JUDGEMENT R.B. MISRA, J. 1. THE present writ petition No. 2336 of 2009 has been preferred for issuance of writ of certiorari for quashing the policy of regularization dated 9.9.2008 (Annexure P-3) and communication dated 8.6.2009 and for writ of mandamus to the respondents to make all appointments to the post of Lecturer (College Cadre) in all subjects by following the Recruitment & Promotion Rules and restraining the respondents from regularizing the services of contract appointees in pursuance to the policy dated 9.9.2008. Following prayers have been made in CWP No.5047 of 2010:- "(i) That a writ in the nature of Mandamus may kindly be issued directing the respondents to regularize the services of the petitioner from due date i.e. on the completion of 8 years service with all consequential benefits. (ii) That a writ in the nature of Mandamus may kindly be issued directing the respondents to pay the arrears consequent upon the regularization of the services of the petitioner." Following prayers have been made in CWP No.8709 of 2011:- (i) That writ in the nature of mandamus may kindly be issued, directing the respondent department to consider the case of the petitioner for regularizing his contractual services from due date with all consequential benefits in light of 8 years policy in view of the fact that the petitioner was appointed as Lecturer- Sociology on contract basis on 24.09.2001 and he has completed his 8 years contractual service on 24.09.209, since the petitioner fulfills all eligibility criteria for lectureship." Since all the above writ petitions are of identical nature, as such, are being heard and disposed of together. 2. THE petitioners of writ petition No.2336 of 2009, being bona-fide residents of Himachal Pradesh, have preferred the present writ petition by submitting that petitioner No.1 is in possession of degree of M.A. (Sociology) and has acquired Doctorate degree in the year 2005. Petitioner No.2 is M.A. (Sociology) and has passed State Eligibility Test in Sociology subject in the year 1998, and has also acquired Doctorate degree in the subject in the year 2007. Petitioner No.2 is M.A. (Sociology) and has passed State Eligibility Test in Sociology subject in the year 1998, and has also acquired Doctorate degree in the subject in the year 2007. Petitioner No.3 has passed M.A. in the subject of Hindi in the year 1997 and acquired Doctorate degree in Hindi in the year 2003 and has also passed State Eligibility Test in the year 1998, whereas, petitioner No.4 is in possession of degree of M.A. in the subject of Public Administration, which, he has passed in the year 2003 and has acquired Doctorate degree in the same subject in the year 2008. The appointment to the post of Lecturer (College Cadre) was being governed in the State under the Recruitment & Promotion Rules 1994 (in short called 'Rules 1994'). Prior to 1994, the appointment to the post of Lecturer, (College Cadre), i.e. to Class-I / (Gazetted post) was being made by Himachal Pradesh Education Service (Class-I Gazetted), College Cadre, Recruitment & Promotion Rules, 1977, which was repealed and vide notification dated 22.12.1994 a new Rule was promulgated, namely, H.P. Education Department, Lecturer (College Cadre), Class-I (Gazetted), Recruitment & Promotion Rules, 1994 (in short called 'Rules 1994'). The said 'Rules 1994' was also repealed and new Rule was notified vide notification dated 29.11.2001 (in short called 'Rules 2001'). The said Rule was repealed and Recruitment & Promotion Rules 2004 came into force in the year 2004. Subsequently, the same was also repealed and new Rule i.e. Himachal Pradesh Higher Education Department, Lecturer (College Cadre) Class-I (Gazetted), Recruitment & Promotion Rules, 2007 vide notification dated 20.9.2007 was made effective from 31.12.2008 (in short called 'Rules 2007'), as such, the post of Lecturer was to be filled through selection under Rule 15 of 'Rules 2007' which reads as below:- "Selection for appointment to the post in case of direct recruitment shall be made on the basis of viva-voce test, if Himachal Pradesh Public Service Commission or other recruiting agency, as the case may be, so consider necessary or expedient, by a written test or practical test, the standard / syllabus etc. of which will be determined by the Commission / other recruiting agcney as the case may be." The procedure for selection for appointment to the post of Lecturer (College Cadre), by way of contractual appointment, has been provided under Rule 15-A as below:- "(a) Under this policy, the Lecturer (College Cadre) in the Department of Higher Education, H.P. will be engaged on contract basis initially for one year which may be extendable for two more years on year to year basis; (b) The Principal Secretary / Secretary (Higher Education) to the Government of Himachal Pradesh, after obtaining the approval of the Government to fill up the vacant posts on contract basis will place the requisition with the concerned recruiting agency i.e. H.P. Public Service Commission; (c) The selection will be made in accordance with the eligibility conditions prescribed in these Rules; and (d) Contract appointee, so selected under these Rules, will not have any right to claim for regularization or permanent absorption in the Government job." The minimum educational qualification required for the post of Lecturer (College Cadre) for direct recruitment has been prescribed under Rule-7 as under:- "Essential Qualifications: (i) A good academic record with at least 55% marks or an equivalent of 55% wherever the grading system is followed in Master Degree level in the relevant subject from a Indian University or an equivalent degree from Foreign University recognized by the Government of India; (ii) For the Lecturer in Fine Arts also i.e. Commercial Arts, Drawing and Painting and Sculpture, Master Degree in Fine Arts having good academic record with 55% marks or equivalent of 55% wherever grading system is followed; (iii) A relaxation of 5% is provided from 55% to 50% marks, as the Masters Degree for the SC/ST categories; (iv) A relaxation of 5% is provided from 55% to 50% of the marks to the Ph.D. Degree holders who have passed their masters degree prior to September 1991; (v)"B" in the 7 point scale with letter grades O, A, B, C, D, E and F shall be regarded as equivalent of 55% wherever the grading system is followed (7 point scale is displayed in the Foot Note). (vi) Candidate besides fulfilling the above qualifications should have cleared the eligibility test (NET) for Lecturers conducted by the UGC, CSIR or similar test accredited the State Public Service Commission; (vii) NET shall remain the compulsory requirement for appointment as Lecturer for those with post graduate degree. However, the candidates having Ph.D. Degree in the concerned subject are exempted from NET for PG level and UG level teaching. The candidates having M.Phil degree in the concerned subject are exempted from NET for UG level teaching only. Desirable Qualification: Knowledge of customs, manners and dialects of Himachal Pradesh and suitability for appointment, in peculiar conditions, prevailing in the Pradesh." 3. AS contended on behalf of the petitioners that such contract appointees, however, have also appeared in selection process but they could not be finally selected and prior to Recruitment & Promotion Rules, 2007, the 'Rules 1994' was applicable till the year 2001, before the 'Rules 2001' came into existence. After 2001 till 2007, the Recruitment & Promotion Rules of 2001 were applicable, however, prior to 2007, no mode of recruitment by way of contract appointment was prescribed. Only by 'Rules 2007', the method of recruitment was prescribed 100% by direct recruitment on contract basis. It appears, without following due process of law, the appointments were made on contract or ad-hoc basis by way of back door entry to the post of Lecturer (College Cadre)/Class-1 posts. Whereas, the appointment to such posts are to be made by Himachal Pradesh Public Service Commission (in short called 'Commission'). Even for the purpose of ad-hoc / contract appointments, the selection invariably was to be made by the 'Commission' in respect of all Class-I posts. The practice of the State Government to regularize the services of lecturers, appointed on contract or ad-hoc basis, is dehors the 'Rules'. Even for the purpose of ad-hoc / contract appointments, the selection invariably was to be made by the 'Commission' in respect of all Class-I posts. The practice of the State Government to regularize the services of lecturers, appointed on contract or ad-hoc basis, is dehors the 'Rules'. The petitioners, in Para-8 of the writ petition, have also given a long list of as many as 82 persons in which many of the candidates, though appointed on contract or ad-hoc basis, were not even in possession of the minimum requirement but the endeavour of the State Government to regularize the services of contract appointee Lecturer (College Cadre) vide notification dated 9.9.2008 was dehors, the Rules and the verdict of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the settled law on the subject as mere continuance of such ad-hoc / contractual appointees as College Cadre Lecturers does not entitle them for regularization without approval of 'Commission'. In absence of any specific rules for the purpose framed in consonance to the verdict of Hon'ble Supreme Court, whereas, the recruitment rules provide only one mode of appointment i.e. by way of direct recruitment wherein the assessment of suitability of the candidates is to be made through competitive examination. The recruitment to the post of Lecturer (College Cadre) is governed under the statutory rules, as such, any administrative order or executive instruction cannot provide the mode of regularization of the services of contract / ad- hoc appointees. Moreso, no executive instruction or administrative order, in derogation to the Rules, can provide the way of regularization of such category of persons. 4. THE respondents have neither notified the vacancies through 'Commission' nor at any point of time, the respondents have been subjected to any selection process. It appears that State of Himachal Pradesh, vide notification dated 20.9.1973, has granted exemption from consultation of 'Commission' for filling certain posts and as per notification dated 20.9.1973, the posts, which were to be made without consulting the 'Commission' for appointment to a permanent post of a person temporarily for a period, not exceeding six months, if an emergency has arisen and, in the public interest, to fill the vacancy immediately and there is likely to be undue delay for making the appointment after consulting the 'Commission'. The State of Himachal Pradesh has also taken a decision to fill up all Class-I and Class-II posts on ad-hoc / contract basis without consultation of 'Commission' vide notification dated 31.7.2006, which, however, later-on was deleted by notification dated 19.8.2006. The Government of Himachal Pradesh / (Department of Personnel) has issued a circular dated 9th September, 2008 (Annexure P-3) conveying the same to all the concerned authorities regarding regularization of contract / ad-hoc appointee in Government departments. The main text of circular reads as below:- "1. The contractual appointees who have completed 8 years service as on 31.3.2008 will be considered for regularization against the available vacancies. 2. the regularization will be strictly on the basis of seniority subject to fitness and the fulfillment of eligibility conditions prescribed in the concerned Recruitment and Promotion Rules. 3. The candidate should be medically fit for the post being considered for regularization. The Medical fitness certificate of the candidate shall be ensured in accordance with the provisions contained F.R. 10 and S.R. 4(1), 4(2) and 4(3). 4. The regularization shall be subject to verification of character and antecedents of the candidate being considered for regularization as provided in H.P. Financial Rules. 5. For the determination of date of birth of the candidate concerned criterion as laid down in Rule 7.1 of the H.P. Financial Rules Vol.I Hand-Book No.2 shall be observed. 6. A screening Committee shall be constituted by the Department concerned for regularization. 7. The contractual appointees who are to be regularized shall be put in at the minimum of the time scale of the post. 8. The contractual appointee so regularized shall be liable to be posted anywhere within the State. 9. The regularization shall be subject to orders regarding reservation in the service for Scheduled Castes / Scheduled Tribes / Other Backward Classes / Other categories of persons issued by the Himachal Pradesh Govt. from time to time." To carry out the regularization of contract appointees, the State Government (Department of Higher Education), vide letter 8.6.2009 (Annexure P-4) has scrutinized as many as 22 persons for the purpose of regularization of their services appointed as lecturer on contract basis. Mrs. from time to time." To carry out the regularization of contract appointees, the State Government (Department of Higher Education), vide letter 8.6.2009 (Annexure P-4) has scrutinized as many as 22 persons for the purpose of regularization of their services appointed as lecturer on contract basis. Mrs. Ranjana Parmar, learned counsel for the petitioners in CWP No.2336 of 2009, has made following propositions for our consideration:- (i) The incumbents appointed initially dehors the Rules cannot be regularized; (ii) Persons lacking qualification at the time of initial appointment are not entitled for regularization; (iii) Appointment of respondents made initially by back door entry cannot be regularized being derogatory to Article 14 of the Constitution; (iv) The services of the respondents cannot be regularized without consultation of Public Service Commission of the State of H.P.; (v) The regularization policy, in the form of instruction and contrary to rules, is not legally sustainable; (vi) The posts not notified by Public Service Commission and filled up locally without proper advertisement without giving wide circulation in Newspapers are not valid appointments. 