Judgment : 1. The plaintiffs 2 to 8 in O.S.No.492 of 1996, on the file of the Principal District Munsif Court, Chidambaram, are the appellants herein. They filed the suit for declaration that the preliminary decree passed in O.S.No.56 of 1996, on the file of the District Munsif Court, Chidambaram, as null and void, not executable and not binding on the plaintiffs, for consequential injunction, restraining the defendants 1 and 2 from evicting the plaintiffs from the suit property, in any manner, and for mandatory injunction, directing the defendants to restore the electricity service connection to the plaintiffs' premises. 2. The Trial Court, in and by its judgment, dated 21.03.2006, dismissed the Suit. The Lower Appellate Court also confirmed the judgment and decree of the Trial Court. Aggrieved by the same, this Second Appeal is filed. 3. The case of the plaintiffs, as stated in the plaint, in short, is that the suit property belonged to one Ambalathadi. The plaintiffs are living in the suit property as tenants. The deceased first plaintiff entered into an oral agreement with one Appasamy Iyer, son of Vaithiyalingam, born through his first wife. As per that agreement, the first plaintiff was allotted a vacant site, bearing Door No.12/2, having an extent of 55 feet in length, and, 35 feet in breadth, to build a house. The first plaintiff put up a thatched house, having an extent of 35 x 25 feet. The suit property was maintained by Vaidiyalingam, on behalf of Ambalathadi. The plaintiffs have further stated that the defendants 1 and 2 herein filed O.S.No.56 of 1996 for mandatory injunction to disconnect the electricity service connection to the suit premises, and even before the service of summons on the first plaintiff herein, who was the fourth defendant in O.S.No.56 of 1996, the defendants 1 and 2 herein approached the first plaintiff herein and assured him that they would make arrangements for restoration of electricity, provided, the first plaintiff should sign certain blank papers. Reposing faith on their words, the first plaintiff also signed the blank papers and that was misused by the defendants in the suit, as if, the parties have entered into a compromise, by which, the first plaintiff herein has agreed to vacate the suit premises, on or before January, 1997 and the suit in O.S.No.56 of 1996 was dismissed on the basis of the compromise memo filed by the parties and taking advantage of the compromise memo filed in O.S.No.56 of 1996, the defendants 1 and 2 herein are attempting to evict the plaintiffs by force and they also disconnected the electricity connection to the plaintiffs' premises with the help of other defendants. According to the plaintiffs, the compromise memo was not executed in accordance with the provisions of law and the parties have never appeared before the Court and the plaintiffs were not aware of the compromise memo, and therefore, the suit was filed for declaration that the decree passed in O.S.No.56 of 1996 as null and void, not executable and not binding on the plaintiffs, as stated above. 4. The defendants 1 and 2 filed a written statement, stating that in O.S.No.56 of 1996, the present first plaintiff was the fourth defendant and he remained ex parte. Later, he filed an application to set aside the ex parte decree passed against him, stating that the matter was compromised. The first plaintiff along with the defendants 1 and 2 filed a joint memo before the Court in O.S.No.56 of 1996 and on the basis of the compromise memo filed by the parties, the suit was dismissed. As per the compromise memo, the first plaintiff is bound to vacate the premises by the end of January, 1997 and to avoid the same, he has filed the present suit. Therefore, the suit is not maintainable. Moreover, if there is any failure on the part of the first plaintiff to vacate the suit premises by the end of January, 1997, the defendants 1 and 2 herein are at liberty to initiate proceedings against the first plaintiff for recovery of possession of the suit properties, and therefore, the present suit for injunction is not maintainable. 5. Moreover, if there is any failure on the part of the first plaintiff to vacate the suit premises by the end of January, 1997, the defendants 1 and 2 herein are at liberty to initiate proceedings against the first plaintiff for recovery of possession of the suit properties, and therefore, the present suit for injunction is not maintainable. 5. The Trial Court, on the basis of both, oral and documentary evidence held that the compromise decree passed in O.S.No.56 of 1996 was not obtained by fraud, or, force and the first plaintiff signed the compromise memo, after fully knowing its contents. Therefore, it is not open to the first plaintiff to contend now that the compromise decree passed in O.S.No.56 of 1996 was null and void, not executable, and dismissed the suit. 6. The Lower Appellate Court also appreciated the facts of the case, independently, and held that if fraud has been practiced by the defendants 1 and 2 herein on the first plaintiff by getting his signature in the blank papers, the first plaintiff would have taken action against the defendants 1 and 2, either by sending notice, or, by giving police complaint against them. Moreover, the signature found in the compromise memo was admitted by P.W.1 himself, and having filed the compromise memo and got the suit in O.S.No.56 of 1996 filed by the defendants1 and 2 herein dismissed, it is not open to the plaintiffs to contend now that the compromise memo is null and void, not executable and not binding on the plaintiffs, and, confirmed the judgment and decree of the Trial Court and dismissed the Appeal Suit. Aggrieved by the same, this Second Appeal is filed. 7. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants has submitted that compromise memo filed by the parties in O.S.No.56 of 1996 is not valid. Even as per the decree passed in O.S.No.56 of 1996, the suit filed by the respondents 1 and 2 herein was dismissed on the basis of the compromise memo, and hence, the respondents 1 and 2 cannot take advantage of the compromise memo and the deceased first plaintiff did not appear before the Court, while presenting the compromise memo and the Court also did not ascertain whether the compromise was signed by the parties or not, and therefore, the decree passed in O.S.No.56 of 1996 is null and void and not binding on the appellants. 8. The learned counsel for the appellants further submitted that even as per the terms of the compromise, in the event of the first plaintiff herein failing to vacate and hand over possession of the suit premises by the end of January, 1997, the respondents 1 to 2, who were the plaintiffs in O.S.No.56 of 1996 ought to have taken proceedings through the Court of law to evict the plaintiffs and without taking steps to file the suit for eviction, they disconnected the electricity service connection to the plaintiffs' premises and also attempting to take forceful possession. Hence, the suit was filed and these aspects were not properly appreciated by the Courts below. 9. I am unable to accept the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellants. As stated supra, the suit was filed for declaration that the decree passed in O.S.No.56 of 1996 as null and void and not executable and not binding on the plaintiffs. It is seen from the compromise decree passed in O.S.No.56 of 1996, marked as Ex.A12, that the suit was filed by the defendants 1 and 2 herein for mandatory injunction to disconnect the electricity service connection given to the premises in occupation of the first plaintiff herein in the suit. Admittedly, the first plaintiff herein was set ex parte. Thereafter, he filed an application to set aside the ex parte decree and also entered into a compromise with the defendants 1 and 2 herein, who were the plaintiffs in O.S.No.56 of 1996 and on the basis of the compromise memo filed by the parties, the suit was dismissed. Therefore, there is no question of passing any decree holding that O.S.No.56 of 1996 is null and void, and not binding on the plaintiffs. 10. As stated supra, O.S.No.56 of 1996 was dismissed on the basis of the compromise memo. Hence, there is no question of declaring the suit decree as null and void. Further, as per Order 23, Rule 3 A, no suit shall lie to set aside the decree, on the ground that the compromise memo, based on which the decree is passed, was not lawful. Hence, there is no question of declaring the suit decree as null and void. Further, as per Order 23, Rule 3 A, no suit shall lie to set aside the decree, on the ground that the compromise memo, based on which the decree is passed, was not lawful. Therefore, the present suit filed by the appellants to declare the decree passed in O.S.No.56 of 1996 as null and void, is not maintainable, having regard to the provisions of Order 23, Rule 3 A, as O.S.No.56 of 1996 was dismissed on the basis of the compromise memo and as per the decree, the suit filed by the respondents 1 and 2 was dismissed. 11. The other contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that as per the compromise memo, the deceased first plaintiff agreed to vacate the premises by end of January, 1997, failing which, the defendants 1 and 2 herein may file the suit for recovery of possession and taking advantage of that, the defendants are trying to evict the plaintiffs from the suit premises, and therefore, injunction has to be granted. 12. I am unable to accept the aforesaid contention of the learned counsel for the appellants. It is seen from the compromise memo that in the event of failure on the part of the deceased first plaintiff to vacate the suit premises within the stipulated time, the respondents 1 and 2, who were the plaintiffs in O.S.No.56 of 1996 were permitted to file the suit for eviction. The respondents 1 and 2 also admitted that they will initiate proceedings against the plaintiffs for getting vacant possession. Considering all these aspect, the Courts below have rightly dismissed the suit holding that the prayer sought for cannot be granted. Hence, I do not find any infirmity in the judgments and decrees of the Courts below and no questions of law, much less, any substantial question of law arises for consideration in this Second Appeal. 13. In the result, the Second Appeal is dismissed, by confirming the judgments and decrees of the Courts below. However, there shall be no order as to costs. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed.