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Meghalaya High Court · body

2013 DIGILAW 3 (MEG)

J. N. Bawri v. Union of India & Anr.

2013-04-08

T.NANDAKUMAR SINGH

body2013
Order 1. Heard Mr. B.K. Deb Roy, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner as well as Mr. R. Deb Nath, learned CGC appearing for the respondent No. 1 and Mr. S.P. Mahanta, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 2. 2. By this revision petition, the petitioner/plaintiff is assailing the judgment and order of the District Judge, Shillong dated 21-10-2011 for rejecting the FAO No. 3(H) of 2011 filed against the judgment and order of the trial Court i.e. Munsiff at Shillong dated 26-4-2011 passed in Misc. Case No. 35(H) of 2002 (reference T. S. No. 34(H) of 2002), for returning the plaint for the reason that the value of the relief sought for in the plaint is not properly fixed and as a result proper Court fees are not paid and the value of the suit is not correctly fixed for the purpose of pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit. 3. Over and above, in the judgment and order of the Court below, there is an indication that the respondents/defendants in their pleadings have stated that there is an appropriate forum for the remedy sought for in the plaint. 4. Before considering the adversarial submissions of the parties, it would be beneficial to have a glance of the pleadings of the petitioner/plaintiff in the plaint of the T.S. No. 34(H) of 2002 and the relief sought for in the plaint. 5. The petitioner/plaintiff is a lawful lessee of holding No. 60CB and 60ACB Sy. No. 15/9 situated at Paltan Bazar Lukier Road, Shillong. The petitioner/plaintiff for construction of Residential-cum-Commercial building in the said lessee holding property applied through his valid building application to the Office of the respondent No. 2. After receipt of the said application, the respondent No. 2 informed the petitioner/plaintiff that on preliminary scrutiny of the building application/plan, it was found that the building plan proposed to be erected is falling within the holding No. 60ACB Sy. No. 15/9 and as such one set of building plan was returned for resubmission after duly incorporating exact Holding No. and Sy. No. of the property. 6. The petitioner/plaintiff also pleaded in the plaint that there are irregularities in issuing the orders/letters by the respondents/defendants for the purposes of deciding this revision petition, it would not be required to mention the pleadings of the petitioner/plaintiff in details. No. of the property. 6. The petitioner/plaintiff also pleaded in the plaint that there are irregularities in issuing the orders/letters by the respondents/defendants for the purposes of deciding this revision petition, it would not be required to mention the pleadings of the petitioner/plaintiff in details. The Court is more concerned with the type of relief sought for in the plaint for deciding the nature/type of the suit no doubt the whole pleadings of the petitioner/plaintiff in the plaint are required to be read. Accordingly, this Court has given anxious consideration of the pleadings of the petitioner/plaintiff in the plaint; and the relief sought for by the petitioner/plaintiff in the plaint are:-- “(a) Declaring that the building plans as submitted by the plaintiff on 15-12-1993 and prior thereto under Section 179 of the Cantonment Act, 1924 in response to letter dated 30-11-1993 issued by the defendant is valid and fit for accordance of sanction. (b) Declaring that since the defendant neglected to accord sanction or to refuse sanction of said valid building plan of the plaintiff after receipt of the same and after issue of notice as per provision of Section 181(6) of the Cantonment Act, 1924 it shall be presumed to have been sanctioned by the Board. (c) Declaring that since the sanction of the building plain was in conformity with the provision of Section 181 (6) of the Cantonment Act, 1924 it cannot be termed as unauthorized. (d) Declaring that the claim of the defendant that the construction of the plaintiff is unauthorized, is not proper and legal. (e) Declaring that the imposition of Tax in the plea of unauthorized construction and also imposition of Taxes otherwise is not proper and biased on reasonable calculations in terms of facility to be provided by the Cantonment Board and as such same cannot be levied in any way from the plaintiff. (f) Declaring that unless the construction of the plaintiff is regularized by the defendant, no imposition of taxes is possible to be levied and demanded. (g) Permanent injunction restraining the defendant to charge, demand impose and levy and Taxes from the plaintiff till the suit is finally disposed of. (h) Permanently restraining the defendants to take any action of levy taxes or action of demolition of the building in the name unauthorized construction. (g) Permanent injunction restraining the defendant to charge, demand impose and levy and Taxes from the plaintiff till the suit is finally disposed of. (h) Permanently restraining the defendants to take any action of levy taxes or action of demolition of the building in the name unauthorized construction. (i) Full cost of the suit and such other relief or reliefs to which the plaintiff