5. IN order to strengthen her submission, learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted as below:- (a) Hon'ble Supreme Court in Secretary, State of Karnataka and Others versus Uma Devi and Others, (2006) 4 SCC 1 , has observed in the following paragraphs which are extracted as below:- "4. But, sometimes this process is not adhered to and the Constitutional scheme of public employment is by-passed. The Union, the States, their departments and instrumentalities have resorted to irregular appointments, especially in the lower rungs of the service, without reference to the duty to ensure a proper appointment procedure through the Public Service Commission or otherwise as per the rules adopted and to permit these irregular appointees or those appointed on contract or on daily wages, to continue year after year, thus, keeping out those who are qualified to apply for the post concerned and depriving them of an opportunity to compete for the post. It has also led to persons who get employed, without the following of a regular procedure or even through the backdoor or on daily wages, approaching Courts, seeking directions to make them permanent in their posts and to prevent regular recruitment to the concerned posts. It has also led to persons who get employed, without the following of a regular procedure or even through the backdoor or on daily wages, approaching Courts, seeking directions to make them permanent in their posts and to prevent regular recruitment to the concerned posts. Courts have not always kept the legal aspects in mind and have occasionally even stayed the regular process of employment being set in motion and in some cases, even directed that these illegal, irregular or improper entrants be absorbed into service. A class of employment which can only be called 'litigious employment', has risen like a phoenix seriously impairing the constitutional scheme. Such orders are passed apparently in exercise of the wide powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Whether the wide powers under Article 226 of the Constitution is intended to be used for a purpose certain to defeat the concept of social justice and equal opportunity for all, subject to affirmative action in the matter of public employment as recognized by our Constitution, has to be seriously pondered over. It is time, that Courts desist from issuing orders preventing regular selection or recruitment at the instance of such persons and from issuing directions for continuance of those who have not secured regular appointments as per procedure established. The passing of orders for continuance, tends to defeat the very Constitutional scheme of public employment. It has to be emphasized that this is not the role envisaged for High Courts in the scheme of things and their wide powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are not intended to be used for the purpose of perpetuating illegalities, irregularities or improprieties or for scuttling the whole scheme of public employment. Its role as the sentinel and as the guardian of equal rights protection should not be forgotten. 10. When these matters came up before a Bench of two Judges, the learned Judges referred the cases to a Bench of three Judges. The order of reference is reported in 2003 (9) SCALE 187. This Court noticed that in the matter of regularization of ad hoc employees, there were conflicting decisions by three Judge Benches of this Court and by two Judge Benches and hence the question required to be considered by a larger Bench. The order of reference is reported in 2003 (9) SCALE 187. This Court noticed that in the matter of regularization of ad hoc employees, there were conflicting decisions by three Judge Benches of this Court and by two Judge Benches and hence the question required to be considered by a larger Bench. When the matters came up before a three Judge Bench, the Bench in turn felt that the matter required consideration by a Constitution Bench in view of the conflict and in the light of the arguments raised by the Additional Solicitor General. The order of reference is reported in 2003 (10) SCALE 388. It appears to be proper to quote that order of reference at this stage. It reads: 1. "Apart from the conflicting opinions between the three Judges' Bench decisions in Ashwani Kumar and Ors. Vs. State of Bihar and Ors., reported in 1997 (2) SCC 1 , State of Haryana and Ors vs., Piara Singh and Ors. Reported in 1992 (4) SCC 118 and Dharwad Distt. P.W.D. Literate Daily Wage Employees Association and Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka and Ors. Reported in 1990 (2) SCC 396 , on the one hand and State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Suresh Kumar Verma and Anr., reported in AIR 1996 SC 1565 , State of Punjab vs. Surinder Kumar and Ors. Reported in AIR 1992 SC 1593 , and B.N. Nagarajan and Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka and Ors., reported in 1979 (4) SCC 507 on the other, which has been brought out in one of the judgments under appeal of Karnataka High Court in State of Karnataka vs. H. Ganesh Rao, decided on 1.6.2000, reported in 2001 (4) Karnataka Law Journal 466, learned Additional Solicitor General urged that the scheme for regularization is repugnant to Articles 16(4), 309, 320 and 335 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, these cases are required to be heard by a Bench of Five learned Judges (Constitution Bench). 2. On the other hand, Mr. M.C. Bhandare, learned senior counsel, appearing for the employees urged that such a scheme for regularization is consistent with the provision of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. 3. Mr. V. Lakshmi Narayan, learned counsel, appearing in CC Nos.109-498 of 2003, has filed the G.O. dated 19.7.2002 and submitted that orders have already been implemented. 4. M.C. Bhandare, learned senior counsel, appearing for the employees urged that such a scheme for regularization is consistent with the provision of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. 3. Mr. V. Lakshmi Narayan, learned counsel, appearing in CC Nos.109-498 of 2003, has filed the G.O. dated 19.7.2002 and submitted that orders have already been implemented. 4. After having found that there is conflict of opinion between three Judges Bench decisions of this Court, we are of the view that these cases are required to be heard by a Bench of five learned Judges. 5. Let these matters be placed before Hon'ble the Chief Justice for appropriate orders." We are, therefore, called upon to resolve this issue here. We have to lay down the law. We have to approach the question as a constitutional court should. 6. IN spite of this scheme, there may be occasions when the sovereign State or its instrumentalities will have to employ persons, in posts which are temporary, on daily wages, as additional hands or taking them in without following the required procedure, to discharge the duties in respect of the posts that are sanctioned and that are required to be filled in terms of the relevant procedure established by the Constitution or for work in temporary posts or projects that are not needed permanently. This right of the Union or of the State Government cannot but be recognized and there is nothing in the Constitution which prohibits such engaging of persons temporarily or on daily wages, to meet the needs of the situation. But the fact that such engagements are resorted to, cannot be used to defeat the very scheme of public employment. Nor can a court say that the Union or the State Governments do not have the right to engage persons in various capacities for a duration or until the work in a particular project is completed. Once this right of the Government is recognized and the mandate of the constitutional requirement for public employment is respected, there cannot be much difficulty in coming to the conclusion that it is ordinarily not proper for courts whether acting under Article 226 of the Constitution or under Article 32 of the Constitution, to direct absorption in permanent employment of those who have been engaged without following a due process of selection as envisaged by the constitutional scheme. What is sought to be pitted against this approach, is the so called equity arising out of giving of temporary employment or engagement on daily wages and the continuance of such persons in the engaged work for a certain length of time. Such considerations can have only a limited role to play, when every qualified citizen has a right to apply for appointment, the adoption of the concept of rule of law and the scheme of the Constitution for appointment to posts. It cannot also be forgotten that it is not the role of courts to ignore, encourage or approve appointments made or engagements given outside the constitutional scheme. In effect, orders based on such sentiments or approach would result in perpetuating illegalities and in the jettisoning of the scheme of public employment adopted by us while adopting the Constitution. The approving of such acts also results in depriving many of their opportunity to compete for public employment. We have, therefore, to consider the question objectively and based on the constitutional and statutory provisions. In this context, we have also to bear in mind the exposition of law by a Constitution Bench in State of Punjab Vs. Jagdip Singh & Ors. ( 1964 (4) SCR 964 ). It was held therein: "In our opinion, where a Government servant has no right to a post or to a particular status, though an authority under the Government acting beyond its competence had purported to give that person a status which it was not entitled to give, he will not in law be deemed to have been validly appointed to the post or given the particular status." 10. In B.N. Nagarajan and Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka and Ors. [ (1979) 3 SCR 937 ], this court clearly held that the words "regular" or "regularization" do not connote permanence and cannot be construed so as to convey an idea of the nature of tenure of appointments. They are terms calculated to condone any procedural irregularities and are meant to cure only such defects as are attributable to methodology followed in making the appointments. This court emphasized that when rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India are in force, no regularization is permissible in exercise of the executive powers of the Government under Article 162 of the Constitution in contravention of the rules. This court emphasized that when rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India are in force, no regularization is permissible in exercise of the executive powers of the Government under Article 162 of the Constitution in contravention of the rules. These decisions and the principles recognized therein have not been dissented to by this Court and on principle, we see no reason not to accept the proposition as enunciated in the above decisions. We have, therefore, to keep this distinction in mind and proceed on the basis that only something that is irregular for want of compliance with one of the elements in the process of selection which does not go to the root of the process, can be regularized and that it alone can be regularized and granting permanence of employment is a totally different concept and cannot be equated with regularization. 11. We have already indicated the constitutional scheme of public employment in this country, and the executive, or for that matter the Court, in appropriate cases, would have only the right to regularize an appointment made after following the due procedure, even though a non- fundamental element of that process or procedure has not been followed. This right of the executive and that of the court, would not extend to the executive or the court being in a position to direct that an appointment made in clear violation of the constitutional scheme, and the statutory rules made in that behalf, can be treated as permanent or can be directed to be treated as permanent. 12. The decision in Dharwad Distt. P.W.D. Literate Daily Wage Employees Association and ors. Vs. State of Karnataka and Ors. ( 1990 (1) SCR 544 ) dealt with a scheme framed by the State of Karnataka, though at the instance of the court. The scheme was essentially relating to the application of the concept of equal pay for equal work but it also provided for making permanent, or what it called regularization, without keeping the distinction in mind, of employees who had been appointed ad hoc, casually, temporarily or on daily wage basis. In other words, employees who had been appointed without following the procedure established by law for such appointments. This Court, at the threshold, stated that it should individualize justice to suit a given situation. In other words, employees who had been appointed without following the procedure established by law for such appointments. This Court, at the threshold, stated that it should individualize justice to suit a given situation. With respect, it is not possible to accept the statement, unqualified as it appears to be. This Court is not only the constitutional court, it is also the highest court in the country, the final court of appeal. By virtue of Article 141 of the Constitution of India, what this Court lays down is the law of the land. Its decisions are binding on all the courts. Its main role is to interpret the constitutional and other statutory provisions bearing in mind the fundamental philosophy of the Constitution. We have given unto ourselves a system of governance by rule of law. The role of the Supreme Court is to render justice according to law. As one jurist put it, the Supreme Court is expected to decide questions of law for the country and not to decide individual cases without reference to such principles of law. Consistency is a virtue. Passing orders not consistent with its own decisions on law, is bound to send out confusing signals and usher in judicial chaos. Its role, therefore, is really to interpret the law and decide cases coming before it, according to law. Orders which are inconsistent with the legal conclusions arrived at by the court in the self same judgment not only create confusion but also tend to usher in arbitrariness highlighting the statement, that equity tends to vary with the Chancellor's foot. 13. With respect, it appears to us that the question whether the jettisoning of the constitutional scheme of appointment can be approved, was not considered or decided. The distinction emphasized in R.N. NANJUNDAPPA Vs T. THIMMIAH and ANR. (supra), was also not kept in mind. The Court appears to have been dealing with a scheme for 'equal pay for equal work' and in the process, without an actual discussion of the question, had approved a scheme put forward by the State, prepared obviously at the direction of the