Sudhir Agarwal, J.— 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 2. The first floor of accommodation in question namely house No.3/20 (old) part of 64 (new), Dev Nagar, Mission Compound, Begum Bridge Road, Meeerut was declared vacant by Rent Control & Eviction Officer /Delegated Authority, Meerut (hereinafter referred to as "RCEO") whereafter petitioner-landlord moved an application under Section 16(i)(b) of Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as "Act, 1972") for release of said accommodation but the same was rejected by RECO vide order dated 26.11.1999 and he proceeded for allotment of accommodation whereagainst petitioner preferred S.C.C. Revision No.394 of 1999. 3. While revision was pending, prospective allottees namely respondents No.1 and 2 moved an application that they should also be heard in opposition of landlord's release application whereupon impugned order dated 15.5.2004 has been passed by Special Judge (Anti/Corruption), Meeru, Revisional Court whereby he has not allowed prospective allottees to become party in the matter but has permitted them to address the Court in opposition of petitioner's application. 4. It has been settled long back by Full Bench decision of this Court in Talib Hasan and another Vs. 1st Additional District Judge and others, 1986 (1) ARC 1 that no allotment in respect of a building covered by an application under Section 16(1)(b) of the Act can be made unless such an application is rejected and the right of a prospective allottee to have his application considered can, therefore, arise only after the rejection of the application of the landlord. The Full Bench also observed that neither the Act nor the Rules postulate any right in the prospective allottee to file an objection against the release application and nor does the prospective allottee have any right or interest in the property or claim against the landlord so as to enable him to any hearing in the disposal of the release application. The Full Bench further observed that even after deletion of the old Rule 13 (4) there is no change in the legal position of a prospective allottee to have any locus standi in the disposal of the release application. The Full Bench made it clear that a prospective has only a contingent right which can be exercised only if the accommodation is not released in favour of the landlord. The relevant observations are : "26. The Full Bench made it clear that a prospective has only a contingent right which can be exercised only if the accommodation is not released in favour of the landlord. The relevant observations are : "26. The right of a prospective allottee is not an absolute right. It is contingent upon, firstly, the accommodation being vacant and, secondly, the building being available for allotment. Rule 13(4), as it stands, at present reinforces this conclusion. It provides that no allotment in respect of a building covered by an application under Section 16 (1) (b) shall be made unless such application is rejected. The right of a prospective allottee to have his application considered hence arise only after the rejection of the landlord's application under Section 16 (1) (b). A fortiori the prospective allottee comes into the picture only after the disposal of the landlord's application for release under Section 16 (1) (b), and, only if the same is rejected. 27. So far, therefore, as the scheme of the Act and the rules framed thereunder is concerned, the same, in our opinion, clearly points to the conclusion that a prospective allottee has no right of objection against the release application filed under Section 16 (1) (b). As mentioned above, this right to have this application considered for allotment accrues only after the rejection of the release application. Indeed the consideration of the applications for allotment is taken up only after the rejection of the application under Section 16 (1) (b). Neither the Act nor the rules framed thereunder thus postulate any right in a prospective allottee to file objections against the release application. 28. The prospective allottee has also no right or interest in the property or claim against the landlord so as to be entitled to any hearing in the disposal of the release application on general principles or doctrine of audi alteram partem. 29. We have reached the above conclusion on a systematic analysis of the statute even without the aid of the old Rule 13 (4). The old Rule 13 (4), in our opinion, which was dropped in 1977, merely recognized the long settled legal position as spelled out by series of decisions rendered on the construction and scope of Rule 5 framed under the 1947 Act. It was purely declaratory in nature and appears to have been inserted by way of reiteration of the existing legal position. It was purely declaratory in nature and appears to have been inserted by way of reiteration of the existing legal position. Its deletion hence did not, in our considered view, bring about any change in the legal position, namely, that prospective allottees have no locus standi in the disposal of an application for release under Section 16 (1) (b)." 37. Learned counsel for the petitioner next placed reliance on Section 16 (1) and submitted that the right of a prospective allottee to file an objection under Section 16 (1) (b) is implicit in that provision. We cannot accept the contention. The only right which the allottee has under Section 16 (1) is to apply for allotment of an accommodation if the same is vacant. There is nothing in Section 16 (1) (b) which may indicate directly or by implication that the prospective allottee has a right of objection under that provision. As discussed above, the prospective allottee has only a contingent right exercisable only in case the accommodation is vacant and only if the same is not released in favour of the landlord. 38. The third submission of the learned counsel as that the rejection of the allottee's application entails civil consequences and consequently on the principle of audi alteram partem the prospective allottee is entitled to be heard even in an application under Section 16 (1) (b). 39. The submission is devoid of any merit. The principle of audi alteram partem presupposes existence of some right or interest in the subject matter of the lis. We have demonstrated above that the prospective allottee has no right or claim against the landlord nor any interest in the accommodation in dispute. He has, therefore, no right to be heard in opposition to an application for release filed by the landlord even on the above principle. Further, the allottee's application is rejected on the accommodation being released in favour of the landlord not on the merits of his claim so as to justify giving of any hearing to the applicant but on the ground that the same is not entertainable because the accommodation is not available for allotment. If the District Magistrate is satisfied that the accommodation is bona fide required by the landlord, it goes out of the pool of allotment." 5. If the District Magistrate is satisfied that the accommodation is bona fide required by the landlord, it goes out of the pool of allotment." 5. The view taken by the Full Bench of this Court found approval of the Apex Court in Vijay Kumar Sonkar Vs. Incharge District Judge, and others, 1995 (2) ARC-1 and the Court said: "2. The distinction between the two orders envisaged in sub-section (1) is well marked. In the case of an allotment order the result is brought about by a dialogue between the prospective tenant and the District Magistrate, thereafter, under whose orders the landlord is required to let any building to the prospective tenant. On the other hand, in the case of a release order the dialogue takes place between the District Magistrates and the landlord and the prospective tenant does not figure in it at all. The allotment order and the release order, as the case may be, being mutually exclusive, have separate areas of operation permitting no encroachment of one over the other. The mere fact that the focal point is the District Magistrate from whom flow the respective orders is of no consequence. It is on this understanding of the law that the High Court relying on its Full Bench decision in the case of Talib Husain Vs. 1st Additional District Judge, 1986 (1) ARC 1 (SC) rejected the prayer of the prospective tenant that he had a right to be heard in a release application of the landlord based as it was on the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 16 on ground of bona fide requirement. On the allowing of the release application the premises in question ceased to be allotable and since the District Magistrate, thereafter would have no jurisdiction to make an allotment thereof and the prospective tenant consequently has no right to resist the landlord in release proceedings. The view of the High Court seems to us to be correct in the circumstances of the case as also in law because as of today no allotment order subsists in favour of the appellant and yet he continues to be in possession." 6. In view thereof, Revisional Court in so far as permitted prospective allottee to address the Court for opposing petitioner's release application under Section 16 of Act, 1972 by hearing the revision is not justified. 7. In view thereof, Revisional Court in so far as permitted prospective allottee to address the Court for opposing petitioner's release application under Section 16 of Act, 1972 by hearing the revision is not justified. 7. In the circumstances, modifying the impugned order, the Revisional Court is directed to consider petitioner's revision and decide the same expeditiously within three months but it shall not allow hearing of any prospective allottee to oppose release application. 8. The writ petition is disposed of accordingly. _____________