to treat the present petition as the Contempt Petition by exercising suo motu power of the High Court under Article 215 of the Constitution of India read with the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act. According to him, the offending publication and telecast does amount to interference with the Administration of Justice and publication of the false news also lowers the authority of the Court. He then invited our attention to Rule 5 (f) in Chapter-XXXIV of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, and argued that this petition be treated as the one lodged in the office of this Court inviting this Court to take action under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and under Article 215 of the Constitution of India, and be directed to be placed before Hon’ble the Chief Justice in Chambers for appropriate orders. He cited the following decisions:- [a] P.N. Duda Vs. P. Shiv Shanker & others [ (1988) 3 SCC 167 ], and [b] Bal Thackrey Vs. Harish Pimpalkhute & others [2005 (1) Mh.L.J., 322]. 3. Per contra, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor vehemently opposed the petition and argued that the Advocate General has refused consent with reasons. The same cannot be said to be irrelevant and on the contrary the decision taken by him is perfectly within the four corners of law. He opposed the prayer for treating the Contempt Petition as suo motu action, or to process the Contempt Petition in accordance with Rule 5 (f) of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules and prayed for dismissal of the petition. 4. We have perused the decisions cited before us. We have also perused the material, which, according to the petitioner, amounts to interference in the Administration of Justice. We have gone through the communication dated 15th October, 2012 refusing consent. It would be appropriate to quote the following proposition of law contained in the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. Union of India & another [ (1998) 4 SCC 409 ], which reads thus:- “9. We have gone through the communication dated 15th October, 2012 refusing consent. It would be appropriate to quote the following proposition of law contained in the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. Union of India & another [ (1998) 4 SCC 409 ], which reads thus:- “9. ‘The purpose of contempt jurisdiction is to uphold the majesty and dignity of the Courts of law. It is an unusual type of jurisdiction combining ‘the jury, the judge and the hangman’ and it so because the Court is not adjudicating upon any claim between litigating parties. This jurisdiction is not exercised to protect the dignity of an individual judge but to protect the administration of justice from being maligned. In the general interest of the community it is imperative that the authority of Courts should not be imperiled and there should be no unjustifiable interference in the administration of justice.” 5. In the instant case, admittedly, the Advocate General has declined to grant consent and for which he has recorded the following reasons:- “I do not grant consent for initiation of criminal contempt proceedings since even assuming the news reports are as alleged by you there is no allegation that scandalizes the Court or which lowers the authority of any Court or which interferes with the administration of justice or prejudices any judicial proceeding or obstructs the administration of justice or tends to any of the foregoing. None of the allegations make out a case of criminal contempt.” It is true, as laid down by the Apex Court in Para 63 (c) of its Judgment in the case of P.N.Duda [cited supra], that the refusal of consent by the Advocate General is not justiciable. At the same time, this Court is entitled to look into the reasons given by the Advocate General to satisfy whether the consent was refused on irrelevant considerations for testing the submission or a plea to take suo motu action for contempt under the Contempt of Courts Act, or under Article 215 of the Constitution. Such a course is not prohibited. In the case of Conscientious Group Vs. Such a course is not prohibited. In the case of Conscientious Group Vs. Mohammed Yunus & others [ AIR 1987 SC 1451 ], the Apex Court in para 8 observed with reference to the refusal of consent by the Solicitor General of India that elaborate reasons have been stated by the learned Solicitor General in support of his conclusion that it would not be in the public interest to give his consent to the initiation of the contempt proceedings. It further said after scrutinizing the reasons given by the learned Solicitor General, ‘we are of opinion that the grounds stated by the Solicitor General for declining to grant consent cannot be said to be irrelevant in the eye of law, nor can the view expressed by the Solicitor General be characterized as arbitrary, illegal or unreasonable.’ The material on the basis of which the petitioner has prayed this Court to take suo motu action for contempt does not, in our opinion, constitute interference in the administration of justice, nor the same amounts to scandalization of the Court. It is well settled that the suo motu action for contempt should normally be taken in rare cases and further use of suo motu power frequently will render the procedural safeguards of the consent of Advocate General nugatory. The whole object of prescribing procedural safeguards is to safeguard the valuable time of the Court from being wasted by frivolous contempt petition. As observed in the case of J.R. Parashar, Adv., & others Vs. Prasant Bhushan, Adv., and others [ (2001) 6 SCC 735 ], the underlying rationale of clauses (a), (b) and (c) of section 15 appears to be that when the Court is not itself directly aware of the contumacious conduct, and the actions are alleged to have taken place outside its precincts, it is necessary to have the allegations screened by the prescribed authorities so that Court is not troubled with the frivolous matters. The same view was taken in the case of S.K. Sarkar, Member, Board of Revenue, UP, Lucknow Vs. Vinay Chandra Misra [ (1981) 1 SCC 436 ]. We are inclined to agree with the opinion expressed by the Advocate General. We, thus, respectfully follow the above legal position expounded by the Apex Court and hold that the present Contempt Petition cannot be treated as suo motu contempt petition. 6. Vinay Chandra Misra [ (1981) 1 SCC 436 ]. We are inclined to agree with the opinion expressed by the Advocate General. We, thus, respectfully follow the above legal position expounded by the Apex Court and hold that the present Contempt Petition cannot be treated as suo motu contempt petition. 6. The submission with reference to Rule 5 (f) of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules also does not appeal to us. Rule 5 (f) reads thus:- “5. ......................................... (f) If any information is lodged in the office of this Court in the form of a Petition or otherwise, inviting this Court to take action under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 or Article 215 of the Constitution of India, where the informant is not one of the persons named in section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, the aforesaid petition or information received shall be placed before the Chief Justice in Chambers for appropriate orders.” Rule 5 (f) will have no application in the case at hand, since the petitioner approached the Advocate General for consent and the Advocate General has declined to grant consent. The petition was filed in this Court by the petitioner as a private petition. It is not in dispute that that the petitioner did not lodge information in the Office of the Court inviting the Court to take action under the Contempt of Courts Act, all the more so because he had already approached the Advocate General by his letter dated 19th June, 2012 for obtaining consent. We are, therefore, of the opinion that Rule 5 (f) is not attracted in such a case and the petitioner having elected the remedy of approaching the Advocate General for consent for filing the Contempt Petition, cannot be allowed to go on finding out multiple remedies in the same subject-matter over and again, particularly in view of the fact that his request for consent by the Advocate General was screened by the Advocate General. At any rate, since in our opinion, there is no case made out for taking suo motu action, we are not inclined to entertain the present petition. In the result, we make the following order:- Criminal Contempt Petition No. 5 of 2012 is dismissed. No costs.