JUDGMENT Dev Darshan Sud, J. This revision petition has been preferred by the judgment debtors against the order of the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Dehra passed on the application under Order 21, Rule 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as CPC), filed by the decree holders praying for action against the respondents for disobedience of the decree. 2. It is undisputed before me that the suit in which the execution proceedings were instituted was decreed in the following terms: “ Issue No.8 (Relief): 19. In view of my findings on issue Nos. 1 to 7 above, the suit of the plaintiff is decreed with costs. The defendant is directed to stop throwing dirty water from his shed comprised in khasra No. 1592 towards the suit land comprised in khata No.129, khatauni No. 147, khasra Nos. 1595 and 1596 situated in Mohal Garh Teh. Dehra Distt. Kangra (HP). The defendant is also directed by way of mandatory injunction not to cause any damage or dampness to Atly and foundations of the plaintiff’s house situate over khasra No.1595. The defendant is further directed to remove the wall and structure on the suit land i.e. khasra Nos.1595 and 1596 as shown in Ex. P13 from Point ‘AEDGH’ which is 5 sq. Mtrs. approx and also in the site plans Ex. PW5/A and Ex.PW5/B. The demarcation report Ex. P11, Najari Naksha Ex. P13 and site plans Ex. PW5/A and Ex.PW5/B shall form part of decree. The wall and structure raised on the suit land by the defendants shall be removed at the costs of defendant. Decree sheet be drawn up accordingly. The file after due completion be consigned to the Records.” 3. It is undisputed that this decree has not been reversed, varied or set aside. The plaintiff/decree holders/respondents herein pleaded that the decree has not been implemented/obeyed. The pleading was that judgment debtors have not stopped the folw of water from their shed in khasra No. 1592 towards the suit land bearing khasra Nos. 1595 and 1596 nor stopped causing damage and dampness to the Atly and foundation of the house of the plaintiff situated over khasra No.1595 or removed the wall and structure from area identified AEDGH according to the report of the Local Commissioner, aks sajra and site plan. 1595 and 1596 nor stopped causing damage and dampness to the Atly and foundation of the house of the plaintiff situated over khasra No.1595 or removed the wall and structure from area identified AEDGH according to the report of the Local Commissioner, aks sajra and site plan. The result was that stagnated water flowing from the land of the judgment debtors towards the suit land is causing damage to the suit property. This was the primary issue between the parties. 4. The learned executing Court on the pleadings. settled issues. The most important issues being as to whether the decree (supra) has been disobeyed, whether the petition was barred by limitation, whether it was not maintainable and as to whether it was bad for better particulars. All these issues were held against the judgment debtors. Parties went to trial on these issues and in order to prove their case, both the parties led evidence in support of their respective contentions. The learned executing Court on the evidence of Shri Alok Sharma, son of the decree holder, who appeared as AW1, AW 2 Shri Naresh Kumar, the photographer and one Shri Vijay Kumar, AW3 has concluded that there was disobedience of the decree. AW1 Shri Alok Sharma stated that decree has been flouted by the judgment debtor that is to say dirty/filthy water was flowing from his unauthorized construction towards the house of the decree holder and this was causing damage to the wall of the house of the decree holder which had developed dampness. AW2 Shri Naresh Kumar proved on record photographs taken by him which show that plaster of the walls was falling off and dampness etc., was the consequence. RW1 Shri Ashok Bala had denied these allegations stating that no water falls on the land of the decree holder causing any dampness etc. RW2 Shri Jagdish Ram and RW3 Shri Vagesh Bhatt also examined by the petitioners/judgment debtors in support of their contention that they have not disobeyed the decree in any sense. The learned executing court notices that RW-2 Shri Jagdish Ram states in cross-examination that when Shri Chakarpani (defendant in the suit) started the construction of shed, Shri Shiv Kumar (plaintiff) was forced to file the suit out of which the present proceedings have arisen. The learned executing court notices that RW-2 Shri Jagdish Ram states in cross-examination that when Shri Chakarpani (defendant in the suit) started the construction of shed, Shri Shiv Kumar (plaintiff) was forced to file the suit out of which the present proceedings have arisen. He admits that due to the construction of the sheds by the judgment debtor there become a gali (alley) between the sheds and the house of the decree holder and its width is 1½ feet. It was difficult for them to use this portion. He admits that there are difficulties for both the parties and the problem can be solved if the shed is shifted to another place. He denied all other allegations. RW3 Shri Vagesh Bhatt in cross-examination states that bone of contention for the quarrel between the parties was with respect to the fall/flow of the water in the gali (alley). On limitation, the learned trial Court holds that the period to execute a decree for possession is 12 years and there is no limitation for executing decree for permanent prohibitory injunction. The report of the Local Commissioner also does not support the case of the judgment debtor. In these circumstances, order of disobedience was passed. