Alhaj DR. MD. Meraj Alam v. State of Assam and Anr.
2013-05-10
A.C.UPADHYAY
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DigiLaw.ai
1. This petition under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code has been filed by the husband for quashing of Complaint(Domestic Violence) case No. 124M/2011 initiated by the wife in the Court of Judicial Magistrate (1st Class) at Kamrup, Guwahati, under section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. 2. Heard Mr P. Bora, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. R. All, learned counsel for the respondent 2. 3. Only question which arose for consideration is: whether after divorce with the husband, a petition by wife under section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, could be maintainable. 4. The facts leading to filing of this revision may be stated as follows : The petitioner is an Assistant Professor of Surgery at Gauhati Medical College and Hospital, married the petitioner 2 on 11.1.1996 as per Muslim rituals and they were living as a spouse until 18.8.2011, when the final talaque was pronounced by the petitioner in terms of the procedure laid out in the Mohammedan Law. Meanwhile, they were blessed vv: a male child on 9.8.2002. 5. The petitioner(husband) is challenging proceedings in Complaint (Domestic Violence) case No. 124M/2011 initiated by the respondent 2(wife) in Court of Judicial Magistrate (1st Class) at Kamrup in Guwahati under section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, on the premise that after divorce with the petitioner, whether the respondent 2 was entitled to the protections under the provisions of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 ('the Act of 2005')- 6. The respondent No.2 also filed an application under section 7 of the Family Court Act, 1984, for a declaration that the divorce granted on 18.8.2011, as null-and-void, which is pending for disposal at the Family Court in Guwahati. Admittedly, the Family Court has not issued any interim order suspending the operation of the divorce granted on 18.8.2011. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner, placing reliance on the decision of the hon'ble Supreme Court reported in Inderjit Singh Grewal v. State of Punjab, (2011) SCC 12 SCC contended that after divorce with the petitioner, a petition under section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, Act is not maintainable.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner, placing reliance on the decision of the hon'ble Supreme Court reported in Inderjit Singh Grewal v. State of Punjab, (2011) SCC 12 SCC contended that after divorce with the petitioner, a petition under section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, Act is not maintainable. In this context, observations made by the hon'ble Supreme Court read as follows : In D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal, this court considered the expression "domestic relationship" under section 2(f) of the 2005 Act placing reliance on an earlier judgment in Savitaben Somabhai Bhatiya v. State of Gujarat and held that "relationship in the nature of marriage" is akin to a common law marriage. However, the couple must hold themselves out to society as being akin to spouses in addition to fulfilling all other requisite conditions for a valid marriage. The said judgments are distinguishable on facts as those cases relate to live-in relationship without marriage. In the instant case, the parties got married and the decree of the civil court for divorce still subsitsts. More so, a suit to declare the said judgment and decree as a nullity is still pending consideration before the competent court. In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that permitting the Magistrate to proceed further with the complaint under the provisions of the 2005 Act is not compatible and in consonance with the decree of divorce which still subsists and, thus, the process amounts to abuse of the process of the court. Undoubtedly, for quashing a complaint, the court has to take its contents on its face value and in case the same discloses an offence, the court generally does not interfere with the same. However, in the backdrop of the factual matrix of this case, permitting the court to proceed with the complaint would be travesty of justice. Thus, interest of justice warrants quashing of the same". 8. From the decision of the hon'ble Supreme Court in Inderjit Singh Grewa (supra), it transpires that a complaint under the provisions of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, Act, is not compatible and in consonance with the decree of divorce which still subsists and thus the process would be of sheer abuse of the process of the court. 9.
