JUDGMENT 1. This judgment shall also govern disposal of M.A. No. 31/2013 as the question of law involved in these appeals are one and the same. 2. The substantial question of law which requires to be considered and decided in these appeals is whether the First Appellate Court is justified in directing wholesale remand in exercise of its power under. Order 41 Rule 23A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter called as 'CPC') without reversing the decree passed by the trial Court and without holding that the retrial is necessary? 3. Questioning the legality and validity of judgment and decree dated 08.03.2013 passed in Civil Appeal No. 113-A/2012 (Devcharan V. Anish Fulara) and Civil Appeal No. 83-A/2012 (Devcharan v. Ghanshyam Agrawal & another) by the First Additional District Judge, Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh, the appellants/defendants have preferred these appeals under Order 43 Rule 1(u) of CPC. 4. 3. Questioning the legality and validity of judgment and decree dated 08.03.2013 passed in Civil Appeal No. 113-A/2012 (Devcharan V. Anish Fulara) and Civil Appeal No. 83-A/2012 (Devcharan v. Ghanshyam Agrawal & another) by the First Additional District Judge, Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh, the appellants/defendants have preferred these appeals under Order 43 Rule 1(u) of CPC. 4. By the impugned judgment and decree, the learned First Appellate Court allowed the appeal tiled by the respondent/plaintiff; and while setting aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court dated 12.10.2009 passed by the Civil Judge Class-II, Saraipali in Civil Suit No. 6-A/2006, remanded the case to the trial Court for deciding the suit afresh on merits by giving following directions: ^^mHk; i{k ds }kjk izLrqr U;k; n`”Vkarksa dk euu fd;k x;kA fopkj.k U;k;ky; ds }kjk ifjr fu.kZ; fnukad 12&10&2009 ds vuqlkj oknxzLr Hkwfe dks e`rd I;kjsyky dk gksuk ik;k x;k gS rFkk ;g Hkh fu”d”kZ fn;k x;k gS fd mDr edku esa izfrvihykFkhZ fdjk;snkj gSA bu nksuksa fcUnq ij izfrvihykFkhZ@izfroknh dh vksj ls dzkl vkCtsD’ku is’k ugha fd;k x;k gSA oknh us LoŒ I;kjsyky ds olh;rukek ds vk/kkj ij Loa; dk LoRo gksuk crk;k gS] ftl laca/k esa okn iz’u cuk;s x;s gSA ijUrq mldk fu”d”kZ ^^izekf.kr ugha** esa fn;k x;k gSA ,slh fLFkfr esa oknxzLr LFky ds LokfeRo ds laca/k esa fof/kd fLFkfr vLiLV cukrh gS] ftls LiLV djuk fopkj.k U;k;ky; ds fy, vko’;d FkkA oknh@vihykFkhZ us fopkj.k U;k;ky; ds le{k vafre rdZ ds LVst esa iqu% lk{; is’k djus dk volj dh ekax dh Fkh] ftls fopkj.k U;k;ky; us vLohdkj dj fn;kA vihy esa vkns’k 41 fu;e 27 O;-iz-la- dk vkosnu is’k dj iqu% mDr fuosnu dks nksgjk;k x;k gSA ,slh fLFkfr esa fu.kZ; ds i’pkr~ ysD;wuk dh iwfrZ gsrq vkosnu is’k djuk ugha ik;k x;kA izkjaHk Lrj ij gh oknh@vihykFkhZ }kjk fopkj.k U;k;ky; ds le{k olh;rukek dks izekf.kr djus ds fy, lk{; gsrq volj fn;s tkus dh ekax dh tkrh jgh gSA ,slh n’kk esa tcfd fu.kZ; esa Hkh LoRo dh oS/kkfud fLFkfr Li”V ugha gS] olh;rukek dks izekf.kr djus ds fy, rFkk LoRo dh fLFkfr Li”V djus ds fy, lk{; gsrq volj fn;k tkuk vko’;d izrhr gksrk gSA izfrvihykFkhZx.k }kjk izLrqr U;k; n`”Vkarksa esa bl izdkj dh ifjfLFkfr;ka ugha gSA vr% mldk ykHk mls ugha feyrkA ;g U;k;ky; i{kdjksa dh lgh fLFkfr ds fy, olh;rukek dks izekf.kr fd;k tkuk vko’;d ik;k tkrk gSA vr% vihykFkhZ }kjk izLrqr U;k; n`”Vkarksa ds izdk’k esa vkosnu vkns’k 41 fu;e 27 lgikfBr /kkjk 151 lh-ih-lh- Lohdkj fd;k tkrk gSA oknh dks fopkj.k U;k;ky; ds le{k olh;rukek izekf.kr djus gsrq lk{; is’k fd;s tkus gsrq volj fn;k tkrk gSA lkFk gh bldk [kaMu djrs gq, izfroknh.k pkgs rks fopkj.k U;k;ky; ds le{k lk{; is’k dj ldrs gSaA fopkj.k U;k;ky; }kjk ikfjr fu.kZ; 12-10-2009 vikLr djrs gq, izdj.k dks lk{; ysdj iqu% fu.kZ; ikfjr djus gsrq fopkj.k U;k;ky; dks izfrizsf”kr fd;k tkrk gSA** 5. Brief facts necessary for disposal of these appeals are as under: 5.1 The respondent/plaintiff herein filed a civil suit for declaration of his title, possession and for arrears of rent pleading inter alia that appellant/defendant herein is the tenant of late Shri Pyarelal, sole owner of the property described in Schedule annexed to the plaint let-out to him in the year 1975 on monthly rent of Rs.175; and further pleaded that the appellant/defendant failed to pay rent since 01.10.2005 and late Shri Pyarelal has executed a will dated 20.02.1984 which is duly registered in favour of respondent/plaintiff and he has acquired right and title on the said property by way of the will and claimed decree for declaration and possession. 5.2 The appellant/defendant filed his written statement before the trial Court denying the averments made in the plaint and disputed the relationship of landlord and tenant and also disputed the will alleged to be executed in favour of respondent/plaintiff and finally pleaded that the suit accommodation is not required bona fide by the respondent/plaintiff. 5.3 Upon pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed as many as 11 issues and put the parties to trial on the aforesaid issues. 