JUDGMENT By the Court.—We have heard learned standing counsel for the appellant. Sri Vijay Gautam appears for respondent. 2. This intra Court Special Appeal under Chapter VIII, Rule 5 of the Court arises out of judgment in Praveen Tyagi v. State of U.P., 2010(6) ADJ 60 , by which he has set aside the order dated 25.7.2007 passed by Commandant 41Bn, PAC Ghaziaabad, terminating the services of respondent Praveen Tyagi who was undergoing training for the Constables under the U.P. Temporary Government Servants (Termination of Service) Rules 1975, on the ground that the services of Sri Praveen Tyagi were no longer required. 3. Learned Single Judge has found that the background facts in which the order of termination of service was passed, was an incident of misconduct in which the petitioner had left the premises of 6th Bn. PAC where he was undergoing training without taking leave, as also quarrelled with the attendant of the petrol pump. A preliminary enquiry was made in which he was found guilty, and for that instead of taking action against him under the U.P. Police Officers of Subordinate Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules 1991, an order of simplicitor was passed by which his services were terminated. 4. Learned Single Judge held that the constables in PAC are governed by U.P. P.A.C. Act 1948 read with Police Act 1861 and the Rules and Regulations framed thereunder viz., para 541 of U.P. Police Regulations. 5. Para 541(1) of the Regulations provides that a recruit will be on probation for a period of two years from the date he begins to officiate in a clear vacancy. If at the end of the period of probation, his work and conduct is satisfactory, he is liable to be confirmed by the authority. In the present case, instead of assessing his suitability - the work and conduct as satisfactory during the period of probation, the petitioner was terminated by an order simplicitor on a misconduct, which was the motive for terminating his services. 6. In the present case, instead of assessing his suitability - the work and conduct as satisfactory during the period of probation, the petitioner was terminated by an order simplicitor on a misconduct, which was the motive for terminating his services. 6. Learned Single Judge relied upon Full Bench decision of the Court in Vijay Singh and others v. State of U.P. and others, (2004 (4) ESC 2209, in which it was held that Rules framed under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India do not apply to the police personnel as their services are governed by the Police Act 1861 and the U.P. Police Regulations. 7. Learned Standing Counsel submits that the judgment in Vijay Singh’s case (Supra) is not applicable to the facts of the present case, as it was rendered in the context of age of employment in Civil Police vis-a-vis general rule of age framed under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution for Government service. In the present case, the order has been passed under the U.P. Temporary Government Servants (Termination of Service) Rules 1975. . 8. We find that the question of law raised by the learned standing counsel is squarely covered by Full Bench decision in Vijay Singh’s case (Supra)’and the Division Bench judgment in Vijay Shankar Tripathi v. State Public Service Tribunal and others, 2006(1) ESC 69 (All)(DB), in which it was held that rules framed under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India including the U.P. Temporary Government Servants (Termination of Service) Rules 1975 are not applicable to the police force. The Division Bench in Vijay Shankar Tripathi’s case (supra) also relied on Apex Court’s decision in Chandra Prakash Shahi v. State of U.P. and others, 2000 (5) SCC 152 . 9. Learned Single Judge had quashed the termination order dated 25.7.2007 with all consequential benefits as admissible in law. It was observed in the judgment that the order will not preclude the respondents from proceeding afresh against the petitioner in accordance with law. 10. We do not find any good ground to interfere with the order of the learned Single Judge. The Special Appeal is dismissed. It was observed in the judgment that the order will not preclude the respondents from proceeding afresh against the petitioner in accordance with law. 10. We do not find any good ground to interfere with the order of the learned Single Judge. The Special Appeal is dismissed. It will be open to the appellant to complete the enquiry and find out whether the petitioner was guilty of the incident and that his conduct would amount to misconduct under the provisions of U.P. Police Officers of Subordinate Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules 1991. ———————