Rajiv Sharma & Dr. Satish Chandra, JJ. Heard Mohd. Arif Khan, Senior Advocate, assisted by Mohd. Aslam Khan, learned Counsel for the appellants, Sri Prashant Chandra, Senior Advocate, assisted by Sri Lokendra Kumar Gupta, learned Counsel for the respondent No.6, Sri Shalabh Singh, learned Counsel for the proforma respondent No.8 and Sri Santosh Shukla, learned Counsel for the proforma respondent No.9. 2. Through the instant First Appeal From Order under Order 43 Rule 1(r) of the Code of Civil Procedure [hereinafter referred to as the "CPC"], the plaintiffs/appellants have assailed the judgment and order dated 8.3.2013 passed by the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Malihabad, Lucknow, in Regular Suit No.96 of 2013 :Gulab Vaswani and another Vs. State of U.P. and others, whereby the application preferred by the plaintiffs/appellants under Order XXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC (6Ga) has been rejected. 3. Shorn off unnecessary details the facts of the case are as under : The plaintiffs/appellants have filed a regular suit for perpetual injunction, which was registered as Regular Suit No. 96 of 2003 before the Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division), Lucknow. In the plaint, the stand taken by the plaintiff is to the effect that they are the owner of the property indicated in site map annexed to the plaint marked as ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQ RSTUV, pertaining to the gata no.2225, 2226/7, 2219/12/2 and in this regard, they are placed reliance on the report of Kanoongo in respect to the property in dispute on the spot. It is also pleaded by the plaintiff that Gata No. 2219/12/11 was owned and possessed by one Ram Dayal and his brother Shiv Narayan after the death of Ram Dayal he was succeeded the representatives defendant no. 2 (daughter), Shri Shiv Narayan after his death was succeeded by defendant no. 3 and 4 and defendant no. 2 son died living behind Defendant No. 5 and 6. 4. Cause of action which has been indicated by the plaintiffs in respect of filing of the suit as well as moving of application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 C.P.C. read with Section 151 C.P.C. (marked as paper No. Ga-6) is that they have entered into agreement to sale with same person, with respect to the property situated at Gata No.2219/12/11 and the boundaries have been wrongly shown in the agreement and includes the part of the plaintiff's properties and the defendant nos. 3 to 6 are going to sale the shares of plaintiff in Gata Nos.2225, 2226/7 2219/12/2. Thus, prayer has been made by the plaintiffs in the application under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 read with Section 151 C.P.C. that the defendants may be restrained from raising any construction and interfering in the peaceful possession of the plaintiff in respect to land in dispute. 5. Defendant No. 6-Sri Pankaj Verma filed an objection to the interim injunction application as prayed by the plaintiffs that the detailed of the property is required under Order VII Rule 3 C.P.C. is not pleaded. Further defence has been taken that the total Area of 2219 is 4.739 hectares, out of which, plaintiffs have 3.924 Hectares, whereas the areas are shown as ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOP QRSTUV is about 4.8792 Hectares, which is more than 0.142 Hectares as pleaded in para 34 of the counter Affidavit. 6. The trial Court, after hearing the parties and perusing the records, vide impugned order dated 7.3.2013, rejected the said application for temporary injunction (Ga6). 7. Hence the instant appeal. 8. While assailing the impugned order dated 7.3.2013, Mohd. Arif Khan, Senior Advocate, appearing on behalf of the appellants has submitted that the Court below, despite recording a specific finding based on the appreciation of the evidence on record that the appellants are in possession over the land in dispute, has erred in refusing to grant injunction. He further submits that the Court below has also failed to consider the fact that necessary ingredient for granting temporary injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC exists in favour of the plaintiffs in the present case insofar as no suit having been filed by the respondents for possession with the allegations that the appellants have encroached upon the land belonging to the respondents and the Court below without there being any positive evidence on record has erred in law declining to grant injunction as prayed for. 9. Elaborating his submission, Sri Khan has submitted that while deciding the application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 CPC for grant of an ad interim injunction, the Court below would not hold mini trial. Therefore, the order impugned dated 7.3.2013, rejecting the temporary injunction, is vitiated in law. 10. To strengthen his arguments, Sri Khan has relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bruce Vs. Therefore, the order impugned dated 7.3.2013, rejecting the temporary injunction, is vitiated in law. 10. To strengthen his arguments, Sri Khan has relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bruce Vs. Silva Raj and others :1987 (Spp) SCC 161, Maharwal Khewaji Trust (Regd.), Faridkot Vs. Baldev Dass : 2005 (23) LCD 298; this Court's judgment in Kendriya Karmchari Sahkari Grih Nirman Samiti Ltd. Vs. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority : 2009 (27) LCD 185, Som Nath Vs. the Additional District Judge IInd, Muzaffarnagar and another : 1994 R.D. 246; Rahmullah and others Vs. District Judge, Siddharth Nagar and others : 1999 (17) LCD 211, and Anupam Sahkari Avas Samiti Ltd. Vs. Addl. Distt. Judge, Court No.4, Lucknow and another : 2006 (24) LCD 137). 11. Per contra, Sri Prashant Chandra, Senior Advocate, appearing on behalf of the contesting respondents, has submitted that the Court below, after taking into consideration the material facts on record as well as map submitted by kanoongo, had came to the conclusion that plaintiffs/appellants, at the first instance, failed to establish on the basis of evidence that they are entitled for any interim injunction as prayed by them. He submits that while rejecting the application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC, the Court below has recorded a specific finding that no ingredients for granting temporary injunction exists in favour of the plaintiffs. He submits that mater is still to be adjudicated by the Court below. 12. We have heard Counsel for the parties and perused the records. 13. Before adjudicating the matter on merit, we think it appropriate to deal with the provisions of Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 CPC and the circumstances under which the Courts can exercise power and grant temporary or ad interim injunction or reject the same. 14. Rule 1 of Order XXXIX lays down three circumstances where the Courts may grant temporary or interim injunction if the circumstances and facts are proved by affidavit or otherwise. Firstly, where the disputed property is in danger of being wasted, damaged or alienated by any party to the suit or from being fully sold in the execution of a decree; secondly where the defendant threatens or intends to remove or dispose of his property with an intention to defraud his creditor; and thirdly where the defendant threatens to dispossess the plaintiff in relation to the disputed property. On proof of these on affidavits, the Court may pass an order restraining or forbearing the defendant from doing such act of wasting, damaging, alienating , sale, removal or dispossession of the property or restrain the defendant from dispossession the plaintiff from the suit property or causing injury to the plaintiff in relation to the disputed property. 15. Similarly, under Rule 2 of Order XXXIX, the Court may, by an order of temporary or interim injunction, restrain the defendant from committing breach of contract or injury complained of arising out of the same contract. However, while exercising the power under Rule 2, the Court must bear in mind that in case where the performance of a contract is not specifically enforced, damages for such breach would be the proper and adequate relief. Then in such cases injunction may not be granted. The Courts must also bear in mind the provisions of Section 41, particularly clause (e) of the Specific Relief Act, while exercising the power under Rule 2 of the Order XXXIX of the Code. According to this Section, the perpetual injunction could not be granted to restrain the breach of a contract, then in such cases the court may refuse to grant temporary injunction. 16. The principle upon which the jurisdiction can be exercised has been discussed by the author in his book "Kerr on Injunctions". The relevant portion is quoted herein below:- (at pages 410 and 411- Sixth Edition) "The Jurisdiction of the Court by way of interlocutory injunction against breach of covenant or contract being in aid of the legal right, and having for its object the protection of the property from irreparable damage pending the trial of the right, a man who seeks the aid of the Court must be able to show a good prima facie legal title to the right which he asserts. If the right at law under the covenant is clear or fairly made out, and the breach of it is clear or fairly made out, and serious injury is likely to arise from the breach, it is the duty of the Court to interfere before the hearing to restrain the breach. If the right at law under the covenant is clear or fairly made out, and the breach of it is clear or fairly made out, and serious injury is likely to arise from the breach, it is the duty of the Court to interfere before the hearing to restrain the breach. But if the right at law under the covenant is not clear or is not fairly made out, or the breach of it is doubtful and no serious injury can arise to the plaintiff, pending the trial of the right, the case resolves itself into a question of comparative injury, whether the defendant will be more damnified by the injunction being granted or the plaintiff by its being withheld. It is not necessary that the breach in respect of which the interference of the Court is sought should have been actually committed: it is enough that the defendant claims and insists on his right to do the act complained of, although he may not have actually done it. But the Court will not interfere unless it is clear that a breach is intended. The Court will not assume that a man means to violate his agreement." 17. The main object of grant of temporary injunction is to protect the rights of a party pending litigation and also to prevent future injury leaving the matter as far as possible in status quo until the suit is finally heard and the rights of the parties are finally determined. 