JUDGMENT Brij Kishore Dube, J. 1. This petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is preferred by the petitioner/complainant for quashing the order dated 17.04.2012 passed by J.M.F.C., Gwalior in Complaint Case No......../2012 (Balwant Singh Tomar v. Tigmanshu Dhulia Film & Another) by which an application under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. filed by the petitioner/complainant has been dismissed. Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner/complainant, Balwant Singh Tomar submitted a complaint in writing on 23.02.2012 to the Station House Officer, Police Station Madhoganj, District Gwalior and the Superintendent of Police, District Gwalior alleging therein that the respondents No. 1 & 2 had approached while he was at his house in Guda and sought his assistance for the purpose of making film 'Paan Singh Tomar' for which they offered to pay Rs. 40.00 lacs but after seeking and procuring his assistance for making of the film they had not paid Rs. 40.00 Lacs. Therefore, it was prayed that after registering the case against the respondents No. 1 & 2 for commission of the offence of cheating, they may be punished. Thereafter, on 24.02.2012 petitioner preferred writ petition bearing No. 1608/12, alleging inaction of the police authorities for not taking action against the respondents No. 1 & 2 on the basis of the aforesaid complaint dated 23.02.2012 and prayed for issuance of writ of mandamus to the police authorities for registering the FIR against the respondents No. 1 & 2 in respect of commission of the offence of cheating as alleged in the complaint dated 23.02.2012. The writ petition was disposed of by this Court vide order dated 01.03.2012 with an observation that if the petitioner prefers a representation, the authorities will deal with it in accordance with the law. Thereafter, on 06.03.2012, the petitioner preferred an application before the Superintendent of Police, Gwalior praying for registration of FIR against the respondents. On 09.04.2012, the petitioner filed an application under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. before the Court of J.M.F.C., Gwalior seeking a direction to the Station House Officer, Kampoo, District Gwalior to register FIR in respect of commission of offence punishable under Sections 419 and 420 of IPC against the respondents No. 1 & 2 and for investigation thereof. The application was rejected by the Court vide the impugned order dated 17.04.2012. The relevant portion of the impugned order reads as under:- 2. The application was rejected by the Court vide the impugned order dated 17.04.2012. The relevant portion of the impugned order reads as under:- 2. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, this petition has been preferred by the petitioner. 3. Shri A.S. Bhadoriya, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits that the petitioner had submitted a complaint in writing for commission of offence of cheating by the respondents No. 1 & 2 to the Station House Officer and the Superintendent of Police, District Gwalior but the complaint has not been registered by the police. Thereafter, in compliance with the direction of this Court in W.P. No. 1608/12, the petitioner submitted an application dated 06.03.2012 before the Superintendent of Police, Gwalior for registering the FIR against respondents No. 1 & 2 but the FIR has not been registered, then, the petitioner filed an application under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. but the application was dismissed by the impugned order observing that the alleged dispute i.e., the breach of contract is of civil nature. It is further submitted by the learned counsel that sub-section (1) of Section 156 of Cr.P.C. empowers the Police Officer incharge of the Police Station to investigate cognizable offences. The police has statutory duty to investigate the circumstances of an alleged cognizable offence but on failing to do so, the petitioner submitted an application before the Magistrate under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. Sub-section (3) of Section 156 of Cr.P.C. empowers any Magistrate to order for an investigation. The power under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. has been conferred on the Magistrate to check the arbitrary action of the police in matters of registration of FIR of cognizable offence. It is mandatory under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. that if the Magistrate found prima-facie the cognizable offence is made out from the contents of the application, he is bound to order to register the case and order to investigate the matter. As per facts mentioned in the application, it is clear that the offence of commission of cheating which is cognizable offence is made out against the respondents No. 1 & 2. Learned counsel has further submitted that merely because alleged act has civil profile, not sufficient to denude it of its criminal outfit. As per facts mentioned in the application, it is clear that the offence of commission of cheating which is cognizable offence is made out