Judgment : The sole accused in C.C.No.490 of 2012 on the file of the XVII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad, filed the revision questioning the order of the Court dated 10-7-2012 taking cognizance of the case on the protest petition filed by the 2nd respondent herein. The 2nd respondent filed a private complaint before the XVII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad, against the petitioner. The learned XVII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate referred the same to Musheerabad Police under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. Consequently, the Police registered the complaint as First Information Report in Crime No.363 of 2010 under Section 420 I.P.C. After due investigation, the Police submitted a final report that the case was civil in nature and that the complaint therefore was referred. Aggrieved by the same, the 2nd respondent filed a protest petition before the XVII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. After recording the sworn statement of the 2nd respondent, the learned XVII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate took the case on file on 10-7-2012. Aggrieved by the same, the present revision is laid. 2. While the petitioner is represented by a counsel, the husband of the 2nd respondent tried to represent the 2nd respondent. As the husband of the 2nd respondent is not an Advocate, I declined to hear him representing the 2nd respondent. The 2nd respondent consequently filed written arguments. 3. The point for consideration is whether cognizance deserves to be taken on the protest petition or otherwise? 4. Point:-The case of the 2nd respondent is that the petitioner fraudulently induced the 2nd respondent on 10-01-2001 to part with cash of Rs.2,50,000/-to the petitioner as hand loan and that the petitioner thus cheated the 2nd respondent. The 2nd respondent further contended that the petitioner fraudulently issued a cheque for Rs.2,50,000/- in favour of the 2nd respondent after closing the account and that he thus acted with intentional dishonesty. Her case is that the petitioner consequently is liable for punishment under Section 420 IPC. 5. Sri L.T. Rajagopal, learned counsel for the petitioner, attacked the order of the trial court on three grounds, viz., (1) the petition is barred by limitation, (2) the offence of Section 420 IPC prima facie is not made out and (3) the order of the trial court is laconic and deserves to be set aside. 5. Sri L.T. Rajagopal, learned counsel for the petitioner, attacked the order of the trial court on three grounds, viz., (1) the petition is barred by limitation, (2) the offence of Section 420 IPC prima facie is not made out and (3) the order of the trial court is laconic and deserves to be set aside. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that while the offence allegedly occurred on 10-01-2001, the complaint was lodged 8 years thereafter and that the petition more or less is hopelessly barred by limitation. 6. On behalf of the 2nd respondent, it was suggested in the written arguments that there is no period of limitation for lodging a complaint in respect of the offence of cheating. Under Section 468(2)(c) Cr.P.C., there is no period of limitation if the offence alleged is punishable with imprisonment for a period more than 3 years. The 2nd respondent cited The Assistant Collector of the Customs, Bombay v. L.R. Melwani ( AIR 1970 SC 962 ) in support of her contention. In that case, the Supreme Court held that if the delay in filing the complaint has satisfactorily been explained by the complainant, the delay can be condoned. The Supreme Court further observed that the delay per se is not a ground to quash a complaint. Further, this is a case where the question of delay did not arise. Indeed, the complaint was lodged about 8 years after the petitioner received Rs.2,50,000/-from the 2nd respondent, according to the 2nd respondent. The delay in filing the complaint is a question of fact and the appreciation of the filing of the complaint with such a delay cannot be exercised in a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. It is for the trial court to decide whether the delay is a ground apart from other grounds to conclude that the complainant has failed to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, the question of delay is not a valid ground in this petition. 7. The 2nd ground of attack by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the offence under Section 420 IPC prima facie is not made out. In this context, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that a case was already filed by the 2nd respondent under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (the Act, for short) and consequently, this petition is not maintainable. In this context, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that a case was already filed by the 2nd respondent under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (the Act, for short) and consequently, this petition is not maintainable. The cause of action for this petition inter alia is the issuance of a cheque by the petitioner dishonestly after the petitioner had closed the account, whereas the cause of action in a petition laid in respect of the offence under Section 138 of the Act would appear to be different. Added to it, the 2nd respondent also contended that the petitioner borrowed Rs.2,50,000/-from the 2nd respondent with dishonest intention at the time of the borrowal itself. Thus, the 2nd respondent alleged that the very borrowal was with dishonest and fraudulent intention. Such an intention on the part of the petitioner constitutes the offence under Section 420 IPC. Whether the contention is true or otherwise is for the trial court to decide. Insofar as the parameters relate to revision, the question is whether an allegation is made against the petitioner that he cheated the 2nd respondent and whether the 2nd respondent stated the circumstances in which the petitioner cheated her. The 2nd respondent satisfied these circumstances. Consequently, I am constrained to hold that the 2nd respondent prima facie made out a case triable by the Court. The 2nd objection raised by the petitioner consequently is not sustainable. 8. The 3rd contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the order dated 10-7-2012 by the trial court is cryptic and deserves to be set aside. Clearly the order is laconic. It did not contain the reasons for taking cognizance of the case by the trial court. Be that as it is, the circumstances of the case as mentioned already clearly establish that the 2nd respondent made out a prima facie case. Consequently, the order dated 10-7-2012 by the trial court is just and reasonable. It does not require any interference. The revision case accordingly is found to be devoid of merits and is dismissed.