18. Though various principles have been laid down for the grant of temporary or interim injunction, but the Court must take into consideration three important conditions for the grant of temporary or interim injunction i.e., (i) Prima Facie Case ; (ii) Balance of Convenience ; and (iii) Irreparable Injury 19. So far as first condition i.e. prima facie case is concerned, it is relevant to mention that prima facie case means the plaintiff must, by making positive averments, assert that he has a strong case and a legal right to the property in suit, which has to be preserved and protected. It is not necessary for the plaintiff to prove by evidence. But, at least he must show that he has a strong prima facie case and there is every chance of his success in the case. It is not necessary for the plaintiff to prove by evidence. But, at least he must show that he has a strong prima facie case and there is every chance of his success in the case. Existence of prima facie case is sine qua non for the issuance of an interim injunction, provided the two other conditions namely, balance of convenience and irreparable injury are satisfied. Prima facie case does not mean prima facie title. Prima facie case exists whenever there are issues which need trial and adjudicating. Necessary criteria for establishing a prima facie case is that the plaintiff has to show that he has bonafidely raised a substantial question which needs to be adjudicated at the trial of the suit. 20. So far as second condition i.e. Balance of Convenience is concerned, it is relevant to mention that mere existence of prima facie case is not sufficient for the grant of injunction. The plaintiff must also show that the balance of convenience lies in his favour in grant of injunction. The Court must see that there is a bona fide contest between the parties, and then, in which side the balance of convenience lies, in the event of success, if injunction is not issued, Injunction cannot be granted if balance of convenience is not in favour of the plaintiff. In a nutshell, it is clear that in order to obtain an order of injunction, the party who seeks for grant of injunction has to prove that he had made out a prima facie to go for trial and also the balance of convenience is in his favour. However, when the party fails to prove prima facie case to go for trial then the question of considering balance of convenience does not arise. 21. So far as third condition i.e. Irreparable Injury is concerned, it is relevant to mention that another important ingredient is the proof of irreparable injury. A party who seeks the aid of the Court must also satisfy the Court that its interference is necessary to protect him from the irreparable injury till the legal right claimed by him in the suit is established. The term 'irreparable injury' means such injury, which is a material one and could not be adequately remedied or compensated in terms of money or damages. The term 'irreparable injury' means such injury, which is a material one and could not be adequately remedied or compensated in terms of money or damages. There are, however, certain instances where the injury although can be compensated by damages, yet if such injury totally destroys the subject matter of the suit, then that can be treated as irreparable injury. An injunction can be applied for at any stage of the proceeding. But, no motion should be made without notice to the other side. However, if the Court is satisfied that the delay caused by proceeding in the ordinary way would or might entail irreparable or serious mischief, then in such a case order of ex parte injunction can be passed upon such terms as the Court otherwise thinks fit and proper. 22. From the foregoing discussion, it is manifest that before an order of temporary or interim injunction is passed, a party has to prove the existence of the above three important ingredients. But, ultimately it is for the Court to decide as to whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, it is necessary to protect the property, which is the subject matter of the suit from being damaged. The right of a party with regard to the property could be secured by issuing prohibitory order. 23. As discussed above, where a party moves the Court for grant of injunction under Order XXXIX Rule 1 or 2, plaintiffs have to satisfy the Court that the defendant/opposite party has threatened or intended to remove or dispossess the property or threaten to dispossess him or otherwise cause injury in relation to the property or the property in dispute is in danger of being wasted, damaged or alienated or fully sold in execution of the decree as provided under Rule 1 (a) (b) and (c) of Order XXXIX or the conditions contemplated in Rule 2 of the Code. 24. The question will then arise as to whether the Court in exercise of its inherent power under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot grant temporary injunction or interim injunction in cases not covered under the aforesaid Rule. The matter has been set at rest by the Supreme Court in the decision rendered in Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal ( AIR 1962 SC 527 ). The matter has been set at rest by the Supreme Court in the