5.3 Upon pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed as many as 11 issues and put the parties to trial on the aforesaid issues. The issues are as under: okn iz’u fu”d”kZ 1- D;k okn vuqlwph ^^v** esa oknxzLr laifr ^^gka** Lo- I;kjsyky ds LoRo dh gS\ 2- D;k Lo- I;kjsyky )kjk oknxzLr laifr dks ^^izekf.kr ugha** iathd`r olh;rukek fnukad 20-2-84 )kjk okn dks olh;r dj fn;k x;k gS\ ;fn gka rks izHkko\ 3- D;k izfroknh )kjk oknxzLr edku dks Lo- ^^izfroknh vful I;kjsyky ls fdjk;s ij fy;k x;k Fkk vFkok Qqykj Lo- I;kjsyky D;k izfroknh Lo- I;kjsyky dk fdjk;snkj gS\ dk fdjk;snkj gS** 4- D;k Lo- I;kjsyky dh e`R;q mijkar izfroknh ^^izekf.kr ugha** )kjk oknh dks edku ekfyd Lohdkj fd;k tk pqdk gS\ 5- D;k oknh )kjk lwpuk izsf”kr dj izfroknh dh ^^izekf.kr ugh** fdjk;snkjh lekIr dh tk pqdh gS\ 6- D;k oknxzLr edku izfroknh )kjk 30&32 o”kksZ ^^izekf.kr ugh** ls fufeZr dj mlesa fcuk fdlh jksdVksd ds dkfct gksus ds dkj.k izfroknh fojks/kh vf/kiR; ds vk/kkj ij oknxzLr edku dk Hkwfe Lokeh gd izkIr dj fy;k gS\ 7- D;k oknh izfroknh ls vuqlwph ^^v** esa ^^vf/kdkjh ugha** fnf’kZr edku ,oa laifr dk izfroknh dks csn[ky djkdj fjDr vkf/kiR; izkIr djus dk vf/kdkjh gS\ 8- D;k oknh izfroknh ls oknxzLr edku dk ^^vf/kdkjh ugha** cdk;k fdjk;k vDVwcj 05 ls Qjojh 06 dk fdjk;k 845@& :i;s ikus dk vf/kdkjh gS\ 9- D;k oknh izfroknh ls okn ds yacudky rd ^^vf/kdkjh ugha** dk fdjk;k jkf’k ,oa fdjk;snkjh lekfIr fnukad ls oknxzLr edku dk izfrfnu 50@& :i;s ds fnu ds fglkc ls gtkZuk vkf/kiR; izkIr gksus rd ikus dk vf/kdkjh gS\ 10- lgk;rk ,oa okn O;;\ ^^nkok [kkfjt** 11- D;k oknxzLr edku I;kjsyky jkblkey ifjlj ^^izekf.kr ugha** ds ckgj xzke cluk esa fLFkr vkcknh Hkwfe [k-dz- 54@1 esa fLFkr o fufeZr gS\ ;fn gka rks izHkko\ 5.4 The Trial Court by its judgment and decree dated 12.10.2009 dismissed the suit filed by the respondent/plaintiff and recorded the following findings: (i) The suit property is owned by late Shri Pyarelal, but the will dated 20.02.1984 alleged to be executed in favour of the respondent/plaintiff is not established. (ii) The appellant/defendant is the tenant of late Shri Pyarelal. (iii) Issues No. 4 to 11 were decided in negative. (ii) The appellant/defendant is the tenant of late Shri Pyarelal. (iii) Issues No. 4 to 11 were decided in negative. 5.5 Feeling dissatisfied with the judgment and decree dated 12.10.2009, the respondent/plaintiff filed first appeal under Section 96 of CPC before the First Appellate Court; impugning the legality and correctness of the said judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. During the pendency of the appeal, the appellant also filed an application under Order 41 Rule 27 read with Section 151 of CPC and prayer was made for granting pem1ission to adduce additional evidence to prove the execution and attestation of the will, stating inter-alia that his counsel appearing before the trial Court has failed to notice provision contained in Section 69 of the Indian Evidence Act and therefore, the will executed by late Shri Pyarelal in favour of respondent/plaintiff could not be proved and opportunity be granted to adduce additional evidence. The said application was resisted by the appellant/defendant by replying inter-alia that the application lacks merit and it deserves to be rejected. 5.6 The First Appellate Court by its judgment and decree allowed the appeal filed by the respondent/plaintiff by granting the application filed under Order 41 rule 27 read with Section 151 of CPC, and came to the conclusion that in order to prove the attestation and execution of the will, opportunity to adduce evidence is required to be granted to the respondent/plaintiff and thereby set-aside the judgment and decree directing the trial Court to take evidence and pronounce judgment afresh in accordance with law. 6. Shri Manoj Paranjpe, learned counsel appearing for the appellants/defendants would submit that the First Appellate Court has committed legal error in directing wholesale and open remand under Order 41 Rule 23-A or CPC. He would further submit that the Appellate Court is not at all justified in passing the order of wholesale remand as it has not reversed the findings on all the issues recorded by the trial Court. He would also submit that the respondent/plaintiff having onus to prove due execution and attestation of the will has failed to establish the same and is not entitled to a fresh opportunity, to adduce evidence and as such, the First Appellate Court was fully empowered to pronounce judgment on the evidence already recorded by the trial court. He would also submit that the respondent/plaintiff having onus to prove due execution and attestation of the will has failed to establish the same and is not entitled to a fresh opportunity, to adduce evidence and as such, the First Appellate Court was fully empowered to pronounce judgment on the evidence already recorded by the trial court. He would finally submit that granting application under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC and thereby, permitting to produce the additional evidence is only for removing lacuna in the evidence and thus, the impugned judgment and decree as well as order granting application under Order 41 Rule 27 Read with Section 151 of CPC are liable to be set-aside. 