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2013 DIGILAW 2880 (MAD)

Chandrasekarendra Saraswati Viswa Maha Vidyalaya, Enathur, Kanchipuram, Kanchipuram District v. S. Girija

2013-08-06

N.PAUL VASANTHAKUMAR, P.DEVADASS

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JUDGMENT 1. This writ appeal is filed against the order made in W.P. (MD) No. 5671 of 2007, dated 17.4.2013, allowing the writ petition filed by the 1st respondent. 2. The objection raised by the appellant in this writ appeal is that the writ petition filed by the first respondent is not maintainable before this Bench, as the applications were called for at Enathur in Kanchipuram District; the first respondent applied at Kanchipuram District; the first respondent served in the College at Enathur, Kanchipuram District; she was terminated at Kanchipuram; the termination order itself was served in Kanchipuram District; and therefore the question of jurisdiction, even though was raised in paragraph No. 3 of the counter affidavit filed in the writ petition, as a preliminary issue, the same has not been considered by the learned single Judge. 3. The learned counsel appearing for the first respondent, on the other hand, submitted that even though the appointment order was signed at Kanchipuram, it was served to the first respondent at Madurai, and therefore a part of cause action has arisen at Madurai, and therefore the writ petition is maintainable before this Bench. 4. We have considered the submissions of the learned counsel on either side. 5. Mere sending or communicating appointment order to the first respondent at Madurai will not confer jurisdiction to this Bench to entertain the writ petition, as the order of termination alone is challenged in the writ petition. The termination order, as stated supra, was signed and served at Kanchipuram only. The first respondent also served at Kanchipuram. Hence, mere service of the appointment order at Madurai will not confer cause of action, as per the judgment of this Court in W.P. (MD) No. 8790 of 2013, dated 6.6.2013. 6. Similar issue was considered by the Honourable Supreme Court in the decision reported in Alchemist Ltd. v. State Bank of Sikkim AIR 2007 SC 1812 : (2007) 11 SCC 335 : (2008) 3 MLJ 812. In the said case, not entertaining of the writ petition by the Punjab & Haryana High Court was upheld by the Supreme Court as the respondent in the said writ petition viz., State Bank of India, Sikkim, was having its head office at Gangtok. In the said case, not entertaining of the writ petition by the Punjab & Haryana High Court was upheld by the Supreme Court as the respondent in the said writ petition viz., State Bank of India, Sikkim, was having its head office at Gangtok. Several proposals were received from various entities throughout the country and the bank informed the appellant company, who was at Chandigarh, that its proposal was accepted in principle, subject to consideration and approval of the Government of Sikkim. The appellant Company received a communication at Chandigarh, not approving the proposal and sought to withdraw the proposal. The said action was challenged before the Punjab & Haryana High Court in the writ petition and the same was dismissed on the ground that the Punjab & Haryana High Court did not have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition as no cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of that Court. The said order was challenged before the Supreme Court contending that the appellant Company has its registered and Corporate Office at Chandigarh; it carries on business at Chandigarh; the acceptance of offer of the appellant Company was communicated at Chandigarh; the part-performance of the contract viz., 450 crores had been deposited by the Company in a fixed deposit at Chandigarh; and the revocation order was received at Chandigarh office, among other things. The respondent State Bank of India, Sikkim, resisted the case by contending that the respondent’s Corporate Office is at Gangtok, Sikkim; offers were called for from various parties at Gangtok; the offers were scrutinised and decision to accept the offer was taken at Gangtok; the decision not to approve the proposal was taken at Gangtok; the resolution to withdraw the letter of acceptance was passed at Gangtok; and a communication was despatched to the appellant Company at Chandigarh at Gangtok. The Supreme Court considered the provision contained in Article 226(1)(a) of the Constitution of India and answered the said issue in paragraphs 19 to 24 which read thus, “19. The question for our consideration is as to whether the assertion of the appellant is well founded that a part of cause of action can be said to have arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana. The question for our consideration is as to whether the assertion of the appellant is well founded that a part of cause of action can be said to have arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana. Whereas, the appellant Company submits that a part of cause of action had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of that Court, the respondents contend otherwise. 