STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. SVEC CONSTRUCTIONS LIMITED
2013-10-17
P.SAM KOSHY
body2013
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT 1. Through the instant Civil Revision the State/applicants have challenged the award dated 30.10.1999 passed by M.P. Arbitration Tribunal in reference case No. 60/91. 2. Facts of the case in nutshell leading to the reference case are that the construction company had obtained three different contracts for remodelling and C.C. Lining of Mahanadi main canal at different points. In the instant case, the Porous concrete slabs were casted as an extra item of work in the slopes, after completion of PCC lining as per the designs, drawings and instructions of the engineers. For laying Porous concrete slabs, room was made in the completed lining by removing the already laid slabs. The area of these slabs, which were removed for casting porous concrete slabs was deducted from the measurements of PCC lining in the final bill. According to the non-applicant, the bill raised towards this extra work which was deducted by the State Govt. was not justified and the contractor therein was entitled to receive the payment for the same. After refusal by the State Govt. to release the payment for the said extra work both the parties decided to resolve the dispute by way of the remedy available under M.P. Madhastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983 (in short 'the Act of 1983'). The said dispute raised by the non-applicant was registered as three different cases by the Tribunal: first reference case No. 101/91 was pertaining to the remodelling and C.C.Lining of Mahanadi main canal from 24 to 27 Km. Similarly, second reference case No.60/91 was in respect of the remodelling and C.C.Lining of Mahanadi main canal from 28 to 32 Km. Likewise the third reference case No.61/91 was pertaining to remodelling and C.C.Lining of Mahanadi main canal from 44 to 49 Km. The instant Revision deals with the Reg. Case No.60/91 before the Adhiniyam. The non-applicant thereafter made a statement claiming for different items from the State Govt. by way of arbitration and ultimately after considering the non-applicant the State Govt. also refuted the claim of the non-applicant by filing a separate objection. Finally, after considering all the objections raised by the petitioner the Tribunal vide its impugned award dated 30th October, 1999 passed the order dealing with all the three reference cases. While deciding the matter, the Tribunal hold that the non-applicant would be entitled to receive an amount of Rs. 6,27,300 from the State.
Finally, after considering all the objections raised by the petitioner the Tribunal vide its impugned award dated 30th October, 1999 passed the order dealing with all the three reference cases. While deciding the matter, the Tribunal hold that the non-applicant would be entitled to receive an amount of Rs. 6,27,300 from the State. It is this impugned order dated 30th October, 1999 which has been assailed by the State/applicants by way of the instant Civil Revision invoking the Act of 1983. 3. The main grounds challenged by the State/applicants in the instant Civil Revision are that the Tribunal has not exercised his jurisdiction properly and has exercised the power illegally with the material irregularity. It was also challenged by the State that the Tribunal in fact has failed to see that there was no agreement between the applicant/State and non-applicant. Lastly it was challenged that the claim raised by the contractor was barred by limitation and this issue has not been dealt with by the Tribunal. 4. Shri G. D. Vaswani, G.A. appearing on behalf of the State taking the Court through the award passed by the Tribunal tried to canvass before the Court that in fact the Tribunal has not properly appreciated the submissions raised by State in their defence before the Tribunal and has passed the award which is either perse illegal or perverse in its finding. 5. As regards the first objection raised by Shri Vaswani as to whether the non-applicant company had got the contract and whether the non-applicant/company was competent enough to pursue with the instant case. While passing the award, in paragraph-8, the Tribunal has categorically given clear finding of fact as to how the non-applicant came into existence and as to how the non-applicant is competent enough to pursue the proceedings under the Tribunal. Considering all the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal finally in a well reasoned manner has decided the said issue in favour of the non-applicant contractor. 6. As regards the other submission in respect of the Tribunal having exercised its jurisdiction in an excessive manner and committed an illegality in passing of the award, the learned counsel for the State fairly admits that for the reasons the Tribunal cannot be said to have exercised its jurisdiction illegally or an excessive manner. 7.
6. As regards the other submission in respect of the Tribunal having exercised its jurisdiction in an excessive manner and committed an illegality in passing of the award, the learned counsel for the State fairly admits that for the reasons the Tribunal cannot be said to have exercised its jurisdiction illegally or an excessive manner. 7. However, Shri Vaswani finally restricts his arguments only on the issue that the Tribunal has failed to properly appreciate the fact in respect of maintainability of the reference cases filed by the non-applicant on the ground of the same being barred by limitation under the provisions of the Act of 1983. While arguing on the said ground, contention of Shri Vaswani was that the work was completed in March 1996 and the petitioner submitted its claim application only on 30.08.1997 which was decided by the superintendent engineer on 24.08.2007 and according to the State counsel, the claim of the contractor if any under the terms of the agreement could have been raised within a period of one year i.e. in this case 23rd October, 1998. On perusal of the award it is evidently clear that the said issue has also been elaborately in a well reasoned manner discussed and decided by the Tribunal in its impugned award. The relevant portion in respect of the reasoning given by the Tribunal dealing with the issue of limitation as well as the issue of maintainability of the reference cases has been dealt by the Tribunal is reproduced as hereunder for ready reference : "Shri I. B. Shastri's argument that the petitions are barred by limitation is not correct because limitation has come in force only through M.P. Act No.9 of 1990 and there was no time limit prescribed for making reference to the Tribunal before Act No.9 of 1990. After the insertion of Section 7 (B) in the Act, the petitioner has filed these petitions on 20.02.1991 & 08.03.1991 within amnesty period (upto 23.04.1991) as provided under Sub clause (2) of 7(B). Thus, the petitions are within period of limitation and maintainable. It is also observed that work has not been assigned to SVEC Construction Private Ltd. By Shri Venkateshwars Engineering Contractors which was a private company. Govt.