7. Per contra, Mr. Sunil Sahu, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent/plaintiff, while supporting the impugned judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court would submit that the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court is fully justified in the facts and circumstances of the case and would further submit that in order to establish the due execution and attestation of the will, the additional evidence was required to be adduced. Thus, the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court deserves to be upheld. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered the rival submissions made therein. 9. These appeals have been admitted for final hearing on following substantial questions of law: (i) Whether the First Appellate Court is justified in remanding the matter under Order 41 Rule 23-A of CPC without reversing the decree in appeal and without holding that the retrial is necessary? (ii) Whether the First Appellate Court is justified in remanding the matter to the trial Court merely by granting an application under Order 41 Rule 27 read with Section 151 of CPC? 10. Order 41 of CPC provides for appeals from original decrees. The Code empowers the Appellate Court to order remand in three situations. These three situations are covered by Order 41 Rule 23, Order 41 Rule 23-A and Order 41 Rule 25 of CPC, which read as under: "23. Remand of case by appellate court. 10. Order 41 of CPC provides for appeals from original decrees. The Code empowers the Appellate Court to order remand in three situations. These three situations are covered by Order 41 Rule 23, Order 41 Rule 23-A and Order 41 Rule 25 of CPC, which read as under: "23. Remand of case by appellate court. - Where the court from whose decree an appeal is preferred has disposed of the suit upon a preliminary point and the decree is reversed in appeal; the appellate court may, if it thinks fit, by order remand the case, and may further direct what issue or issues shall be tried in the case so remanded, and shall send a copy of its judgment and order to the court from whose decree the appeal is preferred, with directions to readmit the suit under its original number in the register of civil suits, and proceed to determine the suit; and the evidence (if any) recorded during the original trial shall, subject to all just exceptions, be evidence during the trial after remand. 23-A. Remand in other cases. - Where the court from whose decree an appeal is preferred has disposed of the case otherwise than on preliminary point, and the decree is reversed in appeal and a retrial is considered necessary, the appellate court shall have the same powers as it has under Rule 23. 25. Whether appellate court may frame issues and refer them for trial to court whose decree appealed from. - Where the court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has omitted to frame or try any issue, or to determine any question of fact, which appears to the appellate court essential to the right decision of the suit upon the merits, the appellate court may, if necessary, frame issues, and refer the same for trial to the court from whose decree the appeal is preferred, and in such case shall direct such court to take the additional evidence required; and such court shall proceed to try such issues, and shall return the evidence to the appellate court together with its findings thereon and the reasons there[or within such time as may be fixed by the appellate court or extended by it from time to time." 11. Order 41 Rule 23 of CPC is invocable by the Appellate Court where the appeal has arisen from the decree passed on a preliminary point; in other words, where the entire suit has been disposed of by the trial court on a preliminary point and such decree is reversed in appeal and the Appellate Court thinks proper to remand the case for fresh disposal. While doing so, the Appellate Court may issue further direction for trial of certain issues. 12. Order 41 Rule 23-A of CPC has been inserted in the Code by Act 104 of 1976 w.e.f., 01.02.1977. According to Order 41 Rule 23-A of CPC, the Appellate Court may remand the suit to the trial Court even though such suit has been, disposed of on merits. It provides that where the trial court has disposed of the suit on merits and the decree is reversed in appeal and the Appellate Court considers that retrial is necessary, the Appellate Court may remand the suit to the trial Court. Thus, on twin conditions being satisfied, the Appellate Court can exercise the same power of remand under Order 41 Rule 23-A of CPC. 13. In so far as Order 41 Rule 25 of CPC is concerned, the Appellate Court continues to be in seisin of the matter; it calls upon the trial court to record the finding on some issue or issues and to send that finding to the Appellate Court. The power under Order 41 Rule 25 is invoked by the Appellate Court, where it holds that the trial Court which passed the decree omitted to frame or try any issue or determine any question of fact essential to decide the matter finally. The Appellate Court, while remitting some issue or issues, may direct the trial Court to take additional evidence on such issue (s). 