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners urges that the decree being one for mandatory injunction, Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963 governs Execution and in these circumstances the application was time bar. He places reliance on the decision of this Court in Gopi Chand and another versus Sonam Dass and others, 1998(1) Shim.L.C. 488 holding: “18. There is yet another aspect of the case. Admittedly, on an earlier occasion a mandatory decree for demolition of the super structure was granted ex parte in favour of the plaintiffs. Such decree never came to be executed by the plaintiffs. 19. Article 135, Limitation Act, 1963, provides for a period of limitation of three years for execution of a decree for mandatory injunction. The requisite period stands expired and the decree has remained unexecuted. Due to expiry of the period of limitation, the plaintiffs have lost the remedy of mandatory injunction. The plaintiff, therefore, are debarred from enforcing such remedy by way of the present suit. The requisite period stands expired and the decree has remained unexecuted. Due to expiry of the period of limitation, the plaintiffs have lost the remedy of mandatory injunction. The plaintiff, therefore, are debarred from enforcing such remedy by way of the present suit. Be it stated that the present suit for mandatory injunction is based on the same cause of action on which the previous suit was based and as such the present suit will be barred under Section 11, of the Code of Civil Procedure. Resultantly, the present appeal fails and the same is accordingly dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.” (p.491) 6. Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides: “Descriptio Period of Time from which period begins n of limitation to run. application 136. For Twelve (When) the decree or order the years becomes enforceable or where execution the decree or any subsequent of any order directs any payment of decree money or the delivery of any (other than property to be made at certain a decree date or at recurring periods, granting a when default in making the mandatory payment or delivery in respect injunction) of which execution is sought, or order of takes place; any civil Provided that an court. application for the enforcement of execution of a decree granting a perpetual injunction shall not be subject to any period of limitation.” 7. Before considering the provisions of the Limitation Act, I advert to the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents. It is submitted by learned counsel that the decree is for permanent perpetual injunction which prohibits throwing of waste water and in this eventuality, it is the provisions of Article 136 of the Limitation Act which comes into force. Learned counsel places reliance on the decision of this Court in Kailash Chand and another versus (Smt.) Gudi and others, 1989(1) Shim. L.C. 96 holding that causing nuisance on the property of another person is not an easementary right. The Court holds: “8. As far as the right to throw refuse and to use the property for purposes of easing thereon is concerned, it amounts to the claim of a right which is per se a nuisance. Commission of a nuisance on the property of another person cannot be claimed by way of an easementary right. The view aforesaid is almost settled. As far as the right to throw refuse and to use the property for purposes of easing thereon is concerned, it amounts to the claim of a right which is per se a nuisance. Commission of a nuisance on the property of another person cannot be claimed by way of an easementary right. The view aforesaid is almost settled. If precedents are needed, they are in abundance. See Gopal Krishna Sil v. Abdul Samad Chaudhuri and others, AIR 1921 Cal 569; Mangat Ram v. Siraj-ul-hasan and others, AIR 1924 Lahore 492; Sheo Raj Chamar and another v. Mudeer Khan and others, AIR 1934 All 868; Bherulal v. Mohan Singh and others, AIR 1966 Raj 123 ; Bankey Lal v. Krishan lal and another, AIR 1967 All 43 ; Jag Narain and another v. Ram Dularay and another, AIR 1979 All 71 and Prabhu Narain Singh v. Ram Niranjan (deceased by L.Rs.) and others, AIR 1983 All 223 .” (p.98) Learned counsel submits that in case