Sudhir Agarwal, J. 1. Small Cause Suit No. 32 of 1997 instituted by petitioner claiming himself to be the owner and landlord of House No. 3, Minto Road, Allahabad having been dismissed by Small Cause Court, Allahabad vide judgment dated 21.09.1999 and thereagainst petitioner's Civil Revision No. 1302 of 1999 having been dismissed by Additional District Judge, Court No. 17, Allahabad vide judgment dated 05.12.2005, this writ petition has been filed seeking a writ of certiorari for quashing the said two judgments and orders and further a mandamus is sought to decree the suit directing eviction of respondent no. 3 from the disputed premises. 2. The brief facts necessary to understand the dispute for proper adjudication are as under. 3. The land over which building in dispute was constructed is a Nazul land, leased out to one Sri H.J. Jokim, vide registered lease deed dated 30.06.1941. The area of leased out land was two acres and two poles, i.e., 8144.03 squire meters. After the death of Sri H.J. Jokim, names of legal heirs were mutated vide Administrator, Nagar Mahapalika, Allahabad's order dated 05.03.1957. 4. The aforesaid lease holders subsequently sought permission which was allowed by Collector, Allahabad vide letter dated 05.07.1957 and the lease rights were transferred, by sale, to Sri G.M. Frank Agrawal; his son, Sri Indrajeet Frank Agrawal, and, daughter, Km. E.M. Frank Agrawal. 5. The names of aforesaid three transferees also mutated in the record of Nagar Mahapalika, Allahabad vide Administrator, Nagar Mahapalika, Allahabad's order dated 21.09.1957. With the passage of time, Sri G.M. Frank Agrawal and his wife Smt. Ela Ramola Frank Agrawal died, hence the son and daughter of Srilate) G.M. Frank Agrawal continued to be the lease holders of aforesaid land. 6. The house in dispute is constructed on the aforesaid land and belongs to lessees. The main bungalow was in occupation of three tenants. About 1/4 premises was in occupation of two tenants, namely, M/s Jeep Industrial Syndicate Ltd. and Mohd. Naseem Khan, the respondent no. 3. 7. There are some out houses also with which this Court is not concerned. 8. The two lessees, namely, Sri I. F. Agrawal and Mrs. Era Frank Agrawalafter marriage she became Mrs. Era David and now shall be referred as "Mrs. David") executed a registered agreement for sale, dated 21.08.1982,Annexure-3 to the writ petition) with petitioner and his wife, Smt. Asha Agrawal. 8. The two lessees, namely, Sri I. F. Agrawal and Mrs. Era Frank Agrawalafter marriage she became Mrs. Era David and now shall be referred as "Mrs. David") executed a registered agreement for sale, dated 21.08.1982,Annexure-3 to the writ petition) with petitioner and his wife, Smt. Asha Agrawal. It mentions that House No. 3, Minto Road, Allahabad was purchased by Sri G.M. Frank Agrawal and his two children vide registered sale deed dated 08.04.1957, and after death of Sri G.M. Frank Agrawal, the aforesaid two individuals are the owners of the aforesaid house, which is constructed on a lease hold plot. It also mentions that second party, namely, Sri Vinod Kumar Agrawal and Smt. Asha Agrawal shall also be lessee of lease hold land. The lease was subsisting till 30.06.1996. The area of lease hold land which was initially 8119 square meters, stood reduced, in view of ceiling authority's order, declaring 2140.05 square meters as excess vacant land, leaving with lessees 5979 square meters of lease hold land, alongwith building, including out houses constructed on land. The first party, i.e., I.F. Agrawal and Smt. David decided to sell House No. 3, Minto Road, Allahabad for a sale consideration of Rs. 2.5 lacs alongwith lease hold rights of land over which the house is constructed. The parties, therefore, agreed that House No. 3, Minto Road, Allahabad shall stand transferred alongwith land appurtenant thereto measuring about 5979 square meters and the sale deed shall be executed after necessary permission from Collector, Allahabad is obtained. 9. Clause 3 of agreement stipulates that out of sale consideration of Rs. 2.5 lacs, Rs. 50,000/- is being paid at the time of execution of agreement for sale and Rs. 2 lacs shall be paid before Sub-Registrar, Allahabad at the time of execution of sale deed. The first party, i.e., Sri I.F. Agrawal and his sister were to obtain necessary permission from Collector, Allahabad, whereafter the sale deed was to be executed within two years from the date of such permission. Clauses 5 and 6 of the agreement for sale, dated 21.08.1982, read as under "5. That the first party shall obtain necessary permission from Collector, Allahabad, or from such other authority or authorities, which may be necessary for executing an effective sale deed in favour of the second party. 6. Clauses 5 and 6 of the agreement for sale, dated 21.08.1982, read as under "5. That the first party shall obtain necessary permission from Collector, Allahabad, or from such other authority or authorities, which may be necessary for executing an effective sale deed in favour of the second party. 6. That after the first party obtains the necessary permission the first party shall execute the sale deed within a period of two years from the grant of such permission or permissions."emphasis added) 10. Clause 7 also says that, in case, first party fails to execute sale deed after obtaining necessary permission, which is pre-requisite for execution of sale deed, either party shall be at liberty to get the sale deed executed from Court. Clause 7 reads as under "7. That in the event of the first party fails to execute the sale deed, after obtaining the necessary permission, which is pre-requisite for execution of the sale deed, within the period of two years, either party shall be at liberty to get the sale deed executed through Court at the costs and expenses of failing party. "emphasis added) 11. Then Clause 8 of agreement says that there are other tenants in the house. The parties authorised their "said attorney" to realize rent from tenants, which will then come to the second party and liability of house tax and water tax will be that of second party. 12. Clause 9 recognized that second party is already in possession over more than 3/4 of house as tenant and with execution of agreement for sale they would cease to be tenant of that premises. Clauses 8 and 9 is also reproduced as under "8. That there are other tenants in the said house. We hereby authorize our said attorney to realize rent from them and issue receipt for the same. The rent so realized from the tenants will go to second party, and the liability of House tax, water tax etc. will be of the second party. 9. That the second party is already in possession over more than three-forth of the house no. 3, Minto Road Allahabad, tenant. The second party, with the section of these presents, shall cease to be tenant of the premises." emphasis added) 13. will be of the second party. 9. That the second party is already in possession over more than three-forth of the house no. 3, Minto Road Allahabad, tenant. The second party, with the section of these presents, shall cease to be tenant of the premises." emphasis added) 13. Clause 8 talks of collection of rent from tenants by the "said attorney" of parties but in the entire agreement, who would be the "attorney" of parties, is not stated at all. Clause 8 authorized the "attorney" by using the words "we hereby authorize", and, the agreement has been executed by both the parties, hence the "attorney" obviously, could have been anyone, other than the parties. The "attorney" after realizing rent from tenants was required to tender said rent was second party, namely, Sri V.K. Agrawal and his wife Smt. Asha Agrawal. 14. On the same day, i.e., 21.08.1982, Sri I.F. Agrawal and his sister, Smt. David also executed a power of attorney, referring execution of agreement for sale, and also the factum that sale deed cannot be executed so long as permission of Collector is not obtained, and, that part consideration has been paid by Sri V.K. Agarwal and Smt. Asha Agrawal, who are already in possession of the property, which is subject matter of agreement for sale and, therefore, the power of attorney is executed, authorizing "Sri V.K. Agrawal" to collect rent from other tenants, as also to pursue permission from Collector and maintain the house property. 15. Clause 4 authorized the said attorney, namely, Sri V.K. Agrawal to collect rent from other tenants in the house and issue receipt to them. The rent so realized had to go to second party, i.e., Sri V.K. Agrawal and Smt. Asha Agrawal both. The attorney was also authorized to contest any litigation etc. Lastly it was stipulated that the special power of attorney executed in favour of Sri V.K. Agrawal is irrevocable. The relevant paras 4 and 5 of power of attorney are reproduced as under "4. That there are other tenants in the said house. We hereby authorize out said attorney to realize rent from them and issue receipt for the same. The rent so realized from the tenants will go to second party, and the liability of house tax, water tax etc. will be the second party. 5. That there are other tenants in the said house. We hereby authorize out said attorney to realize rent from them and issue receipt for the same. The rent so realized from the tenants will go to second party, and the liability of house tax, water tax etc. will be the second party. 5. That we also authorize our said attorney, that in case it is necessary, to file any suit for ejectment of the tenants or any of the grounds to be decided by our said attorney, our said attorney shall for us and on our behalf sign the plaint vakalatnama, affidavit, compromise deed and such other papers, which may be necessary for conducting the case. In case any suit is filed in respect of this house No. 3, Minto Road, Allahabad against us our said attorney authorized to defend the same for us and on our behalf sign vakalatnama, written statement, engage counsel and do such other act or acts necessary, including filing compromise as may be necessary for the purpose." emphasis added) 16. The case of petitioner is that having executed aforesaid two documents, Sri I.F. Agrawal wrote a letter dated 08.11.1982, requesting respondent no. 3 to handover monthly rent to Sri V.K. Agrawal, in future. The language of letter is of importance and reads as under "Dear Mr. Khan, This is to request you to kindly handover your monthly rents from now onwards to Mr. Vinod Agarwal and oblige."emphasis added) 17. The aforesaid letter was received by Sri Khan on 21.12.1982. A similar letter was given by Sri I.F. Agrawal to another tenant, namely, M/s Jeep Industrial Syndicate Ltd., copy whereof is on page 101 of paper book. 18. The petitioner sought to make the lease hold land in question free hold and made an application before Collector, Allahabad sometime in 1999 by depositing Rs. 4,78,320/- vide Treasury Challan No. 12, dated 25.01.1999 and rest of amount in September, 1999. The Nazul land was made free hold in favour of petitioner vide free hold deed dated 29.09.1999Annexure-8 to the writ petition) executed by Collector, Allahabad. 19. The petitioner through his counsel got a notice dated 30.12.1996 issued to respondent no. 3, alleging that he has not paid water tax from September, 1982 till December, 1996 and is liable to pay Rs. 2170/- under this head. 19. The petitioner through his counsel got a notice dated 30.12.1996 issued to respondent no. 3, alleging that he has not paid water tax from September, 1982 till December, 1996 and is liable to pay Rs. 2170/- under this head. Besides, he has also made structural alteration, illegally, disfiguring the building and also reducing its utility, and diminishing value, therefore, liable to be evicted. The tenancy was also determined. 