is found to be entitled to and for which act of kindness as in duty bound the plaintiff shall ever pray.” 7. The general principle which governs the question of jurisdiction at the time of inception of the suit had been discussed by the Apex Court in the case of Raizada Topandas and Anr. v. M/s. Gorakhram Gokalchand, reported in AIR 1964 SC 1348 and held that: “The general principle which governs the question of jurisdiction at the inception of suits is as follows:-- The plaintiff chooses his forum and files his suit if he establishes the correctness of his suit he will get his relief from the forum chosen. If he frames his suit in a manner not warranted by the facts and goes for his relief to a Court which cannot grant him relief on the true facts, he will have his suit dismissed. Then there will be no question of returning the plaint for presentation to the proper Court for the plaint, as framed, would not justify the other kind of Court to grant him the relief. If it is found on a trial on the merits so far as this issue of jurisdiction goes, that the facts alleged by the plaintiff are not true and the facts alleged by the defendants are true, and that the case is not cognizable by the Court, there will be two kinds of orders to be passed. If the jurisdiction is only one relating to territorial limits or pecuniary limits, the plaint will be ordered to be returned for presentation to the proper Court. If, on the other hand, it is found that, having regard to the nature of the suit, it is not cognizable by the class of Court to which the Court belongs, the plaintiff’s suit will have to be dismissed in its entirety.” 8. It is clear from the ratio decidendi of the case of Raizada Topandas and Anr. If, on the other hand, it is found that, having regard to the nature of the suit, it is not cognizable by the class of Court to which the Court belongs, the plaintiff’s suit will have to be dismissed in its entirety.” 8. It is clear from the ratio decidendi of the case of Raizada Topandas and Anr. ( AIR 1964 SC 1348 ) (supra) that the plaintiff chooses his forum and files his suit and if he establishes the correctness of his facts, he will get his relief from the forum he chosen. If the frame of the suit is not in a manner warranted by the facts and also goes for a relief to a Court which cannot grant him relief on the true facts, he will have the suit dismissed. There will be no question of returning the plaint for presentation to the proper Court, for the plaint, as framed, would not justify the other kind of Court to grant him the relief. If the jurisdiction is only one relating to territorial limits or pecuniary limits, the plaint will be ordered to be returned for presentation to the proper Court. 9. The question of Court Fees must be considered in the light of the allegations made in the plaint and its decision cannot be influenced either by the pleas in the written statement or by the final decision of the suit on the merits. As such, the Court is required to consider the pleadings of the petitioner/plaintiff in the plaint and the relief sought for in the plaint for deciding the question of Court Fees and also for deciding the type of the suit. For determination of the proper Court Fees and also for valuation of the suit, this Court is concerned with Section 7 of the Court-fees Act, 1870 (in short ‘the Act of 1870’) and Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act, 1887 (in short “the Act of 1887”) in the instant case. 10. For ready reference Section 7 of the Court-fees, Act, 1870 and Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act, 1887 are quoted hereunder:-- “Section 7 of the Court-fees Act, 1870 7. 10. For ready reference Section 7 of the Court-fees, Act, 1870 and Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act, 1887 are quoted hereunder:-- “Section 7 of the Court-fees Act, 1870 7. Computation of fees payable in certain suits.-- The amount of fee payable under this Act in the suits next hereinafter mentioned shall be computed as follows:-- (i) For money -- In suits for money (including suits for damages or compensation, or arrears of maintenance of annuities, or of other sums payable periodically) -- according to the amount claimed : (ii) for maintenance and annuities -- In suits for maintenance and annuities or other sums payable periodically -- according to the value of the subject-matter of the suit, and such value shall be deemed to be ten times the amount claimed to be payable for one year. (iii) for other movable property having a market value -- In suits for movable property other than money, where the subject-matter has a market - value - according to such value at the date of presenting the plaint: (iv) In suits -- for movable property of no market-value -- (a) for movable property where the subject matter has no market value, as, for instance, in the case of documents relating to title. to enforce a right to share in joint family property -- (b) to enforce a right to share in any property on the ground that it is joint family property for a declaratory decree and consequential relief -- (c) to obtain a declaratory decree or order, where consequential relief is prayed: for an injunction -- (d) to obtain an injunction, for easements - (e) for a right to some