JUDGMENT Hon’ble Ran Vijai Singh, J.—Heard Sri Arun Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner. No one is present on behalf of the respondents even in the revised list. 2. This writ petition has been filed with the prayer to quash the order dated 27.7.1976 passed by Deputy Director of Consolidation in Revision No. 2778/5228 (Mu. Kishun Jotiya v. Bhola). The order impugned has been challenged on the ground that the respondent no. 2 has neither filed any objection nor appeal against the allotment of chak to the petitioner. However, it appears she filed an application before the Deputy Director of Consolidation ( in short D.D.C.) raising her grievance against one Sri Bhola Bhagat without raising any grievance against the petitioner. The said application, it appears, was treated as revision and was allowed by the impugned order dated 27.7.1976 .The submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that neither the petitioner was party nor he was ever noticed and without hearing the petitioner, the impugned order was passed which has caused serious prejudice to the petitioner. In paragraph 4 of the writ petition, it is stated that the respondent no. 2 was chak holder of Chak No. 66 in the provisional consolidation scheme and she did not file any objection or appeal. In paragraph 5, it is stated that the Plot Nos. 4709 and 4947 were the original plot of respondent no. 2 and were allotted to Sri Bhola Bhagat and Sri Bhola Bhagat was party in the revision. In paragraph 7 it is stated that the petitioner was never served with any notice of the application. The reply of paragraph 4 of the writ petition has been given in paragraph 5 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondent no. 4. There is a vague denial without there being any concrete material establishing that the respondent no.2 has ever filed any objection or appeal before the Settlement Officer Consolidation. There is also no specific denial with regard to the service of notice on the petitioner while passing the order by the Deputy Director of Consolidation. From the perusal of the judgment of the Deputy Director of Consolidation it do not transpire that the petitioner who happens to be chak holder of Chak No.1052 has ever been noticed and heard. The case of the petitioner has not been considered while passing the impugned order. 3. From the perusal of the judgment of the Deputy Director of Consolidation it do not transpire that the petitioner who happens to be chak holder of Chak No.1052 has ever been noticed and heard. The case of the petitioner has not been considered while passing the impugned order. 3. I have gone through the impugned judgment. After going through the same, I am of the opinion that before passing the impugned order dated 27.7.1976 the petitioner was not heard as the specific averments made by the petitioner in the writ petition has not been denied. However, a bald statement has been made in paragraph 7 of the counter-affidavit that the petitioner has signed the order-sheet and certified copy of the order-sheet should be shown to the Court at the time of hearing. Except this, there is no material on record to indicate that the petitioner was ever noticed and heard. As neither the order-sheet has been brought on record nor anybody appeared on behalf of the respondents, therefore, in my considered opinion, the order impugned suffers from breach of principle of natural justice. 4. It may be noticed that in para 11 of the writ petition, the petitoner has stated that the respondent no. 2 has neither filed any revision nor any reference was made by any subordinate authority under sub-section (3) of Section 48 of the Act. The reply of the same has been given in para 12 of the counter-affidavit in which this fact has not been denied and it is only stated that D.D.C. has very wide power to pass such order under Section 48 of the Act. I am of the opinion that there cannot be two views in this regard that the D.D.C. has very wide power under Section 48 of the Act but the power can always be exercised by the D.D.C. only under Section (1) of Section 48 either it is reference made by the subordinate authority under sub-section (3) of Section 48 or revision filed under Section 48 (1). For appreciating the controversy, the language used in sub-section (1) and (3) of Section 48 is reproduced hereinunder : (1) The Director of Consolidation may call for and examine the record of any case decided or proceedings taken by any subordinate authority for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the regularity of the proceedings; or as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any order (other than an interlocutory order) passed by such authority in the case or proceedings, may, after allowing the parties concerned an opportunity of being heard, make such order in the case or proceedings as he thinks fit. (3) Any authority subordinate to the Director of Consolidation may, after allowing the parties concerned an opportunity of being heard, refer the record of any case or proceedings to the Director of Consolidation for action under sub-section (1). 5. From the bare reading of sub-section (3), it appears that any subordinate authority to the D.D.C. can make reference before him but that has to be heard only under Sub-section (1) of Section 48. Further Sub-section (1) of Section 48 provides that final order can be passed by the D.D.C. only after due notice and hearing of the affected parties. This Court in the case of Smt. Dukhani and another v. State of U.P. and others, passed in Writ Petition No. 42057 of 2012 has held that provisions contained either under sub-section (3) or (1) are mandatory in nature and non-compliance of which leads the proceeding void. Here, from the perusal of record and submission of the petitioner’s counsel it would appear that the order impugned has been passed without notice or hearing to the petitioner therefore the same is against the statutory requirement which amounts to an illegal and void order. 6. It is settled that every order either it is administrative or judicial or quasi-judicial must be passed in conformity with the principle of natural justice and procedure adopted must be just, fair, reasonable and confirm the test of Article 14 of the Constitution. It is also held that even in the statute which does not require notice before passing the order, party should not be condemned unheard. In both ways, impugned order cannot be sustained in the eye of law. It is also held that even in the statute which does not require notice before passing the order, party should not be condemned unheard. In both ways, impugned order cannot be sustained in the eye of law. Reference may be given to the judgment of the Apex Court in State of W.B. v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, 1952 SCR 284 , Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248 , Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, (1978) 1 SCC 405 , D.K. Yadav v. J.M.A. Industries Ltd., 1993, 3 SCC 259, Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, 1998 (8) SCC, Canara Bank v. V.K. Awasthy, 2005 (6) SCC 321, Bidhannagar (Salt Lake) Welfare Assn. v. Central Valuation Board and others, (2007) 6 SCC 668 , and Devdutt v. Union of India and others, 2008 (3) ESC 433 (SC). 7. It is also noticeable that when the writ petition was filed in the year 1976 an interim order was passed directing the respondent not to disturb the petitioner’s chak pursuant to the impugned order dated 27.7.1976, the said order was confirmed after hearing both the sides on 20.12.1977 and the order passed by the D.D.C. has yet not been given effect to. 8. In view of the foregoing discussions, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 27.7.1976 passed by D.D.C. (Annexure 2 to the writ petition) is hereby quashed. The matter is remitted back before the Deputy Director of Consolidation to pass fresh order in accordance with law after hearing all concerned. ——————