14. In a decision in P. Purushottam Reddy and another Vs. Pratap Steels Limited (2002) 2 SCC 686 , the Supreme Court has held that unless the decree in appeal is reversed by the First Appellate Court and retrial is considered necessary, wholesale remand can not be made by the First Appellate Court. It has been held as under: "10. The next question to be examined is the legality and propriety of the order of remand made by the High Court. It has been held as under: "10. The next question to be examined is the legality and propriety of the order of remand made by the High Court. Prior to the insertion of Rule 23A in Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure by CPC Amendment Act 1976, there were only two provisions contemplating remand by a court of appeal in Order 41 of CPC. Rule 23 applies when the trial court disposes of the entire suit by recording its findings on a preliminary issue without deciding other issues and the finding on preliminary issue is reversed in appeal. Rule 25 applies when the appellate court notices an omission on the part of the trial court to frame or try any issue or to determine any question of fact which in the opinion of the appellate court was essential to the right decision of the suit upon the merits. However, the remand contemplated by Rule 25 is a limited remand in as much as the subordinate court can try only such issues as are referred to it for trial and having done so the, evidence recorded together with findings and reasons therefore of the trial court, are required to be returned to the appellate court. However, still it was a settled position of law before 1976 Amendment that the court, in an appropriate case could exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 151 of the CPC to order a remand it such a remand was considered pre-eminently necessary ex debito justitiae, though not covered by any specific provision of Order 11 of the CPC. In cases where additional evidence is required to be taken in the event of anyone of the clause of Sub-rule (1) of Rule 27 being attracted such additional evidence oral or documentary, is allowed to be produced either before the appellate court itself or by directing any court subordinate to the appellate court to receive such evidence and send it to the appellate court. In 1976, Rule 23A has been inserted in Order 41 which provides for a remand by an appellate court hearing an appeal against a decree if (i) the trial court disposed of the case otherwise than on a preliminary point, and (ii) the decree is reversed in appeal and a retrial is considered necessary. In 1976, Rule 23A has been inserted in Order 41 which provides for a remand by an appellate court hearing an appeal against a decree if (i) the trial court disposed of the case otherwise than on a preliminary point, and (ii) the decree is reversed in appeal and a retrial is considered necessary. On twin conditions being satisfied, the appellate court can exercise the same power of remand under Rule 23A as it is under Rule 23. After the amendment all the eases of wholesale remand are covered by Rule 23 and 23A. In view of the express provisions of these rules, the High Court cannot have recourse to its inherent powers to make a remand because as held in Mahendra v. Sushila (AIR 1965 SC 365 at p. 399), it is well settled that inherent powers can be availed of ex debito justitiae only in the absence of express provisions in the Code. It is only in exceptional cases where the court may now exercise the power of remand de hors the Rules 23 and 23A. To wit the superior court, if it finds that the judgment under appeal has not disposed of the case satisfactorily in the manner required by Order 20 Rule 3 or Order 11 Rule 31 of the CPC and hence it is no judgment in the eye of law, it may set aside the same and send the matter back for re-writing the judgment so as to protect valuable rights of the parties. An appellate court should be circumspect in ordering a remand when the case is not covered either by Rule 23 or Rule 23A or Rule 25 of the CPC. An unwarranted order of remand gives the litigation an undeserved lease of life and, therefore must be avoided. 11. In the case at hand, the trial court did not dispose of the suit upon a preliminary point. The suit was decided by recording findings on all the issues. By its appellate judgment under appeal herein, the High Court has recorded its finding on some of the issues, not preliminary, and then framed three additional issues leaving them to be tried and decided by the trial Court. It is not a case where a retrial is considered necessary. Neither Rule 23 not Rule 23-A of Order 41 applies. By its appellate judgment under appeal herein, the High Court has recorded its finding on some of the issues, not preliminary, and then framed three additional issues leaving them to be tried and decided by the trial Court. It is not a case where a retrial is considered necessary. Neither Rule 23 not Rule 23-A of Order 41 applies. None of the conditions contemplated by Rule 21 exists so as to justify production of additional evidence by either party under that Rule. The validity of remand has to be tested by reference to Rule 25. So far as the objection as to maintainability of the suit for failure of the plaint to satisfy the requirement of Forms 47 and 48 of Appendix-A