petitioners plea is accepted, it would amount to negating the decree and vest a right in the petitioners which would amount to enforcement of an illegality. Learned counsel also places reliance on the decision of Punjab & Haryana High Court in Suba Singh and others v. Bagicha Singh, AIR 1980 P&H 62 holding:- “3. ……………This being a finding of fact arrived at after considering the evidence on record, this Court will not interfere with the same in its revisional jurisdiction. As regards the question of limitation based on Art. 135, I do not find any force therein. That article is applicable only for the enforcement of a decree granting a mandatory injunction whereas in the present case, the decree is for prohibitory injunction.” (p.64) He submits that this view is settled in Bashir Ahmad versus Menhandi Hasan, AIR 1982 Allahabad 321 holding: “2. ……….The suit was decreed as prayed with ex-parte costs and the defendants were ordered not to interfere with the possession of the plaintiff over the land in dispute. The decree holder filed an application for execution of the said decree on 1.5.1976. An objection was raised by the judgment-debtors that the execution was barred by time. The Court below held that by the reliefs (a) and (b) aforesaid the plaintiff had asked for and was allowed mandatory injunction against the defendants. The decree holder filed an application for execution of the said decree on 1.5.1976. An objection was raised by the judgment-debtors that the execution was barred by time. The Court below held that by the reliefs (a) and (b) aforesaid the plaintiff had asked for and was allowed mandatory injunction against the defendants. The limitation for executing a decree for mandatory injunction being three years vide Art.131 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, the executing was held to be barred by time. However, with regard to relief (c) it was said by the court below that it was not a relief of the grant of mandatory injunction, hence the execution for the enforcement of a decree for injunction with respect to relief (c) aforesaid was maintainable. The decree holder being aggrieved by the order so far as it has disallowed the executing for the enforcement of the decree pertaining to reliefs (a) and (b) has preferred this revision. 3…………………………Article 135 prescribes a period of three years for the enforcement of a decree granting mandatory injunction. The time begins to run from the date of the decree or where a date is fixed for performance such date. However, under Article 136 a period of twelve years has been prescribed for the execution of any decree other than a decree granting a mandatory injunction or order of any civil court. The application for the enforcement of execution of a decree granting perpetual injunction is not subject to any period of limitation vide proviso to Article 136. It has now to be seen whether the reliefs (a), (b) and (c) sought for in the plaint were the reliefs for the grant of a mandatory injunction or perpetual injunction. Sub-section (2) of Section 37 of the Specific Relief Act stipulates that by perpetual injunction the defendant is perpetually enjoined from the assertion of a right, or from the commission of an act, which would be contrary to the rights of the plaintiff. Under Section 38 of the Specific Relief Act, a perpetual injunction may be granted to the plaintiff to prevent the breach of an obligation existing in his favour, whether expressly or by implication. When the defendant invades or threatens to invade the plaintiff's right to, or enjoyment of property, the court may grant a perpetual injunction in cases enumerated in Sub-section (3) of Section 38 of the Act. When the defendant invades or threatens to invade the plaintiff's right to, or enjoyment of property, the court may grant a perpetual injunction in cases enumerated in Sub-section (3) of Section 38 of the Act. Mandatory injunction is dealt with in Section 39 of the Specific Relief Act which says that when, to prevent the breach of an obligation, it is necessary to compel the performance of certain acts which the court is capable of enforcing the Court may in its discretion grant an injunction to prevent the breach complained of, and also to compel performance of the requisite acts. Applying these principles relief (a) aforesaid claimed by the plaintiff in Suit No. 228 of 1971 was a relief for the grant of a perpetual injunction. However, relief (b) sought for by the plaintiff in the said suit pertains to mandatory injunction whereas relief (c) aforesaid relates to the grant of perpetual injunction. The court below was right in holding that relief (c) does not relate to mandatory injunction. In fact it relates to perpetual injunction. But, the court below fell in error in holding that by relief (a) aforesaid the plaintiff had asked for mandatory injunction. In fact that relief was for a perpetual injunction. In these circumstances the execution