benefit (not herein otherwise provided for) to arise out of land, and for accounts - (f) for accounts according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint or memorandum of appeal. In all such suits the plaintiff shall state the amount at which the values the relief sought: for possession of lands, houses and gardens -- (v) In suits for the possession of land, houses and gardens -- according to the value of the subject matter, and such value shall be deemed to be -- Where the subject-matter is land, and -- (a) where the land forms an entire estate or a definite share of an estate, paying annual revenue to Government, or forms part of such an estate and is recorded in the collector’s register as separately assessed with such revenue and such revenue is permanently settled - ten times the revenue so payable; (b) where the land forms an entire estate, or a definite share of an estate, paying annual revenue to Government, or forms part of such estate and is recorded as aforesaid; and such revenue is settled, but not permanently -- five times the revenue so payable: (c) where the land pays no such revenue, or has been partially exempted from such payment, or is charged with any fixed payment in lieu of such revenue, and net profits have arisen from the land during the year next before the date of presenting the plaint -- fifteen times such net profits: but where no such net profits have been arisen therefrom the amount at which the Court shall estimate the land with reference to the value of similar land in the neighbourhood: (d) where the land forms part of an estate paying revenue to Government, but is not a definite share of such estate and is not separately assessed as above mentioned the market value of the land: Proviso as to Bombay Presidency -- Provided that in the (territories subjects to the Governor of Bombay in council the value of the land shall be deemed to be -- (1) where the land is held on settlement for a period not exceeding thirty years and pays the full assessment to Government - a sum equal to five times the survey assessment; (2) where the land is held on a permanent settlement, or on a settlement for any period exceeding thirty years, and pays the full assessment to government - a sum equal to ten times the survey - assessment and (3) where the whole or any part of the annual survey-assessment is remitted - a sum computed under paragraph (1) or paragraph (2) of this proviso, as the case may be in addition to ten times the assessment, or the portion of assessment, so remitted: Explanation -- The word “estate” as used in this paragraph, means any land subject to the payment of revenue, for which the proprietor or farmer or raiyat shall have executed a separate engagement to Government or which, in the absence of such engagement, shall have been separately assessed with revenue : for houses and gardens -- (e) where the subject-matter is a house or garden -- according to market value of the house or garden; to enforce a right of pre-emption -- (vi) In suits to enforce a right of pre-emption according to the value (computed in accordance with paragraph V of this section) of the land, house or garden in respect of which the right is claimed; for interest of assignee of land revenue - (vii) In suits for the interest of an assignee of land revenue -- fifteen times his net profits as such for the year next before the date of presenting the plaint; to set aside an attachment- (viii) In suits to set aside an attachment of land or of an interest in land or revenue - according to the amount for which the land or interest was attached; Provided that, where such amount exceeds the value of the land or interest, the amount of fee shall be computed as if the suit were for the possession of such land or interest: to redeem -- (ix) In suit against a mortgagee for the recovery of the property mortgaged; to foreclose - and in suits by a mortgagee to forclose the mortgage or, where the mortgage is made by conditional sale, to have the sale declared absolute -- according to the principal money expressed to be secured by the instrument of mortgage: for specific performance - (x) In suits for specific performance -- (a) of a contract of sale -- according to the amount of consideration: (b) of a contract of mortgage according to the amount agreed to be secured: (c) of a contract of lease according to the aggregate amount of the fine or premium (if any) and of the rent agreed to be paid during the first year of the term: (d) of an award according to the amount or value of the property dispute: between landlord and tenant - (xi) In the following suits between landlord and tenant:-- (a) for the delivery by a tenant of the counterpart of a lease, (b) to enhance the rent of a tenant having right of occupancy, (c) for the delivery by a landlord of a lease, ((cc)) for the recovery of immovable property from a tenant including a tenant holding over after the determination of a tenancy,) (d) to contest notice of ejectment, (e) to recover the occupancy of (immovable property) from which a tenant has been illegally ejected by the landlord, and- (f) for abatement of rent -- according to the amount of the rent of the (immovable property) to which the suit refers payable for the year next before the date of presenting the plaint. Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act, 1887 8. Court-fee value and jurisdictional value to be the same in certain suits -- Where in suits other than those referred to in the Court-fees Act, 1870 (7 of 1870), Section 7, paragraphs V, VI and IX, and paragraph X, clause (d), Court-fees are payable ad valorem under the Court-fees Act, 1870 (7 of 1870), the value as determinable for the computation of Court-fees and the value for the purposes of jurisdiction shall be the same.” 11. Section 7 of the Court-fees Act of 1870 mentioned the amount of Court Fees payable in different suits, Section 7 of the Act of 1870, provides that in all such suits falling under Section 7(iv) of the Act of 1870, the plaintiff shall state the amount at which the values the relief sought for. In respect of the suit filing under sub-section (iv) of Section 7 of the Act of 1870, a departure has been made and liberty has been given to the plaintiff to value his claim for the purposes of Court fees. Therefore, this provision has given the option to the plaintiff to value his claim. The Apex Court (Constitution Bench) in the case of S. Rm. Ar. S. Sp. Sathappa Chettiar v. S. Rm. Ar. Rm Ramanathan Chettiar, reported in AIR 1958 SC 245 , held that:-- “14..........Section 7 further provides that in all suits falling under S. 7(iv) the plaintiff state the amount at which the value of the relief is sought. If the scheme laid down for the computation of fees payable in suits covered by the several sub-sections of S. 7 is considered, it would be clear that, in respect of suits falling under sub-sec. (iv), a departure has been made and liberty has been given to the plaintiff to value his claim for the purposes of Court-fees. The theoretical basis of this provisions appears to be that in cases in which the plaintiff is given the option to value his claim with any precision or definiteness. Take for instance the claim for partition where the plaintiff seeks to enforce his right to share in any property on the ground that it is joint family property. The basis of the claim is that the property in respect of which a share is claimed is joint family property. Take for instance the claim for partition where the plaintiff seeks to enforce his right to share in any property on the ground that it is joint family property. The basis of the claim is that the property in respect of which a share is claimed is joint family property. In other words, it is property in which the plaintiff has an undivided share. What the plaintiff purports to do by making a claim for partition is to ask the Court to give him certain specified properties separately and absolutely on his own account for his share in lieu of his undivided share in the whole property. Now it would be clear that the conversion of the plaintiff’s alleged undivided share in the joint family property into his separate share cannot be easily valued in terms of rupees with any precision or definiteness. That is why legislature has left it to the option of the plaintiff to value his claim for the payment of Court-fees. It really means that in suits falling under S. 7 (iv)(b) the amount stated by the plaintiff as the value of his claim for partition has ordinarily to be accepted by the Court in computing the Court-fees payable in respect of the said relief. In the circumstances of this case it is unnecessary to consider whether, under the provisions of this section, the plaintiff has been given an absolute right or option to place any valuation whatever on his relief. 15. ..............In other words, so far as suits falling under S.7, sub-sec. (iv) of the Act are concerned. S. 8 of the Suits Valuation Act provides that the value determinable for the computation of Court-fees and the value for the purposes of jurisdiction shall be the same. There can be little doubt that the effect of the provisions of S. 8 is to make the value for the purpose of jurisdiction dependent upon the value as determinable for computation of Court-fees and that is natural enough. The computation of Court-fees in suits falling under S. 7 (iv) of the Act depends upon the valuation that the plaintiff makes in respect of his claim. Once the plaintiff exercises his option and values his claim for the purpose of court-fees, that determines the value for jurisdiction. The computation of Court-fees in suits falling under S. 7 (iv) of the Act depends upon the valuation that the plaintiff makes in respect of his claim. Once the plaintiff exercises his option and values his claim for the purpose of court-fees, that determines the value for jurisdiction. The value for court-fees and the value for jurisdiction must no doubt be the same in such case; but it is the value for court-fees stated by the plaintiff that is of primary importance. It is from this value that the value for jurisdiction must be determined. The result is that it is the amount at which the plaintiff has valued the relief sought for the purposes of court-fees that determines the value for jurisdiction in the suit and not vice versa....................” 12. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Commercial Aviation and Travel Company & Ors. v. Mrs. Vimla Pannala, reported in AIR 1988 SC 1636 , held that:-- “7. So far as suits coming under S. 7(iv) of the Court-fees Act are concerned, the Legislature has left the question of valuation of the relief sought in the plaint or memorandum of appeal to the plaintiff. The reason is obvious. The suits which are mentioned under S. 7(iv) are of such nature that it is difficult to lay down any standard of valuation indeed, the Legislature has not laid down any standard of valuation in the Court-fees Act. Under S. 9 of the Suits Valuation Act, the High Court may with the previous sanction of the State Government frame rules for the valuation of suits referred to in S. 7(iv) of the Court-fees Act. Although the Punjab High Court has framed rules under Section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act which are applicable to the Union Territory of Delhi, such rules do not lay down any standard of valuation with regard to the suits coming under S. 7(iv) of the Court-fees Act. It has already been noticed that under R. 4(i) of the Punjab High Court Rules, the value of suit for accounts for purposes of Court-fee will be as determined by the Court-fee Act, which means that the valuation of the relief will have to be made by the plaintiff under S. 7(iv)(f) of the Court-fees Act. 20. It has already been noticed that under R. 4(i) of the Punjab High Court Rules, the value of suit for accounts for purposes of Court-fee will be as determined by the Court-fee Act, which means that the valuation of the relief will have to be made by the plaintiff under S. 7(iv)(f) of the Court-fees Act. 20. In Tara Devi v. Sri Thakur Radha Krishna Maharaj (1987) 4 SCC 69 : ( AIR 1987 SC 2085 ) it has been laid down by this Court that in a suit for declaration with consequential relief falling under Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court-fees Act, the plaintiff is free to make his own estimation of the relief sought in the plaint and such valuation both for purposes of Court-fee and jurisdiction has to be ordinarily accepted. Further it has been observed that it is only in cases where it appears to be Court on a consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case that the valuation is arbitrary unreasonable and the plaint has been demonstratively undervalued, the Court can examine the valuation and can revise the same. In that case, the plaintiff had valued the leasehold interest on the basis of the rent and such valuation was held to be reasonable and not demonstratively arbitrary.” 13. The Apex Court in the case M/s. Commercial Aviation and Travel Company & Ors. v. Mrs. Vimla Pannala, reported in AIR 1988 SC 1636 , held that the Court has no alternative than to accept the plaintiff’s valuation tentatively for the relief in a suit. Para 9 in M/s. Commercial Aviation and Travel Company & Ors. (supra) read as follows:-- “9. In this connection, we may refer to the provision of Order VII, Rule 11(b) of the Civil P. C. which provides, inter alia, that the plaint shall be rejected where the relief claimed is undervalued and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court fails to do so. It is manifestly clear from the provision of the Order VII, R. 11(b) that the Court has to come to a finding that the relief claimed has been undervalued, which necessarily means that the Court is able to decide and specify proper and correct valuation of the relief and, after determination of the correct value of the relief, required the plaintiff to correct his valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court if the plaintiff does not correct the valuation within the time allowed, the plaint is liable to be rejected. The question is whether in a suit for accounts simpliciter, the Court can come to a finding as to the proper and correct value of the relief until the final determination is made. In our opinion, ordinarily it is not possible for the Court at a preliminary stage to determine the value of the relief in a suit for accounts simpliciter. If the Court is itself unable to say what the correct valuation of the relief is, it cannot require the plaintiff to correct the valuation that has been made by him. Indeed in a suit for accounts it is also difficult for the Court to come to a finding even as to the approximate correct valuation of the relief in such a case, the Court has no other alternative than to accept plaintiff’s valuation tentatively.” 14. For deciding as to whether the suit is the type of suit which falls within Section 7 Clause (iv) Clause (c) of the Act of 1870, it is required to see if the averments made in the plaint clearly establishes that the primary and dominant purpose of the suit is for declaration and other relief is consequential. 15. Section 8 of the Act of 1887, clearly states that the value of the relief in a suit for declaratory decree and consequential relief envisaged under Section 7 Clause (iv) Clause (c) of the Act of 1870 for purpose of Court Fees and the value for purposes of jurisdiction shall be the same. This being a settled law, this Court is required to see in the present case. If the averments made in the plaint clearly establish that the primary and dominant purpose of the suit is for declaration and the other relief is merely consequential. 