Court, to order permanent absorption of such daily rated workers. (supra), was also not kept in mind. The Court appears to have been dealing with a scheme for 'equal pay for equal work' and in the process, without an actual discussion of the question, had approved a scheme put forward by the State, prepared obviously at the direction of the Court, to order permanent absorption of such daily rated workers. With respect to the learned judges, the decision cannot be said to lay down any law, that all those engaged on daily wages, casually, temporarily, or when no sanctioned post or vacancy existed and without following the rules of selection, should be absorbed or made permanent though not at a stretch, but gradually. If that were the ratio, with respect, we have to disagree with it. 14. We may now consider, State of Haryana Vs. Piara Singh and Others [1992) 3 SCR 826]. There, the court was considering the sustainability of certain directions issued by the High Court in the light of various orders passed by the State for the absorption of its ad hoc or temporary employees and daily wagers or casual labour. This Court started by saying: "Ordinarily speaking, the creation and abolition of a post is the prerogative of the Executive. It is the Executive again that lays down the conditions of service subject, of course, to a law made by the appropriate legislature. This power to prescribe the conditions of service can be exercised either by making rules under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution or (in the absence of such rules) by issued rules/instructions in exercise of its executive power. The court comes into the picture only to ensure observance of fundamental rights, statutory provisions, rules and other instructions, if any governing the conditions of service" 15. This Court then concluded in paragraphs 45 to 50: "The normal rule, of course, is regular recruitment through the prescribed agency but exigencies of administration may sometimes call for an ad hoc or temporary appointment to be made. In such a situation, effort should always be to replace such an ad hoc/temporary employee by a regularly selected employee as early as possible. Such a temporary employee may also compete along with others for such regular selection/appointment. If he gets selected, well and good, but if he does not, he must give way to the regularly selected candidate. In such a situation, effort should always be to replace such an ad hoc/temporary employee by a regularly selected employee as early as possible. Such a temporary employee may also compete along with others for such regular selection/appointment. If he gets selected, well and good, but if he does not, he must give way to the regularly selected candidate. The appointment of the regularly selected candidate cannot be withheld or kept in abeyance for the sake of such an ad hoc/temporary employee. Secondly, an ad hoc or temporary employee should not be replaced by another ad hoc or temporary employee; he must be replaced only by a regularly selected employee. This is necessary to avoid arbitrary action on the part of the appointing authority. Thirdly, even where an ad hoc or temporary employment is necessitated on account of the exigencies of administration, he should ordinarily be drawn from the employment exchange unless it cannot brook delay in which case the pressing cause must be stated on the file. If no candidate is available or is not sponsored by the employment exchange, some appropriate method consistent with the requirements of Article 16 should be followed. In other words, there must be a notice published in the appropriate manner calling for applications and all those who apply in response thereto should be considered fairly. An unqualified person ought to be appointed only when qualified persons are not available through the above processes. If for any reason, an ad hoc or temporary employee is continued for a fairly long spell, the authorities must consider his case for regularization provided he is eligible and qualified according to the rules and his service record is satisfactory and his appointment does not run counter to the reservation policy of the State." 16. With respect, why should the State be allowed to depart from the normal rule and indulge in temporary employment in permanent posts? This Court, in our view, is bound to insist on the State making regular and proper recruitments and is bound not to encourage or shut its eyes to the persistent transgression of the rules of regular recruitment. With respect, why should the State be allowed to depart from the normal rule and indulge in temporary employment in permanent posts? This Court, in our view, is bound to insist on the State making regular and proper recruitments and is bound not to encourage or shut its eyes to the persistent transgression of the rules of regular recruitment. The direction to make permanent -- the distinction between regularization and making permanent, was not emphasized here -- can only encourage the State, the model employer, to flout its own rules and would confer undue benefits on a few at the cost of many waiting to compete. With respect, the direction made in paragraph 50 of Piara Singh (supra) are to some extent inconsistent with the conclusion in paragraph 45 therein. With great respect, it appears to us that the last of the directions clearly runs counter to the constitutional scheme of employment recognized in the earlier part of the decision. Really, it cannot be said that this decision has laid down the law that all ad hoc, temporary or casual employees engaged without following the regular recruitment procedure should be made permanent. 17. We shall now refer to the other decisions. In State of Punjab and others Vs. Surinder Kumar and others (1991 Suppl. (3) SCR 553), a three judge bench of this Court held that High Courts had no power, like the power available to the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, and merely because the Supreme Court granted certain reliefs in exercise of its power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, similar orders could not be issued by the High Courts. The bench pointed out that a decision is available as a precedent only if it decides a question of law. The temporary employees would not be entitled to rely in a Writ Petition they filed before the High Court upon an order of the Supreme Court which directs a temporary employee to be regularized in his service without assigning reasons and ask the High Court to pass an order of a similar nature. The temporary employees would not be entitled to rely in a Writ Petition they filed before the High Court upon an order of the Supreme Court which directs a temporary employee to be regularized in his service without assigning reasons and ask the High Court to pass an order of a similar nature. This Court noticed that the jurisdiction of the High Court while dealing with a Writ Petition was circumscribed by the limitations discussed and declared by judicial decisions and the High Court cannot transgress the limits on the basis of the whims or subjective sense of justice varying from judge to judge. Though the High Court is entitled to exercise its judicial discretion in deciding Writ Petitions or Civil Revision Applications coming before it, the discretion had to be confined in declining to entertain petitions and refusing to grant reliefs asked for by the petitioners on adequate considerations and it did not permit the High Court to grant relief on such a consideration alone. This Court set aside the directions given by the High Court for regularization of persons appointed temporarily to the post of lecturers. The Court also emphasized that specific terms on which appointments were made should be normally enforced. Of course, this decision is more on the absence of power in the High Court to pass orders against the constitutional scheme of appointment. 18. It was then contended that the rights of the employees thus appointed, under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, are violated. It is stated that the State has treated the employees unfairly by employing them on less than minimum wages and extracting work from them for a pretty long period in comparison with those directly recruited who are getting more wages or salaries for doing similar work. The employees before us were engaged on daily wages in the concerned department on a wage that was made known to them. There is no case that the wage agreed upon was not being paid. Those who are working on daily wages formed a class by themselves, they cannot claim that they are discriminated as against those who have been regularly recruited on the basis of the relevant rules. There is no case that the wage agreed upon was not being paid. Those who are working on daily wages formed a class by themselves, they cannot claim that they are discriminated as against those who have been regularly recruited on the basis of the relevant rules. No right can be founded on an employment on daily wages to claim that such employee should be treated on a par with a regularly recruited candidate, and made permanent in employment, even assuming that the principle could be invoked for claiming equal wages for equal work. There is no fundamental right in those who have been employed on daily wages or temporarily or on contractual basis, to claim that they have a right to be absorbed in service. As has been held by this Court, they cannot be said to be holders of a post, since, a regular appointment could be made only by making appointments consistent with the requirements of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The right to be treated equally with the other employees employed on daily wages, cannot be extended to a claim for equal treatment with those who were regularly employed. That would be treating unequals as equals. It cannot also be relied on to claim a right to be absorbed in service even though they have never been selected in terms of the relevant recruitment rules. The arguments based on Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution are therefore overruled. 19. It is contended that the State action in not regularizing the employees was not fair within the framework of the rule of law. The rule of law compels the State to make appointments as envisaged by the Constitution and in the manner we have indicated earlier. In most of these cases, no doubt, the employees had worked for some length of time but this has also been brought about by the pendency of proceedings in Tribunals and courts initiated at the instance of the employees. Moreover, accepting an argument of this nature would mean that the State would be permitted to perpetuate an illegality in the matter of public employment and that would be a negation of the constitutional scheme adopted by us, the people of India. It is therefore not possible to accept the argument that there must be a direction to make permanent all the persons employed on daily wages. It is therefore not possible to accept the argument that there must be a direction to make permanent all the persons employed on daily wages. When the court is approached for relief by way of a writ, the court has necessarily to ask itself whether the person before it had any legal right to be enforced. Considered in the light of the very clear constitutional scheme, it cannot be said that the employees have been able to establish a legal right to be made permanent even though they have never been appointed in terms of the relevant rules or in adherence of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. 20. One aspect needs to be clarified. There may be cases where irregular appointments (not illegal appointments) as explained in S.V. NARAYANAPPA (supra), R.N. NANJUNDAPPA (supra), and B.N. NAGARAJAN (supra), and referred to in paragraph 15 above, of duly qualified persons in duly sanctioned vacant posts might have been made and the employees have continued to work for ten years or more but without the intervention of orders of courts or of tribunals. The question of regularization of the services of such employees may have to be considered on merits in the light of the principles settled by this Court in the cases above referred to and in the light of this judgment. In that context, the Union of India, the State Governments and their instrumentalities should take steps to regularize as a one time measure, the services of such irregularly appointed, who have worked for ten years or more in duly sanctioned posts but not under cover of orders of courts or of tribunals and should further ensure that regular recruitments are undertaken to fill those vacant sanctioned posts that require to be filled up, in cases where temporary employees or daily wagers are being now employed. The process must be set in motion within six months from this date. We also clarify that regularization, if any already made, but not subjudice, need not be reopened based on this judgment, but there should be no further by-passing of the constitutional requirement and regularizing or making permanent, those not duly appointed as per the constitutional scheme. 54. The process must be set in motion within six months from this date. We also clarify that regularization, if any already made, but not subjudice, need not be reopened based on this judgment, but there should be no further by-passing of the constitutional requirement and regularizing or making permanent, those not duly appointed as per the constitutional scheme. 54. It is also clarified that those decisions which run counter to the principle settled in this decision, or in which directions running counter to what we have held herein, will stand denuded of their status as precedents." (b) The appointment of persons / incumbents, made contrary to the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and the statutory rules, are illegal and non-est in the eyes of law rendering such appointment as nullity in reference to the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ashok Kumar Sonkar versus Union of India and Others, (2007) 4 SCC 54 . The relevant Paras-34 and 35 are extracted as below:- "34. It is not a case where appointment was irregular. If an appointment is irregular, the same can be regularized. The court may not take serious note of an irregularity within the meaning of the provisions of the Act. But if an appointment is illegal, it is non-est in the eye of law, which renders the appointment to be a nullity. 