JUDGMENT 1. The petitioner has approached this Court seeking quashing of order dated 27.09.2001, whereby an order of penalty has been imposed upon the petitioner reducing his salary from Rs. 3,795/to Rs. 3,200/in the pay-scale of Rs. 3200854900 for a period of four years with further direction that the petitioner will not earn increment of pay for a period of four years. 2. The petitioner, while serving with the Central Industrial Security Force, was served with a chargememo dated 23.11.2000 under Rule 34 of CISF Rules, 1969. The petitioner was granted full opportunity to represent his case. During the departmental enquiry the petitioner has cross-examined the witnesses. The petitioner has been served with order dated 23.04.2001, passed by the disciplinary authority. Differing with order dated 23.04.2001, the appellate authority has enhanced the penalty imposed by the disciplinary authority (Commandant) by order dated 27.09.2001. Therefore, the petitioner has approached this Court. 3. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondents denying the plea of the petitioner. It has been stated in the counter affidavit that on the request of the petitioner to supply copy of the chargememo in Hindi, the same has been supplied to the petitioner on two occasions, i.e. on 14.12.2000 and 20.12.2000. 4. Heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the documents. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the enquiry officer as well as the appellate authority had ignored the evidence of P.W.6 (Deputy Commandant) and P.W.5 (Driver of the Commandant). He has further submitted that appellate authority has erroneously enhanced the penalty imposed upon the petitioner. This is a case where relevant materials, i.e. the evidences of P.Ws.5 and 6 have been ignored by the authorities while passing the order of penalty upon the petitioner. 6. Learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that charges framed against the petitioner were grave. The petitioner has been found guilty of assisting in the theft of the materials (iron scraps) of the SAIL, Bokaro. 7. I have perused the evidences brought on record. The evidence of P.Ws. 5 and 6 are not such which would discredit the case of the department. The power of the High Court in exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been settled by a catena of judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In the case of “State of Orissa & Ors. Vs. The evidence of P.Ws. 5 and 6 are not such which would discredit the case of the department. The power of the High Court in exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been settled by a catena of judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In the case of “State of Orissa & Ors. Vs. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra”, reported in AIR 1963 SC 779 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: “9. The High Court has held that there was evidence to support the findings on heads (c) and (d) of Charge (1) and on Charge (2). In respect of charge 1 (b) the respondent was acquitted by the Tribunal and it did not fall to be considered by the Governor. In respect of charges 1(a) and 1(e) in the view of the High Court "the rules of natural justice had not been observed." The recommendation of the Tribunal was undoubtedly founded on its findings on charges 1(a), 1(e), 1(c), 1(d) and Charge (2). The High Court was of the opinion that the findings on two of the heads under Charge (1) could not be sustained, because in arriving at the findings the Tribunal had violated rules of natural justice. The High Court therefore directed that the Government of the State of Orissa should decide whether "on the basis of those charges, the punishment of dismissal should be maintained or else whether a lesser punishment would suffice." It is not necessary for us to consider whether the High Court was right in holding that the findings of the Tribunal on charges 1 (a) and 1 (e) were vitiated for reasons set out by it, because in our judgment the order of the High Court directing the Government to reconsider the question of punishment cannot, for reasons we will presently set out, be sustained. If the order of dismissal was based on the findings on charges 1 (a) and 1(e) alone the Court would have jurisdiction to declare the order of dismissal illegal but when the findings of the Tribunal relating to the two out of five heads of the first charge and the second charge was found not liable to be interfered with by the High Court and those findings established that the respondent was prima facie guilty of grave delinquency, in our view the High Court had no power to direct the Governor of Orissa to reconsider the order of dismissal....” 8. In the case of “The State of Orissa & Anr. Vs. Murlidhar Jena” reported in AIR 1963 SC 404 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the High Court has no power while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 to reappreciate the evidence and finding recorded in a departmental enquiry. In para14, the Hon'ble Supreme Court while holding that the High Court's attempt to appreciate the evidence was not legitimate, has observed as under, “14. .....This observation clearly indicates that the High Court was attempting to appreciate evidence. The judgment of the Tribunal shows that it considered several facts and circumstances in dealing with the question about the identity of the individual indicated by the expression “Chatrapur Saheb.” Whether or not the evidence on which the Tribunal relied was satisfactory and sufficient for justifying its conclusion would not fall to be considered in a writ petition. That in effect is the approach initially adopted by the High Court at the beginning of its judgment. However, in the subsequent part of the judgment the High Court appears to have been persuaded to appreciate the evidence for itself and that, in our opinion, is not reasonable or legitimate.” 9. In the case of State of “Andhra Pradesh and others Vs. S. Shree Rama Rao” reported in AIR 1963 SC 1723 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that High Court has no power under Article 226 to interfere with the finding of misconduct recorded during the departmental enquiry. In para7 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under, “7. ....... In the case of State of “Andhra Pradesh and others Vs. S. Shree Rama Rao” reported in AIR 1963 SC 1723 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that High Court has no power under Article 226 to interfere with the finding of misconduct recorded during the departmental enquiry. In para7 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under, “7. ....... The High court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the constitution a Court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant: it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence.” 10. In the case of “State of Andhra Pradesh and others Vs. Chitra Venkata Rao”, reported in (1975) 2 SCC 557 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the High Court is not a court of appeal under Article 226 over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against the public servant. Taking note of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of “State of Andhra Pradesh and others Vs. S. Shree Rama Rao” reported in (1964) 3 SCR 25 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under, 21. “The scope of Article 226 in dealing with departmental inquiries has come up before this Court. Two propositions were laid down by this Court in State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao.(1964) 3 SCR First, there is no warrant for the view that in considering whether a public officer is guilty of misconduct charged against him, the rule followed in criminal trials that an offence is not established unless proved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the Court must be applied. If that rule be not applied by a domestic tribunal of inquiry the High Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not competent to declare the order of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry invalid. The High Court is not a court of appeal under Article 226 over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant. The Court is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Second, where there is some evidence which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion. The departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there is some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226.” 11. In the case of “Rly. Board, representing the Union of India Vs. Niranjan Singh”, reported in (1969) 3 SCR 548 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the High Court has no power to interfere with the conclusion of the disciplinary authority unless the finding is not supported by any evidence or it can be said that no reasonable person would have reached such a finding. 12. In the case of “Apparel Export promotion Council Vs. 12. In the case of “Apparel Export promotion Council Vs. A.K. Chopra”, reported in (1999) 1 SCC 759 , the Hon'ble supreme Court has held that it is a settled position that in a departmental proceeding the disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts and in case an appeal is presented to the appellate authority, appellate authority has also the power/jurisdiction to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on facts, being the sole factfinding authorities. 13. In the case of “Praveen Bhatia Vs. Union of India & Ors.” reported in (2009) 4 SCC 225 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has refused to interfere with the order of penalty in a case in which the property return was not filed by the employee within the stipulated period. 14. In view of the settled law with respect to the power of the High Court to interfere with the departmental proceedings and to substitute its decision in so far as order of penalty is concerned, I am of the opinion that this is not the case which requires interference by this Court. This is not a case which is based on 'no evidence'. I also find that no relevant material has been ignored by the authorities nor any irrelevant material has been considered while passing the impugned order. The petitioner has been afforded fair opportunity to defend himself. The witnesses have specifically stated about the presence of the petitioner at the place of occurrence. Even P.W. 5 and P.W. 6 have also stated about the presence of the petitioner. The petitioner who was supposed to protect and guard the property of the Company has been found assisting in the theft of the Company's property. 15. In the result, the writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed. 16. There shall however, be no order as to cost.