Research › Search › Judgment

Punjab High Court · body

2013 DIGILAW 296 (PNJ)

Surender v. State of Haryana

2013-03-04

Amol Rattan Singh, Satish Kumar Mittal

body2013
JUDGMENT Mr. Satish Kumar Mittal, J.:- This order shall dispose of C.W.P. Nos.20614 of 2011, 20836 of 2011, 20840 of 2011, 16676 of 2012, 17424 of 2012 and 17616 of 2012 as the common question of facts and law is involved in these petitions. 2. For facility of reference, the facts are extracted from C.W.P. No.20614 of 2011. 3. In this writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 27.5.2011 (Annexure P5) passed by the Estate Officer, HUDA, Jagadhri, whereby in pursuance of a direction issued by this Court vide order dated 10.11.2000 in the earlier petitions filed by the petitioners, respondent No.3 was directed to pass a speaking order after providing an opportunity of hearing to the petitioners. In the said order, it was specifically made clear that the petitioners shall not be entitled to benefit of allotment of plots in their favour unless the fresh orders are passed by the competent authority in terms of the said direction. The Estate Officer vide impugned order cancelled the draw of lots conducted on 7.7.2008 qua the applicants of category SC/ST Group ‘A’ and SC/ST Group ‘B’ separately and it was directed that conduct of draw of lots of two Groups separately by dividing the SC and ST category is contrary to the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and this Court, and, as such, he ordered for re-conduct of the draw of lots of all the applicants of SCs/STs, irrespective of Group ‘A’ and Group ‘B’. It has been specifically mentioned that if any of the petitioners does not want to participate in the fresh draw of lots, it will be open to him to seek refund of the earnest money deposited by him and the same may be made to him, and the applications of all the willing applicants, who want to participate in the fresh draw of lots, be included. 4. After the written statement filed by respondents No.2 and 3, we have heard the learned counsel for the parties. 5. In this case, in the year 2008 the HUDA made advertisement for allotment of plots in Sector 17, Part-II, Jagadhri by draw of lots. In the said advertisement, some plots were reserved for various categories, including the category of SC/ST of Group ‘A’ and Group ‘B’. 5. In this case, in the year 2008 the HUDA made advertisement for allotment of plots in Sector 17, Part-II, Jagadhri by draw of lots. In the said advertisement, some plots were reserved for various categories, including the category of SC/ST of Group ‘A’ and Group ‘B’. The 7.5% reservations were made in SC/ST category of Group ‘A’ and Group ‘B’ in 4 marla and 6 marla plots only. After receiving the applications for the allotment of those plots in the reserved category separately for both Group ‘A’ and Group ‘B’, the draw of lots was held for the said reserved category for two groups separately on 7.7.2008. During the process of issuance of the allotment letters, on the representation made by the Haryana Pradesh Chamar Mahasabha, the draw of lots held on 7.7.2008 was cancelled in view of the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in E.V. Chinnaiah Versus State of Andhra Pradesh and Others, (2005) 1 SCC 394 and this Court in Smt. Saroj @ Manju Versus The State of Haryana and others (CWP No.16660 of 2009, decided on 11.8.2010) as well as the subsequent Instructions dated 7.6.2007 issued by the State Government. The said order dated 30.10.2009 was challenged by the petitioners in their earlier petitions, being non-speaking order. Now, upon directions of this Court, vide impugned order dated 27.5.2011, the draw of lots held on 7.7.2008 has been cancelled by passing a speaking order. Hence this petition. 6. The issue raised in these petitions is whether the members of the Scheduled Castes can be divided into two groups, i.e., Group ‘A’ and Group ‘B’ on the basis of their most backward amongst Backward Classes and whether such further classification amongst the members of the SC/ST is constitutionally permitted. This issue has been decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in E.V. Chinnaiah’s case (supra), wherein it was held as under:- “The very fact that the members of the Scheduled Castes are most backward amongst the backward classes and the impugned legislation having already proceeded on the basis that they are not adequately represented both in terms of Clause (4) of Article 15 and Clause (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution, a further classification by way of micro classification is not permissible. Such classification of the members of different classes of people based on their respective castes would also be violative of the doctrine of reasonableness. Such classification of the members of different classes of people based on their respective castes would also be violative of the doctrine of reasonableness. Article 341 provides that exclusion even of a part or a group of castes from the Presidential List can be done only by Parliament. The logical corollary thereof would be that the State Legislatures are forbidden from doing that. A uniform yardstick must be adopted for giving benefits to the members of the Scheduled Castes for the purpose of the Constitution. The impugned legislation being contrary to the above constitutional scheme cannot, therefore, be sustained.” 7. This Court in Smt. Saroj a lias Manju’s case (supra) while relying upon the aforesaid judgment has affirmed the action of the authority in light of the earlier judgment of this Court in the case of Gajay Singh Muwal Versus State of Haryana and Others, (CWP No.398 of 2004), wherein this Court has quashed the Instructions dated 9.11.1994 by holding that:- “We, accordingly, find that the present controversy is fully covered by the decision of Supreme Court in the case of E.V. Chinnaiah’s case (supra). We, accordingly, would quash the Notification No.22/55/90-3GS-III, dated 9.11.1994 holding the same to be ultra vires of the Constitution.” 