against the respondents No. 1 & 2. Learned counsel has further submitted that merely because alleged act has civil profile, not sufficient to denude it of its criminal outfit. He has placed reliance on the following decisions:- (i) State of Punjab v. Pritam Chand and others, 2009 (2) CCSC 798 (SC); (ii) Smt. Rumi Dhar v. State of West Bengal and another, 2009 (2) CCSC 962 (SC); (iii) Suresh Chand Jain v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr., 2002 Cr.L.R. (SC) 221; (iv) Lalita Kumari v. Government of U.P. and others, 2008 (III) MPWN 25 (SC); (v) Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P., 2008 (III) MPWN 73 (SC); (vi) Rajwati v. State of U.P., 2007 (2) CRJ 104; (vii) Smt. Santosh Kumar v. State of U.P., 2007 (5) Criminal Reported Judgments, 195 All. 4. Miss. Uditya Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents No. 1 & 2 argued in support of the impugned order and submitted that the impugned order is a speaking order and does not call for any interference by this Court in exercise of powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. The allegations by the petitioner are completely false and baseless, made with malafide intention of extorting money from the respondents No. 1 & 2. At no point of time, the respondent No. 2 visited the petitioner's house either before the commencement of the film, during its production nor at any time after it. Respondent No. 1 was desirous of making a film based on the life of 'Paan Singh Tomar'. For the said purpose, he alongwith his associates came to Gwalior, where the petitioner who is the nephew of Paan Singh Tomar met and offer to provide the information regarding the life and activities of Paan Singh Tomar voluntarily to the respondent No. 1. No talk took place regarding monetary consideration for the information and assistance being provided by the petitioner. It is further submitted that Sauram Singh Tomar who is the son of Late Paan Singh Tomar has consented to the making of the film, "Paan Singh Tomar" based on the biography and activities of his father. In this respect, a letter of agreement dated 19th June, 2008 was executed between the respondent No. 2 and Sauram Singh. It is further submitted that Sauram Singh Tomar who is the son of Late Paan Singh Tomar has consented to the making of the film, "Paan Singh Tomar" based on the biography and activities of his father. In this respect, a letter of agreement dated 19th June, 2008 was executed between the respondent No. 2 and Sauram Singh. According to the terms and conditions of the said agreement, a sum of Rs. 15 lacs was paid to him. It is further submitted that if the allegations contained in the complaint/application were taken to be true in their entirety, then also, the subject-matter is of civil in nature. The Supreme Court deprecated the practice of registering criminal cases in purely civil cases. She has cited the case of G. Sagar Suri and another v. State of U.P. And others, (2000) 2 SCC 636 in support of her contention. 5. In order to understand the rival contentions, it is useful to refer to the complaint/application dated 09.04.2012 under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. which was made by the petitioner before the J.M.F.C., Gwalior in which the respondents No. 1 & 2 herein have been shown as the accused. The said criminal complaint/application was made for the commission of offence punishable under Sections 419 and 420 of IPC. The following averments in the complaint/application are relevant for consideration, which reads as under:- 6. The complaint is concerned with Sections 419 and 420 of IPC which reads thus:- 419. Punishment for cheating by personation- Whoever cheats by personation shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both. 420. Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property- Whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly induces the person deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to make, alter or destroy the whole or any part of a valuable security, or anything which is signed or sealed, and which is capable of being converted into a valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine. 7. Now, this Court has to find out whether the ingredients of Sections 419 and 420 of IPC have been made out from the complaint and whether the J.M.F.C. was justified in rejecting the application? 