JUDGMENT L. Narasimha Reddy, J. The appellant married the respondent on 02-05-2001 at Hyderabad. They were also blessed with a female child, who was named as Rishitha. Stating that the appellant subjected her to harassment and cruelty and has deserted her, the respondent filed FCOP No.869 of 2010 in the Family Court, Hyderabad, under Section 13(1)(ia) and (ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (for short ‘the Act’), for divorce. She has furnished the various instances, which, according to her, constitute acts of cruelty and desertion, and ultimately prayed for the decree of divorce. It was alleged that appellant himself agreed to obtain a decree of divorce through mutual consent. The appellant opposed the O.P by filing counter. He denied all the allegations made against him and stated that they have been invented only to seek divorce. He has also stated the manner in which he has looked after the respondent and their minor child and furnished the particulars of expenditure incurred by him for the treatment, etc. According to the appellant, the OP for divorce by mutual consent was filed, only with a view to cool down the passions and the appellant never wanted the marriage to be dissolved. Apart from that, he has also filed a counter-claim under Section 9 of the Act, for restitution of conjugal rights. The respondent opposed the counter-claim by filing a counter. She stated that though they were living separately from the year 2007 onwards, the appellant did not think of living together, and the counter-claim was made only as a reaction to the OP., filed by her. It was also alleged that in the year 2008, both the parties agreed to obtain divorce by mutual consent and accordingly filed O.P.No.850 of 2008 in the Family Court, Hyderabad, and when the O.P was called after six months, the appellant did not turn up, though neither there was any change of circumstances, nor reunion. Through its order dated 31-08-2012, the trial Court decreed the O.P and dismissed the counter-claim. This appeal is filed under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984, against the said decree. Sri Surender Desai, learned counsel for the appellant submits that none of the facts pleaded by the respondent are true, and that the evidence adduced before the trial Court was very scanty and not supported by anyone, and still, the decree was passed. This appeal is filed under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984, against the said decree. Sri Surender Desai, learned counsel for the appellant submits that none of the facts pleaded by the respondent are true, and that the evidence adduced before the trial Court was very scanty and not supported by anyone, and still, the decree was passed. He contends that if the acts of cruelty and desertion were resorted to by the appellant, the respondent could have examined anyone acquainted with them, and the fact that she did not choose to examine even her parents, is sufficient to disbelieve the contention. Learned counsel submits that his client made every effort to live with the respondent, and it is the latter, that had deserted the matrimonial home. He further submits that the allegations as to the appellant being addicted to vices or his failure to maintain the respondent and their daughter are totally unfounded and there is no proof at all for them. Sri Kouturu Vinay Kumar, learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, submits that the necessity for the respondent to examine other witnesses did not arise, on account of the fact that in his counter, the appellant has admitted some of the material allegations, which constitute cruelty and desertion, and the very fact that he did not take any steps to bring back the respondent and the child, since 2007, discloses that he was not at all interested in living with his wife. He submits that the appellant resorted to worst form of cruelty by suspecting the character of the respondent, and the same has been tacitly admitted in the counter filed by him. As regards the desertion, learned counsel submits that the appellant did not even open the door, when the respondent came to his house, and she was forced to leave the matrimonial home, late in the night. He submits that the undisputed acts and omissions on the part of the appellant are sufficient to sustain the decree passed by the trial Court. The marriage between the appellant and the respondent is not disputed. The respondent sought divorce from the appellant by pleading grounds of cruelty and desertion. Apart from denying the allegations and opposing the O.P, the appellant filed counter-claim, for restitution of conjugal rights. The marriage between the appellant and the respondent is not disputed. The respondent sought divorce from the appellant by pleading grounds of cruelty and desertion. Apart from denying the allegations and opposing the O.P, the appellant filed counter-claim, for restitution of conjugal rights. Covering these two aspects, the trial Court framed the following points for its consideration, viz., 1) Whether the petitioner (respondent) is entitled for decree of divorce from the respondent (appellant) on the ground of cruelty and desertion, as prayed for? 2) Whether the respondent (appellant) is entitled for restitution of conjugal rights, as prayed in the counter-claim. The respondent deposed as PW-1 and she filed Exs.P-1 to P-4. The documentary evidence, which was filed by her, comprised of Exs.P-1 to P-4 and important among them is Ex.P-4, the certified copy of the order in FCOP No.850 of 2008. The respondent is the sole witness on his behalf. The documentary evidence comprised mostly of medical prescriptions and bills for purchase of medicines for their daughter. The O.P was allowed and the counter-claim was dismissed. Before this Court, the appellant had mainly challenged the decree of divorce, and did not evince much interest, vis-à-vis the denial of counterclaim. The question that arises for consideration is, as to whether the decree passed by the trial Court suffers from any factual or legal infirmity. As observed earlier, the respondent sought divorce on the grounds of cruelty and desertion. Cruelty mentioned in clause (ia) of Section 13(1) of the Act, takes in its fold, the inconvenience, mental agony and harassment suffered by a spouse in the hands of the other to such an extent that, it would no longer be possible for the parties to live together. Cruelty of that nature need not be caused through any physical or bodily attacks. It can be even through the acts and omissions, through spoken words or other manifestations. Desertion, on the other hand, is the state of affairs, through which, the spouse, who is accused of that, has virtually given up his or her marital relationship with the other and denied to the latter, the company, which is expected to be in existence, between the two married persons. Desertion, on the other hand, is the state of affairs, through which, the spouse, who is accused of that, has virtually given up his or her marital relationship with the other and denied to the latter, the company, which is expected to be in existence, between the two married persons. This may include the acts of driving away the spouse from the matrimonial home or failure to make any attempts to bring the other spouse living separately, though the latter was otherwise inclined to join the former. The allegations made by the respondent in her OP, briefly stated, are, that – a) the appellant used to suspect her character and did not even allow her to go to the house of her parents, after she became pregnant; b) ultimately, when her parents took her to their house, the appellant did not turn up, even if the birth of the female child, stating that the birth of a female child is not to his liking; c) the appellant used to ill-treat and abuse her, under the influence of alcohol, and when the same were brought to the notice of the parents of the appellant, they did not take any steps; d) the appellant has set up separate family at Nadergul, 20 kilometers away from Hyderabad, and the request made by her to shift the residence on the ground that there were no facilities, much less medical facilities for their ailing child, was not acceded to; e) in May 2007, she went to an institute to undergo training in Computers, and when she came back at 9:00 p.m., the appellant did not permit her to step into the house, quarreled with her, and she had to go to the parents’ house at that night, and thereafter, they did not live together; f) though she was not agreeable for the proposal of the appellant for obtaining divorce through mutual consent, she ultimately agreed and O.P.No.850 of 2008 was filed, but later on, the appellant did not turn up; g) the appellant did not provide money for the treatment of the child who was born with some infirmities. The appellant used to tell her that her parents are responsible for the ill-health of their child and it is their obligation to meet the medical expenses; and h) when she joined the services in the administrative department of a private hospital, the appellant went to the management and spoke ill about her character with an objective of getting her dismissed from service. In his counter, the appellant denied the allegations and has also made a counter-claim, referable to section 9 of the Act. However, he proceeded further and made certain allegations and comments against the respondent. In paragraph 4 of the O.P, the appellant stated that the respondent made some comments about the inter-caste marriage of her sister. In his reply to the same, the respondent stated, “Para-8 …It is utter false to state that the respondent always made an issue out of inter-caste marriage of the petitioner’s younger sister Smt.Malathi. It is not at all the respondent’s concern who marries whom. It is further relevant to submit that even before marriage of the petitioner her elder brother P. Ravikanth had married with one Rajitha belonging to Goud’s community. The petitioner’s caste is Brahmin. Even after knowing this fact the respondent being broad minded accepted the proposal of the petitioner for marriage. Hence the falsity of the allegation”. The portion extracted above demonstrates the mindset of the appellant. In paragraph 8 of his counter-claim, he