20. It may be stated that the expression “cause of action” has neither been defined in the Constitution nor in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. It may, however, be described as a bundle of essential facts necessary for the plaintiff to prove before he can succeed. Failure to prove such facts would give the defendant a right to judgment in his favour. Cause of action thus gives occasion for and forms the foundation of the suit. 21. The classic definition of the expression “cause of action” is found in Cooke v. Gill (1873) 8 CP 107 : 42 LJCP 98 wherein LORD BRETT observed: “‘Cause of action’ means every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court.” 22. For every action, there has to be a cause of action. If there is no cause of action, the plaint or petition has to be dismissed. 23. Mr Soli J. Sorabjee, senior advocate appearing for the appellant Company placed strong reliance on A.B.C. Laminart (P) Ltd. v. A.P. Agencies AIR 1989 SC 1239 : (1989) 2 SCC 163 and submitted that the High Court had committed an error of law and of jurisdiction in holding that no part of cause of action could be said to have arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana. He particularly referred to the following observations: “12. A cause of action means every fact, which if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the Court. In other words, it is a bundle of facts which taken with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. It must include some act done by the defendant since in the absence of such an act no cause of action can possibly accrue. In other words, it is a bundle of facts which taken with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. It must include some act done by the defendant since in the absence of such an act no cause of action can possibly accrue. It is not limited to the actual infringement of the right sued on but includes all the material facts on which it is founded. It does not comprise evidence necessary to prove such facts, but every fact necessary for the plaintiff to prove to enable him to obtain a decree. Everything which if not proved would give the defendant a right to immediate judgment must be part of the cause of action. But it has no relation whatever to the defence which may be set up by the defendant nor does it depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff.” 24. In our opinion, the High Court was wholly justified in upholding the preliminary objection raised by the respondents and in dismissing the petition on the ground of want of territorial jurisdiction.” In paragraphs 37 to 39, the Supreme Court further held as follows: “37. From the aforesaid discussion and keeping in view the ratio laid down in a catena of decisions by this Court, it is clear that for the purpose of deciding whether facts averred by the appellant-petitioner would or would not constitute a part of cause of action, one has to consider whether such fact constitutes a material, essential, or integral part of the cause of action. It is no doubt true that even if a small fraction of the cause of action arises within the jurisdiction of the Court, the Court would have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit/petition. Nevertheless it must be a “part of cause of action”, nothing less than that. 38. In the present case, the facts which have been pleaded by the appellant Company, in our judgment, cannot be said to be essential, integral or material facts so as to constitute a part of “cause of action” within the meaning of Article 226(2) of the Constitution. The High Court, in our opinion, therefore, was not wrong in dismissing the petition. 39. The High Court, in our opinion, therefore, was not wrong in dismissing the petition. 39. For the foregoing reasons, we see no infirmity in the order passed by the High Court dismissing the petition on the ground of want of territorial jurisdiction. The appeal, therefore, deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, however, we leave the parties to bear their own costs.” (emphasis supplied) 7. Applying the said judgment to the facts of this case, we hold, the writ petition filed by the first respondent before this Bench is not maintainable. Hence, the order passed by the learned single Judge is aside. The writ petition filed by the first respondent, namely W.P.(MD)No. 5l671 of 2007, is transferred to the Principal Bench at Madras and the Principal Bench will decide the issue afresh and pass orders, on merits. The writ petition having been filed in the year 2007, we request the learned Judge, who is dealing with the writ petitions of the year 2007, to dispose of the writ petition, as expeditiously as possible. 8. The writ appeal is disposed of accordingly. No costs. Connected M.P. (MD) No. 1 of 2013 is closed. Appeal disposed of.