CPC is concerned, the High Court has itself found that there was no specific plea taken in the written statement. The question of framing an issue did not, purely as a question of law which, in their submission, strikes at the very root filed and so the plea was permitted to urged. So far as the plea as to readiness and willingness by reference to clause (c) of Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 is concerned, the pleadings are there as they were neither any of the parties made a prayer for amendment in the pleadings nor has the High Court allowed such a liberty. It is true that a specific issue was very much alive to the issue whether Section 16 (c) of the Specific Relief Act was complied with or not and the contentions advanced by the parties in this regard were also adjudicated upon. The High Court was to examine whether such Ending of the trial court was sustainable or not - in law and on facts. Even otherwise the question could have been gone into by the High Court and a finding could have been recorded on the available material inasmuch as the High Court being the court of first appeal, all the questions of fact and law arising in the case were open before it for consideration and decision." 15. In n decision in Municipal Corporation, Hyderabad Vs. In n decision in Municipal Corporation, Hyderabad Vs. Sunder Singh JT 2008 (7) SC 247 the Supreme Court, while considering the scope of Order 41 Rule 23, has held that the Court should be loathe to exercise its power under Order 41 Rule 23 of CPC and an order of wholesale remand should not be passed routinely. It was held as under: "11. It is now well settled that before invoking the said provision, the conditions precedent laid down therein must be satisfied. It is further well settled that the Court should loathe to exercise its power in terms of Order XLI Rule 23 of the Code of Civil Procedure and an order of remand should not be passed routinely. It is not to be exercised by the appellate court only because it finds it difficult to deal with the entire matter. If it does not agree with the decision of the trial court, it has to come with a proper finding of its own. The Appellate Court cannot shirk its duties." 16. In a decision in Ashwinkumar K. Patel Vs. Upendra J. Patel and others AIR 1999 SC 1125 , the Supreme Court has held that the Appellate Court should not ordinarily remand a case under Order 41 Rule 23 of CPC, as such, remand orders lead to unnecessary delay and cause prejudice to the parties and Appellate Court should itself consider material available and should decide the appeal one way or other. It was held as under: "7. In our view, the High Court should not ordinarily remand a case under Order 41, Rule 23, C.P.C. to the lower Court merely because it considered that the reasoning of the lower Court in some respects was wrong. Such remand orders leads to unnecessary delays and cause prejudice to the parties to the case. When the material was available before the High Court, it should have itself decided the appeal one-way or other. It could have considered the various aspects of the case mentioned in the order of the trial Court and considered whether the order of the trial Court ought to be confirmed or reversed or modified. It could have easily considered the documents and affidavits and decided about the prima-facie case on the material available. It could have considered the various aspects of the case mentioned in the order of the trial Court and considered whether the order of the trial Court ought to be confirmed or reversed or modified. It could have easily considered the documents and affidavits and decided about the prima-facie case on the material available. In matters involving agreements of 1980 (and 1996) on the one hand and an agreement of 1991 on the other, as in this case, such remand orders would lead to further delay and uncertainty. We are, therefore, of the view that the remand by the High Court was not necessary." 17. Now keeping in view the twin requirements of Order 41 Rule 23A CPC and law laid down by the Supreme Court in aforesaid cases, I proceed to examine the legality and correctness of the impugned judgment of the First Appellate Court, remanding the case to the trial Court. In the present case, the trial Court has disposed of the suits on merits by deciding and recording findings on all the issues and not on the preliminary issue. The First Appellate Court set-aside the judgment and decree of the trial court and directed the trial Court to decide the suit afresh, after giving an opportunity to the parties to lead oral evidence as well as documentary evidence, as nature of order passed by Appellate Court leads no manner of doubt that such order has been passed by First Appellate Court in exercise of its power under Order 41 Rule 23A of CPC. Now, the question to be considered is whether the First Appellate Court has reversed the decree in appeal and whether it is held that retrial is considered necessary. 