20. Respondent no. 3 replied notice vide letter dated 23.01.1997. It is said that he is tenant in the accommodation in dispute under an order of allotment. In the allotment order, the name of landlord was given as Lesli Green, caretaker and agent of owner Sri I.F. Agrawal. The rate of rent included all taxes and, therefore, water tax separately was not payable. The allegation of structural alteration etc., also denied. The rent upto December, 1996 was already paid to petitioner. Now he has received a letter from house owner through one Sri Alok Dey, who is said to be the attorney of Sri I.F. Agrawal, informing respondent no. 3 that now Sri Alok Dey has been appointed as attorney, revoking earlier power of attorney executed in favour of petitioner; and, Sri Alok Dey vide letter dated 23.12.1996 required the tenant not to make any payment of rent to petitioner and instead it should be paid to him. In view of the aforesaid letter, petitioner ceased to be an attorney of house owner. In case he has any valid authority to continue to collect rent, the same should be communicated to tenant within a week. 21. The petitioner thereupon instituted SCC Suit No. 32 of 1997 seeking eviction of respondent no. 3 on the ground of default in payment of rent, structural alteration, as also denial of title of petitioner as "landlord". 22. The suit was contested by respondent no. 3 by filing written statement dated 13.11.1997. Therein, he referred to and relied on the letter dated 23.12.1996, received from Sri Alok Dey. Petitioner's suit was dismissed by Trial Court, vide judgment dated 21.09.1999, and his Civil Revision No. 1302 of 1999 has also been dismissed by Revisional Court, vide order dated 05.12.2005, hence this petition. 23. I have heard Sri Manish Goyal, learned counsel for petitioner and Sri Shashi Nandan, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Afzal Ahmad, Advocate appearing for respondent no. 3. The respondents no. 23. I have heard Sri Manish Goyal, learned counsel for petitioner and Sri Shashi Nandan, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Afzal Ahmad, Advocate appearing for respondent no. 3. The respondents no. 1 and 2 are formal parties, i.e., courts below and are not to be represented having no interest in the lis. 24. The eviction of respondent no. 3 was sought by petitioner on three grounds, namely, denial of his title or status as landlord, structural alternation and non payment of rent, i.e., water tax. The aforesaid later two issues would stand attracted only if the petitioner is found to be landlord in respect to tenanted building, within the meaning of Section 3 j) of U.P. Urban BuildingRegulations of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972hereinafter referred to as the "Act, 1972"). 25. The first ground which has been seriously canvassed is that respondent no. 3 has denied title of landlord entailing a ground for ejectment under Section 20 2) f) of Act, 1972 which reads as under "20. 2) A suit for eviction of a tenant from a building after the determination of his tenancy may be instituted on one or more of the following rounds, namely . . . . . . . . . f) that the tenant has renounced his character as such or denied the title of the landlord, and the latter has not waived his right of re-entry or condoned the conduct of the tenant;" 26. To attract Section 20 2) f) the necessary ingredients arei) that the tenant has renounced his character as such; orii) denied title of landlord; orc) and the latter has not waived his right of re-entry; ord) condoned the conduct of tenant. 27. In the present case, respondent no. 3 has not disclaimed or renounced his status as a tenant in the building in dispute. It is admitted position that he has throughout maintained his status vis a vis the building in dispute, to be that of a tenant. 28. The only question up for consideration, whether there is a denial of title of landlord or not. 29. In order to attract this clause the first issue would be who is landlord or what is the meaning of the term "landlord". 28. The only question up for consideration, whether there is a denial of title of landlord or not. 29. In order to attract this clause the first issue would be who is landlord or what is the meaning of the term "landlord". It is in this context I have stated just above that the grounds for eviction, namely, structural alteration and non-payment of rent would be attracted only if petitioner is found to be the landlord, within the meaning of Section 3 j) of Act, 1972 and also satisfies any other ancillary question arisen therefrom. 30. I thus proceed first to decide the issue, whether petitioner, in the facts and circumstances of this case, can be said to be a "landlord" within the meaning of Section 3 j) of Act, 1972 and continued to enjoy the said status on the date, notice determining tenancy was given by him, and, when the small cause suit was instituted; and, whether the respondent no. 3 suffered a ground for ejectment by renouncing the status of petitioner as "landlord". 31. The definition of "landlord" under Section 3 j) reads as under " j) "landlord", in relation to a building, means a person to whom its rent is or if the building, were let would be, payable, and includes, except in clauseg), the agent or attorney, of such person."emphasis added) 32. The definition of "landlord" is inclusive in the sense that it is extended to "agent" or "attorney" also. But for the words "agent" or "attorney" of such person, as stated in Section 3 j) of Act, 1972, it may not be doubted that definition of "landlord" otherwise refers to the owner of building or a lessee of the building, who inducts a person as tenant and, therefore, rent is payable to such a person, namely, the owner or lesseeprincipal). The term "rent payable" means, as a matter of legal right, one can enforce his claim for realization of rent from tenant. The term "payable" means payable in law. "Payable" means someone who, in law, has right to receive, and can enforce such right. Such a right undoubtedly shall vest in the owner of building or co-owner of building. I do not find that qua owner, there can be any two opinions. 33. The term "payable" means payable in law. "Payable" means someone who, in law, has right to receive, and can enforce such right. Such a right undoubtedly shall vest in the owner of building or co-owner of building. I do not find that qua owner, there can be any two opinions. 33. Next is, there may be a situation where an owner leased out his premises to a person with a further right of sub-lease. In such a case a sub-lessee would be liable to pay rent to the principal lessee inasmuch as vis a vis sub-lessee the principal lessee would stand in the shoes of lessor and would be entitled to receive rent, therefore, rent would be payable to him. But when sub lessee leased out premises to anyone else, in that case he would become a landlord to whom rent is/would be payable. 34. The only expansion and deviation from the normal capacity of landlord as owner, as discussed above, provided by Section 3 j) is by extending the term "landlord" to the "agent" or "attorney" of such person, i.e., the landlord to whom rent is payable. 35. In other words it can be said that a landlord owner) to whom rent is payable, if has authorized an agent or attorney for the aforesaid purpose of collection of rent, such agent or attorney qua tenant, would also satisfy the definition of landlord under Section 3 j) of Act, 1972. 36. It goes without saying that a definition clause is applicable whenever the term "landlord" has been used in the statute, unless the context otherwise requires. The context in which the term "landlord" has been used can be classified in more than one. The first is in the context of collection of rent. A rent would be payable in respect to a building to owner of building and he would undoubtedly qualify and satisfy the term "landlord". Then comes a lessee having right to further lease out the building and qua the person to whom he let out the premise, such sub-lessee would be 'landlord'. Then comes the third category. If such owner of building has authorized an agent to collect rent, vis a vis tenant, such agent of owner of building would also be a landlord within Section 3 j) of Act, 1972. Similar is the position in respect to attorney. 37. Then comes the third category. If such owner of building has authorized an agent to collect rent, vis a vis tenant, such agent of owner of building would also be a landlord within Section 3 j) of Act, 1972. Similar is the position in respect to attorney. 37. Then comes the capacity in which an action can be taken or may be taken against a tenant. For example, Section 20, sub-sections1) and2), do not clarify as to who can institute a suit. Certain grounds which would render a tenant liable for ejectment are enumerated in sub-section2). In such grounds, the term "landlord' has been used in clausea),c),d),f) andg). This term of "landlord" has also been used in sub-section4) of Section 20. 38. Whether for the purpose of filing a suit, under Section 20 2), the "landlord" in respect of a building, must be owner only, or even his agent or attorney can file the suit, is another aspect of the matter. 39. Looking to the wider perspective of the statute, if a ground to evict tenant as enumerated in sub-section2) of Section 20 exists, the suit can undoubtedly be filed by owner of premises. He can also get the suit filed through his agent or attorney. 40. However, a question may arise, whether such a suit can be filed by agent or attorney in his own individual capacity and in his own name, without making landlord himself to be impleaded as suiter or without the consent or permission of the principal. 41. The authorization of agent or attorney is to act on behalf of principal. Therefore, it would have to be seen, whether such an agent or attorney can act on his own without keeping his Principal at forefront. One of the problems which may arise in case, a suit is allowed to be filed only by an agent or attorney, on the touchstone of fact that though he satisfies the definition of landlord under Section 3 j), but a complex situation may arise when such attorney or agent dies during pendency of the case. The heirs and legal representatives of such agent or attorney cannot satisfy on their own, definition of "landlord" unless they are also, subsequently, so authorized by landlord, i.e., the owner, to act his/their agent or attorney. The heirs and legal representatives of such agent or attorney cannot satisfy on their own, definition of "landlord" unless they are also, subsequently, so authorized by landlord, i.e., the owner, to act his/their agent or attorney. The substitution of heirs or legal representatives of agent or attorney, therefore, cannot be justified since they will have no cause of action or authority to continue to proceed against tenant. In a Court, a party may act through a recognized agent or attorney, as is provided under Order III Rule 1 C.P.C. but here also the context in which this provision is made is different. 42. A second situation may arise when we come to the proceedings under Section 21. Here an application can be filed by a 'landlord', in case he requires the building, bona fide for demolition, and, new construction or for occupation by himself or any member of his family. Here the term "demolition", "new construction" and "occupation" all refers to the capacity of a person who in law has the status to do so. A demolition of a building shall result in cessation of relationship of tenant and landlord unless it is a case covered by Section 24 of Act, 1972. Moreover, an agent or attorney, authorised to let out a building and collect rent, cannot be held competent to seek demolition of such building. 43. A building can be demolished under the orders of owner of building, or, if there is a statutory authority and in exercise of its power under some statute, if such a situation has arisen vide a statutory order, but not by a stranger. However, such power of demolition or new construction can be exercised by owner through an agent or attorney but here the agent and attorney do not have their independent status as such, even though, they satisfy definition of "landlord" but they stand to represent the owner. 44. Therefore, vis a vis tenant, the agent or attorney, who satisfies definition of "landlord" under Section 3 j), would be a person who holds authority as agent or attorney, to represent the true owner of property, to do or not to do, or to act or not to act, in a particular manner, as authorized by owner. The attorney and agent by himself cannot claim to be the owner of property and simultaneously to claim that they satisfy definition of "landlord". 45. The attorney and agent by himself cannot claim to be the owner of property and simultaneously to claim that they satisfy definition of "landlord". 45. In the context of the words "occupation by himself or any members of family" there is a divergence in the opinion; whether these words would apply to anyone and not confined to only owner of property. 