35. We have noticed hereinbefore that in making appointment of the appellant, the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and statutory rules were not complied with. The appointment, therefore, was illegal and in that view of the matter, it would be wholly improper for us to invoke our equity jurisdiction." (c) For the purpose of regularizing the respondents, a new methodology, unknown to the law and Rules, is being adopted and a new channel and mode is being created which is not permissible as has been observed by Hon'ble Supreme Court in J and K Public Service Commission and Others versus Dr.Narinder Mohan and Others, (1994) 2 SCC 630 . The relevant Paragraphs are extracted as below:- "11. This Court in Dr. A. K. Jain v. Union of India, 1988 (1) SCR 335 , gave directions under Art. 142 to regularize the services of the, ad hoc doctors appointed on or before October 1, 1984. It is a direction under Article 142 on the peculiar facts and circumstances therein. The relevant Paragraphs are extracted as below:- "11. This Court in Dr. A. K. Jain v. Union of India, 1988 (1) SCR 335 , gave directions under Art. 142 to regularize the services of the, ad hoc doctors appointed on or before October 1, 1984. It is a direction under Article 142 on the peculiar facts and circumstances therein. Therefore, the High Court is not right in placing reliance on the judgment as a ratio to give the direction to the PSC to consider the cases of the respondents. Article 142-power is confided only to this Court. The ratio in Dr. P. C. C. Rawani v. Union of India (1992) 1 SCC 331 , is also not an authority under Art. 141. Therein the orders issued by this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution to regularize the ad hoc appointments had become final. When contempt petition was filed for non-implementation, the Union had come forward with an application expressing its difficulty to give effect to the orders of this Court. In that behalf, while appreciating the difficulties expressed by the Union in implementation, this Court gave further direction to implement the order issued under Art, 32 of the Constitution. Therefore, it is more in the nature of an execution and not a ratio under Art. 141. In Union of India v. Gian Prakash Singh, 1993 (5) JT (SC) 681 this Court by a Bench of three Judges considered the effect of the order in A. K. Jain's case and held that the doctors appointed on ad hoc basis and taken charge after October 1, 1984 have no automatic right for confirmation and they have to take their chance by appearing before the PSC for recruitment. In H. C. Puttaswamy v. Hon'ble Chief Justice of Karnataka, AIR 1991 SC 295 :(1991 Lab IC 235), this Court while holding that the appointment to the posts of clerk etc. in the subordinate courts in Karnataka State without consultation of the PSC are not valid appointments, exercising the power under Art. 142, directed that their appointments as a regular, on humanitarian grounds, since they have put in more than 10 years service. It is to be noted that the recruitment was only for clerical grade (Class-III post) and it is not a ratio under Art. 141. It is to be noted that the recruitment was only for clerical grade (Class-III post) and it is not a ratio under Art. 141. In State of Haryana v. Piara Singh, 1992 (4) SCC 118 at 152: (1992 AIR SCW 2315), this Court noted that the normal rule is recruitment through the prescribed agency but due to administrative exigencies, an ad-hoc or temporary appointment may be made. In such a situation, this Court held that efforts should always be made to replace such ad-hoc or temporary employees by regularly selected employees, as early as possible. The temporary employees also would get liberty to compete along with others for regular selection but if he is not selected, he must give way to the regularly selected candidates. Appointment of the regularly selected candidate cannot be withheld or kept in abeyance for the sake of such an ad hoc or temporary employee. Ad hoc or temporary employee should not be replaced by another ad hoc or temporary employee. He must be replaced only by regularly selected employee. The ad hoc appointment should not be a device to circumbent the rule of reservation. If a temporary or ad hoc employee continued for a fairly long spell, the authorities must consider his case for regularisation provided he is eligible and qualified according to the rules and his service record is satisfactory and his appointment does not run counter to the reservation policy of the State. It is to be remembered that in that case, the appointments are only to Class-III or Class-IV posts and the selection made was by subordinate selection committee. Therefore, this Court did not appear to have intended to lay down as a general rule that in every category of ad hoc appointment, if the ad hoc appointee continued for long period, the rules of recruitment should be relaxed and the appointment by regularization be made. Thus considered, we have no hesitation to hold that the direction of the Division Bench is clearly illegal and the learned single Judge is right in directing the State Government to notify the vacancies to the PSC and the PSC should advertise and make recruitment of the candidates in accordance with the rules. Thus considered, we have no hesitation to hold that the direction of the Division Bench is clearly illegal and the learned single Judge is right in directing the State Government to notify the vacancies to the PSC and the PSC should advertise and make recruitment of the candidates in accordance with the rules. (d) In reference to the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Bihar versus Upendra Narayan Singh and Others, (2009) 5 SCC 65 , there should be equality of opportunity in the matters of public employment, as such, Public Service Commission plays an important role in ensuring equality of opportunity to rule out the effect of spoil system thereon. An endeavour to regularize the services of respondents is being made in the absence of any statutory rules dehors or in derogation to the observations of Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Karnataka and Others versus M.L.Kesari and Others, (2010) 9 SCC 247 . For reference, following paragraphs are necessary to be indicated:- "5. The decision in State of Karnataka v. Umadevi was rendered on 10.4.2006 (reported in 2006 (4) SCC 1 ): ( AIR 2006 SC 1806 : 2006 AIR SCW 1991). In that case, a Constitution Bench of this Court held that appointments made without fol- lowing the due process or the rules relating to appointment did not confer any right on the appointees and courts cannot direct their absorption, regularization or re- engagement nor make their service permanent, and the High Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution should not ordinarily issue directions for absorption, regularization, or permanent continuance unless the recruitment had been done in a regular manner, in terms of the constitutional scheme; and that the courts must be careful in ensuring that they do not interfere unduly with the economic arrangement of its affairs by the State or its instrumentalities, nor lend themselves to be instruments to facilitate the bypassing of the constitutional and statutory mandates. 6. This Court further held that a temporary, contractual, casual or a daily-wage employee does not have a legal right to be made permanent unless he had been appointed in terms of the relevant rules or in adherence of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. This Court, however, made one exception to the above position and the same is extracted below (Para 44 of AIR) : "53. This Court, however, made one exception to the above position and the same is extracted below (Para 44 of AIR) : "53. One aspect needs to be clarified. There may be cases where irregular appointments (not illegal appointments) as explained in S.V. Narayanappa [ 1967 (1) SCR 128 ] : ( AIR 1967 SC 1071 ); R.N. Nanjundappa [ 1972 (1) SCC 409 ] : (AIR . 1972 SC 1767) and B.N. Nagarajan [ 1979 (4) SCC 507 ] : ( AIR 1979 SC 1676 ) and referred to in para 15 above, of duly qualified persons in duly sanctioned vacant posts might have been made and the employees have continued to work for ten years or more but without the intervention of orders of the courts or of tribunals. The question of regularization of the services of such employees may have to be considered on merits in the light of the principles settled by this Court in the cases above-referred to and in the light of this judgment. In that context, the Union of India, the State Governments and their instrumentalities should take steps to regularize as a one-time measure, the services of such irregularly appointed, who have worked for ten years or more in duly sanctioned posts but not under cover of orders of the courts or of tribunals and should further ensure that regular recruitments are undertaken to fill those vacant sanctioned posts that require to be filled up, in cases where temporary employees or daily wagers are being now employed. The process must be set in motion within six months from this date....." 10. It is evident from the above that there is an exception to the general principles against 'regularization' enunciated in Umadevi (AIR 2006SC 1806:2006AIRSCW 1991), if the following conditions are fulfilled : (i) The employee concerned should have worked for 10 years or more in duly sanctioned post without the benefit or protection of the interim order of any court or tribunal. In other words, the State Government or its instrumentality should have employed the employee and continued him in service voluntarily and continuously for more than ten years. (ii) The appointment of such employee should not be illegal, even if irregular. Where the appointments are not made or continued against sanctioned posts or where the persons appointed do not possess the prescribed minimum qualifications, the appointments will be considered to be illegal. (ii) The appointment of such employee should not be illegal, even if irregular. Where the appointments are not made or continued against sanctioned posts or where the persons appointed do not possess the prescribed minimum qualifications, the appointments will be considered to be illegal. But where the person employed possessed the prescribed qualifications and was working against sanctioned posts, but had been selected without undergoing the process of open competitive selection, such appointments are considered to be irregular. 11. The term 'one-time measure' has to be understood in its proper perspective. This would normally mean that after the decision in Umadevi ( AIR 2006 SC 1806 : 2006 AIR SCW 1991), each department or each instrumentality should undertake a one-time exercise and prepare a list of all casual, daily-wage or ad hoc employees who have been working for more than ten years without the intervention of courts and tribunals and subject them to a process verification as to whether they are working against vacant posts and possess the requisite qualification for the post and if so, regularize their services. 10. At the end of six months from the date of decision in Umadevi, cases of several daily-wage/ad hoc/casual employees were still pending before Courts. Consequently, several departments and instrumentalities did not commence the one-time regularization process. On the other hand, some Government departments or instrumentalities undertook the one-time exercise excluding several employees from consider- ation either on the ground that their cases were pending in courts or due to sheer oversight. In such circumstances, the employees who were entitled to be considered in terms of Para 53 of the decision in Umadevi (AIR 2006 SC1806: 2006 AIR SCW 1991, Para 44), will not lose their right to be considered for regularization, merely because the one-time exercise was completed without considering their cases, or because the six months' period mentioned in para 53 (Para 44 of AIR) of Umadevi has expired. The one-time exercise should consider all daily-wage/ad hoc/those employees who had put in 10 years of continuous service as on 10.4.2006 without availing the protection of any interim orders of courts or tribunals. The one-time exercise should consider all daily-wage/ad hoc/those employees who had put in 10 years of continuous service as on 10.4.2006 without availing the protection of any interim orders of courts or tribunals. If any employer had held the one-time exercise in terms of para 53 (Para 44 of AIR) of Umadevi, but did not consider the cases of some employees who were entitled to the benefit of para 53 (Para 44 of AIR) of Umadevi, the employer concerned should consider their cases also, as a continuation of the one-time exercise. The one time exercise will be concluded only when all the employees who are entitled to be considered in terms of Para 53 (Para 44 of AIR) of Umadevi, are so considered. 12. The object behind the said direction in para 53 of Umadevi ( AIR 2006 SC 1806 : 2006 AIR SCW 1991, Para 44) is two- fold. First is to ensure that those who have put in more than ten years of continuous service without the protection of any interim orders of courts or tribunals, before the date of decision in Umadevi (2006 AIR SCW 1991) was rendered, are considered for regularization in view of their long service. Second is to ensure that the departments/ instrumentalities do not perpetuate the practice of employing persons on daily- wage/ad hoc/casual for long periods and then periodically regularize them on the ground that they have served for more than ten years, thereby defeating the constitutional or statutory provisions relating to recruitment and appointment. The true effect of the direction is that all persons who have worked for more than ten years as on 10.4.2006 (the date of decision in Umadevi) without the protection of any interim order of any court or tribunal, in vacant posts, possessing the requisite qualification, are entitled to be considered for regularization. The fact that the employer has not undertaken such exercise of regularization within six months of the decision in Umadevi or that such exercise was undertaken only in regard to a limited few, will not disentitle such employees, the right to be considered for regularization in terms of the above directions in Umadevi as a one-time measure. 13. These appeals have been pending for more than four years after the decision in Umadevi ( AIR 2006 SC 1806 :2006 AIR SCW 1991). 