16. This being a settled law, this Court is required to see in the present case. If the averments made in the plaint clearly establish that the primary and dominant purpose of the suit is for declaration and the other relief is merely consequential. 16. The relief sought for in the plaint in T.S. No. 34(H)02, which have been quoted above, clearly speak that the relief sought for are for declaration and consequential relief. This Court is not concerned in a suit for declaration and the consequential relief to see what would be the consequential pecuniary value of the result of the declaration. 17. It is clear that under Section 7 Clause (iv) Clause (c) of the Act of 1870, option is given to the plaintiff to value the relief in a suit for declaration and consequential relief. The averments made in the written statements are not the criteria to decide whether the case falls within Section 7(iv) or not. The determinative instrument is the plaint and averments made therein. The reason is obvious. The relief is to be granted on the basis of averments made in the plaint and not on the basis of the written statements. (A) Gauhati High Court in the case of Mrs. Kawlhmingliani v. Motilal Chetri & Ors., reported in (1983) 2 GLR 417, held that:-- “5. But there remains one other contention to be determined. Mr. Bhattacharjee submits that the averments made in the written statement of the defendant should have been the yard-stick to determine the primary and dominant purposes of the suit. It has been consistently ruled by this Court in Batuk Chandra Patwari ( AIR 1972 Gau 69 ) (supra). Ayekoam Biramongoi Singh (supra) and Rakesh Ch. Das v. Khan Bahadur Abdul Majid Choudhury, AIR 1982 Gauhati 82 that the averments made in the written statements are not the criteria to decide whether the case falls within Section 7(iv)(c) or not. The determinative instrument is the plaint and the averments made therein. The reason is obvious. The relief is to be granted to the plaint and not on the basis of the written statement. Therefore, if the averments made in the plaint clearly establish that the primary and dominant purpose of the suit is for declaration and possession was merely consequential the suit to be valued for the purpose of court fee; is under Section 7(iv)(c) of “the Act”. Therefore, if the averments made in the plaint clearly establish that the primary and dominant purpose of the suit is for declaration and possession was merely consequential the suit to be valued for the purpose of court fee; is under Section 7(iv)(c) of “the Act”. (B) Gauhati High Court in the case of Bhatuk Chandra Patwari & Ors. v. Kirti Ram Das & Ors., reported in AIR 1972 Gauhati 69, held that: “6. Mr. D.K. Bhattacharjee a junior Advocate as he is, by an able argument, contends that when the dominant purpose of the suit is for declaration and possession is merely consequential, Court-fee is paid under Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court-Fees Act and the plaintiff can put any value for the purpose of the Court-Fees and in view of the provision under Sec. 8 of the Suits Valuation Act, valuation put by the plaintiff for the purpose of Court-fee under Section 7(iv)(c), Court fees Act, will be the valuation for the purpose of Court’s pecuniary jurisdiction also. The submission of learned counsel is substantial. In my opinion, when the primary and dominant purpose of the suit is declaration and possession is merely consequential, then the suit is to be valued for the purpose of Court Fees under S. 7 (iv)(c) and this valuation will be valuation for the purpose of the Court’s pecuniary jurisdiction under Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act Mr. Bhattacharjee cites AIR 1958 SC 245 which has explained the principle which underlies Section 7(iv) of the Court Fees Act. It has held.............” 18. The Apex Court in the case of Suhrid Singh alias Sardool Singh v. Randhir Singh & Ors., reported in AIR 2010 SC 2807 , clearly held that the suit for declaration that the sale deeds executed by the plaintiff’s father is null and void and for joint possession is not a suit for cancellation of the sale deeds and Court fees need not be paid on sale consideration mentioned in the sale deeds and Court fees payable is computable under Section 7 Clause (iv) Clause (c) of the Act of 1870. Para 6 in the case of Suhrid Singh alias Sardool Singh v. Randhir Singh & Ors. ( AIR 2010 SC 2807 ) (supra) held that:-- “6. Where the executant of a deed wants it to be annulled, he has to seek cancellation of the deed. Para 6 in the case of Suhrid Singh alias Sardool Singh v. Randhir Singh & Ors. ( AIR 2010 SC 2807 ) (supra) held that:-- “6. Where the executant of a deed wants it to be annulled, he has to seek cancellation of the deed. But if a non-executant seeks annulment of a deed he has to seek a declaration that the deed is invalid or non est, or illegal or that it is not binding on him. The difference between a prayer for cancellation and declaration in regard to a deed of transfer/conveyance, can be brought out by the following illustration relating to ‘A’ and ‘B’ - two brothers. ‘A’ executed a sale deed in favour of ‘C’. Subsequently ‘A’ wants to avoid the sale ‘A’ has to sue for cancellation of the deed. On the other hand, if ‘B’, who is not the executant of the deed, wants to avoid it, he has to sue for a