46. One of the earliest decision in this regard is Sri Laxkshmi Shanker Misra Vs. The 1st Additional District Judge, Allahabad and others, 1977 ARC 7. Hon'ble N.D. Ojha, J.as His Lordship then was) observed "'Landlord' as defined in Section 3 j) of the Act in relation to a building, means a person to whom its rent is or if the building, were let would be payable and includes, except in clauseg) the agent or attorney, of such person. In cases where there is a privity of contract between two persons in pursuance of which rent is payable by one person to the other in respect of a building occupied by him in the capacity of a tenant, the person to whom rent is payable, in view of the agreement, would be the landlord of the person by whom the rent would be payable irrespective of the fact as to who was the actual owner of the property. It would be a case covered by the first part of the definition viz, the landlord would be such person to whom the rent of the building is payable. The position in law would, however, be different of an accommodation falls vacant and the question arises as to who is the landlord to whom notices as contemplated by rules 8 and 9 of the rules aforesaid are to be given before passing an order of allotment. At this stage the second part of the definition would be attracted, viz., the landlord would be the person to whom rent, if the building were let, would be payable. It may be emphasised that in either event landlord would be such person to whom rent is or would be payable as the case may be and not the person by whom rent is physically collected on behalf of the landlord would himself become the landlord. Who would be the person to whom rent, if the building were let, would be payable is the crucial question. Who would be the person to whom rent, if the building were let, would be payable is the crucial question. It would be the person authorised to let out the building and to recover rent from the tenants. Normally such person would be the owner of the building. However, if the owner has entered into a contract with some other person authorising him to let out the vacant building and to recover rent from the tenants either as his agent or attorney it may be that person who would be called landlord with in the definition of the said term under the Act. Similar may be the case when for the time being either by an order of the court or by operation of some law the right to let out the building and recover rent from the tenants vests in some person other than the owner."emphasis added) 47. Then in E.E. Dayal Vs. Smt. Phool Mani Dayal and others, 1977 ARCSN 5) 4 Hon'ble R.M. Sahai, J.as His Lordship then was) held that it is difficult to agree that merely because the respondent was permitted by the trust to collect rent, and, the petitioner started paying rent in view of this communication received from the Principal Officer of the Trust, the respondent become landlord of the premises. The mere fact that he was paying rent which was being collected by the respondent on behalf of the Trust, does not mean that she was admitted to be the owner of premises in dispute. The Court further said that for the purpose of Section 21 it cannot be accepted that an attorney or agent who becomes a landlord by virtue of definition clause can file an application for eviction of tenant on the ground that need of attorney or agent is genuine. What is to be seen under Section 21 is the need of the landlord-owner. It may be that the landlord may need the premises for his agent or attorney but that would be different in saying that the Act confers any right on the attorney or agent, himself, to file an application for release of accommodation on the ground that the premises are needed by them for their own personal use. 48. The next decision is Prem Chandra Pachit Vs. 48. The next decision is Prem Chandra Pachit Vs. Second Additional District Judge, Saharanpur and others, 1978 ARC 394, a decision by Hon'ble K.C. Agrawal, J. Therein Prem Chandra Pachit was not owner of building. He claimed to have obtained a Theka of building so as to use the same as lodging house. He filed an application under Section 21 1) a) of Act, 1972 for eviction of one, Ram Lal, a tenant in the building. An objection was raised that Prem Chandra Pachit being not an owner of building, was not a landlord so as to get a right to file application under Section 21 1) a) of Act, 1972. The Court held that Sri Prem Chandra Pachit being only manager, did not satisfy requirement of Section 21 1) a) which contemplates that an application can be filed only by a landlord, who needs the accommodation for himself or a member of his family. HePrem Chandra Pachit) was not member of family of landlord, i.e., the owner of building. 49. The comes a decision of Apex Court in M.M. Quasim Vs. Manohar Lal Sharma and others, 1981 3) SCC 36, a judgment rendered by a three Judges Bench. The matter had arisen from Bihar BuildingsLease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947. There, the definition of expression "landlord" contained in Section 2 d) of Bihar Statute is a bit similar to Section 3 j) of Act, 1972. A provision somewhat similar to Section 21 was in Section 11 thereof. The marked distinction in Bihar and U.P. Rent Statute is one explanation in Section 11 1) c), which says that in this clause the word "landlord" would not include an agent referred to in claused) of Section 2. Despite referring to aforesaid explanation, the stress of Apex Court was that word "occupation" would mean that a person as a matter of right must have the capacity to occupy the building and that must be a person who is owner of building. The relevant observations may be quoted as under "Therefore, while taking advantage of the enabling provision enacted in Section 111)c), the person claiming possession on the ground of his reasonable requirement of the leased building must show that he is a landlord in the sense that he is owner of the building and has a right to occupy the same in his own right. A mere rent collector, though may be included in the expression landlord in its wide amplitude cannot be treated as a landlord for the purposes of Section 111)c). This becomes manifestly clear from the explanation appended to the sub-section. By restricting the meaning of expression landlord for the purpose of Section 11 1) c), the legislature manifested its intention namely that landlord alone can seek eviction on the ground of his personal requirement if he is one who has a right against the whole world to occupy the building himself and exclude any one holding a title lesser than his own. Such landlord who is an owner and who would have a right to occupy the building in his own right, can seek possession for his own use. The latter part of the section envisages a situation where the landlord is holding the buildings for the benefit of some other person but in that case landlord can seek to evict tenant not for his personal use but for the personal requirement of that person for whose benefit he holds the building. The second clause contemplates a situation of trustees and cesti que trust but when the case is governed by the first part of sub clausec) of sub-section1) of Section 11, the person claiming possession for personal requirement must be such a landlord who wants possession for his own occupation and this would imply that he must be a person who has a right to remain in occupation against the whole world and not someone who has no subsisting interest in the property and is merely a rent collector such as an agent, executor, administrator or a receiver of the property. For the purposes of Section 11 1) c) the expression landlord could, therefore, mean a person who is the owner of the building and who has a right to remain in occupation and actual possession of the building to the exclusion of everyone else. It is such a person who can seek to evict the tenant on the ground that he requires possession in good faith for his own occupation. A rent collector or an agent is not entitled to occupy the house in his own right. It is such a person who can seek to evict the tenant on the ground that he requires possession in good faith for his own occupation. A rent collector or an agent is not entitled to occupy the house in his own right. Even if such a person be a lessor and, therefore, a landlord within the expanded inclusive definition of the expression landlord, nonetheless he cannot seek to evict the tenant on the ground that he wants to personally occupy the house. He cannot claim such a right against the real owner and as a necessary corollary he cannot seek to evict the tenant on the ground that he wants possession of the premises for his own occupation. That can be the only reasonable interpretation one can put on the ingredients of sub-clausec) of Section 11 1) which reads"Where building is reasonably and in good faith required by the landlord for his own occupation..." Assuming that the expression 'landlord' has to be understood with the same connotation as is spelt out by the definition clause, even a rent collector or a receiver of the property appointed by the Court in bankruptcy proceedings would be able to evict the tenant alleging that wants the building for his own occupation, a right which he could not have claimed against the real owner. Therefore, the explanation to claused) which cuts down the wide amplitude of the expression 'landlord' would unmistakably show that for the purposes of clausec) such landlord who in the sense in which the word 'owner' is understood can claim as of right to the exclusion of everyone, to occupy the house, would be entitled to evict the tenant for his own occupation." emphasis added) 50. Here in the above case, the Court read the explanation to be only clarificatory but on principle held that eviction proceeding must be initiated by a landlord, who is the owner of property. 51. Then comes a decision of learned Single Judge Hon'ble K.C. Agrawal, J.) in Smt. Sughra Begum Vs. Sri Ram and others, 1983 2) ARC 143. Following Apex Court's decision in M.M. Quasimsupra), the Court in paras 8 and 10 said "8. . . . . . . . Under Section 21 a landlord can move an application for occupation by himself or any member of his family. Sri Ram and others, 1983 2) ARC 143. Following Apex Court's decision in M.M. Quasimsupra), the Court in paras 8 and 10 said "8. . . . . . . . Under Section 21 a landlord can move an application for occupation by himself or any member of his family. The fact that only a person who is entitled to occupy can alone move an application indicates that one who is not entitled to occupy or has no right to occupy in his own right cannot apply for release under Section 21. An agent or attorney of an owner of the house may realize the rent of the house in respect of which power is conferred upon him by the owner to do so and for that purpose he may be considered to be landlord within the meaning of that expression defined in Section 3, but such a person would not be entitled to more an application under Section 21." "10. . . . . . For being entitled to apply under Section 21 1), that person must be entitled to occupy the premises in his own right. The expression "occupation for himself or for family members" has been deliberately used by the legislature to manifest its intention that the landlord alone can seek eviction on the ground of his personal requirement if he is one who has a right against the whole world to occupy the building."emphasis added) 52. In Naseeruddin and others Vs. Prescribed Authority, Meerut and others, 1988 1) ARC 517, Hon'ble R.P. Singh, J. in para 5 of the judgment also took the view, "thus an agent or attorney of an owner of a house may realise the rent of house but such a person would not be entitled to make an application under Section 21 1)." 53. The above phrase in Section 21 1) a), in the context of bona fide need of persons, for whose benefit such application can be filed, the definition of family was given an expansion, in some authorities, namely, Misri Lal Vs. Special JudgeAdditional District Judge), Gorakhpur and others, 1988 2) ARC 430. Hon'ble R.K. Gulati, J. extended it to the domestic servants of landlord. The Court said, though technically, he may not satisfy the definition of family, under Section 3 g) of the Act yet it may be included in spirit. Special JudgeAdditional District Judge), Gorakhpur and others, 1988 2) ARC 430. Hon'ble R.K. Gulati, J. extended it to the domestic servants of landlord. The Court said, though technically, he may not satisfy the definition of family, under Section 3 g) of the Act yet it may be included in spirit. Similarly it was extended to mother-in-law, daughter-in-law, grandchildren etc.; but in the context of the meaning of the word "landlord", who can initiate the proceedings, the position remains slightly complex. 