application for the enforcement of the decree for injunction granted by the court below under reliefs (a) and (c) was within time but so far as it asked the enforcement of the decree granting mandatory injunction under relief (b) it was barred by time.” (pp.321-322) And in M.J. Simon versus Special Grade Panchayat, Athirampuzha, AIR 2001 Kerala 132 : “5. The learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the decision in Sarwan Lal v. Kanti Prasad, AIR 1986 All 1 in support of his contention that even if the decree granting mandatory injunction has become barred by limitation, the decree holder will be justified in proceeding with the execution with regard to other part of the injunction granted by the Court. In this regard, reliance was also placed on the provision to Article 136 of the Limitation Act. It is true that the decree granted by the trial Court is for injunction. In this regard, reliance was also placed on the provision to Article 136 of the Limitation Act. It is true that the decree granted by the trial Court is for injunction. Nevertheless, it is clear from the reading of a decree that it consists of two independent parts; the 1st being for enforcement of the duties of the defendants through mandatory injunction and the other restraining him from doing certain things. While Article 135 provides a period of limitation of three years for enforcement of decree granting mandatory injunction, Article 136 provides for twelve years for executing other decrees. However, it is specifically stated in Article 136 that an application for enforcement or executing of a decree granting perpetual injunction shall not be subjected to any period of limitation. Thus, here is a case where the decree is composite; one part of which is subjected to limitation period of 3 years whereas the other is not subjected to any period of limitation at all and the petitioner can enforce the prohibitory injunction, wherever violation of that part takes place. The Court below has not considered the question of enforcement of the prohibitory part of the injunction with reference to Article 136 of the Limitation Act. On the other hand it assumed that once the mandatory part become unenforceable the other part also would subjected to the same fate. This is clearly erroneous. Here is a case where the decree granted consists of two parts, which are divisible and not at all inter-dependent. Since the proviso to Article 136 does not provide for any limitation for enforcing the prohibitory part, the petitioner can very well maintain an execution petition with regard to that part of the decree.” (p.133) There can thus be no limitation for execution of a decree of perpetual injunction. At this juncture I also note that in Sarwan Lal and another versus Kanti Prasad (deceased by L.R.’s), AIR 1986 Allahabad 1, the Court holds: “5. Learned counsel for the appellants has strenuously urged that even the decree for permanent injunction cannot be executed once it was held that execution of decree for mandatory injunction for removal of the existing fuel-wood stalls could not proceed. According to the learned counsel prohibitory injunction can be granted only in respect of a threatened act and not in respect of an accomplished fact I cannot possibly agree. According to the learned counsel prohibitory injunction can be granted only in respect of a threatened act and not in respect of an accomplished fact I cannot possibly agree. The learned counsel appears to be under some misapprehension as to the legal position. The defendants' possession may be a relevant consideration in a suit for prohibitory injunction but once a decree has been granted, the executing court have only to execute the same. An objection as to maintainability of the suit on such a ground could well be taken during the trial but not before the executing court. It has been candidly conceded that the plaintiff being not the owner of the road patri no relief of possession could have been claimed by him. The plaintiff could only pray for a mandatory injunction for directing the defendants to remove their materials from the road patri. The suit as framed was, therefore, proper and was rightly decreed. In view of the decree, the plaintiff had both the modes of executing the decree open to him. On the expiry of the time allowed to remove the material voluntarily from the road patri, the decree-holder could put the decree for mandatory injunction under execution for the purpose as also to execute the decree for prohibitory injunction. Since the execution of the decree for mandatory injunction had become barred by time, therefore, the remedy to execute the same was no longer available to him. This, however, cannot mean that other part of the decree also must become unexecutable on that ground. The only effect of non-executability of the decree for mandatory injunction would be that actual removal of goods from the road patri cannot be sought through execution. The right of the decree holder to execute the decree for prohibitory injunction by attachment of the property or for committing the judgment debtors to civil prison continues to survive. 