7. Now, this Court has to find out whether the ingredients of Sections 419 and 420 of IPC have been made out from the complaint and whether the J.M.F.C. was justified in rejecting the application? Simultaneously, this Court has to consider the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel. 8. In Pritam Chand and others (supra), the respondents were charged for alleged commission of offence punishable under Section 406 of IPC. They were partners of one Jagdamba Rice Mills to whom the paddy was entrusted for milling by the Punjab State Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd., during the year 1983-84. It was alleged that the accused failed to account for the paddy and thus misappropriated the same. Pursuant to arbitration clause between the parties, an arbitrator was appointed and an award of Rs. 1,81,315.43 was rendered in favour of the Corporation. The trial court acquitted the accused on the ground that the matter arose out of breach of contract, the same was of civil nature and a criminal case against the accused was not made out. High Court endorsed the view and dismissed the appeal. The Apex Court held that the High Court should not have in a summary manner dismissed the appeal after having recorded that a criminal case may arise even when breach of contract is also there and there is no bar for prosecution under the criminal law. Having said so, the High Court came to an abrupt conclusion because two views are possible as to whether the allegation made was a civil dispute or of a criminal nature, no interference was called for. The approach is clearly erroneous. The Apex Court set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and remitted the matter to it for fresh consideration in accordance with law. 9. In Smt. Rumi Dhar (supra), the appellant and her husband alongwith various other persons including the officers of the Oriental Bank of Commerce Khidirpur Branch, Calcutta were prosecuted for alleged commission of offences under Sections 120B /420 /467 /468 and 471 of IPC. The officers of the Bank had also been prosecuted under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. A charge-sheet was filed against the appellant and seven others. She (appellant) was inter alia charged for taking the benefit of overdrafts between the period 8th February, 1993 to 5th March, 1993 without furnishing any security. The officers of the Bank had also been prosecuted under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. A charge-sheet was filed against the appellant and seven others. She (appellant) was inter alia charged for taking the benefit of overdrafts between the period 8th February, 1993 to 5th March, 1993 without furnishing any security. The Bank filed application for recovery before D.R.T. The appellant and Bank entered into settlement and Rs. 25.51 lakhs paid by appellant to Bank. The question was whether the appellant entitled to be discharged from criminal proceedings on account of said settlement and repayment. The Apex Court held that the appellant shal not absolved of criminal liability. A civil proceeding and a criminal proceeding can proceed simultaneously. 10. In Suresh Chand Jain (supra), the Apex Court while explaining the scope of Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. observed that any Judicial Magistrate, before taking cognizance of the offence, can order investigation under Section 156(3) of Code. Even if the Magistrate does not say in so many words while directing investigation under Section, 156(3) of the Code that an FIR should be registered, it is the duty of the officer-in-charge of the police station to register the FIR regarding the cognizable offence disclosed by the complaint because that police officer could take further steps contemplated in Chapter XII of the Code only thereafter. 11. While considering the grievance in regards that the police authorities do not register FIRs' unless some direction is given by the Court and investigations do not commence even after registration or FIRs. 11. While considering the grievance in regards that the police authorities do not register FIRs' unless some direction is given by the Court and investigations do not commence even after registration or FIRs. The Apex Court in the case of Lalita Kumari (supra) has ruled as under:- Let order dated 14th July, 2008, and this order be put on the website of the Supreme Court of India so that the people of India may know what directions have been given by this Court and they may take appropriate steps in case of any inaction on the part of the concerned officer of the police station in instituting a case and the Chief Judicial Magistrate/Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be, shall take action in a case of inaction upon filing of complaint petition and give direction to institute the case within the time directed in the said order failing which the Chief Judicial Magistrate/Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be, shall not only initiate action against the delinquent police officer but punish them suitably by send them to jail, in case the cause shown is found to be unsatisfactory. Apart from this, the Chief Judicial Magistrate/Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be, shall report the matter to the disciplinary authority at once by fax as well upon receipt of which the disciplinary authority shall suspended the concerned police officer immediately in contemplation of departmental proceeding. 12. In Sakiri Vasu (supra), the Apex Court ruled that if a person has a grievance that his FIR has not been registered by the police station, his first remedy is to approach the Superintendent of Police under section 154(3) Cr.P.C. or other police officer referred to in section 36 Cr.P.C. If despite approaching the Superintendent of Police of the officer referred to in section 36 his grievance still persists, then he can approach a Magistrate under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. instead of rushing to the High Court by way of a writ petition or a petition under section 482 Cr.P.C. Moreover, he has a further remedy of filing a criminal complaint under section 200 Cr.P.C. 13. In Smt. Santosh Kumari (supra), a Single Bench of Allahabad High Court held that once a cognizable offence is disclosed in the complaint the Magistrate is bound to direct the FIR to be registered and the matter be investigated. In Smt. Santosh Kumari (supra), a Single Bench of Allahabad High Court held that once a cognizable offence is disclosed in the complaint the Magistrate is bound to direct the FIR to be registered and the matter be investigated. Similar view has been taken by the Single Bench of Allahabad High Court in the case of Rajwati (supra). 14. In the case cited by learned counsel for the respondents No. 1 & 2, the Apex Court in G. Sagar Suri (supra), while explaining the scope of Section 482 of Cr.P.C. in case of civil nature has ruled that jurisdiction under Section 482 of the code has to be exercised with great care. In exercise of its jurisdiction the High Court is not to examine the matter superficially. It is to be seen if a matter, which is essentially of a civil nature, has given a cloak of criminal offence. Criminal proceedings are not a short cut of other remedies available in law. 15. The Apex Court in the case of Thermax Limited and others v. K.M. Johny and others, (2011) 3 SCC 412, held that for proceeding under Section 156(3) of the Code, the complaint must disclose relevant material ingredients of cognizable offence. If there is flavor of civil nature, the same cannot be agitated in the form of criminal proceeding. 16. It is pertinent to mention here that the power conferred under Section 156(3), the Magistrate should not mechanically pass order directing the police to investigate the case. The need for investigation by police is necessary only in cases where the Magistrate is prima facie satisfied that the allegations contained in the complaint point to the commission of cognizable offence. For ordering investigation by police under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C., the Magistrate cannot act merely as a post office and he is bound to apply his mind before doing so. 17. In this case, admittedly, no complaint was filed. The petitioner chose to file only a complaint under Section 156(3) of Code before the Magistrate. 18. On a bare perusal of the complaint/application would only reveal that the allegations as contained in the application are of a civil nature and do not prima-facie disclose commission of allegation criminal offence under Section 420 of IPC. The petitioner chose to file only a complaint under Section 156(3) of Code before the Magistrate. 18. On a bare perusal of the complaint/application would only reveal that the allegations as contained in the application are of a civil nature and do not prima-facie disclose commission of allegation criminal offence under Section 420 of IPC. In Anil Mahajan v. Bhor Industries Ltd. and another, (2005) 10 SCC 228 , a three Judges Bench of Apex Court analyzed the difference between a breach of contract and cheating and held as under:- The substance of the complaint is to be seen. Mere use of the expression "cheating" in the complaint is of no consequence. Except mention of the words "deceive" and "cheat" in the complaint filed before the Magistrate and "cheating" in the complaint filed before the police, there is no averment about the deceit, cheating or fraudulent intention of the accused at the time of entering into MOU wherefrom it can be inferred that the accused had the intention to deceive the complainant to pay. 19. The essential ingredient for an offence under Section 420 of IPC is that there has to be dishonest intention to deceive another person. The relevant allegations made in the complaint and on perusal of the same, reproduced hereinabove, it is evident that no such dishonest intention of the respondents No. 1 & 2 can be seen or even inferred inasmuch as the entire dispute pertains to contractual obligation between the parties. Since, the very ingredients of Section 420 of IPC are not attracted, the J.M.F.C. has rightly disallowed the application. Even for the sake of arguments, this Court admit that allegations in the complaint do make out a dispute, still it ought to be considered that the same are merely a breach of contract and the same cannot give raise to criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right from the beginning [Relied upon Thermax Limited (supra)]. Therefore, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case and in the aforesaid legal dictum and for the reasons given hereinabove, I do not find any infirmity or illegality in the impugned order which may call for interference in exercise of powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. This petition is devoid of any merit and is, therefore, dismissed.