54. In Smt. Ved Rani Diwan and another Vs. VIIIth Additional District Judge, Ghaziabad and others, 1996 2) ARC 14 Hon'ble Sudhir Narain, J. in para 7 of the judgment observed "7. . . . . . . The word ' landlord' in the context of Section 21 1) a) will mean only such person who is not only entitled to realise the rent but also has a right under law to occupy for his personal use and such person alone can file application under Section 21 1) a) of the Act. Respondent no.4 is owner and landlord of the premises in question and if she has authorized her husband to realise the rent, he cannot file an application for release under Section 21 1-A) of the Act in his own right."emphasis added) 55. In Fakaruddin Khan [ Dead) through Lrs Salma Khan, widow and Salman Khan, son] Vs. Xth Additional District Judge, Kanpur and others, 1998 1) ARC 449 Hon'ble S.R. Singh, J. following Apex Court's decision in M.M. Quasimsupra), in para 8, said "The term "landlord" in Section 21 1-A) of the Act connotes landlord in the sense of being the owner of the building." 56. In Furqan Ahmad Alias Mana and another Vs. VIIth A.D.J. and others, 2005 2) AWC 1161 Hon'ble Tarun Agarwala, J. following decisions in Sri Laxkshmi Shanker Misrasupra); Smt. Sughra Begumsupra); and, Naseeruddinsupra) in para 10 of the judgment, said "10. There is no quarrel with the aforesaid proposition as submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner. A person who has been authorised to realize the rent on behalf of the landlord becomes the landlord as contemplated under Section 3f) of the Act. But the said agent cannot file a release application for his own need or for his family members under Section 211)a) of the Act inasmuch as he is not the owner of the premises in question. But the said agent cannot file a release application for his own need or for his family members under Section 211)a) of the Act inasmuch as he is not the owner of the premises in question. The expression "occupation for himself or for family members" as provided under Section 211) of the Act means that the person must be entitled to occupy the premises in his own right. Obviously, the agent is not authorized to occupy the premises in his own right. Therefore, the agent could not file an application for release of the premises for his own personal need."emphasis added) 57. A discordant note, I find in Udai Singh Bhanuvanshi Vs. Kunj Behari Tewari, 2002 1) AWC 647, wherein Hon'ble A.K. Yog, J. observed that there is no reason to read the word "ownership" in the context of expression "landlord" when legislature itself in Section 3 j) has not confined itself to the owner. However, His Lordship further clarified the position by observing that there was a finding in the judgment of court below in the case before the Court that Kunj Behari Tewari was authorised to realise rent as "landlord". In respect to this finding that he was authorised to realise rent as landlord, there was no challenge. The Court observed that his status as landlord of accommodation was not challenged earlier and thus cannot be allowed to be assailed for the first time before this Court. That is how the Court distinguished earlier decisions in Smt. Sughra Begumsupra); Smt. Ved Rani Diwansupra); and M.M. Quasimsupra). Para 20 of the judgment clarifying above observations, reads as under "20. In the cases of Smt. Sughra Begum, Smt. Ved Rani Diwan and M.M. Quasimsupra), this Court held that an 'agent' or such other person cannot maintain release application under Section 21 1) a) of the Act. The facts of the above cases are clearly distinguishable from the facts of the case in hand. In the present case in hand. 'Kunj Behari Tewari', who filed release application, was authorised to realise rent as 'landlord' and thus his status as the owner/landlord of the accommodation as already discussed above, cannot be questioned or assailed in the present proceedings."emphasis added) 58. In the present case in hand. 'Kunj Behari Tewari', who filed release application, was authorised to realise rent as 'landlord' and thus his status as the owner/landlord of the accommodation as already discussed above, cannot be questioned or assailed in the present proceedings."emphasis added) 58. For the purpose of Section 20 also this Court finds that who can institute suit is not specifically mentioned but from a careful reading of scheme it does not appear that a suit for ejectment can be filed by a mere agent or attorney even though the real owner/landlord has not joined the proceedings. If a tenant has been inducted by the owner, it is difficult to accept that his tenancy can be terminated by an agent or attorney, unless so permitted by the owner. 59. Further when there are more than one person satisfying the definition of "landlord", it is the landlord who has better rights or title over property who would exclude others. In order to attract Section 3 f) the plaintiff seeking ejectment of tenant has to show that there is denial of title of landlord. The word "title" here goes not to the authority of landlord to collect mere rent but here the title is something more than that. It is for this reason, and knowing it well that without possessing status of landlord, having semblance of ownership over property in dispute the petitioner would not succeed, learned counsel for the petitioner sought to rest his claim with respect to his status as owner. His status as owner and landlord of tenanted building, is basically founded on the agreement for sale, power of attorney, and free hold deed executed by Collector, Allahabad in 1999 in his favour. 60. Learned counsel for the petitioner sought to argue that concept of "ownership" is not to be imported here, as definition of "landlord" itself is an extended one so as to take within its ambit an agent or attorney also. 61. The submission, in the manner it is sought to be advanced, I find difficult to accept. The definition of "landlord" contained in definition clause has to be read in the context as discussed above. When somebody is authorised to collect rent, he is merely a collector of rent. 61. The submission, in the manner it is sought to be advanced, I find difficult to accept. The definition of "landlord" contained in definition clause has to be read in the context as discussed above. When somebody is authorised to collect rent, he is merely a collector of rent. The rent though is payable to him, in view of instructions issued by landlord-owner, to the tenant, that the rent should be paid to such an agent or attorney, and, in that sense, the agent or attorney may also be included or covered within the definition of "landlord", but his status is fortuitous and with the change of instructions of landlord-owner to tenant, he may/can loose such status at any point of time. 62. There may be another case where an owner has authorised or appointed an agent or attorney to deal with his property in any manner, i.e., let out by inducting tenant, collect rent and do other such functions as are required in the facts and circumstances. A tenant inducted by such an agent or attorney, may not claim his direct relationship of landlord-tenant vis a vis the principal landlord, i.e., owner but for such a tenant it is the agent and attorney who, assumes in its entirety, the capacity of "landlord" for all purposes. 63. Therefore, the term "landlord", as defined, has to be read in the context and that is how the definition clause also provides. It depends on the cumulative reading of statutory provisions, the intention, object and import of statute, and the purpose making provision. No universal principle can be applied hereat. 64. Recently, in the context of East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949hereinafter referred to as the "East Punjab Act, 1949") the question, whether the term "landlord" will include only the owner or others came to be considered in K.D. Dewan Vs. Harbhajan S. Parihar, AIR 2002 SC 67 . No universal principle can be applied hereat. 64. Recently, in the context of East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949hereinafter referred to as the "East Punjab Act, 1949") the question, whether the term "landlord" will include only the owner or others came to be considered in K.D. Dewan Vs. Harbhajan S. Parihar, AIR 2002 SC 67 . There the definition of "landlord" was given in Section 2 c), which read as under "Section 2 c)'landlord' means any person for the time being entitled to receive rent in respect of any building or rented land whether on his own account or on behalf, or for the benefit of any other person, or as a trustee, guardian, receiver, executor or administrator for any other person, and includes a tenant who subjects any building or rented land in the manner hereinafter authorised, and, every person from time to time deriving title under a landlord;" 65. It is a very wide definition which includes any person having status of various shades. It is in this context, and interpreting definition of "landlord", in aforesaid statute, the Court in para 7, said "7. A perusal of the provision, quoted above, shows that the following categories of persons fall within the meaning of landlord1) any person for the time being entitled to receive rent in respect of any building or rented land;2) a trustee, guardian, receiver, executor or administrator for any other person;3) a tenant who sublets any building or rented land in the manner authorised under the Act and4) every person from time to time deriving title under a landlord. Among these four categories of persons, brought within the meaning of 'landlord';, Mr. Sharma sought to derive support from the last category. Even so that category refers to a person who derives his title under a landlord and not under an owner of a premises. For purposes of the said category the transferor of the title referred to therein must fall under any of the categories1) to3). To be a landlord within the meaning of clausec) of section 2 a person need not necessarily be the owner; in a vast majority of case an owner will be a landlord but in many cases a person other than n owner may be as well be a landlord. To be a landlord within the meaning of clausec) of section 2 a person need not necessarily be the owner; in a vast majority of case an owner will be a landlord but in many cases a person other than n owner may be as well be a landlord. It may be that in a given case the landlord is also an owner but a landlord under the Act need not be the owner. It may be noted that for purposes of the ct the legislature has made a distinction between an owner of a premises and a landlord. The Act deals with the rights and obligations of a landlord only as defined therein. Ownership of a premises is immaterial for purposes of the Act." 66. The Court also noticed its earlier decision in M.M. Quasimsupra), and in para 11, while distinguishing aforesaid judgment, said, that to understand the observation in a judgment, it is necessary to look into the factual context and the provision which has fallen for consideration of Court. It also observed that looking to the wide definition of "landlord" under Section 2 c) of East Punjab Act, 1949 and having regard to the width of language and also the fact that there is no other provision in the Act to restrict its meaning for the purpose of Section 13 3) a) to an owner of premises alone, there was no reason to confine it to the owners only. 67. The above decisions fortify the view now being taken that a person when would satisfy the term "landlord", has to be looked into, in the light of statutory provisions, and in the context of other provisions of the Act concerned and the relevant facts of the case in hand. No universal principle can be applied in this regard. 