stated, “Para-9: It is submitted that, when the petitioner was living in a rented premises owned by one B.S. Reddy at road No.7, New Maruthinagar, opposite to Santhoshnagar area there was standing instruction to all the tenants not to come home late after 10 P.M., the same was told to respondent. In spite of this the respondent on the pretext of meetings at office used to come late in the night. On one such occasion when the petitioner was in toilet and the respondent came late in the night there was little bit delay in opening the door. The respondent burst out at the petitioner and left the place in an auto. The petitioner tried to get her back but vain. The petitioner also tried to contact her on mobile phone but she purposefully switched it off”. This itself is sufficient to indicate the approach of the appellant towards the respondent. The respondent burst out at the petitioner and left the place in an auto. The petitioner tried to get her back but vain. The petitioner also tried to contact her on mobile phone but she purposefully switched it off”. This itself is sufficient to indicate the approach of the appellant towards the respondent. As regards the filing of O.P No.850 of 2008, this is what the appellant stated in his counter. “Para-14: It is submitted that the petitioner’s father told the respondent to come to advocate’s house at Moulali and made him to sign on a petition drafted for relief under section 13 B of Hindu Marriage Act; on the assurance that it would take 6 months time for listing before the court and in the meantime they would persuade the petitioner to join his society. It was also stated that this would work as deterrence from moving away from the society of the respondent. Under such deceitful circumstances the respondent was made to sign on the petitioner and appear before the court for initial presentation. But when in spite of several phone calls to advocate and petitioner’s father threw was no positive response, the respondent in the absence of independent and separate counsel for himself was compelled to stay away from the court to avoid dissolution of marriage. This was not with an intention to harass the petitioner but with a solemn motto of preserving marital ties”. It is true that a spouse, who pleads the grounds of cruelty and desertion on the part of the other spouse and prays for divorce, must prove the grounds, to the satisfaction of the Court, and more often than not, the evidence of independent witnesses is necessary. Where, however, from the pleadings delivered by the respondent in an O.P, the Court can gather that there is strength in the grounds pleaded, the nature of burden to prove such grounds relatively gets reduced. The plea of the respondent as to the humiliation caused to her and her parents is fortified from the observation of the appellant. He tried to pretend broad mined, but he suspected the character of respondent through innuendo. The plea of the respondent as to the humiliation caused to her and her parents is fortified from the observation of the appellant. He tried to pretend broad mined, but he suspected the character of respondent through innuendo. More than the evidence on record, the typical feature of this case is that the parties themselves were at one stage reconciled to the fact that they cannot live together and they have filed OP 850 of 2008, under Section 13B of the Act. It is not the case of the appellant that his signature was forged or that it was obtained through fraud, coercion, threat or the like. Though he pleads that the representation made by him was something else, it is difficult to believe that. He is not an illiterate or gullible. He is a Teacher by profession and is by and large working at Hyderabad itself. If there was any sincerity on his part, he could have appeared before the Court after expiry of six months, and revealed his mind before it. The objective underlying the requirement that the OPs of that nature must be kept pending for at least six months is that the legislature took into the possibility of change of mind of the parties, in the meanwhile, can be taken into account, when the petitions are taken up, after the stipulated period. Had the appellant appeared before the Court and stated that he is not interested in dissolution of the marriage, the Court would have taken note of the same and passed appropriate orders. However, he simply refrained from appearing in the Court and subjected the respondent to further humiliation and cruelty. As regards the medical expenditure for the child, said to have been incurred by the appellant, the trial Court recorded a finding to the effect that the entire documentary evidence filed by the appellant covered the period, during which, himself and the respondent lived together, and that there is nothing on record to show that he incurred any expenditure after they started living separately. We do not find any basis to interfere with the well-considered order passed by the trial Court. The Appeal is accordingly dismissed. The miscellaneous petitions filed in the appeal shall also stand disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.