JUDGMENT F.M. Reis. J.- Heard Shri M. Amonkar, learned Central Government Standing Counsel appearing for the petitioners and Shri G. Vijaychandran, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent. 2. Rule, Heard forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel. Learned Counsel appearing for the respondent waives service. 3. The above petition seeks to quash the judgment passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Mumbai dated 3/03/2011 whereby the original application filed by the respondent was allowed and the orders dated 4/08/2008, 25/02/2009 and 12/01/2010 passed by the Disciplinary. Appellate and Revisional Authorities respectively were quashed and set aside. The respondent was directed to be reinstated in service with all consequential benefits. The Tribunal further inter alia clarified that the petitioners would not be entitled for any promotion on the basis of her claim that she was belonging to the Schedule Tribe. 4. Shri M. Amonkar, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners has assailed the impugned order on two counts. The first contention of the learned Counsel is that respondent was not qualified to be appointed for the original post as according to him the post was reserved for Schedule Tribe whereas the respondent belonged to the Backward Tribe. The learned Counsel further pointed out that as the respondent has misrepresented the facts to the petitioners that she was qualified to be appointed to the post on the basis that she belonged to a Backward Tribe itself disentitles her from holding such post. The learned Counsel further pointed out that the Disciplinary Authority as well as the Appellate and the Revisional Authorities have considered the contentions of the respondent and have come to the conclusion that in view of such misrepresentation and took note of the fact that she was not qualified to be appointed to the concerned post of Stenographer Grade III. The learned Counsel has taken me through the impugned judgment and pointed out that the Tribunal has erroneously come to the conclusion that there was no misrepresentation on the part of the respondent and set aside the orders passed by the Disciplinary. Appellate and Revisional Authorities. The learned Counsel, as such, submits that on this count alone the impugned judgment deserves to be quashed and set aside. The learned Counsel further pointed out that whilst passing the impugned judgment the Tribunal has directed payment of full back wages and consequential benefits in favour of the respondent. Appellate and Revisional Authorities. The learned Counsel, as such, submits that on this count alone the impugned judgment deserves to be quashed and set aside. The learned Counsel further pointed out that whilst passing the impugned judgment the Tribunal has directed payment of full back wages and consequential benefits in favour of the respondent. The learned Counsel has taken me through the original claim put forward by the respondent and pointed out that there was no averment therein that respondent was not gainfully employed during the period of her suspension/dismissal to the date of reinstatement. The learned Counsel, as such, submits that considering that such averment is found wanting in the application filed by the respondent the question of granting full back wages and consequential benefits would not arise. The learned Counsel further pointed out that the Tribunal should have exercised its well settled discretion and at the most reduce the payment of back wages and consequential benefits. The learned Counsel in support of his submissions has relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court reported in AIR 2009 SC 240 in the case of M.P. Electricity Board and Ors. v. Maiku Prasad and AIR 2010 SC 397 in the case of M/s. Reetu Marbles v. Prabhakant Shukla wherein 50% of the back wages were directed to be paid. 5. On the other hand, Shri G. Vijaychandran, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent has supported the impugned judgment. The learned Counsel has pointed out that the Tribunal has correctly appreciated the material on record and has come to the conclusion that there was no misrepresentation or any gain availed by the respondent on the basis that she belonged to Schedule Tribe. The learned Counsel further pointed out that the respondent has correctly disclosed that she had produced her certificate before the concerned Authorities to show that she belongs to the Schedule Tribe. The learned Counsel further pointed out that the petitioners themselves accepted the said certificate and found that she fitted into the qualifications to be appointed as Stenographer Grade III. The learned Counsel further pointed out that the respondent was not aware about any differences between the backward tribe and scheduled tribe and as such considering that the petitioners themselves have accepted the said certificate and given her employment for nearly 30 years itself disentitles the petitioners to raise such contention. The learned Counsel further pointed out that the respondent was not aware about any differences between the backward tribe and scheduled tribe and as such considering that the petitioners themselves have accepted the said certificate and given her employment for nearly 30 years itself disentitles the petitioners to raise such contention. The learned Counsel has taken me through the impugned judgment of the Tribunal and pointed out that the Tribunal has rightly assessed the material on record and has allowed the application filed by the respondent. The learned Counsel as such submits that the first contention of Shri M. Amonkar is totally misplaced. The learned Counsel further pointed out with regard to the back wages fairly accepts that there was no averment in the main claim put forward by the respondent that she was not gainfully employed during the interregnum. The learned Counsel however points out that the Tribunal has come to the conclusion that the respondent has been unlawfully dismissed from services and as such in such circumstances the Tribunal was justified to direct the payment of full back wages and consequential benefits. The learned Counsel further pointed out that the respondent has been reinstated at the belated stage despite of the orders passed by the Tribunal in the year 2011. The learned Counsel further pointed out that no interference is called for in the impugned judgment. The learned Counsel in support of his submissions has relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court dated 13/04/2009 passed in Civil Appeal No. 7308/2008 in the case of Somesh Tiwari v. Union of India & Ors, and the judgment of Punjab and Haryana High Court dated 6/11/2009 in Civil Writ Petition No. 14998/2009 in the case of Sports Authority of India and another v. Central Administrative Tribunal & Anr. 6. I have carefully, considered the submissions of the learned Counsel