68. Besides, in the present case, I also find that alleged power of attorney whereupon the petitioner has founded his claim, has not authorised him to induct any tenant in the building in dispute, determine tenancy of tenants who were inducted by owner-landlord in the building in dispute. The petitioner through the power of attorney, was authorised to collect rent and thereafter remit the same to the proposed purchasers under the agreement for sale, dated 21.08.1982. No power of determination of tenancy of existing tenants has been given to petitioner under the said power of attorney. The petitioner through the power of attorney, was authorised to collect rent and thereafter remit the same to the proposed purchasers under the agreement for sale, dated 21.08.1982. No power of determination of tenancy of existing tenants has been given to petitioner under the said power of attorney. The petitioner though has also been given authority to contest the cases but that would apply only to the cases which the petitioner, as a holder of power of attorney, is required to contest on behalf of owners, but so long as authority to terminate tenancy of existing tenants has not been conferred upon him, I find it difficult to read the aforesaid power of attorney, to entitle petitioner, to stand in the shoes of owner so as to possess all the powers and privileges as could have been exercised by owner in respect of property in dispute as also the existing tenants to whom the disputed building is let out. 69. Be that as it may, for my purpose, in the present case, however, there may not be any difficulty on this aspect for the reason that petitioner has not come forward to claim his status as landlord merely being an agent of landlordowner) or attorney of landlordowner). On the contrary, the case set up by petitioner in the plaint is that he is the sole landlord of building and defendant-tenant has denounced his title in respect of building in question as landlord. Para 1 of plaint and relevant extract from para 4-B of plaint, read as under "1. That the plaintiff is the sole landlord of building No. 3, Minto Road, Allahabad." "4B. . . . . . . plaintiff denied the title of the plaintiff in respect of the portion of building in question as the landlord and the plaintiff has not waived his right of re-entry . . . ."emphasis added) 70. Replying same, the defendant-tenant in para 5 of written statement said "5. That since instructions were issued to the defendant to make the payment of rent to Sri Vinod Kumar Agarwal, the plaintiff, by the co-landlord Sri Indrajeet Frank Agarwal for himself and on behalf of E.R. David, the other co-owner co-landlord. The rent was paid to Sri Vinod Kumar Agarwal. The rights of Sri Vinod Kumar Agarwal were limited as rent collector only for and on behalf of the real landlord. . . . The rent was paid to Sri Vinod Kumar Agarwal. The rights of Sri Vinod Kumar Agarwal were limited as rent collector only for and on behalf of the real landlord. . . . ." emphasis added) 71. Thereafter in additional pleas, in paras 11, 12 and 13, the defendant-tenant stated that owners of building, are, Sri I. F. Agrawal and his sister, Mrs. David. Since title of building still vests in them, petitioner has no authority to file suit having no title for himself. In paras 14 and 15 of written statement, the defendant-tenant said " 14) That the plaintiff has not shown as to how and in what manner he has derived right, title as sole landlord of the building nor has he satisfied the defendant of his alleged right to sue. 15) That in any view of the matter Sri Vinod Kumar Agarwal, the plaintiff, had every limited right to act in the matter of tenancy of the premises in question, but in no case he has a right to determine the tenancy and file the suit in his own name. He has exceeded his rights and has acted without jurisdiction." 72. In the oral deposition of DW-1 the defendant clarified his status by stating ^^izfroknh us fnlEcj 1982 ls fdjk;k eq>s nsuk 'kq: fd;kA ySM ykMZ ekudj jftLVMZ ,xzhesUV o ikoj vkWQ ,VkuhZ ns[kus ds ckn ls izfroknh dks vkbZ0,Q0 vxzoky us vksuj dh gSfl;r ls ;g funsZ'k fn;k Fkk fd fdjk;k oknh dks nsA izfroknh us bl nkos esa esjh ySM ykMZ'khi vLohdkj fd;k gS o vkbZ0,Q0 vxzoky dks ySMykMZ gksuk dgk gSA bl izdkj izfroknh us esjh feyfd;r ls bUdkj fd;k gSA ;g dguk xyr gS fd vkbZ0,Q0 vxzoky izfroknh ds ySMykMZ gSA bl ,xzhesUV isij uEcj 20 ds vk/kkj ij gesa ekfydkuk dCtk fn;k x;k Fkk tks ikVZ ijQkjesUl esa FkkA^^ "The defendant has started paying rent to me since December 1982. Considering the plaintiff to be the landlord after going through the registered agreement and power of attorney, Sri I.F. Agrawal had in the capacity of owner directed the defendant to pay rent to him." "That defendant has in this case refused to acknowledge me as landlord and has stated Sri I.F. Agrawal to be such. Considering the plaintiff to be the landlord after going through the registered agreement and power of attorney, Sri I.F. Agrawal had in the capacity of owner directed the defendant to pay rent to him." "That defendant has in this case refused to acknowledge me as landlord and has stated Sri I.F. Agrawal to be such. In this way, the defendant has denied my title." "It is wrong to say that Sri I.F. Agrawal is landlord of the defendant." "On the basis of the agreement being paper no. 20, we had been handed over possession as owner that was in part performance." English translation by the Court) 73. From the above it is evident that petitioner claimed Sri I.F. Agrawal and his sister to be erstwhile owner and that they cease to be the landlord after execution of agreement for sale and power of attorney and thereafter the sole landlord is petitioner. Therefore, he is claiming himself to be the landlord of premises in dispute as a result of cessation of status of landlord of Sri I.F. Agrawal and his sister, Mrs. David. 74. Despite the fact that respondent-tenant is accepting status of Sri I.F. Agrawal as landlord, hethe petitioner) says that since tenant denied landlord status of petitioner, that amounts to denial of title. Apparently, the question of title cannot arise in case of an agent or attorney, in respect of an immoveable property. 75. Moreover, an important aspect here, to be noticed, is that the land and building constitute two different components. The land was never owned by Sri I.F. Agrawal and his sister. They however owned only the building. The land was a Nazul. They were only lessees thereof. They had no right to transfer lease rights over land to any third party, without permission from Collector, Allahabad. 76. The lease rights, were available to Sri I.F. Agrawal and his sister, up to 30.06.1996, as is evident from agreement for sale deed dated 21.08.1982. The building constructed over it constitutes a separate component inasmuch as it was owned by initial lessee, namely, Sri H.J. Jokim and therefrom it devolved upon his legal heirs, then transferred by sale in 1957 to Sri G.M. Agrawal and his children. Therefore, in respect to building constructed over Nazul land, Sri I.F. Agrawal and his sister, were exclusive owners. But in respect to land, they possessed only lease hold rights, subsisting till 30.06.1996. Therefore, in respect to building constructed over Nazul land, Sri I.F. Agrawal and his sister, were exclusive owners. But in respect to land, they possessed only lease hold rights, subsisting till 30.06.1996. 77. Respondent no. 3 is the tenant in a part of building. Act, 1972 is also applicable to a building. It is no doubt true that in respect to building, only an agreement to sale was executed on 21.08.1982 between owners, namely, Sri I.F. Agrawal and Smt. Era Devid and petitioner and his wife Smt. Asha Agrawal. The owners of building obviously could not have executed any sale deed with respect to land since it was a Nazul and they themselves were not owners thereof. Therefore, the agreement for sale talked of transfer of lease hold rights to petitioner and Smt. Asha Agrawal but that could have been possible after permission is obtained from Collector. It is for this reason, the agreement for sale provided that permission of Collector is the pre-requisite for execution of sale deed. 78. So far as respondent no. 3 is concerned, he was informed by a co-owner of tenanted building, i.e., Sri I.F. Agrawal, vide letter dated 08.11.1982 that rent shall be paid prospectively to Sri V.K. Agrawal. Consequently he started paying rent to Sri V.K. Agrawal till he received an otherwise information through another attorney of Sri I.F. Agrawal. 79. I have no manner of doubt that respondent no. 3 was liable to pay rent to the owner of building or his agent or attorney, as per instructions of owner. In that view of the matter, the petitioner became "landlord" within Section 3 j) of respondent no. 3 on and after 08.11.1982, when respondent no. 3 was instructed by Sri I.F. Agrawal, co-owner of the tenanted building, to pay rent henceforth to Sri V.K. Agrawal. A person to whom the rent is payable also includes the agent or attorney of such person and this condition stood satisfied in this case to this extent. 80. It is not the case of petitioner, neither before this Court nor before courts below, that agreement for sale or special power of attorney were also conveyed to respondent no. 3 with an intention and to explain that now petitioner stands in the shoes of owner of property in dispute and, therefore, rent would be payable to him. 80. It is not the case of petitioner, neither before this Court nor before courts below, that agreement for sale or special power of attorney were also conveyed to respondent no. 3 with an intention and to explain that now petitioner stands in the shoes of owner of property in dispute and, therefore, rent would be payable to him. Whatever transpired between petitioner, his wife Smt. Asha Agrawal and Sri I.F. Agrawal and his sister, Smt. David, is a matter between them. It is not the case of petitioner at any stage that respondent no. 3 was also a party to all those proceedings and well aware of legal consequences thereof. It is also not the case of petitioner that these documents were conveyed to respondent no. 3 so that he may know the legal consequences thereof and treat petitioner as landlord, not merely as an agent or attorney of owner of tenanted building, but a person standing in the shoes of owner, in his own rights or so as to become sole landlord, i.e., by extinguishing the status of owners as landlord. 81. It is also an admitted case that though the agreement was executed on 21.08.1982 but the rent for months of August, September, October and November was not paid to petitioner. But, after receiving letter dated 08.11.1982, which the respondent no. 3 claims to have received on 21.12.1982, whereby, the owner directed/instructed respondent no. 3 to pay rent henceforth to Sri V.K. Agrawal, without stating any thing further the respondent no. 3 complied his directions and started paying rent to petitioner. 82. Meaning thereby, hepetitioner) was paid rent by respondent no. 3 as an agent of owner, authorized to receive rent for which necessary instructions were issued by owner to respondent no. 3 directly. 83. The rent continued to be paid for almost 14 years, i.e., upto December, 1996. Thereafter the case of respondent no. 3 is that one Sri Alok Dey, served a letter dated 23.12.1996 upon him informing that now Sri I.F. Agrawal having revoked authority of Sri V.K. Agrawal for collecting rent by revoking his attorney, has authorized himSri Alok Dey) to collect rent and, therefore, rent must be paid to him. 84. In absence of anything further, in his possession, respondent no. 3 brought this fact to the notice of petitioner by letter dated 23.01.1997 while replying petitioner's notice dated 30.12.1996. Respondent no. 84. In absence of anything further, in his possession, respondent no. 3 brought this fact to the notice of petitioner by letter dated 23.01.1997 while replying petitioner's notice dated 30.12.1996. Respondent no. 3 requested, if petitioner is still continuing with authority to collect rent from himrespondent no. 3), should furnish relevant document for this purpose, failing which either he would have to pay rent to Sri Alok Dey or directly to Sri I.F. Agrawal or in absence of any clear situation, may proceed to deposit rent under Section 30 2) of Act, 1972. It is necessary at this stage to reproduce the extract of reply given by respondent no. 3 to petitioner " 5) That is is further to inform your that my client has received a letter from one Sri Alok Dey, who asserts himself to be the attorney of Sri I.F. Agarwal and others informing my client that through a registered document he has been appointed as power of attorney by Sri I.F. Agarwal and others for looking after and managing the property in No. 2, Minto Road, Allahabad and the earlier power of attorney in favour of Sri Vinod Kumar Agarwal has been revoked. Through the letter datd 23.12.1996 Sri Alok Dey has demanded further rent from my client and has asked my client not to make payment of any further rent to Sri Vinod Kumar Agarwal. 