18. A bare perusal of the impugned judgment would show that the First Appellate Court neither considered the findings on all the issues recorded by the trial Court nor reversed the said findings in the appeal, which is apparent from the points of determination framed by the First Appellate Court; which state as under: ^^esjs le{k fopkj.kh; iz’u ;g mRiUu gksrk gS fd & 1- D;k vkns’k 41 fu;e 27 lgifBr /kkjk 151 lh-ih-lh- dk vkosnu Lohdkj ;ksX; gS \ 2- D;k fopkj.k U;k;ky; }kjk ikfjr fu.kZ; ,ao fMdzh vikLr fd, tkus ;ksX; gS \** 19. Thus, it appears that the First Appellate Court .did not consider the findings on all the issues recorded by the trial Court, even particularly, the findings recorded by the trial Court on issue No. 2 and considered only the application for additional evidence filed under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC; read with Section 151 of CPC whereas, the First Appellate Court was required to formulate points for determination under Order 41 Rule 31 of CPC. Order 41 Rule 31 of CPC provides as under: "31. Contents, date and signature of judgment. - The judgment of the Appellate Court shall be in writing and shall state – (a) the points of determination; (b) the decision thereon; (c) the reasons for the decision; and (d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled, and shall at the time that it is pronounced be signed and dated by the Judge or by the Judges concurring therein." 20. Order 41 Rule 31 of CPC provides the procedure for deciding the appeal. The law requires substantial compliance of the said provision. The First Appellate Court being the final Court of facts has to formulate the points for determination and weigh the evidence on the issues, which arise for adjudication and record reasons for its decision on the said points. The first appeal is valuable right of the parties and parties have to be heard on the question of law and fact. The judgment of the First Appellate Court must therefore, reflect the conscious application of mind and record findings supported by the reasons on all the issues arising along with contentions put-forth and pressed by the parties for decision of the Appellate Court. In the instant case, the First Appellate Court neither framed the point for determination nor addressed all the issues missing along with contentions put forth and pressed by the parties for the decision of the Court and straight away considered the application under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC read with Section 151 of CPC and by granting that application set-aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. Thus, the First Appellate Court has not reversed any of the findings recorded by the trial Court on any of the issues including the issue on the will in favour of the plaintiff and simply remanded the suit for de novo consideration in exercise of power under Order 41 Rule 23-A of CPC. 21. The matter did not stop here. The First Appellate Court neither considered nor recorded a finding that retrial is necessary which is one of the twin conditions for exercise of power under Order 41 Rule 23-A of CPC. Thus, the impugned judgment and decree was passed without reversing the decree of trial Court, as none of the issues raised and decided by the trial Court has been reversed in appeal by the First Appellate Court and without holding retrial is necessary, the First Appellate Court has committed serious illegality in directing the wholesale and open remand in exercise of power under Order 41 Rule 23-A of CPC. Thus, the first substantial question of law is answered accordingly. 22. So far as second substantial question of law is concerned; the First Appellate Court has considered the application under Order 41 Rule 27 read with Section 151 of CPC and upon granting the said application set-aside the judgment and decree by directing the trial Court to give an opportunity to the respondent/plaintiff to adduce evidence. 23. The question is whether such a course of making wholesale and making open remand by granting application under Order 41 Rule 27 read with Section 151 of CPC is permissible? 24. In the instant case, the First Appellate Court has remanded the case to the trial Court merely to afford an opportunity to the respondent/plaintiff to prove due-execution and attestation of the will, which the First Appellate Court itself can record the evidence and mark document, if any, as provided in Section 107 of CPC. Section 107 of CPC reads as under: "107. Power of Appellate Court.-(1) Subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed, an Appellate Court shall have power- (a) to determine a case finally; (b) to remand a case; (c) to frame issues and refer them for trial; (d) to take additional evidence or to require such evidence to be taken. Power of Appellate Court.-(1) Subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed, an Appellate Court shall have power- (a) to determine a case finally; (b) to remand a case; (c) to frame issues and refer them for trial; (d) to take additional evidence or to require such evidence to be taken. (2) Subject as aforesaid, the Appellate Court shall have the same powers and shall perform as nearly as may be the same duties as are conferred and imposed by the Code on Courts of original jurisdiction in respect of suits instituted therein." 