13. These appeals have been pending for more than four years after the decision in Umadevi ( AIR 2006 SC 1806 :2006 AIR SCW 1991). The Appellant (Zila Panchayat, Gadag) has not considered the cases of respondents for regularization within six months of the decision in Umadevi or thereafter. 14. The Division Bench of the High Court has directed that the cases of respondents should be considered in accordance with law. The only further direction that needs to be given, in view of Umadevi, is that the Zila Panchayat, Gadag should now undertake an exercise within six months, a general one-time regularization exercise, to find out whether there are any daily wage/casual/ad-hoc employees serving the Zila Panchayat and if so whether such employees (including the respondents) fulfill the requirements mentioned in para 53 (Para 44 of AIR) of Umadevi. If they fulfill them, their services have to be regularized. If such an exercise has already been undertaken by ignoring or omitting the cases of respondents 1 to 3 because of the pendency of these cases, then their cases shall have to be considered in continuation of the said one time exercise within three months. It is needless to say that if the respondents do not fulfill the requirements of Para 53 (Para 44 of AIR) of Umadevi, their services need not be regularized. If the employees who have completed ten years' service do not possess the educational qualifications prescribed for the post, at the time of their appointment, they may be considered for regularization in suitable lower posts." (e) In case of making offers of public appointment, it is necessary to follow the constitutional scheme laid down in Articles 14 and 16 and relevant recruitment rules, however, appointment made by back door in violation of Articles 14 and 16, would be illegal in view of the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh and Another versus Mohd. Abrahim, (2009) 15 SCC 214 . For reference, paragraph-12 is extracted as below:- "12. Appellant No.1 is a 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. In making offers of public appointment, it is necessary to follow the constitutional scheme laid down in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. For the purpose of legal and valid recruitment, the provisions of the recruitment rules are required to be complied with. In making offers of public appointment, it is necessary to follow the constitutional scheme laid down in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. For the purpose of legal and valid recruitment, the provisions of the recruitment rules are required to be complied with. An appointment through side door being an appointment in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India would be illegal. It has been so held by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Secretary, State of Karnataka and Others v. Umadevi (3) and Others [ (2006) 4 SCC 1 ] [See also Official Liquidator v. Dayanand and Others (2008) 10 SCC 1 , State of Bihar v. Upendra Narayan Singh and Others, 2009 (4) SCALE 282." (f) If the regularization of the respondents is made through Public Service Commission of State of Himachal Pradesh, the petitioners shall have no grievance at all. (g) The reliefs / prayers sought by way of prayers No.2 and 3 are to be considered along with prayer No.2 as this Court has ample power to mould the relief as required in the facts and circumstances of the case as observed by Hon'ble Supreme Court in B.C.Chaturvedi versus Union of India and Others, (1995) 6 SCC 749 . 7. SUPPORTING the stand of the petitioners, Mr.D.K.Khanna, learned counsel for the Public Service Commission of State of Himachal Pradesh, has argued as below:- (a) The State Government should fill up the posts after giving a wide circulation and proper advertisement through newspapers and not only by inviting the candidates through Employment-Exchange as observed by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Excise Superintendent Malkapatnam, Krishna District, A.P. versus K.B.N. Visweshwara Rao and Others, (1996) 6 SCC 216 ; Binod Kumar Gupta and Others versus Ram Ashray Mahoto and Others, AIR 2005 SC 2103 and K.Shekar versus V.Indiramma and Others, (2002) 3 SCC 586 . According to Mr.Khanna, in the present case the appointments of respondents were not made in consonance to the above proposition, as such, the proposed regularization of the respondents would not be legally sustainable. The relevant paragraph of Binod Kumar Gupta (supra), is extracted as below:- 13. The "advertisement" was no "advertisement" as required by the High Court. Without adequate notice no fair opportunity was given to others who might have applied. The relevant paragraph of Binod Kumar Gupta (supra), is extracted as below:- 13. The "advertisement" was no "advertisement" as required by the High Court. Without adequate notice no fair opportunity was given to others who might have applied. Apart from this, it does not appear from the records that there was any selection procedure followed at all. There is no explanation why the Selection Committee had been bypassed nor any acceptable reason why the persons who had applied as far back as in 1986 were ignored. This singular lack of transparency supports the finding of the High Court that the appointments were not made bona fide. The District Judge, who was ultimately responsible for the appointment of Class IV staff violated all norms in making the appointments. It is regrettable that the instructions of the High Court were disregarded with impunity and a procedure evolved for appointment which cannot be said to be in any way fair or above board. The submission of the appellants that they had been validly appointed is in the circumstances unacceptable. Nor can we accede to their prayer to continue in service. No doubt, at the time of issuance of the notice on the special leave petition, this Court had restrained the termination of services of the appellants. However, having regard to the facts of the case as have emerged, we are of the opinion that this Court cannot be called upon to sustain such an obvious disregard of the law and principles of conduct according to which every judge and anyone connected with the judicial system are required to function. If we allow the appellants to continue in service merely because they have been working in the posts for the last 15 years we would be guilty of condoning a gross irregularity in their initial appointment. The High Court has been more than generous in allowing the appellants to participate in any fresh selection procedure as may be held and in granting a relaxation of the age limit. (b) The appointment made in violation of the Recruitment and Promotion Rules would not be legally sustainable moreso without ignoring Public Service Commission. The High Court has been more than generous in allowing the appellants to participate in any fresh selection procedure as may be held and in granting a relaxation of the age limit. (b) The appointment made in violation of the Recruitment and Promotion Rules would not be legally sustainable moreso without ignoring Public Service Commission. However, in the present case, the respondents were not in possession of required educational qualification prescribed by the University Grants Commission i.e. NET / SET, as such, they are not entitled for regularization in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jatinder Singh versus Gurmeet Singh Sidhu and Others, (2001) 6 SCC 508 ; (c) The respondents appointed as Lecturers on contractual appointee have no right for regularization in view of the judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Gujarat and Another versus P.J.Kampavat and Others, AIR 1992 SC 1685 , J and K public Service Commission (supra), Dr.(Mrs.) Chanchal Goyal versus State of Rajasthan, AIR 2003 SC 1713 and State of West Bengal and Another versus Alpana Roy and Others, AIR 2005 SC 3657 . The relevant paragraphs from Dr.(Mrs.) Chanchal Goyal (supra), are extracted as below:- "10. In J and K Public Service Commission and ors. v. Dr. Narinder Mohan and ors ( 1994 (2) SCC 630 ), it was, inter alia, observed that it cannot be laid down as general rules that in every category of ad hoc appointment if the ad hoc appointee continued for longer period, rules of recruitment should be relaxed and the appointment by regularization be made. In the said case in paragraph 11 the position was summed up as under : "This Court in Dr. A. K. Jain v. Union of India (1987 Supp SCC 497) gave directions under Article 142 to regularize the services of the ad hoc doctors appointed on or before October 1 1984. It is direction under Article 142 on the peculiar facts and circumstances therein. Therefore, the High Court is not right in placing reliance on the judgment as a ratio to give the direction to the PSC to consider the cases of the respondents. Article 142 power is confided only to this Court. The ratio in Dr. P.P.C. Rawani v. Union of India (1992) 1 SCC 331 is also not an authority under Article 141. Article 142 power is confided only to this Court. The ratio in Dr. P.P.C. Rawani v. Union of India (1992) 1 SCC 331 is also not an authority under Article 141. Therein the orders issued by this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution to regularize the ad hoc appointments had become final. When contempt petition was filed for non implementation, the Union had come forward with an application expressing its difficulty to give effect to the orders of this Court. In that behalf, while appreciating the difficulties expressed by the Union in implementation, this Court gave further direction to implement the order issued under Article 32 of the Constitution. Therefore, it is more in the nature of an execution and not a ratio under Article 141. In Union of India v. Dr. Gyan Prakash Singh. 1994 Supp (1) SCC 306, this Court by a Bench of three Judges considered the effect of the order in A. K. Jain case (supra) and held that the doctors appointed on ad hoc basis and taken charge after October 1, 1984 have no automatic right for confirmation and they have to take their chance by appearing before the PSC for recruitment. In H. C. Puttaswamy v. Hon'ble Chief Justice of Karnataka 1991 Supp (2) SCC 421, this Court while hold- ing that the appointment to the posts of clerk etc. in the subordi- nate courts in Karnataka State without consultation of the PSC are not valid appointments, exercising the power under Article 142, directed that their appointments as a regular, on humanitarian grounds, since they have put in more than 10 years service. It is to be noted that the recruitment was only for clerical grade (Class-III post) and it is not a ratio under Article 141. In State of Haryana v. Ptara Singh (1992) 4 SCC 118 , this Court noted that the normal rule is recruitment through the prescribed agency but due to administrative exigencies, an ad hoc or temporary appointment may be made. In such a situation, this Court held that efforts should always be made to replace such ad hoc or temporary employees by regularly selected employees, as early as possible. The temporary employees also would geT liberty to compete along with others for regular selection but if he is not selected, he must give way to the regularly selected candidates. In such a situation, this Court held that efforts should always be made to replace such ad hoc or temporary employees by regularly selected employees, as early as possible. The temporary employees also would geT liberty to compete along with others for regular selection but if he is not selected, he must give way to the regularly selected candidates. Appointment of the regularly selected candidates cannot be withheld or kept in abeyance for the sake of such an ad hoc or temporary employee. Ad hoc or temporary employee should not be replaced by another ad hoc or temporary employee. He must be replaced only by regularly selected employee. The ad hoc appointment should not be a device to circumvent the rule of reservation. If a temporary or ad hoc employee continued for a fairly long spell, the authorities must consider his case for regularization provided he is eligible and qualified according to the rules and his service record is satisfactory and his appointment does not run counter to the reservation policy of the State. It is to be remembered that in that case, the appointments are only to Class-II or Class-IV posts and the selection made was by subordinate selection committee. Therefore, this Court did not appear to have intended to lay down as a general rule that in every category of ad hoc appointment, if the ad hoc appointee continued for long period, the rules of recruitment should be relaxed and, the appointment by regularization be made. Thus considered, we have no hesitation to hold that the direction of the Division Bench is clearly illegal and the learned single Judge is right in directing the State Government to notify the vacancies to the PSC and the PSC should advertise and make recruitment of the candidates in accordance with the rules." 12. On the facts of the case delineated above, the principle of legitimate expectation has no application. It has not been shown as to how any act was done by the authorities which created an impression that the conditions attached in the original appointment order were waived. Mere continuance does not imply such waiver. No legitimate expectation can be founded on such unfounded impressions. It was not even indicated as to who, if any and with what authority created such impression. No waiver which would be against requisite compliances can be countenanced. Mere continuance does not imply such waiver. No legitimate expectation can be founded on such unfounded impressions. It was not even indicated as to who, if any and with what authority created such impression. No waiver which would be against requisite compliances can be countenanced. Whether an expectation exists is self-evidently, a question of fact. Clear statutory words override any expectation, however, founded. (See Regina v. Director of Public Prosecutions. Exparte Kebilene and ors. (1999) 3 WLR 972 (H.L.)