6) That if the power of attorney granted earlier in favour of your client Sri Vinod Kumar Agarwal, has been revoked by the landlord Sri I.F. Agarwal, your client Sri Vinod Kumar Agarwal ceases to have any right to represent Sri I.F. Agarwal and other, the landlords. Your client ceases to have any right to realise rent from my client. However, if your client has got any other power of attorney or writing of Sri I.F. Agarwal and others authorising your client either to continue as their power of attorney or authorising them a new to act as their agent and attorney in future, kindly intimate my client within a week from the date of receipt of this reply. However, if your client has got any other power of attorney or writing of Sri I.F. Agarwal and others authorising your client either to continue as their power of attorney or authorising them a new to act as their agent and attorney in future, kindly intimate my client within a week from the date of receipt of this reply. In case my client does not receive any intimation in writing from your client within the said period my client shall have reason to accept the claim of Sri Alok Dey and with a view to discharge his liability to pay the rent inclusive of water tax, will pay due rent to Sri Alok Dey as directed by him. 8) That the notice sent under instructions of your client is wholly illegal and without jurisdiction. However, in case further controversial claims are made by your client and Sri Alok Dey my client shall have no other option but to tender rent directly to Sri I.F. Agarwal or in his wisdom will deposit the rent under Section 30 sub-clause2) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. Your are requested to instruct your client to clarify and establish his position by convincing and cogent proof within a period of a week from the date of receipt of this reply and to pay Rs. 250/- towards costs of this reply failing which my client shall have no other option but to act in the manner as has been mentioned above." emphasis added) 85. It is not the case of petitioner that after aforesaid reply, he apprised respondent no. 3 about the documents like, agreement for sale, power of attorney etc., advising him that in view thereof he stands in the shoes of owner and the power of attorney being irrevocable, the letter given by Sri Alok Dey has no legal consequences. Instead, the petitioner opted to institute the suit in question, straightaway . 86. From the pleadings and discussions made above, I find it difficult to hold that there is any denial of title of landlord by respondent no. 3. At the best, it can be said that respondent no. Instead, the petitioner opted to institute the suit in question, straightaway . 86. From the pleadings and discussions made above, I find it difficult to hold that there is any denial of title of landlord by respondent no. 3. At the best, it can be said that respondent no. 3 disclosed information to petitioner, received through Sri Alok Dey, that, owners of property have revoked authority of collection of rent given to petitioner and this authority now has been conferred upon another person, hence petitioner, if still continue to hold such authority, should convey the same to respondent no. 3 otherwise he would exercise options like, tendering or offering rent to original owners or deposit in the court or to pay to new agent or new attorney. 87. The conduct and response of respondent no. 3 was quite natural, normal and that of a prudent person of reasonable intelligence. It is not, each and every act of tenant, which could attract mischief under Section 20 2) f) of Act, 1972. In this respect it would be useful to refer the verdict in Kundan Mal v. Guru Datt. 1989 ALR 367SC) where the Court observed, if tenant has not denied the title of landlord in clear and unequivocal terms, he shall not be liable for eviction on the ground of disclaimer of title. The mere statement by a tenant that he was not aware about the particular state of facts or that he has sufficient material which create a reasonable doubt as to who is entitled to collect rent or that he has no information about transfer of property by real owner to anyone else, by itself would not constitute denial of title of landlord. The above dictum was followed in Munsami Naidu Vs. Sri Ranganathan, 1991 1) ARC 382. 88. To wriggle out from this problem an attempt was made by Sri Goyal, learned counsel for the petitioner to argue that the status of petitioner was nothing but that of owner of property in dispute and, therefore, refusal to pay rent to petitioner on the ground that he has lost authority to collect rent amounts nothing less than that of disclaimer of title. In order to bring his case and fortify the above argument, he took this Court through the agreement for sale, the power of attorney and free hold deed. 89. In order to bring his case and fortify the above argument, he took this Court through the agreement for sale, the power of attorney and free hold deed. 89. Much has been argued about the status and consequences of agreement for sale as well as power of attorney, its irrevocability and effect. 90. Though law on this aspect is not in dispute but applicability thereof on the facts and circumstances of present case is the real issue. However to put the record straight, I may notice hereat arguments advanced and the relevant law on these aspects and my findings. 91. It is contended that agreement for sale having conferred right upon petitioner to collect rent from other tenants of building and also that petitioner shall cease to be a tenant of building in which he is the tenant, created an interest in his favour in the property as such and, therefore, he entered into the shoes of owner of property. 92. In my view, the attempt of petitioner to raise his status based on agreement for sale, in the manner it has been argued, is not correct. 93. Sale of immoveable property is defined in Section 54 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882hereinafter referred to as the "Act, 1882"). It says that sale is a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part paid and part promised. The procedure to give effect to sale of immoveable property is also stated in the aforesaid provision. Section 54 as amended in State of Uttar Pradesh clearly provides that such transfer can be made only by a registered instrument. Then there is a provision for "contract of sale" also and as amended in State of Uttar Pradesh, this also required to be a registered instrument. Since the sale can be effective only by registered instrument of sale of immoveable property, the property itself shall pass on to vendee and the sale is complete as soon as the deed is registered and not otherwise. 94. In Vidhyadhar Vs. Manikrao and another, 1999 3) SCC 573, after referring to definition of sale in Section 54 of Act, 1882, the Court said, that in order to constitute sale, there must be a transfer of ownership from one person to another. 94. In Vidhyadhar Vs. Manikrao and another, 1999 3) SCC 573, after referring to definition of sale in Section 54 of Act, 1882, the Court said, that in order to constitute sale, there must be a transfer of ownership from one person to another. A transfer must be of all rights and interest in the property which are possessed by that person, who is transferring same to another person. The transferor cannot retain any part of his interest or right in that property or else it would not be a sale. The definition further says that transfer of ownership has to be for a price paid or promised or part paid or part promised. Price thus constitutes an essential ingredient of transfer of sale. The words "price paid or promised" or "part paid or part promised" indicate that actual payment of whole of price, at the time of execution of sale deed, is not a sine qua non to the completion of sale. Even if the whole of price is not paid, but the document is executed, and thereafter registered, if the property is of value of more than Rs. 100/-, the sale would be complete. 95. The decision, therefore, leaves no manner of doubt that it is only when a deed of sale of property in question is registered, the sale of property would be complete and not otherwise. The agreement for sale which was executed by Sri I.F. Agrawal and his sister, Mrs. David clearly stipulates that sale deed shall be executed after requisite permission is obtained from Collector which clearly shows that there was no sale by virtue of document, namely, agreement for sale. The sale was to take place in future which has not accomplished, admittedly when suit was filed and atleast nothing is on record to show before courts below also when matter was pending, that it has been so executed. 96. Be that as it may, whenever it would be executed, only then one can say that sale is complete and not otherwise. 97. Now I come to the legal status and consequences flowing from document, namely, the agreement for sale or contract for sale. 98. The agreement for sale or contract for sale, by itself is not an instrument giving effect to sale of immoveable property. 97. Now I come to the legal status and consequences flowing from document, namely, the agreement for sale or contract for sale. 98. The agreement for sale or contract for sale, by itself is not an instrument giving effect to sale of immoveable property. The title to property agreed to be sold continued to vests in the vendor, in case of agreement for sale, but in case of sale, title or property vests with purchaser. In other words an agreement for sale is an executory contract whereas sale is an executed contract. An agreement for sale does not create an interest in the proposed vendee in the suit property but only creates an enforceable right in parties. An agreement for sale of property, and promise to transfer the property convey the same meaning and effect in law. A promise to transfer property is an agreement for sale of property. 99. In Maung Shwe Goh Vs. Maung Inn, 1917 1) Bom LR 179 the Court considered Section 54 of Act, 1882 and said that a contract for sale by virtue of Section 54 creates no interest in or charge upon the land. 100. Again in Rupchand Balmukund Aharwala Vs. Jankibai Kanhyalal, AIR 1926 Bom 24 the Division Bench of Bombay High Court said that an agreement executed between the parties to divide property at the expiration of litigation would not create any interest on property under the provisions of Section 54 of Act, 1882. A temporary arrangement with regard to profits during litigation is nothing but a system evolved by parties amongst themselves from management of property during litigation, does not mean that it has created any right or interest in property itself. The Court relied on an earlier decision of Privy Council in Rajangam Ayyar Vs. Rajangam Ayyarta, ILR1922) Mad. 373 where a document, i.e., a memorandum regarding secession of jointness of parties making a declaration that from that time forth the parties became entitled to possession and enjoyment of their properties in separate shares and further providing for execution of further deed effectuating partition would mean that document/memorandum itself did not create or declare or assign or limit or extinguish any right or interest in the moveable property. 101. In English Law, there is recognition of two classes of ownership, legal and equitable but this has not been recognized in Indian Law. 101. In English Law, there is recognition of two classes of ownership, legal and equitable but this has not been recognized in Indian Law. Here the Legislature has recognized, in its wisdom, only one owner. There has been a catena of authorities including that of Privy Council in Chhatra Kumari Devi v. Mohan Bikram Shah and Ors., AIR 1931 PC 196 where it was observed that the Indian Law does not recognize legal and equitable estates. The Privy Council referred to and relied on earlier decisions in J.M. Tagore Vs. G.M. Tagore1872) IA Sup. Vol. 47 and Webb Vs. Macpherson,1904) 31 Cal 57. The Privy Council further said that by that law there can be only one owner. 