25. In a decision reported in Vasant Ganesh Damle Vs. Shrikant Trimbak Datar & another AIR 2002 SC 1237 , considering the scope of Section 107 of CPC, the Supreme Court has held as under: "8. The appeal is considered to be an extension of the suit because under S. 107 of the code of Civil Procedure, the appellate Court has the same powers as are conferred by the Code on Courts of original jurisdiction in respect of suits instituted therein. Such a power can be exercised by the appellate Court "as nearly as may be" exercised by the trial Court under the Code." 26. In a Decision in S. Umapathy Vs. Arunachalam Pattankattiar and another AIR 2000 Madras 259, Justice P. Sathasivam, (as then His Lordship was), has held that mere reception of additional evidence cannot be a ground for order of remand and to try the suit once again by the trial Court. The relevant portion of the said judgment is as under: "5. The first infirmity committed by the lower appellate Court is that there is no specific finding and reason for reception of additional documents at the appellate stage and the appellate Court failed to consider the claim of the appellants therein in terms of Order 41. Rule 27(1)(aa) and (2) of CPC. Another infirmity is that in spite of considering those documents, after satisfying the above-mentioned provision, viz, Order 41, Rule 27(1)(aa) and (2), it is open to the lower appellate court to consider the additional documents or additional evidence and record evidence and mark documents as mentioned in Order 41, Rule 27(1), CPC. Here again, the lower appellate Court failed to follow the said procedure. In a matter like this, there should be always endeavour to dispose of the case by the appellate Court itself. Here again, the lower appellate Court failed to follow the said procedure. In a matter like this, there should be always endeavour to dispose of the case by the appellate Court itself. When certain commissions and omissions made by the trial Court is brought to the notice of the appellate Court, the same should be corrected by the appellate Court." 27. The trial Court has recorded the oral evidence as well as documentary evidence and rendered a decision after a full fledged trial. Merely for affording an opportunity to prove the execution and attestation of will by granting an application for additional evidence, the suit cannot be remanded to the trial Court for fresh disposal in accordance with law. There should be always an endeavour to dispose of the case by the Appellate Court itself, where the commissions and omissions made by the First Court could be corrected by the Appellate Court. 28. Thus, keeping in view the aforesaid pronouncements, mere reception of the additional evidence, if any, by the First Appellate Court cannot be a ground for remanding the matter to the trial Court for de novo consideration. Thus, the second substantial question of law is answered accordingly in affirmative and in favour of the appellant/defendant. 29. Thus, not only the impugned judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court suffers from infirmity, the order granting the application under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC also suffers from illegality for one or more reasons. The Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC provides as under: "27. Production of additional evidence in Appellate Court:-(1) The parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the Appellate Court. But if:- (a) the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted, or (aa) the party seeking to produce additional evidence, establishes that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence such evidence was not within his knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due diligence, be produced by him at the time when the decree appealed against was passed, or] (b) the Appellate Court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause, the Appellate Court may allow such evidence or document to be produced, or witness to be examined. (2) Wherever additional evidence is allowed to be produced by an Appellate Court, the Court shall record the reason for its admission." 30. A bare perusal of the impugned judgment would show that the First Appellate Court has granted the application under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC simply stating that since the issue relating to will has been answered in negative and since the question of title of suit house is not clear, therefore, for due execution and attestation of will an opportunity is required to be given to the respondent/plaintiff to adduce evidence. The Appellate Court may permit additional evidence only and only, if the conditions laid down in Rule 27(b) of Order 41 CPC are satisfied to the Court. This rule will not apply, when, on the basis of evidence on record, the Appellate Court can pronounce a satisfactory judgment, though it is entirely discretionary. 