Judgment :- Tarun Kumar Gupta, J. The plaintiffs are the appellants against a judgment of reversal. The plaintiffs filed a suit being Title Suit No.59 of 1981 in the court of learned Munsif, 1st Court, Tamluk, District Midnapore. Said suit was transferred to the court of learned Munsif, Additional Court, Tamluk and was renumbered as Title Suit No.20 of 1984. Plaintiffs’ case, in short, is that one Sk. Nabir and his co-sharers were original owners of the suit plots. Sk. Nabir had two wives viz. Sundari Bibi and Behula. Behula got the suit land from Sk. Nabir by way of dower. Behula had four sons viz. Adhar, Dinu, Basiruddin and Satya. Satya predeceased his mother Behula. Behula while in possession of the suit property died and on her death the same devolved upon her three living sons viz. Adhar, Dinu and Basiruddin in equal shares. The plaintiffs are the legal heirs of Adhar. They, by way of inheritance, by purchase from other co-sharers and by exercising the right of pre-emption have acquired title to 3 ¾ decimals of land in plot No.1534 and 11 decimals of land in plot No.1534/1801. In Title Suit No.107 of 1937, the shares of Adhar, Dinu and Basiruddin in two suit plots, were determined. It was accordingly recorded in the R. S. R. O. R. The defendants in spite of having no title in the suit plot illegally cut away bamboos and one tree therefrom. Hence was the suit for declaration of title, permanent injunction and damages. The defendant Nos. 1 to 4 contested the suit by filing written statement denying material allegations of the plaint. They contended inter alia that Behula Bibi while in possession of the suit lands, as owner died intestate leaving four sons Adhar, Dinu, Basiruddin and Satya as her legal heirs. The right and interest of the legal heirs of Satya were acknowledged in Title suit No.107 of 1937. Some of the legal heirs of Satya sold away their shares of lands to the defendants by one registered deed dated 20 th August, 1958. The defendants are in possession of their share of land. The entries in the record of right are erroneous. The suit is liable to be dismissed. The defendant Nos. 5 to 7, 19 and 20 also contested the suit by filing written statement supporting the stand taken by defendant No.1 to 4. The defendants are in possession of their share of land. The entries in the record of right are erroneous. The suit is liable to be dismissed. The defendant Nos. 5 to 7, 19 and 20 also contested the suit by filing written statement supporting the stand taken by defendant No.1 to 4. They have put forward an alternative case of open and adverse possession of their share of suit property over 20 years and thereby acquiring a title by way of adverse possession. The defendant Nos. 9, 10, 12, 16, 18 and 21 filed a separate written statement supporting the stand on defendant Nos. 1 to 4 but they did not contest the suit. Learned trial court framed several issues. Both the parties adduced evidence, both oral and documentary during trial. After contested hearing learned trial court decreed the suit on contest against the contesting defendants and ex parte against the rest vide judgment dated 19th August, 1985. The contesting defendants preferred an appeal being Title Appeal No.1 of 1986. After contested hearing learned Additional District Judge, 2nd Court, Midnapore allowed the said appeal by setting aside the judgment and decree of learned trial court. Being aggrieved with the said judgment and decree of learned lower appellate court this second appeal has been preferred by the plaintiffs. The hearing of the second appeal was held on the following substantial questions of law: (i) Whether the Court of appeal below committed a ‘Substantial error of law in discarding the death certificate of Sk. Satya (Ext.5(a) on grounds untenable in law; (ii) Whether court of appeal below committed a substantial error of law in holding that the decree in T. S. No.107 of 1937, 1 st Court of learned Munsif, Tamluk is binding on the plaintiff overlooking that no issues was decided in the said case; (iii) Even admitting the defence case that Sk. Satya died after Behula, whether the Court of appeal committed ‘substantial’ error of law in dismissing the suit in its entirety. Mr. S. P. Roychowdhury, learned senior counsel appearing for the plaintiff appellants, submits that suit property and other properties originally belonged to said Nabir and his co-sharers. He further submits that Behula got the suit property from Sk. Nabi by way of dower. Mr. S. P. Roychowdhury, learned senior counsel appearing for the plaintiff appellants, submits that suit property and other properties originally belonged to said Nabir and his co-sharers. He further submits that Behula got the suit property from Sk. Nabi by way of dower. He next submits that Satya predeceased his mother and that on death of Behula her share