102. It is thus evident that the law as it stand is very clear that contract for sale would not make the purchaser/vendee to be owner in equity of estate so long as the sale deed is executed and registered. Mere execution of contract for sale by itself would not create any right or interest in property. 103. In Rambaran Prosad v. Ram Mohit Hazra and Ors., AIR 1967 SC 744 it was held that a contract for sale does not create any interest in property. A three Judge Bench of the Court noticed distinction in law as it was prior to enactment of Act, 1882 and thereafter. In para 14 of the judgment, it said, that in the case of an agreement for sale entered into, prior to passing of Transfer of Property Act, could have resulted in creating an interest in land itself in favour of purchaser. Thereafter the Court referred to the change resulted with enactment of Act, 1882, and in para 17, said as under ". . . . . a mere contract for sale of immovable property does not create any interest in the immovable property and it therefore follows that the rule of perpetuity cannot be applied to a covenant of pre-emption even though there is no time limit within which the option has to be exercised."emphasis added) 104. The Court also noticed, when agreement itself recited with that sale deed would be executed within three years, the purchaser had a right to sue for specific performance and this by itself mean that agreement for sale does not create any right or interest in property. 105. In Jiwan Das Vs. The Court also noticed, when agreement itself recited with that sale deed would be executed within three years, the purchaser had a right to sue for specific performance and this by itself mean that agreement for sale does not create any right or interest in property. 105. In Jiwan Das Vs. Narain Das, AIR 1981 Delhi 291 a Single Judge in para 10 and 11 of the judgment following Rambaran Prosadsupra) said "10. . . . . . . the law in India does not recognise any such estate. Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act in specific terms provides that a contract for sale does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property. Such contract is merely a document creating a right to obtain another document in the form of sale deed to be registered in accordance with law. In other words, a contract for sale is a right created in personam and not in estate, No privity in estate can be deduced there from which can bind estate, as is the position in cases of mortgage, charge or lease. Of course, such personal right created against the vendor to obtain specific performance can ultimately bind any subsequent transferee who obtains transfer of the property with notice of the agreement of sale. 11. Till, therefore, a decree for specific performance is obtained, the vendor or a purchaser from him is entitled to full enjoyment of the property. In fact, even if a decree for specific performance of contract is obtained, and no sale-deed is actually executed, it cannot be said that any interest in the property has passed." 106. In Sujan Charan Lenka and others Vs. Smt. Pramila Mumari Mohanty and others, AIR 1986 Ori 74 the Court in para 7 of judgment said that a bare contract for sale of immoveable property does not create any interest in immoveable property. Referring to Section 54 of Act, 1882, it says "7. . . . . . a contract for sale does not, by itself, create any interest in or charge on such property. Such contract is merely a document creating a right to obtain another document in the form of sale deed to be registered in accordance with law. In other words, a contract for sale is a right created in personam and not in estate. a contract for sale does not, by itself, create any interest in or charge on such property. Such contract is merely a document creating a right to obtain another document in the form of sale deed to be registered in accordance with law. In other words, a contract for sale is a right created in personam and not in estate. No privity in estate can be deduced therefrom which can bind the estate, as is the position in cases of mortgage, charge or lease. Of course, such personal right created against the vendor to obtain specific performance can ultimately bind any subsequent transferee who obtains transfer of the property with notice of the agreement of sale. Till, therefore, a decree for specific performance is obtained, the vendor or a purchaser from him is entitled to full enjoyment of the property. In fact, even if a decree for specific performance of contract is obtained, and no sale-deed is actually executed, it cannot be said that any interest in the property has passed." 107. A Division Bench in Dewan and sons Investments Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Delhi Development Authority, AIR 1997 Delhi 388 said "6. In our opinion, the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that as a result of agreement to still dated the 1st May. 1970 in respect of the properly in question, entered into between the petitioner and M/s. Goodwill India Limited, the petitioner had acquired a 'vested right' not only in the property in question bill also to claim a 'No Objection Certificate' on that basis, is devoid of substance. . . . . . . In Kanaya Ram v. Rajender Kumar, AIR 1985 SC 371 their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that in cases where after oral sales mutation of lands was effected in favour of the transferees even then i.e. after the mutation of properties, no rights accrued in favour of the transferees in respect of such lands as the purported sales and the subsequent mutation based on those sales did not create any right or title in favour of the transferees as the provisions of Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act were not complied with-their being no registered sale deeds. In the present case too the agreement to sell dated the 1st May, 1970 in the absence of any registered sale deed by itself would not be sufficient to create any right or title in favour of the petitioner in respect of the property in question. The registered sale deed, admittedly, in respect of the property in question, was executed on 13-2-90 and thus the petitioners acquired a right and a title in respect of the property in question only after the execution of the registered sale deed on 13-2-90."emphasis added) 108. A person who has contracted to buy land is not the owner of any interest in the land and is, therefore, not competent to apply to set aside an execution sale of the same land. 109. Section 54 itself says that a contract for sale does not create any interest in or charge upon such property. This is what has been noticed by this Court in Indira Fruits and General Market, Meerut Vs. Bijendra Kumar Gupta, AIR 1995 All 316 . 110. In other words, a person having an agreement for sale in his favour does not get any right in the property except the right of litigation on that basis. Sometimes it is also described that a contract for sale is merely a document, creating a right to obtain another document. 111. In Imtiaz Ali Vs. Nasim Ahmed, AIR 1987 Del 36 it was said that in absence of a registered sale deed, nobody can call himself as owner by purchase, on the basis of agreement for sale and power of attorney executed by alleged vendor in favour of prospective purchaser cum attorney. The agreement for sale, therefore, by itself does not create any status to petitioner to enter into the shoes of owner of building in dispute. 112. Coming to the aspect of the alleged right conferred about collection of rent, this Court finds that no such right as such was conferred upon the second party in the deed of agreement which constituted Sri V.K. Agrawal, petitioner and his wife Smt. Asha Agrawal. Clause 8 of agreement for sale stipulates that parties to agreement shall authorize their said attorney to realize rent from other tenants and issue receipt for the same. This agreement itself has been signed by first party and second party both. Clause 8 of agreement for sale stipulates that parties to agreement shall authorize their said attorney to realize rent from other tenants and issue receipt for the same. This agreement itself has been signed by first party and second party both. They all refer to their own said attorney but who the said attorney is, not stated anywhere in this agreement. 113. In any case, the authorization of collection of rent at the best can be said to be an interest creating in respect to property in dispute but not that any interest was created in property. Whatever may be the contention, but it cannot go to the extent of claiming that stipulations contained in agreement for sale went to the extent of creating right and interest of petitioner so as to confer upon him any indicia of ownership of property in dispute or permit him entry into shoes of real owners. 114. Be that as it may, the parties agreed that there would be an authorization to collect rent to the attorney who would be collecting it from other tenants, issuing receipt for the same, and, rent so realized from tenants will go to the second party. It need not be addressed that second party is not the petitioner alone but it constitutes petitioner as well as Smt. Asha Agrawal both. Now for the purpose of attorney, though agreement for sale itself does not mention anything but this Court finds that a power of attorney was executed only by the owners of property, i.e., Sri I.F. Agrawal and his sister, Smt. Era David in favour of petitioner, i.e., V.K. Agrawal. The authority granted to attorney, besides other, includes collection of rent from other tenants in the house and issue receipt to them. The power of attorney also specifically states that executor had the intention of making power of attorney, irrevocable. Therefore, to find out whether power of attorney executed in favour of petitioner is irrevocable or not, one may not, need to go, to any other material, since the instrument itself makes intention of executor clear that he is executing an irrevocable power of attorney. But here again this is a matter known to executor and the party in whose favour the attorney was executed. But here again this is a matter known to executor and the party in whose favour the attorney was executed. It is not the case of petitioner, since not pleaded before Courts below, and plaint is totally silent on this aspect, that, the terms of power of attorney were communicated to respondent no. 3 and he was made known about all these facts. 115. On the contrary, vis a vis the owner of building in dispute and respondent no. 3, the petitioner's authority to collect rent and respondent no. 3's volition to pay rent to him is founded only on owner's letter dated 08.11.1982 whereby he requested the tenant to handover monthly rent henceforth to Sri V.K. Agrawal. 116. It is a simple letter, by owner of property in dispute to tenant to handover rent to an individual and, complying thereto, respondent no. 3 started paying rent to petitioner. Such kind of instruction issued by landlord is always liable to modification, change or cancellation. Respondent no. 3 honestly complied with aforesaid instructions of owner-landlord for almost 14 years but in December, 1996 when he received the letter dated 23.12.1996 from one Sri Alok Dey that now authority of petitioner has been revoked and heAlok Dey) has been made attorney to collect rent from respondent no. 3, there was nothing uncommon or a strange behaviour on the part of respondent no. 3 if he asked petitioner to clarify, whether his authority to collect rent still continues or not. Without communicating and clarifying position to respondent no. 3, petitioner, straightaway, came to court, instituting suit alleging that respondent no. 3 is guilty of renouncing petitioner's status as landlord which, in my view, is totally misconceived and untenable in law. It thus cannot be said that respondent no. 3 renounced even the status of petitioner as landlord, what to say of his title. 