appearing for the respective parties and have also gone through the records. On perusal of the impugned judgment passed by the Tribunal. I find that the Tribunal after appreciating the material on record has observed that in the present case the petitioners believed the certificate produced by the respondent and further that as per the said certificate she would belong to the Schedule Tribe. The Tribunal further noted that the mistake committed by the petitioners came to their notice 30 years after the respondent was appointed for the post. The Tribunal further noted that the mistake committed by the petitioners came to their notice 30 years after the respondent was appointed for the post. It is also observed by the Tribunal that as the certificate has been found to be genuine it cannot be said that the respondent could not be misled and as such reasonably believed that her caste was such that she would fit to be a Schedule Tribe. The Tribunal further found that there was no misrepresentation on the part of the respondent nor that she had in any way misled the petitioners to believe that she belonged to a particular caste. On the basis of such finding and taking note of the fact that the respondent was working for nearly 30 years the Tribunal found that the Authorities below including the Disciplinary Authority. Appellate and Revisional Authorities have not considered the matter in accordance with law and consequently directed the reinstatement of the respondent. The finding of fact arrived at by the Tribunal on the basis of material on record cannot be reappreciated by this Court in a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. In fact. Shri M. Amonkar, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners was unable to point out that there was any perversity in the said finding of the Tribunal whilst passing the impugned judgment. Hence, the first contention of Shri Amonkar, learned Counsel deserves to be rejected. 7. With regard to the second contention of the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners. I find that the Tribunal whilst passing the impugned judgment has directed the payment of consequential benefits. It is not disputed by the Counsel appearing for the respective parties that such consequential benefits would also include back wages. In such circumstances taking note of the fact that there is no material on record to establish otherwise that the respondent was not gainfully employed during the period of her dismissal/suspension from service of the petitioners. I find that the petitioner is not entitled to full back wages. 8. The Apex Court in the case of M/s. Reetu Marbles v. Prabhakant Shukla (supra) has observed at paras 17, 18, 19, 20, 22 and 23 thus :- 17. From the above observations it becomes apparent that payment of full back wages upon an order of termination being declared illegal cannot be granted mechanically. 8. The Apex Court in the case of M/s. Reetu Marbles v. Prabhakant Shukla (supra) has observed at paras 17, 18, 19, 20, 22 and 23 thus :- 17. From the above observations it becomes apparent that payment of full back wages upon an order of termination being declared illegal cannot be granted mechanically. It does not automatically follow that reinstatement must be accompanied by payment of full back wages even for the period when the workman remained out of service and contributed little or nothing to the industry. 18. Again in the case of Haryana State Electricity Development Corporation Ltd. v. Mamni, (2006) 9 SCC 434 : (2006 AIR SCW 2979) this Court reiterated the principle. The principles laid down in U.P. State Brassware Corp. Ltd., 2005 AIR SCW 6314. 19. Recently this Court again examined the issues with regard to payment of full back wages in the case of P.V.K. Distillery Ltd. v. Mahendra Ram, (2009) 5 SCC 705 : (2009 AIR SCW 2904). 20. After examining the relevant case. (2009 AIR SCW 2904) (paras 13 to 15) law it has been held as follows : "Although direction to pay full back wages on a declaration that the order of termination was invalid used to be the usual result but now, with the passage of time, a pragmatic view of the matter is being taken by the Court realizing that an industry may not be compelled to pay to the workman for the period during which he apparently contributed little or nothing at all to it and/or for a period that was spent unproductively as a result whereof the employer would be compelled to go back to a situation which prevailed many years ago, namely, when the workman was retrenched. In Haryana Urban Development Authority v. Om Pal, 2007 AIR SCW 7303 (Para 7) it is stated that (SCC p.745. para 7) : '7..... it is also now well settled that despite a wide discretionary power conferred upon the Industrial Courts under Section 11-A of the 1947 Act, the relief of rein-statement with full back wages should not be granted automatically only because it would be lawful to do so. Grant of relief would depend on the fact situation obtaining in each case. it is also now well settled that despite a wide discretionary power conferred upon the Industrial Courts under Section 11-A of the 1947 Act, the relief of rein-statement with full back wages should not be granted automatically only because it would be lawful to do so. Grant of relief would depend on the fact situation obtaining in each case. It will depend upon several factors, one of which would be as to whether the recruitment was effected in terms of the statutory provisions operating in the field, if any.' In deciding the question, as to whether the employee should be recompensed with full back wages and other benefits until the date of reinstatement, the tribunals and the Courts have to be realistic albeit the ordinary rule of full back wages on reinstatement. Western India Match Co. Ltd. v. Third Industrial Tribunal, AIR 1978 SC 311 . 22. In our opinion the High Court was unjustified in awarding full back wages. We are also of the opinion that the Labour Court having found the termination to be illegal was unjustified in not granting any back wages at all. 23. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of this case we direct that the respondent shall be paid 50% of the back wages from the date of termination of service till reinstatement. 9. Considering the said judgment of the Apex Court. I find in the circumstances of the case and for the reasons stated above that the respondent is entitled to 50% o the back wages. The petitioners would have to compute the said amount in accordance with law. To that extent the impugned judgment deserves to be modified. 10. In view of the above, the impugned judgment passed by the Tribunal is modified to the extent that the petitioners are directed to pay consequential benefits inclusive of 50% of the back wages. The remaining part of the judgment of the Tribunal dated 3/03/2011 stands confirmed. Rule stands disposed of accordingly. Petition disposed of.