declaration that the deed executed by ‘A’ is invalid/void and non est/illegal and he is not bound by it. In essence both may be suing to have the deed set aside or declared as non-binding. But the form is different and Court-fee is also different. If “A”, the executant of the deed, seeks cancellation of the deed, he has to pay ad valorem court-fee on the consideration stated in the sale deed. If ‘B’, who is a non-executant, is in possession and sues for a declaration that the deed is null or void and does not bind him or his share, he has to merely pay a fixed court-fee of Rs. 19.50 under Article 17(iii) of Second Schedule of the Act. But if ‘B’, a non-executant, is not in possession, and he seeks not only a declaration that the sale deed is invalid, but also the consequential relief of possession, he has to pay an ad valorem court-fee as provided under Section 9(iv)(c) of the Act. Section 7(iv)(c) provides that in suits for a declaratory decree with consequential relief, the court-fee shall be computed according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint. Section 7(iv)(c) provides that in suits for a declaratory decree with consequential relief, the court-fee shall be computed according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint. The proviso thereto makes it clear that where the suit for declaratory decree with consequential relief is with reference to any property, such valuation shall not be less than the value of the property calculated in the manner provided for by clause (v) of Section 7.” 19. It is also a settled law, when the suit attracts Section 7 Clause (iv) of the Act of 1870, the valuation as put by the plaintiff is normally to be accepted and the Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the same even if the same be somewhat arbitrary. The Gauhati High Court in the case of Smti Prativa Rani Das & Ors. v. Hamida Khatun Choudhury & Ors., reported in (1982) 1 GLR 436, held that:-- “6. From the above it appears that in a suit for partition, Court fee has to be determined as per the share claimed by the plaintiff and not qua the entire property in question. This apart when the suit attracts section 7(iv) of the Court Fees Act, the valuation as put by the plaintiff is normally to be accepted. Even if the same be somewhat arbitrary, the Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the same as held by the Division Bench of this Court in the case reference above.” 20. The Division Bench of the Gauhati High Court in the case of Ayekpam Biramangol Singh v. State Bank of India & Ors., reported in AIR 1979 Gauhati 27, held that:-- “10. The view we have taken of S. 7 (iv) (c) of the Court-fees Act gets support from AIR 1918 PC 135 and AIR 1915 Mad 948 (FB). The Division Bench of the Gauhati High Court in the case of Ayekpam Biramangol Singh v. State Bank of India & Ors., reported in AIR 1979 Gauhati 27, held that:-- “10. The view we have taken of S. 7 (iv) (c) of the Court-fees Act gets support from AIR 1918 PC 135 and AIR 1915 Mad 948 (FB). In AIR 1918 PC 135 (supra) their Lordships of the Privy Council approving the view of the Bombay High Court held, “where a plaintiff sues for declaratory decree and asks for consequential relief, and puts his own valuation upon that consequential relief, then for the purposes of Court-fees and also for the purpose of jurisdiction, it is the value that the plaintiff puts upon the plaint that determines both.” A Full Bench of the Madras High Court reported in AIR 1915 Mad 948 (supra) held -- “A suit for a declaration that an instrument of mortgage or sale executed by the plaintiff or a decree passed against the plaintiff for a debt is not binding on him, is not a mere declaratory suit, but is one with consequential relief falling under Section 7(iv) (c), Court-fees Act, and the Court is bound to accept the valuation put by the plaintiff on which ad valorem fee should be paid.” 21. For the foregoing reasons, this Court is of the considered view that the present suit i.e. T.S. No. 34(H)02 is a suit for declaration and consequential relief which falls under Section 7 Clause (iv) Clause (c) of the Act of 1870 and therefore, the value of the relief sought for the purposes of computation of the Court Fees and the value for the purposes of jurisdiction would be same, and accordingly the Court is bound to accept the valuation as put by the petitioner/plaintiff inasmuch as valuation made by him is not arbitrary. 22. Accordingly, the judgment and order of the learned District Judge, Shillong dated 21-10-2011 passed in FAO No. 3(H)2011 and the judgment and order passed by the learned Munsiff, Shillong on 26-4-2011 passed in M.C. No. 35(H)2002 (reference T.S. No. 34 (H) 2002) are hereby quashed and set aside. 23. The learned trial Court is directed to proceed with the trial of the suit and decide according to merit. 24. 23. The learned trial Court is directed to proceed with the trial of the suit and decide according to merit. 24. The Registry is directed to send down the LCR to the learned trial Court and the learned trial Court on receipt of the record, shall issue notice to the parties for further proceedings of the suit. 25. The revision petition is allowed. 26. The parties are directed to bear their own costs. Revision allowed.