6. The learned counsel for the appellants placed reliance on Shyam Sunder Pd. v. Ram Dass Singh, AIR 1946 Pat 392. In that case the relief of mandatory injunction for removal of an encroachment from the village path-way had been dismissed but a decree for permanent injunction had been passed restraining the defendants from encroaching upon the said path way. The Court held that such a decree was not capable of execution until an obstruction was caused to it. In that case the relief of mandatory injunction for removal of an encroachment from the village path-way had been dismissed but a decree for permanent injunction had been passed restraining the defendants from encroaching upon the said path way. The Court held that such a decree was not capable of execution until an obstruction was caused to it. As soon as obstruction is caused in breach of the decree a cause of action for enforcement of the decree would arise. Thus decree holders' right to apply for execution accrues only when an obstruction is caused The facts and circumstances of the Patna case are obviously very different from those of the present case. It is not disputed that the execution of the decree for permanent injunction was not barred by limitation. The only objection raised was that the decree was not executable since the decree for mandatory injunction could no longer be executed. The two reliefs granted by the decree are in no way interdependant Even if actual removal of the material from the road side patri may not be possible through execution yet the personal obligation imposed on the defendants by prohibitory injunction would still be binding. They may choose to disobey the injunction only at their own peril. The decree holders can certainly bring the matter before the Court by way of execution in the manner prescribed by law.” (p.2) 8. In these circumstances, I find no force in the submissions made by learned counsel appearing for the petitioners. The judgment debtors/petitioner cannot be allowed to disobey the decree by taking shelter of technicalities. The Supreme Court has time and again held that the decree holder cannot be deprived of the fruits of the decree. 9. In Ravinder Kaur vs. Ashok Kumar and another (2003)8 SCC 289 , Court holds:-“22. …………Therefore, raising a dispute in regard to the description or identity of the suit schedule property or a dispute in regard to the boundary of the suit schedule property is only a bogey to delay the eviction by the abuse of the process of court. Courts of law should be carefully enough to see through such diabolical plans of the judgment debtors to deny the decree holders the fruits of the decree obtained by them. Courts of law should be carefully enough to see through such diabolical plans of the judgment debtors to deny the decree holders the fruits of the decree obtained by them. This type of errors on the part of the judicial forums only encourage frivolous and cantankerous litigations causing laws delay and bringing bad name to the judicial system.”(p-295) (emphasis supplied) 10. In Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes and Others vs. Erasmo Jack De Sequeira (dead) through LRs, (2012)5 SCC 370 , the Supreme Court holds: “82. This Court in a recent judgment in Ramrameshwari Devi v. Nirmala Devi, (2011)8 SCC 249 aptly observed at page 266 para 43 that unless wrongdoers are denied profit from frivolous litigation, it would be difficult to prevent it. In order to curb uncalled for and frivolous litigation, the Courts have to ensure that there is no incentive or motive for uncalled for litigation. It is a matter of common experience that Court’s otherwise scarce time is consumed or more appropriately, wasted in a large number of uncalled for cases. In this every judgment, the Court provided that this problem can be solved or at least be minimized if exemplary cost is imposed for instituting frivolous litigation…………..” (p.393). 11. I am in respectful agreement with the principles of law as laid down supra. In these circumstances, I find no merit in this petition which is accordingly dismissed. I direct that the execution of the decree cannot be thwarted by urging limitation. In these circumstances, the judgment debtors shall dutifully obey the decree even if as a consequence it involves the removing of any structure raised by the judgment debtors. To hold otherwise would be grant an unfair advantage to the judgment debtors who can disobey the decree with impunity. This direction in no manner contravenes Article 136 as the execution of the perpetual injunction may involve removal of obstacles etc., or carrying out a positive act to drain away the water from the land of the decree holders. 12. All pending miscellaneous applications also stand disposed of.