devolved upon her three living sons Adhar, Dinu, Basiruddin. According to Mr. Roychowdhury the plaintiff appellants being sons of Adhar purchased the shares of suit property from other co-sharers of Adhar as well as from the heirs of Dinu and Basiruddin and also through pre-emption from third party purchaser and became owners of 16 annas share of the suit property. He submits that in absence of convincing oral evidence about the date of death of Behula and her son Satya, the plaintiffs produced the certified copies of the entries of the death register relating to death of Behula and Satya which were marked Ext.5 and Ext. 5(a) respectively. He submits that Ext.5 and Ext. 5(a) reveal that Behula and Satya died on 27.06.1935 and on 10th of September, 1929 respectively. According to Mr. Roychowdhury in the certified copy of death register relating to said Satya it was specifically noted thereupon that the entry copied from the register for the year 1929. According to him, said entries of the certified copies of the death register had presumptive value of correctness and that learned lower appellate court declined to give any authenticity to said entry only on the ground that the year of death was not noted against the entries of the relevant columns. In this connection he refers to Section 25 of the Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act, 1886 (henceforth to be referred as Act of 1886). He also refers to Section 79 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (henceforth to be referred as Act of 1872) to submit that said certified copy of the extract of the death register relating to said Satya [(Ext.5(a)] should have been presumed to be genuine in the absence of any evidence to the contrary. Mr. Roychowdhury next submits that learned Trial Court should have put reliance on Ext.5(a), in absence of any evidence to the contrary, and as such learned lower appellate court wrongly reversed said findings of learned Trial Court without any justification. Mr. Roychowdhury next submits that learned Trial Court should have put reliance on Ext.5(a), in absence of any evidence to the contrary, and as such learned lower appellate court wrongly reversed said findings of learned Trial Court without any justification. In this connection he refers a case law reported in (2001) 3 SCC page 179 (Santosh Hazari vs. Purushottam Tiwari) to impress upon this Court that Appellate Court ought not to interfere with findings of trial court Judge on a question of fact unless the latter has committed a gross mistake. Mr. Mrinal Kanti Das, learned counsel for the defendant respondents, on the other hand, submits that said Act of 1886 was enacted mainly for registration of births, deaths and marriages of the Europeans living in India as it would reveal from the statements of objects and reasons for enacting said Act of 1886. He next submits that the Bengal Births and Deaths Registration Act, 1873 was prevailing in Bengal and that under Section 4 of said Act of 1873 a magistrate was required to maintain register books for noting births and deaths and that the pages of such books were required to be numbered progressively from the beginning to end. According to Mr. Das even if it is admitted for argument’s sake that the Act of 1886 was applicable in Bengal and that the present certified copy [Ext.5(a)] was issued under said Act of 1886, even then said document loses its authenticity as it was not issued by the proper authority. According to him, this document was issued with a certificate of true copies by the record keeper but under Section 25(2) of said Act of 1886 every copy of an entry in a registered book given under said section was required to be certified by the registrars of births and deaths, to be admissible in evidence for the purpose of proving the birth or death which the entries relate. He next submits that the year of death of Satya was not noted in said certified copy [Ext.5(a)]. According to him, the notings in the top left hand of the certificate in a different ink “entry copied from the register for the year 1929” which was not even authenticated by any competent person is not even admissible in evidence not to speak of having any presumptive value of genuineness. According to him, the notings in the top left hand of the certificate in a different ink “entry copied from the register for the year 1929” which was not even authenticated by any competent person is not even admissible in evidence not to speak of having any presumptive value of genuineness. According to him, learned lower appellate court rightly held that said notings in the top left hand corner of said document denoting the year had no authenticity and hence was not admissible in evidence. In support of his contention he refers to headnotes ( c ) and (d) of the case law reported in AIR 1956 Nagpur page 74 (State vs. Kamruddin). The relevant portion of which refers as follows:- (c) Evidence Act (1872), S. 35. – Birth and death registers. “The Birth and death Register is no doubt a document within the meaning of S. 35 Evidence Act, and is therefore relevant and has evidentiary value. But this does not mean that each and every entry made in that register is admissible in evidence. Only such entries as are made therein by persons in the discharge of their official duty are admissible.” (d) Evidence Act (1872), S. 35 – Birth and Death registers. “A mere entry in a Birth and death register to the effect that a child was born to a person without any statement as to the identity of the child is not sufficient to prove the birth of a particular person. The identity of that person has to be fully established by other evidence.” He also refers head note (b) of the case reported in AIR 1938 Calcutta 120 (Hemanta Kumar Das vs. Alliantz Ins. Co.) which runs as follows:- “Evidence – Entries of names of persons in register of births or deaths are not positive evidence unless identity is proved. Entries of the names of persons in a register of births or deaths or marriages cannot be positive evidence of the birth, death or marriage of such persons unless their identity is fully proved.” He next submits that as an entry in death register is not conclusive evidence of date of death of deceased the fact that certificate was admitted in evidence without objection does not alter the position. In this connection he refers a case law reported in AIR 1794 Calcutta 393 (Swarna Lata vs. K. I. F. and M. Works Ltd. According to Mr. Das, save and except Ext.5(a) there was no other evidence, not to speak of convincing evidence to show that Sk. Satya, son of Behula, predeceased his mother. Mr. Das submits that learned lower appellate court rightly declined to put any reliance on Ext.5(a) being a convincing document showing death of Sk. Satya in 1929. There is no dispute that there was no convincing oral or documentary evidence save and except Ext.5 and 5(a) to show the date of death of Behula and her son Sk. Satya. From the entries in Ext.5 it is clear that Behula wife of Sk. Nabir died on 27.06.1935. But in Ext.5(a) the year of death was not noted against the concerned column. In the top left hand of said certificate it was written “entry copied from the register for the year 1929” in a different ink having no authentication. It is true that under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 an entry in any public or other official book, register, or record stating a fact in issue or relevant fact and made by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty, or by any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law is a relevant fact. Again under Section 79 of said Act of 1872 there is a presumption of genuinity of the entries in the document duly certified by a competent officer provided said document was substantially in the form and was executed in the manner directed by the law in that behalf. Said notings in the top left hand of Ext.5(a) to the effect “entry copied from the register for the year 1929” in different ink with no authentication are neither notings as per prescribed form nor authenticated by a competent person as per law. As such, said notings had no authenticity, not to speak of presumptive value of correctness in the eye of law. The case law of Santosh Hazari (supra) has no application in the facts of this case as it is not a case where trial court decided an issue on the basis of conflicting oral evidence and learned lower appellate court interfered with said findings of fact without any justification. The case law of Santosh Hazari (supra) has no application in the facts of this case as it is not a case where trial court decided an issue on the basis of conflicting oral evidence and learned lower appellate court interfered with said findings of fact without any justification. Learned lower appellate court in the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the discussions made above has rightly observed that no reliance should be placed on Ext.5(a) as a document showing death of Sk. Satya, son of Behula, in the year 1929. As such, no error was committed by learned lower appellate court in discarding Ext.5(a). Mr. Roychowdhury submits that the court of appeal below committed a substantial error of law in holding that the decree in Title Suit No.107 of 1937 was binding on the plaintiffs overlooking that no issue regarding heirs of Behula was decided in said case. On perusal of the lower appellate court judgment I find that learned lower appellate court did not make any observation regarding impact of Title Suit No.107 of 1937 in the matter of deciding who became heirs of Behula on her death. The last but not least important submission of Mr. Roychowdhury is that