ORDER (Per: HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE) Feeling aggrieved by the order dated 27th March 2012 made by the learned single Judge in CWJC No. 15890 of 2011, the writ petitioner has preferred this Appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent. 2. Pursuant to the Public Notice dated 25th August 2008, the writ petitioner applied for appointment as Panchayat Teacher for Gram Panchayat Suryapura, District – Rohtas. Feeling aggrieved by selection of the respondent no. 9 and his non-selection, the appellant approached the District Teacher Employment Appellate Authority, Rohtas (hereinafter referred to as “the Appellate Authority”) in Case No. 61 of 2011. The authority below held that the respondent no. 9 was more meritorious than the appellant and rejected the challenge by the appellant. The challenge to the order of the Appellate Authority in above CWJC No. 15890 of 2011 has failed before the learned single Judge. Therefore, this Appeal. 3. Learned counsel Mr. Kamal Nayan Chaubey has appeared for the appellant. He has submitted that this Bench, under order dated 25th February 2013 made in L.P.A. No. 683 of 2012 (Abha Kumari vs. The State of Bihar & Ors.), has held that the marks obtained in vocational subjects cannot be included for determining the comparative merits of the candidates. He has submitted that the order of the Appellate Authority runs contrary to the above referred judgment and is not sustainable. He has further submitted that the appellant is governed by the Bihar Panchayat Elementary Teacher (Employment and Service Conditions) Rules, 2006 (hereinafter referred to as “the Rules of 2006”). Rule 9 (v) of the Rules of 2006 provides for preparation of merit list on the basis of percentage of marks obtained at the qualifying examinations. The said Rule 9 (v) further provides for additional 20 marks to be added to the percentage for teaching experience of more than one year acquired by the candidate. He has submitted that if the said 20 marks are added to 51.5 per cent marks obtained by the petitioner, he would receive more marks than the respondent no. 9 and the appellant would be higher than the respondent no. 9 on the merit list. 4. We see no merit in the contentions raised before us. He has submitted that if the said 20 marks are added to 51.5 per cent marks obtained by the petitioner, he would receive more marks than the respondent no. 9 and the appellant would be higher than the respondent no. 9 on the merit list. 4. We see no merit in the contentions raised before us. At first; we must note that what was under consideration in the above referred matter of Abha Kumari was the marks obtained by the concerned candidates in additional / vocational subjects in addition to the marks obtained in the compulsory / optional subjects at the Intermediate examination. It was not a case of a candidate’s undertaking vocational course. 5. As to the vocational course, the Appellate Authority has observed that the State Government has, pursuant to the judgments of this Court dated 18th April 2007 and 11th November 2008, passed a Resolution that the Intermediate certificate in vocational course is equivalent to the Intermediate examination and is a qualification acceptable for appointment as Panchayat Teacher. In the present case, we are not considering the marks obtained in vocational subjects. 6. Second; Rule 9 (v) of the Rules of 2006 employs three different terminologies, namely, “Pratishat” (the percentage)”, “Aank” (the number) and “Medha Aank” (the merit number)”. In our opinion all the three words have a different connotation and have to be read as such. The word “Aank” (number) cannot be read to mean “Pratishat” (percentage). For the teaching experience, what is provided is additional marks and not the percentage as submitted by Mr. Chaubey. We do agree that the said Rule 9 (v) is ambiguous and does not clearly project the Government’s intention. Nevertheless, if we accept the construction put forth by Mr. Chaubey, the result would be catastrophic. We are not inclined to accept the construction which would lead to an anomalous situation. 7. In above view of the matter it is evident that the respondent no. 9 is far higher in merit than the appellant. The appellant’s challenge to his appointment cannot be countenanced. 8. Appeal is dismissed in limine.