." (d) The rules for recruitment cannot be overruled by the instructions issued for the specific purpose of appointment in view of the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Government of Andhra Pradesh and Another versus Dr.R.Murli Babu Rao and Another, (1988) 2 SCC 386 . The relevant paragraph is extracted as below:- "16. As is manifest from the affidavit filed by the Indian Medical Council, it is only a recommendatory body. This Court has in a series of decisions defined the precise functions and duties of the Medical Council of India. The Indian Medical Council constituted under S. 3 of the Act is an expert body intended and meant to control the minimum standards of medical education and to regulate their observance. We may only cite the case of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Km. Nivedita Jain, (1981) 4 SCC 296 : ( AIR 1981 SC 2045 ) where the court had to consider the effect of the Regulations framed by the Medical Council and the various executive orders issued by the State Government. Analysing the various provisions of the Act in depth, it was observed as follows (at p. 2053 of AIR) : "An analysis of the various sections of the Act indicate that the main purpose of the Act is to establish Medical Council of India, to provide for its constitution, composition and its functions and the main function of the Council is to maintain the medical register of India and to maintain a proper standard of medical education and medical ethics and professional conduct for medical practitioners. The scheme of the Act appears to be that the Medical Council of India is to be set up in the manner provided in the Act and the Medical Council will maintain a proper medical register, will prescribe minimum standards of medical education required for granting recognised medical qualifications, will also prescribe standards of post-graduate medical education and will further regulate the standards of professional conduct and etiquette and code of ethics for medical practitioners." A fortiori the recommendations made by the Council or the Regulations framed by it are only recommendatory and not mandatory. It is not for the Council to prescribe qualifications for recruitment to posts of Professors, Readers and Lecturers. It can only lay down broad guidelines therefor. Such qualifications have necessarily to be prescribed by the framing of Rules under the proviso to Art. 309. Right to be considered for promotion is a condition of service and it can only be regulated by a rule framed under the proviso to Art. 309." Mr. Khanna has also submitted that administrative instructions cannot supersede the rules applicable for appointment in view of the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Senior Supdt. of Post Office & Others versus Izhar Hussain, AIR 1989 SC 2262 and Bindeshwari Ram versus State of Bihar & Others, (1989) 4 SCC 465 . According to Mr.Khanna, the appointment of respondents were dehors the rules by way of back door entry and their proposed regularization by way of executive instructions cannot be a mode of recruitment in view of the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in R.N.Nanjundappa versus T. Thimmiah & Another, (1972) 1 SCC 409 . The relevant paragraphs of which are extracted as below:- "23. It was contended on behalf of the State that under Article 309 of the Constitution the State has power to make a rule regularizing the appointment. Shelter was taken behind Article 162 of the Constitution and the power of the Government to appoint. No one can deny the power of the Government to appoint. If it were a case of direct appointment or if it were a case of appointment of a candidate by competitive examination or if it were a case of appointment by selection recourse to rule under Article 309 for regularization would not be necessary. No one can deny the power of the Government to appoint. If it were a case of direct appointment or if it were a case of appointment of a candidate by competitive examination or if it were a case of appointment by selection recourse to rule under Article 309 for regularization would not be necessary. Assume that Rules under Article 309 could be made in respect of appointment of one man but there are two limitations. Art. 309 speaks of rules for appointment and general conditions of service. Regularization of appointment by stating that notwithstanding any rules the appointment is regularized strikes at the root of the rules and if the effect of the regularization is to nullify the operation and effectiveness of the rules, the rule itself is open to criticism on the ground that it is in violation of current rules. Therefore, the relevant rules at the material time as to promotion and appointment are infringed and the impeached rule cannot be permitted to stand to operate as a regularization of appointment of one person in utter defiance of rules requiring consideration of seniority and merit in the case of promotion and consideration of appointment by selection or by competitive examination. 24. It was contended on behalf of the State that Rule 3 of the Mysore State Civil Services Rules, 1957 spoke of method of recruitment to be by competitive examination or by selection or by promotion. The method of recruitment and qualifications for each State Civil Service were to be set forth in the rules of recruitment but there were no rules until the year 1964. In 1964 the rule spoke of the Principal of School of Mines to be Class I and the method of recruitment for the Principal of School of Mines was to fill up the post by promotion from the cadre of Head of Sections or by direct recruitment. It was said on behalf of the respondent that he was the only eligible candidate in 1964, and therefore, his appointment was valid. This is opposed to facts. It is not a case of direct recruitment in the year 1958 or at any time. The State made rules in the year 1967 to regularize the appointment from the month of February, 1958. Again, if it were a case of direct recruitment one would expect proper materials for the direct recruitment. This is opposed to facts. It is not a case of direct recruitment in the year 1958 or at any time. The State made rules in the year 1967 to regularize the appointment from the month of February, 1958. Again, if it were a case of direct recruitment one would expect proper materials for the direct recruitment. There should be advertisements for the post. Candidates have to be selected. Their respective merits would have to be considered. To say that the appellant (respondent?) was the only eligible candidate is to deny the rights of others to apply for such eligibility tests. 26. The contention on behalf of the State that a rule under Article 309 for regularization of the appointment of a person would be a form of recruitment read with reference to power under Article 162 is unsound and unacceptable. The executive has the power to appoint. That power may have its source in Article 162. In the present case the rule which regularized the appointment of the respondent with effect from 15th February, 1958 notwithstanding any rules cannot be said to be in exercise of power under Article 162. First Article 162 does not speak of rules whereas Article 309 speaks of rules. Therefore, the present case touches the power of the State to make rules under Article 309 of the nature impeached here. Secondly, when the Government acted under Article 309 the Government cannot be said to have acted also under Article 162 in the same breath. The two Articles operate in different areas. Regularization cannot be said to be a form of appointment. Counsel on behalf of the respondent contended that regularization would mean conferring the quality of permanence on the appointment whereas counsel on behalf of the State contended that regularization did not mean permanence but that it was a case of regularization of the rules under Article 309. Both the contentions are fallacious. If the appointment itself is in infraction of the rules or if it is in violation of the provisions of the Constitution illegality cannot be regularized. Ratification or regularization is possible of an act which is within the power and province of the authority but there has been some non-compliance with procedure or manner which does not go to the root of the appointment. Regularization cannot be said to be a mode of recruitment. Ratification or regularization is possible of an act which is within the power and province of the authority but there has been some non-compliance with procedure or manner which does not go to the root of the appointment. Regularization cannot be said to be a mode of recruitment. To accede to such a proposition would be to introduce a new head of appointment in defiance of rules or it may have the effect of setting at naught the rules." 13. Arguing for the State, Mr.R.K.Sharma, learned Senior Advocate / Senior Additional Advocate General, on the other hand, has made following submissions:- (i) After 3rd January, 2008, State has not made any appointment from back door but every appointment has been made as per rules applicable wherein the contractual appointment was also brought as a source or mode of recruitment. (ii) The respondents in the present case have completed 17 18 years of service though all of them were initially qualified but keeping in view that they have successfully / satisfactorily rendered the service, as such, by way of one time settlement, their regularization is being made in view of the circular dated 9.9.2008 (Annexure P-3). 10. Mr.Rajiv Rai, learned counsel for the private respondents, has made the following submissions:- (i) The respondents are in limited number, whereas, all the similarly situated persons have not been arrayed as parties / respondents, as such, the petitioners have no locus-standi to file the present writ petition; (ii) The petitioners have not challenged the initial appointment of private respondents and unless their initial appointment is challenged, subsequent orders could not be challenged; (iii) Knowing fully well about the initial appointment of the private respondents, the petitioners, for the reasons best known to them, have filed the present writ petition at belated stage, as such, the petition suffers from laches. In order to strengthen the submission, Mr.Rajiv Rai, learned counsel for the petitioner, has referred to and relied upon the decision of Dr.Duryodhan Sahu and Others versus Jitender Kumar Mishra and Others, (1998) 7 SCC 273 , where it was held that the petition of quo-warranto filed before the appointment of the beneficiary lecturers with a prayer to prevent the lecturers, was held not to be considered, in the nature of quo-warranto as the petitioners cannot be the persons aggrieved of and the writ petition in the form of PIL cannot be maintained. In our considered view, the facts and circumstances of Dr.Duryodhan (supra) were different as in that case the petition was filed in the form of PIL in the Administrative Tribunal which itself is not entitled to entertain Public Interest Litigation and the petitioner in that case has prayed for quashing the proposed appointment of beneficiary lecturers by way of petition for co-warranto which, however, is not a case in the present petition. (iv) Out of four persons, petitioner No.2, namely, Dr.Kewal Krishan, filed Original Application No.1175 of 1999, along with two others, and obtained interim order dated 26.3.1999 from erstwhile Tribunal, however, the Original Application No.1175 of 1999 became infructuous as regular post was not vacant and Dr.Kewal Krishan is continuing as contractual teacher in school cadre. (v) Similarly, petitioner No.3, namely, Dr.Inder Singh, is working as contractual teacher in 10+2, having been appointed after filing the present writ petition. (vi) Petitioner No.1, namely, Dr.Anjana Thakur, is working as Medical Social Worker in IGMC, whereas she was appointed after filing the present writ petition; (vii) Petitioner No.4, Dr.Baldev Singh, was appointed as contractual teacher in 10+2 school cadre after filing the present writ petition whereas, the rules were framed in 2007 and came into force w.e.f. 20.9.2007. (viii) All the departments under the State of Himachal Pradesh have not been made parties as in many of the departments, the petitioners / appointees have been regularized from the year 2009 onwards, (however, in that respect any such order in support of the contention has not been produced before us). All the respondents are in possession of the eligibility requirement as required by Clause-2 of circular dated 9.9.2008 (Annexure P-3). Instruction / circular dated 9.9.2008 is given as below:- "The regularization will be strictly on the basis of seniority subject to fitness and the fulfillment of eligibility conditions prescribed in the concerned Recruitment and Promotion Rules." (ix) Since the petitioners have not pleaded in the writ petition that the appointment of private respondents was not made in reference to any advertisement, as such, the proper reply could not be given on behalf of them. After deriving the names from Employment Exchange concerned, the private respondents were selected by duly constituted committee and it cannot be said that their initial appointment was bad in law. After deriving the names from Employment Exchange concerned, the private respondents were selected by duly constituted committee and it cannot be said that their initial appointment was bad in law. The appointments of private respondents in question was made in utter need to cope up the requirements in consonance to the policy decision of the State Government and such appointment on contractual basis continued for long time, therefore, to say that initial appointment was bad, is not justified. There is less scope of judicial review in interfering in the policy matters unless it runs counter to the mandate of the Constitution in view of the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Himachal Pradesh and Others versus Himachal Pradesh Nizi Vyavsayik Prishikshan Kendra Sangh, (2011) 6 SCC 597 and to strengthen the submission Mr.Rajv Rai, learned counsel, has referred and relied upon Paras 20 and 21 of Himachal Pradesh Nizi Vyavsayik Prishikshan Kendra Sangh (supra), are extracted as below:- "20. It is seen that the Cabinet considered the proposal of the State Council for Vocational Training and after deliberation, the decision has been taken to continue various courses under SCVT except for the courses at Sl. No.1 (Art and Craft), Sl.No.4 (Library Science) and Sl. No.7 (PTI). Though in the supplementary affidavit, the State has not highlighted the reason for discontinuing the three courses in the State of Himachal Pradesh, the High Court presumed that the State is precluded from taking fresh / revised policy in the matter of imparting technical education. If fact, in the said decision, the State has not barred all the institutions from continuing the courses already notified under SCVT. The Cabinet decided to discontinue only three courses. Inasmuch as the said Cabinet decision dated 18.7.2009 not being the subject matter or issue of the writ petition, the State was not in a position to highlight all the details before the Court. Accordingly, we are satisfied that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the Cabinet decision dated 18.7.2009 which was not the issue or challenge in the writ petition. We are also unable to accept the conclusion of the High Court that the petitioner Association (respondent herein) is entitled to run all the courses under the principle of "legitimate expectation". 