even if Sk. Satya died after his mother Behula and thereby inherited 1/4th share of Behula but even then learned lower appellate court was not justified in dismissing the entire suit of the plaintiffs. According to him, the plaintiffs being some of the heirs of Adhar, purchased the remaining shares of Adhar from other heirs of Adhar, and also obtained the shares of Dinu and Basiruddin through purchase as well as through pre-emption case. Accordingly he submits that even if the contesting defendant respondents purchased some share of Satya in the suit property from the heirs of Satya through a kobala dated 20.08.1958 (Ext. A) even then the learned lower appellate court should not have dismissed the suit in its entirety. According to Mr. Roychowdhury in terms of order VII rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure and in view of the prayer ‘gha’ of the plaint learned lower appellate court should have granted a decree declaring title of the plaintiff appellants in the rest of the suit property. Mr. According to Mr. Roychowdhury in terms of order VII rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure and in view of the prayer ‘gha’ of the plaint learned lower appellate court should have granted a decree declaring title of the plaintiff appellants in the rest of the suit property. Mr. Das, on the other hand, submits that the plaintiff appellants claimed 16 annas share in the suit property and also claimed damages against contesting defendant respondents for alleged cutting of bamboos and trees from the suit property. He submits that once it is proved that the plaintiffs / appellants were not 16 annas owner of the suit property and that contesting defendant respondents were also co-sharers then there was no scope of granting any decree. The plaintiffs appellants claimed 16 annas share in the suit property alleging that heirs of Satya had no share in any part of the suit property as Satya predeceased his mother Behula. But plaintiffs appellants failed to prove the same. The contesting defendant respondents purchased some share of suit property from heirs of Satya. The contesting defendant Nos. 1 to 4 being co-sharers cannot be injuncted either from possessing the suit property or from enjoying the usufructs therefrom so long a partition is not effected in between the co-sharers by metes and bounds. Under these circumstances plaintiff appellants were not entitled to get a decree declaring their 16 annas share in the suit property together with injunction and damages. In prayer ‘Gha’ of the plaint the plaintiffs prayed for any other relief under law and equity besides the specific reliefs of declaration of title, permanent injunction and damages as made in other prayers. Said prayer ‘Gha’ of the plaint was practically redundant in view of order VII Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 which runs as follows:- “Relief to be specifically stated. – Every plaint shall state specifically the relief which the plaintiff claims either simply or in the alternative, and it shall not be necessary to ask for general or other relief which may always be given as the Court may think just to the same extent as if it had been asked for. – Every plaint shall state specifically the relief which the plaintiff claims either simply or in the alternative, and it shall not be necessary to ask for general or other relief which may always be given as the Court may think just to the same extent as if it had been asked for. And the same rule shall apply to any relief claimed by the defendant in his written statement.” It is true hat the plaintiff appellants claimed to acquire the shares of Adhar, Dinu and Basiruddin in the suit property. It was not disputed by anybody. A person cannot obtain a simple declaration of title unless he claims other consequential reliefs. In the case in hand, the plaintiff appellants did not pray for a decree declaring their share as well as right of joint possession of the suit property with contesting defendant respondents. Again, they did not also pray even alternatively for determining their share and for partition. As neither the contesting defendant respondents nor anybody is denying the plaintiff appellants’ title relating to the shares of Adhar, Dinu and Basiruddin in the suit property there was no question of granting a simple decree of declaring their share in the suit property without any consequential relief. As such, I do not think that any wrong was committed by the learned lower appellate court by dismissing the entire suit. As a result, the appeal is hereby dismissed on contest. However, I pass no order as to costs. Send down lower court records along with a copy of this judgment to the lower court at the earliest. Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgment be supplied to learned counsels of the parties, if applied for.