117. The discussion made above leaves no manner of doubt that agreement for sale did not confer any title or ownership upon petitioner in respect to property in dispute and such status cannot be claimed by petitioner unless there is a sale deed in respect to building in dispute transferring ownership and title from real existing owners to petitioner and/or to anybody else. 118. So far as document relating to free hold is concerned, that would not turn the case either way. 118. So far as document relating to free hold is concerned, that would not turn the case either way. It was in respect to only the lease hold land. Here also, the learned counsel for respondent no. 3 has raised serious doubts over the correctness and legality of free hold document but for the purpose of present case, I need not, go into this question for the reason that Act, 1972 is applicable on rented building and, therefore, I am concerned with rented building. The rented building is not owned by State and the act of Collector in making the land free hold would not result in making petitioner, owner of building also, which in fact, is owned by Sri I.F. Agrawal and Sm.t Era Devid and this ownership can be transferred to petitioner or anybody else only when a sale deed duly registered in respect to building is executed by its owner. 119. Sri Manish Goyal, learned counsel for the petitioner has endeavoured to counter above situation by referring to Section 8 of Act, 1882. I, however, do not find the same to be applicable in the present case. It reads as under "8. Operation of transfer.--Unless a different intention is expressed or necessarily implied, a transfer of property passes forthwith to the transferee all the interest which the transferor is then capable of passing in the property and in the legal incidents thereof. Such incidents include, where the property is land, the easements annexed thereto, the rents and profits thereof accruing after the transfer, and all things attached to the earth; and, where the property is machinery attached to the earth, the movable parts thereof. and, where the property is a house, the easements annexed thereto, the rent thereof accruing after the transfer, and the locks, keys, bars, doors, windows, and all other things provided for permanent use therewith; and, where the property is a debt or other actionable claim, the securities thereofexcept where they are also for other debts or claims not transferred to the transferee), but not arrears of interest accrued before the transfer; and, where the property is money or other property yielding income, the interest or income thereof accruing after the transfer takes effect."emphasis added) 120. Sri Goyal has tried to put stress on the words "all things attached to the earth shall stand transferred to vendee when property is land". Sri Goyal has tried to put stress on the words "all things attached to the earth shall stand transferred to vendee when property is land". He referred to the meaning of words "attached to earth" as contained in Section 3, which reads as under "3. Interpretation-clause.-- . . . . . . . 'attached to the earth' means-- a) rooted in the earth, as in the case of trees and shrubs; b) imbedded in the earth, as in the case of walls or buildings; or c) attached to what is so imbedded for the permanent beneficial enjoyment of that to which it is attached;" 121. He said that with the land transferred to him as freehold, the building also stood transferred. In my view, he has read these words bereft of the words that "only such interest shall be passed on which the transferor is capable of passing in his capacity". The State or the Collector had no authority, interest or capacity over the building since it is owned by the individuals who constructed the same. It is not the case of petitioner, either pleaded anywhere or before this Court, that State was capable of passing him any interest in the building also when it conferred free hold rights over the land in question upon petitioner by way of free hold deed. 122. Section 8 would be attracted only to the extent that transfer passes all interest of transferor and not beyond that. 123. Here there are some authorities I may refer which would demonstrate fallacy in the arguments of learned counsel for the petitioner. 124. The first decision is Kanhaiya Lal Vs. Sheva Lal, AIR 1936 All 14. Sir Syed Sulaiman, J. pointed out that when a co-sharer built a residential house on a land of which he is the co-sharer then his rights can be decided in to three parts,i) a joint right in the site;ii) a proprietary right in the materials; andiii) a right of residence in the house situated on the site. If his Zamindari is sold, there can be no doubt that his joint right in the site must go with it but it does not necessarily follow that the proprietary right in the materials and his right of residence must also pass. 125. Next comes Narayan Das Vs. Jatindra Nath, AIR 1927 PC 135 . If his Zamindari is sold, there can be no doubt that his joint right in the site must go with it but it does not necessarily follow that the proprietary right in the materials and his right of residence must also pass. 125. Next comes Narayan Das Vs. Jatindra Nath, AIR 1927 PC 135 . Their Lordships of Judicial Committee said "Having special regard to the view held in India respecting the separation of the ownership of the buildings from the ownership of the land, and to the recognition by the Courts in India that there is no rule of law that whatever is affixed or built on the soil becomes a part of it and is subjected to the same rights of property as the soil itself, their Lordships are of opinion that in order to make a house erected upon the land, as well as the land itself, subject to the Government power of sale for arrears of revenue special words indicating the intention of the Legislature to make the building subject to sale would be necessary." 126. A Full Benchseven Judges) of this Court in Deota Din Vs. Gur Prasad and another, AIR 1955 All 292 considered Sections 3 and 8 of Act, 1882 and in paras 19 and 20 of the judgment, said "19. Reliance is placed on Section 8 of the Transfer of Property Act. The first part of the section is general and deals with transfer of property, and provides that when property is transferred in the absence of any intention which is express or is necessarily implied, the transfer passes forthwith to the transferee all the interest which the transferor is then capable of passing in the property and in the legal incidents thereof. Under this clause when a Zamindari share is transferred, along with the transfer must pass interest which the transferor had in that share and in the legal incidents thereof so that anything appurtenant to the zamindari share must go along with it. This will not advance the case of the respondents any further as it would have to be decided whether a residential family house is or is not appurtenant to the zamindari. This will not advance the case of the respondents any further as it would have to be decided whether a residential family house is or is not appurtenant to the zamindari. Reliance is, therefore, placed on the second clause that "Such incidents include, where the property is land, the easements annexed thereto, the rents and profits thereof accruing after the transfer, and all things attached to the earth." . . . . . . . . . . . It is urged that Section 8 read with Section 3 makes it clear that where land is sold, the buildings situated on it must be deemed to have been sold along with it. Two things have to be kept in mind in this connection. The section is subject to the exception that this result, would not follow if a different intention is expressed or is necessarily implied. There is no rule of law in India, as was pointed out by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Narayan Das's caseB), that whatever is affixed or built on the soil becomes a part of it and is subject to the same rights of property as the soil itself. Unless the transfer makes it clear that the residential house of the zamindar was intended to be included, it must necessarily be implied that it was not intended that it should be included. Moreover the sale of a share in a mahal or even the sale of the entire mahal is not necessarily a transfer of land, at least, it is not a transfer of land as such. " A Zamindar has got certain rights in a mahal. These rights may give him the right to remain in possession of certain lands situated within that area but when a share in the mahal is sold, it cannot be said that it is a sale of any specific plot of land. The section deals with the sale of land as such and in the case of a sale of a plot of land there is a presumption that everything that is attached to the earth goes with it but the same presumption does not necessarily arise where a share in a mahal or even the whole mahal is sold."emphasis added) 127. The above provision also came to be considered in Krishna Mohan and another Vs. Balkrishna ChaturvediDead) through L.Rs. The above provision also came to be considered in Krishna Mohan and another Vs. Balkrishna ChaturvediDead) through L.Rs. and others, AIR 2001 All 334 and this Court concluded that unless it is shown that alongwith land the structure or house has also been sold, no right in structure/house would be acquired by purchaser even by virtue of Section 8 of Act, 1882. 128. To the same effect is the earlier decision in Jatindra Nath Roy Chowdhury and others Vs. Narayan Das Khetry,AIR 1926 Cal 97where in para 14 of the judgment the Court said "14. . . . . the ownership of the structures or buildings, which were admittedly erected by the appellants' predecessor the defaulting proprietor, did not pass to the respondent, the purchase." 129. In the present case the free hold deed by itself cannot be said to be a general sale of property by estate to an individual. The real owners did possess the lease rights. Under the agreement for sale dated 21.08.1982 they agreed to transfer lease rights over land in question to petitioner and to sell house and building erected thereon, of which they are owners, to petitioner on execution of sale deed. The State Government formulated a policy of converting lease rights into free hold rights in respect of Nazul land, which is land in question. Founded on said scheme of State Government, under various Government orders, the petitioner directly applied to Collector, Allahabad for converting lease rights in respect to land in dispute, in free hold rights, in his favour, based on agreement dated 21.08.1982 whereby the lease rights in respect of land only were agreed to be transferred by original lease holders to petitioner. This request was admitted and in terms of that scheme, the lease rights of erstwhile lease holders were converted into free hold rights in the name of petitioner. The free hold rights vide agreement dated 21.08.1982 thus are confined only to the land and not to anything else. Even otherwise, it does not mention that structure and houses existing or built on land in question would also stand transferred to petitioner. In fact the Collector himself had no authority in any manner to make a transaction in respect to structures etc. existing over land in question. Even otherwise, it does not mention that structure and houses existing or built on land in question would also stand transferred to petitioner. In fact the Collector himself had no authority in any manner to make a transaction in respect to structures etc. existing over land in question. The State could have converted lease rights into free hold by transferring only that much rights and interest which itself possessed and not otherwise. The submissions, therefore, advanced with referred to Section 8 of Act, 1882, in my view, has no substances and has to be rejected. I hold accordingly. 130. In view of the discussion above, I am clearly of the view that neither the petitioner was owner of the building in dispute nor the sole landlord, nor was competent to initiate proceedings for eviction of respondent no. 3, a tenant inducted by the owners of the building and therefore, the courts below have rightly passed impugned judgements. Moreover, even the allegation that there was denial of status of petitioner as landlord by respondent no. 3, is not substantiated. 131. In view of above discussion, the further question, whether respondent no. 3 made any structural alteration in building in dispute or there is any other ground need not be adjudicated for the reason that petitioner had no authority being not an owner/landlord of the building in dispute to oust respondent no. 3 by invoking Section 20 2) of Act, 1972 and, therefore, I find no apparent or otherwise error, legal or factual, in the judgments under consideration warranting interference. 132. The writ petition is devoid of merit. It is accordingly dismissed. 133. However, there shall be no order as to costs.