21. We are also unable to accept the conclusion of the High Court that the petitioner Association (respondent herein) is entitled to run all the courses under the principle of "legitimate expectation". 21. The High Court has lost sight of the fact that education is a dynamic system and courses / subjects have to keep changing with regard to market demand, employability potential, availability of infrastructure, etc. No institute can have a legitimate right or expectation to run a particular course forever and it is the pervasive power and authority vested in the Government to frame policy and guidelines for progressive and legitimate growth of the society and create balances in the arena inclusive of imparting technical education from time to time. Inasmuch as the institutions found fit were allowed to run other courses except the three mentioned above, the doctrine of legitimate expectation was not disregarded by the State. Inasmuch as ultimately it is the responsibility of the State to provide good education, training and employment, it is best suited to frame a policy or either modify/alter a decision depending on the circumstance based on relevant and acceptable materials. The courts do not substitute their views in the decision of the State Government with regard to policy matters. In fact, the court must refuse to sit as appellate authority or super legislature to weight the wisdom of legislation or policy decision of the Government unless it runs counter to the mandate of the Constitution." (x) In reference to the observations of Hon'ble Supreme Court in M.L.Kesari (supra) and D.M.Premkumari versus Divisional Commissioner, Mysore Division and Others, (2009) 12 SCC 267 , the judiciary has a very strong sense of justice and it was to maintain social justice and fairness and the judiciary does not believe in misplaced sympathy. [The appointments of private respondents have not been made by pick and choose method as their appointment was made on their suitability.] (xi) The two circulars dated 23.8.1994 issued by the Government of Himachal Pradesh (Education Department) regarding regularization of services of ad-hoc / tenure / contract teachers / Assistant Librarian working in the Education Department in reference to circular dated 26.6.1995 issued from Commissioner-cum-Secretary (Education) to the Govt. of Himachal Pradesh wherein in Para-2 of the circular it has been mentioned that in future there should be no appointment on ad-hoc / tenure basis and only contract appointments for filling the vacancies temporarily be made, as such, the mode of appointment on contract basis of private respondents was an outcome of conscious decision of the Cabinet, as such, such appointments cannot be said to be dehors the rule or cannot said to have been made from back door entry. (xii) In reference to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gurpal Singh versus State of Punjab and Others, (2005) 5 SCC 136 , the petitioners are not entitled to file the present writ petition in the form of Public Interest Litigation, more so, when Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Paragraphs-6 and 7, has observed as below:- "6. Courts must do justice by promotion of good faith, and prevent law from crafty invasions. Courts must maintain the social balance by interfering where necessary for the sake of justice and refuse to interfere where it is against the social interest and public good. (See State of Maharashtra v. Prabhu ( 1994 (2) SCC 481 ), and Andhra Pradesh State Financial Corporation v. M/s. Gar Re-Rolling Mills and another ( AIR 1994 SC 2151 ). No litigant has a right to unlimited draught on the Court time and public money in order to get' his affairs settled in the manner as he wishes. Easy access to justice should not be misused as a licence to file misconceived and frivolous petitions. (See Dr. B. K. Subbarao v. Mr. K. Parasaran ( 1996 (7) JT 265 ). Today people rush to courts to file cases in profusion under this attractive name of public interest. They must inspire confidence in Courts and among the public. 7. As noted supra, a time has come to weed out the petitions, which though titled as public interest litigations are in essence something else. It is shocking to note that Courts are Hooded with large number of so called public interest litigations where even a minuscule percentage can legitimately be called as public interest litigations. Though the parameters of public interest litigation have been indicated by this Court in large number of cases, yet unmindful of the real intentions and objectives. It is shocking to note that Courts are Hooded with large number of so called public interest litigations where even a minuscule percentage can legitimately be called as public interest litigations. Though the parameters of public interest litigation have been indicated by this Court in large number of cases, yet unmindful of the real intentions and objectives. High Courts are entertaining such petitions and wasting valuable judicial time which, as noted above, could be otherwise utilized for disposal of genuine cases. Though in Dr. Duryodhan Sahu and others v. Jitendra Kumar Mishra and others ( AIR 1999 SC 114 ), this Court held that in service matters PILs should not be entertained, the inflow of so-called PILs involving service matters continues unabated in the Courts and strangely are entertained. The least the High Courts could do is to throw them out on the basis of the said decision. The other interesting aspect is that in the PILs, official documents are being annexed without even indicating as to how the petitioner came to possess them. In one case, it was noticed that an interesting an- swer was given as to its possession. It was stated that a packet was lying on the road and when out of curiosity the petitioner opened it, he found copies of the official, documents. Whenever such frivolous pleas are taken to explain possession, the Court should do well not only to dismiss the petitions but also to impose exemplary costs. It would be desirable for the Courts to filter out the frivolous petitions and dismiss them with cots as aforestated, so that, the message goes in the right direction that petitions filed with oblique motive do not have the approval of the Courts. 8. MR. Onkar Jairath, with the permission of the Court, has supplemented the submissions of Mr. Rajiv Rai as below:- (a) The above mentioned two circulars dated 23.8.1994 and 26.6.1995 were said to be issued by the Government of Himachal Pradesh in exercise of executive powers of the State Government without arraying other departments of the State Government what to say of making the private respondents in their representative capacity, as such, the writ petition is not maintainable merely by challenging the policy decision dated 9.9.2008 (Annexure P-3). In support of his submission, our attention has been invited to the observations of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Arun Tewari and Others versus Zila Mansavi Shikshak Sangh and Others, AIR 1998 SC 331. The relevant Paras-13 and 15 are extracted as below:- "13. The first contention is to the effect that the proviso to Rule 10(3) is bad in law because it confers unguided and excessive delegation of powers to the State Government in the matter of criteria and procedure for recruitment. Now, the Recruitment Rules have been framed under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India. These Rules, inter alia, prescribe the procedure for selection and the criteria for selection. The proviso which has been inserted in Rule 10(3) gives to the State Government, in consultation with the General Administration Department, power to prescribe separate criteria and procedure for selection of candidates in specific circum-stances. The power to frame these criteria and procedure is not delegated to any subordinate authority. The very authority which framed the original Rules is delegated the power to frame special rules prescribing criteria and procedure in specific circumstances in consultation with the General Administration Department. The question of excessive delegation does not, therefore, arise because the rule-making authority has given to itself the power to prescribe criteria and procedure for selection in specific circumstances. 15. In the present case the criteria and procedure have to be prescribed by the State Government itself in exercise of power conferred on it by statutory Rules. This cannot be considered as excessive delegation. Also, prescribing of separate criteria and procedure is permitted only in specific circumstances. In the present case, the departure from normal recruitment process has been occasioned on account of the time-bound programme of the Operation Black Board Scheme. This necessitated a large number of Assistant Teachers being recruited to strengthen the education programme of the State within a time-bound schedule. If the State Government felt that the existing procedure would be unduly time-consuming, and provided a special procedure which is not fair, no objection can be raised to such procedure when an express power has been conferred on the State in this connection." (b) The circular dated 9.9.2008 (Annexure P-3) is not only applicable to the Education Department but pertains to other departments also, as such, other departments were to be made party. In reference to judgment dated 2.8.2012 of this Court (DB), passed in CWP No.5572 of 2012, (Ajay Kumar Thakur and Others versus State of H.P. and Others), the writ petition cannot be said to be maintainable. The facts and circumstances of the case of CWP No.5572 of 2012 [Ajay Kumar Thakur (supra)], is different and distinguishable and the case has been filed taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case and cannot be made applicable in the present case. The issues are to be adjudicated in light of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The circular dated 20.7.2011 and 30.5.2012 have not been challenged. The appointment of private respondents by deriving the names of the private respondents has incumbent is not fatal to Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution in view of the observations of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India and Others versus N.Hargopal and Others, AIR 1987 SC 1227 . For reference, Para-10 is extracted as below:- "... .....In a country so vast as India, in a country where there was so much poverty, illiteracy and ignorance, it was not right that employment opportunities should necessarily be channelled through the employment exchanges when it is not shown that the network of employment exchanges is so wide, that it reaches all the corners of this vast country. He argued that it is futile to expect that persons living in distant places could get themselves registered with employment exchanges situated far away. The submission of Shri Parmeshwara Rao is indeed appealing and attractive. Nonetheless, we are afraid we cannot uphold it. The object of recruitment to any service or post is to secure the most suitable person who answers the demands of the requirements of the job. In the case of public employment, it is necessary to eliminate arbitrariness and favouritism and introduce uniformity of standards and orderliness in the matter of employment. There has to be an element of procedural fairness in recruitment. If a public employer chooses to receive applications for employment where and when he pleases, and chooses to make appointments as he likes a grave element of arbitrariness is certainly introduced. This must necessarily be avoided if Arts. 14 and 16 have to be given any meaning. We, therefore, consider that insistence of recruitment through employment exchanges advances rather than restricts the rights guaranteed by Arts. This must necessarily be avoided if Arts. 14 and 16 have to be given any meaning. We, therefore, consider that insistence of recruitment through employment exchanges advances rather than restricts the rights guaranteed by Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The submission that employment exchanges do not reach everywhere applies equally to whatever method of advertising vacancies is adopted. Advertisement in the daily Press, for example, is also equally ineffective as it does not reach everyone desiring employment. In the absence of a better method of recruitment, we think that any restriction that employment in Government Department should be through the medium of employment exchanges does not offend Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution. With this- modification of the judgment of the High Court, the appeals and the special leave petitions are disposed of. No orders are necessary in the writ petition." (c) In reference to judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Accountant General, State of Madhya Pradesh versus S.K.Dubey and Another, (2012) 4 SCC 578 , the action of the State Government to regularize the respondents is being made by way of policy measure in exercise of executive power under Article 162 of the Constitution. The relevant paragraphs of S.K. Dubey (supra) are extracted as below:- "31. Subject to the provisions of the Constitution, the executive power of a State extends to the matters with respect to which the Legislature of the State has power to make laws. This is what is provided in Article 162 of the Constitution. In other words, the executive power of the State Executive is coextensive with that of the State Legislature. 33. The Constitution Bench of this Court in Lalit Mohan Deb (para 9; pg. 867) said : "9. It is true that there are no statutory rules regulating the selection of Assistants to the selection grade. But the absence of such rules is no bar to the Administration giving instructions regarding promotion to the higher grade as long as such instructions are not inconsistent with any rule on the subject.........." In Union of India and another v. Central Electrical and Mechanical Engineering Service (CE&MES) Group 'A' (Direct Recruits) Association, CPWD and others, (2008) 1 SCC 354 , this Court held that the executive instructions could fill in gaps not covered by rules but such instructions cannot be in derogation of the statutory rules. 