9. Mr Ali, learned counsel for the respondent 2, submitted that since the respondent 2 has challenged the divorce decree in the Family Court, the Wife/respondent would be considered to have been in the company of the petitioner/husband and thus protections under the 2005 Act would be available to her. Admittedly, the divorce (talaq) taken by the petitioner in the office of Sadar Kaji, Kamrup ,has not been stayed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Kamrup. 10. In support of his contention, Mr. Ali, relying on a decision reported in Rim Devi Bora v. Dwijen Ch Bora and Another, (2009) 4 GLR 432, submitted that "the deprivation of a woman of maintenance and denying her access to shared-household constitute a domestic violence". 11. In Rina Devi Bora (supra), it was observed that of the Act of 2005, a power has been vested on a Magistrate to exercise his jurisdiction if the facts placed before him disclose the respondent to have been committing, or has committed, an act of domestic violence on the aggrieved person. Provisions of the 2005 Act clearly show that the domestic violence is a continuing offence unlike any other penal offence under the Penal Acts; it persists so long the deprivation envisaged in the 2005 Act subsists. In the instant case, since the relationship as husband and wife was terminated by a divorce and admittedly the parties were living separately the petitioner had no domestic relationship with his wife. 12. The definition of "wife" as presented under section 125, Cr.PC could not be imported into Domestic Violence Act. The purpose and object of Domestic Violence and provision under section 125, Cr.PC is different. While Domestic Violence Act has been enacted by the Parliament to stop acts of domestic violence on women living in a shared household, nonetheless, section 125 of Cr.PC is meant to prevent vagrancy where wife is left high and dry without maintenance. Law gives a right to claim maintenance under Civil Law as well as section 125, Cr.PC even to a divorced wife, but an act of domestic violence cannot be committed on a divorced wife, who is not living with her husband or family and is free to live wherever she wants. She has a right to claim maintenance and enforce other rights in accordance with law.
She has a right to claim maintenance and enforce other rights in accordance with law. She has a right to claim custody of children as per law, but then again denial of these rights does not amount to domestic violence. 13. On the other hand, the fact remains that the respondent/wife has been legally divorced by her husband and the divorce offered by the petitioner has been in challenge. Therefore, during the subsistence of the divorce order, when no stay order of the divorce given by the petitioner has been made by the court scrutinizing the challenge, the protections envisaged in the 2005 Act, would not be available to the wife. After the divorce it would be improper to ignore severance of such relationship of husband and the wife and it cannot be said that domestic relationship of the wife continued with her husband. Domestic relationship has been defined under section 2(f) of the 2005 Act : (f) "domestic relationship" means a relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared household, when they a re related by consanguinity, marriage, or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family members living together as a joint family. On reading of above definition, it is clear that domestic relationship means a relationship between two persons, who live or have at arty point of time lived together in a shared household, when they are related by consanguinity, marriage or a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family members living together as a joint family. In the instant case, admittedly was living separately from the petitioner. Perusal of the copy of the complaint under section 12 of the 2005 Act, annexed with the petition would show that in the complaint, Respondent has shown her address as resident of Sundarbari, P.S. Jalukbari and the address of the Petitioner is resident of Gauhati Medical College Campus, Bhangaragh, Guwahati-5. From this, it is evident that the Petitioner and respondent were no residing together. 14. Apparently the allegations relate to the alleged incidents prior to the divorce. It is not disputed that husband of Respondent wife had obtained a divorce order. The complaint under section 12 of the 2005 Act has been filed after the receipt of the notice of the divorce.
14. Apparently the allegations relate to the alleged incidents prior to the divorce. It is not disputed that husband of Respondent wife had obtained a divorce order. The complaint under section 12 of the 2005 Act has been filed after the receipt of the notice of the divorce. From this, it can be safely inferred that the complaint filed by Respondent No. 2 is a counterblast to the divorce given by the petitioner. If not also, undisputedly the Petitioner is residing individually which is at a reasonable distance from the matrimonial home. Therefore, I find it difficult to believe that the allegations of domestic violence made in the complaint against the petitioner are correct. On overall consideration of facts of this case, it appears that the complaint so far as the petitioner is concerned, appears to be motivated and it appears to have been filed by respondent wife with a view to exert pressure upon her husband who has obtained divorce. Thus, in my view, the complaint as well as the summoning order is liable to be set aside. 15. Consequently, this petition is allowed and the impugned order dated 5th September, 2011 is set aside. Complaint (Domestic Violence) case No. 124M/2011, in the Court of Judicial Magistrate (1st Class) at Kamrup, in Guwahati is set aside and quashed. However, it is made clear that in the event of declaration by the Principal Judge, Family Court, of the divorce given by the petitioner as flawed or unacceptable or not binding, the respondent/wife would be at liberty to continue with the proceeding in terms of the provisions of Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. 16. Send back the LCR immediately.