Thus, the petitions are within period of limitation and maintainable. It is also observed that work has not been assigned to SVEC Construction Private Ltd. By Shri Venkateshwars Engineering Contractors which was a private company. Govt. of M.P's letter No.52/19/MPS/31/83/1245 dated 29.06.1998 and E.E. M.R.P's letter No. 1682 dated 20.8.85 (filed by petitioner during the course of final argument) indicate that respondents have accepted that M/s SVEC Constructions (Pvt.) Ltd. was successor of the Private Company which has signed the Agreement. Accordingly payments were made to M/s SVEC Construction (Pvt.) Ltd. for the contracts by the respondents. Thus, it is immaterial whether agreement was signed by M/s SVEC Constructions (Pvt.) Ltd. or their predecessors, to whom they have succeeded. It is, also seen that Shri I. B. Shastri's argument that there is no agreement between the petitioner and the respondents and thus Tribunal can not grant any relief, is not pleaded in the written statement. Therefore, we decide that reference petitions are within jurisdiction of this Tribunal. Shri S. V. Ratnam is properly authorized to present the reference petitions before the Tribunal and the petitioner Co. is competent to submit these reference petitions." 8. A bare perusal of the award would itself make it clear that the Tribunal in fact has considered all the objections raised by the State objectively and has given reasons for reaching to the particular conclusion. So far as the question of limitation is concerned, there are couple of decisions in this regard decided by the Hon'ble Madhya Pradesh High Court i.e. Naresh and Co. Vs. State of M.P. and others 2005(1)MPLJ 604, Ramla Construction, New Delhi Vs. State of M.P. and others 2006(1) MPLJ 234 , M/s. Sermen (India) Road Makers Pvt. Ltd Vs. State of M.P. and others 2005(3) MPHT 292 , M.P. State Ware housing Corporation and others Vs. Lalchand Wadwani 2005(2) MPHT 291 and Lachmandas Vs. State of M.P. and another 2000(3)MPLJ 21. 9. In the all above referred judgments of Madhya Pradesh High Court the Division Bench has very categorically held that after introduction of Section 7 (B) in the Act of 1983 the Tribunal could entertain an application provided the same was filed within the period of one year as prescribed under Section 7 (B). 10.
9. In the all above referred judgments of Madhya Pradesh High Court the Division Bench has very categorically held that after introduction of Section 7 (B) in the Act of 1983 the Tribunal could entertain an application provided the same was filed within the period of one year as prescribed under Section 7 (B). 10. On perusal of the records in the instant case and also the judgment it is evidently clear that the claim of the contractor was alive when the amendment was introduced in the Act and therefore the finding reached at by the Tribunal is legal, proper and justified and therefore the said ground of limitation also having properly dealt with by the Tribunal does not warrant any interference. 11. Further, if we see the provision of Section 19 (2) of the Act of 1983 it is evidently clear that the makers of the law in a very categorical terms had empowered the High Court to exercise the power of revision only under the given five grounds if available. For ready reference the provisions of Section 19 (2) of the Act of 1983 is reproduced as hereunder : If it appears to the high Court that the Tribunal– (a) has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law; or (b) has failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested; or (c) has acted in exercise of its jurisdiction illegally, or with material irregularity; or (d) has misconducted itself or the proceedings; or (e) has made an award which is invalid or has been improperly procured by any party to the proceedings. The High Court may make such order in the case as it thinks fit. 12. From reading of the award and on going through the provisions of Section 19 (2), it is evidently clear that the State/applicants have miserably failed in justifying their contention in establishing the fact as to how the award passed by the Tribunal is bad in law, illegal, arbitrary and against the provisions of law so as to attract the revisional powers of the High Court. For the reasons stated in the preceding paragraphs I am of the opinion that the Civil Revision preferred by the State being totally devoid of merits, is liable to be rejected and accordingly the same is hereby rejected. 13. In the result, the Civil Revision fails and the same is accordingly dismissed.
For the reasons stated in the preceding paragraphs I am of the opinion that the Civil Revision preferred by the State being totally devoid of merits, is liable to be rejected and accordingly the same is hereby rejected. 13. In the result, the Civil Revision fails and the same is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs. Revision Dismissed.