31. In a recent decision in Union of India Vs. Ibrahim Uddin and another 2013 AIR SCW 2752, while dealing with an application under Order XLI Rule 27 of CPC, the Supreme Court has held as under:- "26. The Appellate Court should not, ordinarily allow new evidence to be adduced in order to enable a party to raise a new point in appeal. Similarly, where a party on whom the onus of proving a certain point lies fails to discharge the onus, he is not entitled to a fresh opportunity to produce evidence, as the Court can, in such a case, pronounce judgment against him and does not require any additional evidence to enable it to pronounce judgment. (Vide Haji Mohammed Ishaq Wd. S.K. Mohammed & Ors. v. Mohamed Iqbal and Mohamed Ali and Co., AIR 1978 SC 798 ). 27. Under Order XLI, Rule 27 CPC, the appellate Court has the power to allow a document to be produced and a witness to be examined. But the requirement of the said court must be limited to those cases where it found it necessary to obtain such evidence for enabling it to pronounce judgment. This provision does not entitle the appellate Court to let in fresh evidence at the appellate stage where even without such evidence it can pronounce judgment in a case. It does not entitle the appellate court to let in fresh evidence only for the purpose of pronouncing judgment in a particular way. This provision does not entitle the appellate Court to let in fresh evidence at the appellate stage where even without such evidence it can pronounce judgment in a case. It does not entitle the appellate court to let in fresh evidence only for the purpose of pronouncing judgment in a particular way. In other words, it is only for removing a lacuna in the evidence that the appellate court is empowered to admit additional evidence. [Vide: Lala Pancham Ors. (supra)]. 28. It is not the business of the Appellate Court to supplement the evidence adduced by one party or the other in the lower Court. Hence, in the absence of satisfactory reasons for the non-production of the evidence in the trial court, additional evidence should not be admitted in appeal as a party guilty of remissness in the lower court is not entitled to the indulgence of being allowed to give further evidence under this rule. So a party who had ample opportunity to produce certain evidence in the lower court but failed to do so or elected not to do so, cannot have it admitted in appeal. (Vide: State of U.P. Vs. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava, AIR 1957 SC 912 ; and S. Rajagopal Vs. C.M. Armugam & Ors., AIR 1969 SC 101 ). 29. The inadvertence of the party or his inability to understand the legal issues involved or the wrong advice of a pleader or the negligence of a pleader or that the party did not realise the importance of a document does not constitute a " substantial cause" within the meaning of this rule. The mere fact that certain evidence is important, is not in itself a sufficient ground for admitting that evidence in appeal." 32. In my considered opinion, the First Appellate Court has failed to consider and meet the twin requirements of Order 27 Rule 1(b) of CPC as neither it has been held that for the purpose of pronouncing judgment fresh opportunity of adducing evidence is required to be granted to the respondent/plaintiff nor it has been held, when evidence has been taken by the First Appellate Court so imperfectly, that the Appellate Court can not pass a satisfactory judgment and same comes 'within' the meaning of "for any substantial cause" as provided in Order 41 Rule 27 (b) of CPC. 33. 33. Therefore, the impugned judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court in Civil Appeal No. 113-A/2012 and Civil Appeal No. 83-A/2012, making wholesale and open remand in exercise of its power under Order 41 Rule 23-A of CPC, deserve to be and are accordingly set-aside. The order of the First Appellate Court granting application under Order 41 Rule 27 read with Section 151 of CPC also cannot be sustained and is hereby set-aside. 34. Resultantly, the judgment and decree dated 08.03.2013 passed in Civil Appeal No. 113-A/2012 (Devcharan v. Anish Fulara) and Civil Appeal No. 83-A/2012 (Devcharan v. Ghanshyam Agrawal & Another) by the First Additional District Judge, Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh are hereby set-aside. Both the aforesaid appeals are restored to the original file of the said Court. The Appellate Court shall hear both the civil appeals and while hearing, if it feels that the respondent/plaintiff has made out a case for reception of additional evidence after rendering a specific finding, it shall record evidence and mark the documents and shall thereafter, considering the judgment and decree of the trial court, dispose of the appeals one way or the other. The application under Order 41 Rule 27 read with Section 151 of CPC is also restored to its original number for fresh consideration and disposal in accordance with law. 35. Considering the fact that Civil Suits were filed by the respondent/plaintiff on 03.03.2006, the First Appellate Court is directed to dispose of both the appeals expeditiously preferably within a period of 3 months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this judgment. 36. Parties are directed to appear before the First Appellate Court on 27.11.2013. 37. The original judgment be kept on the record of M.A. No. 30/2013 and a copy thereof be kept on the record of connected M.A. No. 31/2013. 38. Certified copy as per Rules. Case Remanded.