39. 39. I am of the considered view that there is no difference in the legal position in a case where power conferred on the State Government for framing rules has been exercised but such rules remain silent on certain aspects although it had power to make rules with regard to those aspects and in the situation where no rules have been framed in exercise of the power conferred on it, insofar as executive power of the State is concerned. The power that vests in the State Government in Section 30(2) to carry out the provisions contained in Section 16(2) does not take away its executive power to make provision for the subjects covered in Section 16(2) for which no rules have been framed by it. The exercise of such power by the State Government, obviously, must not be inconsistent with the constitutional provisions or statutory provision in Section 16(2) or the State Rules framed by it. In the present case, the exercise of power by the State Government by issuance of the order dated April 5, 2002 does not suffer from any such vice." In our considered view, since above case has been referred to larger Bench for reference, as such, the ratio of the case cannot be applied in the present case. (d) Relying upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Centre For Public Interest Litigation and Others versus Union of India and Others, (2012) 3 SCC 1 , it has been submitted that the judicial scrutiny has to be made of the policy with care and caution. For this purpose, following paragraphs are extracted as below:- "99. In majority of judgments relied upon by learned Attorney General and learned counsel for the respondents, it has been held that the power of judicial review should be exercised with great care and circumspection and the Court should not ordinarily interfere with the policy decisions of the Government in financial matters. There cannot be any quarrel with the proposition that the Court cannot substitute its opinion for the one formed by the experts in the particular field and due respect should be given to the wisdom of those who are entrusted with the task of framing the policies. We are also conscious of the fact that the Court should not interfere with the fiscal policies of the State. We are also conscious of the fact that the Court should not interfere with the fiscal policies of the State. However, when it is clearly demonstrated that the policy framed by the State or its agency/instrumentality and/or its implementation is contrary to public interest or is violative of the constitutional principles, it is the duty of the Court to exercise its jurisdiction in larger public interest and reject the stock plea of the State that the scope of judicial review should not be exceeded beyond the recognised parameters. 100. When matters like these are brought before the judicial constituent of the State by public spirited citizens, it becomes the duty of the Court to exercise its power in larger public interest and ensure that the institutional integrity is not compromised by those in whom the people have reposed trust and who have taken oath to discharge duties in accordance with the Constitution and the law without fear or favour, affection or ill will and who, as any other citizen, enjoy fundamental rights and, at the same time, are bound to perform the duties enumerated in Article 51A. Reference in this connection can usefully be made to the judgment of the three Judge Bench headed by Chief Justice Kapadia in Centre for P.I.L. v. Union of India (2011) 4 SCC 1 ." (e) In reference to judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Joint Action Committee of Airline Pilots' Association of India (ALPAI) and Others versus Director General of Civil Aviation and Others, (2011) 5 SCC 435 , it has been submitted that the action of the respondents is justifiable. For reference, Paras-24, 25 and 26 are being extracted as below:- "24. It is not a case of automatic revival of AIC 28/92, but there is a specific order by the competent authority in exercise of statutory powers whereby the AIC 28/92 has been revived. Since the instructions which have been issued under the letter dated 2.6.2008 are merely in the form of interim measures, the question of the applicability of the principles of natural justice does not arise. The suspension of CAR 2007 had created a vacuum, and it was, therefore, necessary for the DGCA to take an appropriate decision during the finalisation of the CAR, pursuant to the report to be submitted by a Committee constituted by the Government. The suspension of CAR 2007 had created a vacuum, and it was, therefore, necessary for the DGCA to take an appropriate decision during the finalisation of the CAR, pursuant to the report to be submitted by a Committee constituted by the Government. The appellants did not challenge the subsequent order dated 2.6.2008, by virtue of which AIC 28/92 dated 10.12.1992 came into force which had also been nothing but special directions and remained in force from 1992 to 2007. 25. In the High Court it was sought to be contended on behalf of the appellants that as the order dated 2.6.2008 was in continuation of the Circular dated 29.5.2008, it was not necessary for the appellants to challenge the said order separately. The High Court held: "We are afraid the contention is not well-founded. While the Circular dated 29.5.2008 relates to the subject of suspension of CAR of 2007, the letter dated 2.6.2008 refers to instructions to the effect that AIC 28/92 would be effective till CAR is approved by following the procedure laid down in CAR of 13.10.2006. The subject matter of two documents being different, merely because the second document is in continuation of the first document, it cannot be said that the challenge to the first document would ipso facto include challenge to the second document. The letter dated 2.6.2008 is not the effect of the Circular dated 29.5.2008, but the same has been issued in exercise of powers under Rule 133A of the Rules 1937 to meet the circumstances which have resulted on account of CAR 2007, being suspended. The cause for issuance of the letter dated 2.6.2008 is not directly flowing from the Circular dated 29.5.2008, but it was issued for the consequences which followed the issuance of the Circular dated 29.5.2008. Being so, in case the appellants wanted to challenge the communication dated 2.6.2008, they ought to have challenged the same by raising specific ground in that regard by laying proper factual foundation in support of such ground and only then, they could have invited the order in that regard from the court." In absence of the challenge to the same, it is immaterial to determine as to whether the same had been issued by the competent authority or not, as it is not the case of statutory rules i.e. subordinate legislation. The question of following any procedure for replacement is not warranted. The question of following any procedure for replacement is not warranted. The contention was raised before the High Court that the Circular dated 29.5.2008 has been issued by the authority having no competence, thus cannot be enforced. It is a settled legal proposition that the authority which has been conferred with the competence under the statute alone can pass the order. No other person, even a superior authority, can interfere with the functioning of the Statutory Authority. In a democratic set up like ours, persons occupying key positions are not supposed to mortgage their discretion, volition and decision making authority and be prepared to give way to carry out commands having no sanctity in law. Thus, if any decision is taken by a statutory authority at the behest or on suggestion of a person who has no statutory role to play, the same would be patently illegal. (Vide: The Purtabpur Co., Ltd. v. Cane Commissioner of Bihar & Ors., AIR 1970 SC 1896 ; Chandrika Jha v. State of Bihar & Ors., AIR 1984 SC 322 ; Tarlochan Dev Sharma v. State of Punjab & Ors., AIR 2001 SC 2524 ; and Manohar Lal (D) by L.Rs. v. Ugrasen (D) by L.Rs. & Ors." AIR 2010 SC 2210 ). In reference to Bhagwati Prasad versus Delhi State Mineral Development Corporation, (1990) 1 SCC 361 , it has been submitted that the minimum educational qualification of an incumbent has to be looked into at the stage of initial appointment but not at the stage of regularization or confirmation. 9. MR. R.L. Chaudhary, learned counsel for the petitioner, in CWP No.8709 of 2011, has submitted that the writ petitioner was appointed as Lecturer (Sociology) on contract basis on 24.9.2001 and has already completed 8 years of service on 24.9.2009 and every year the contractual appointment of the petitioner was renewed, as the petitioner innocently was engaged without fault and continued for such a long time, therefore, he is directed to be regularized in view of the judgment of Supreme Court in Mool Raj Upadhyaya versus State of H.P. & Others, 1994 Supp(2) SCC 316. 10. IT is well settled that when rules have been framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India, then no regularization is permissible under the instructions issued under Article 162 of the Constitution in contravention of the rules. 10. IT is well settled that when rules have been framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India, then no regularization is permissible under the instructions issued under Article 162 of the Constitution in contravention of the rules. The Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court in Umadevi's case (supra), has observed that there is no fundamental right in favour of persons employed on daily wages or temporarily or on contractual basis to claim that they have any right to be absorbed in service as they cannot be said to be holders of a post. A regular appointment can be made only by making appointments in consonance to the requirements of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The claim by persons, employed on daily wages, to treat them equally and extend the claim for equal treatment with those who were regularly employed, cannot be granted. Subsequently, the Supreme Court in M.L.Kesari's case (supra), following the verdict of Umadevi's case (supra), has observed that appointments made without following due process or the rules relating to appointment did not confer any right on the appointees and Courts can neither direct their absorption, regularization or re-engagement nor make their service permanent and the High Court, in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, should not issue directions for absorption, regularization or permanent continuance unless the recruitment has been done in a regular manner. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has very categorically observed in Paragraph-53 of Umadevi's case (supra), that Union of India, the State Governments and their instrumentalities may take steps to regularize as one time measure, the services of irregularly appointed incumbents, who have worked for ten years or more against duly sanctioned posts but not under cover of orders of Courts or Tribunals. Taking of such step of one time measure of regularization have been mentioned in Paragraph-6 of M.L.Kesari & Others (supra). However, such exercise was to be made within six months from the passing of the judgment of Supreme Court in Umadevi's case (supra). Taking of such step of one time measure of regularization have been mentioned in Paragraph-6 of M.L.Kesari & Others (supra). However, such exercise was to be made within six months from the passing of the judgment of Supreme Court in Umadevi's case (supra). In light of the observations made in Paragraph-9 of M.L.Kesari (supra), in order to undertake a one time measure, a list of all casual, daily wage or ad-hoc or contractual employees was to be prepared who have worked for more than ten years without the intervention of Courts or Tribunals provided that such employees were working against vacant posts and then their cases were to be considered for regularization, in view of Paragraph-13 of M.L.Kesari (supra). The case of the employees who have completed ten years' service, however, were not having educational qualifications prescribed for the post, at the time of their appointment, were to be considered for regularization in suitable lower posts. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and perusing the contents of the record, the private respondents before us in CWP No. 2336 of 2009 have not been able to prove that their appointments were made after observing the provisions of Articles of 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The regularization policy, dated 9.9.2008 (Annexure P-3), appears to have not been issued in consonance to the settled position of law by Supreme Court in Umadevi's case (supra). The policy dated 9.9.2008 and subsequent communication dated 8.6.2009 also appear to have been made by way of executive instructions, as such, the circulars dated 9.9.2008 and the communication letter dated 8.6.2009 cannot over-ride the rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution. These circulars cannot be treated to be substitute of the rules for State Government for regularization and the circulars, mentioned above, as such, being in the teeth of the settled position of law by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Umadevi's case (supra), these are not legally sustainable for regularizing the private respondents. The respondent / State is expected to make appointments and regularize the services of private respondents in consonance to the Recruitment & Promotion Rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution. In view of the above observations, CWP No.2336 of 2009 is disposed of. 11. The respondent / State is expected to make appointments and regularize the services of private respondents in consonance to the Recruitment & Promotion Rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution. In view of the above observations, CWP No.2336 of 2009 is disposed of. 11. IN view of the analysis, made herein-above, no mandamus or direction of any kind can be issued for regularization of the petitioner in CWP No. 5047 of 2010 as well as writ petitioner in CWP No.8709 of 2011, as such, these writ petitions are dismissed.