8. It is pertinent to mention here that the earlier Instructions dated 9.11.1994 issued by the Haryana Government have already been withdrawn vide subsequent notification dated 7.6.2007, i.e., much before the advertisement in question inviting applications for allotment of plots, i.e., on 7.1.2008. However, in the advertisement the aforesaid judicial pronouncements and the subsequent notification dated 7.6.2007 issued by the State Government could not be taken note of. The Instructions dated 7.6.2007 read as under:- “I am directed to refer to Haryana Government letter No.22/55/90-3GS-III, dated 9.11.1994 on the subject noted above which inter alia laid down that for the purpose of reservation in services, Scheduled Castes in Haryana would be put in two categories i.e. Block A and Block B in direct recruitment. These instructions had been challenged in the Hon’ble Punjab & Haryana High Court by way of Writ Petition 398 of 2004 - Gajay Singh Muwal Vs. State of Haryana and other 3 Civil Writ Petitions. These instructions had been challenged in the Hon’ble Punjab & Haryana High Court by way of Writ Petition 398 of 2004 - Gajay Singh Muwal Vs. State of Haryana and other 3 Civil Writ Petitions. The Hon’ble High Court vide its common judgment/orders dated 6.7.2006 has quashed the above instructions dated 9.11.1994 in the following terms:- “We accordingly, find that the present controversy is fully covered by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case E.V. Chinnaiah’s case (Supra). We, accordingly, would quash the Notification No.22/55/90-3GS-III, dated 9.11.1994 holding the same to be ultra vires of the Constitution.” The State Government has filed a Special Leave Petition CC No.1789 of 2007 - State of Haryana Vs. Gajay Singh Muwal along with an application for staying the operation of the judgment/orders dated 6.7.2006 of the Hon’ble High Court in the said case. Similar SLPs have been filed by some private respondents also. However, these SLPs have neither been listed for hearing nor any stay has been granted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, so far. Under these circumstances the State Government on reconsideration of the matter, has decided to withdraw instructions bearing No.22/55/90-3GS-III, dated 9.11.1994 subject to the final decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the SLPs referred to above. Consequently, there will be no categorisation of the Scheduled Castes into A and B blocks. The vacancies meant for direct recruitment to reserved category of Scheduled Castes will be notified to the recruiting agencies without categorisation of Scheduled Castes in A & B Blocks.” 9. It has not been disputed before us that the respondents have bifurcated the members of the Scheduled Castes in two groups while inviting the applications for allotment of the plots in view of the earlier notification dated 9.11.1994 which stands quashed by this Court. Thus, the issue with regard to creation of sub-classes among the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes has already been decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and this Court against the petitioners. Thus, we do not find any illegality in the impugned order passed by respondent No.3 in cancelling the earlier draw of lots and ordering for re-conduct of the draw of lots. Further, merely on the basis of the pendency of the SLP in the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the impugned order cannot be invalidated. Thus, we do not find any illegality in the impugned order passed by respondent No.3 in cancelling the earlier draw of lots and ordering for re-conduct of the draw of lots. Further, merely on the basis of the pendency of the SLP in the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the impugned order cannot be invalidated. In our opinion, bifurcation of the Scheduled Castes category in two groups is totally contrary to the law laid down, for the purpose of employment and even for the purpose of making allotment of the plots. Thus,no prejudice is to be caused to the petitioners as their right to participate afresh in the draw of lots has not been taken away. 10. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the respondent-HUDA is bound by its advertisement on the principle of promissory estoppel. This contention of the learned counsel cannot be accepted because the principle of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked against the statutes and mandates of the Constitution. It is settled proposition of law that estoppel does not lie against the statute. In this regard, a Division Bench of this Court in Kabul Singh Versus Punjab Urban Planning and Development Authority, 1997(2) R.C.R. (Civil) 498 has held that promise against the Statute and public policy by the Public Authority cannot be enforced in law. It has been further held that the Public Authority cannot make any promise contrary to law to give preferential treatment to any one in violation to the principle of equality before law. Further, it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shree Sidhbali Steels Ltd. Versus State of U.P., AIR 2011 SC 1175 that the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked for enforcement of a promise made contrary to law, because none can be compelled to act against the statute. 11. In view of the aforesaid, we do not find any illegality or perversity in the impugned order passed by respondent No.3. 12. Hence, the writ petitions are dismissed being devoid of merit. ---------0.B.S.0-----------