decision rendered in Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal ( AIR 1962 SC 527 ). Their Lordships held that the Court has inherent jurisdiction to issue temporary injunction in circumstances which are not covered by the provisions of Order XXXIX of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was held that no party has a right to insist on the Court's exercising that jurisdiction. Inherent jurisdiction can be exercised by the Court only when it considers it absolutely necessary for the ends of justice to do so. 25. In the case of Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. & Ors. v. Coca Cola Co. & Ors. AIR 1995 SC 2372, the Supreme Court elaborately discussed the scope and object of Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2. Their Lordships held:- "46. The grant of an interlocutory injunction during the pendency of legal proceedings is a matter requiring the exercise of discretion of the court. While exercising the discretion the court applies the following tests- (i) whether the plaintiff has a prima facie case; (ii) whether the balance of convenience is in favour of the plaintiff; and (iii) whether the plaintiff would suffer an irreparable injury if his prayer for interlocutory injunction is disallowed. The decision whether or not to grant an interlocutory injunction has to be taken at a time when the existence of the legal right assailed by the plaintiff and its alleged violation are both contested and uncertain and remain uncertain till they are established at the trial on evidence. Relief by way of interlocutory injunction is granted to mitigate the risk of injustice to the plaintiff during the period before that uncertainty could be resolved. The object of the interlocutory injunction is to protect the plaintiff against injury by violation of his right for which he could not be adequately compensated in damages recoverable in the action if the uncertainty were resolved in his favour at the trial. The need for such protection has, however, to be weighed against the corresponding need of the defendant to be protected against injury resulting from his having been prevented from exercising his own legal rights for which he could not be adequately compensated. The court must weigh one need against another and determine where the "balance of convenience" lies. The need for such protection has, however, to be weighed against the corresponding need of the defendant to be protected against injury resulting from his having been prevented from exercising his own legal rights for which he could not be adequately compensated. The court must weigh one need against another and determine where the "balance of convenience" lies. [See: Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd. (1990 Supp. SCC 727)." 26. In the case of Kashi Math Samasthan & Anr. Vs. Shrimad Sudhindra Thirtha Swamy & Anr. AIR 2010 SC 296 , the Supreme Court held:- "13. It is well settled that in order to obtain an order of injunction, the party who seek for grant of such injunction has to prove that he has made out a prima facie case to go for trial, the balance of convenience is also in his favour and he will suffer irreparable loss and injury if injunction is not granted. But it is equally well settled that when a party fails to prove prima facie case to go for trial, question of considering the balance of convenience or irreparable loss and injury to the party concerned would not be material at all, that is to say, if that party fails to prove prima facie case to go for trial, it is not open to the court to grant injunction in his favour even if, he has made out a case of balance of convenience being in his favour and would suffer irreparable loss and injury if no injunction order is granted. Therefore, keeping this principle in mind, let us now see whether the appellant has been able to prove prima facie case to get an order of injunction during the pendency of the two appeals in the High Court." 27. In view of the above settled position of law for grant of temporary injunction, the same can be granted only on being satisfied that the ingredients of Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 of CPC, e.g. prima facie case, balance of convenience and suffer irreparable loss should extent in favour of the plaintiff. 28. In view of the above settled position of law for grant of temporary injunction, the same can be granted only on being satisfied that the ingredients of Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 of CPC, e.g. prima facie case, balance of convenience and suffer irreparable loss should extent in favour of the plaintiff. 28. In the instant case, the trial Court has given a finding that none of the aforesaid ingredients exist in favour of the plaintiffs, while rejecting the appellants' application for temporary injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of CPC and given a categorical finding that the main dispute is with respect to the positioning of Gata No. 2219 and plaintiffs failed to establish the identify and the correct position, as there is conflict in the map of 1958 of Kanoongo and map annexed as Annexure A alongwith plaint. Further a finding has also been given by the Court below that the Gata Nos. 2225, 2226/7 have no where been indicated, there is discrepancies/difference between the map and Annexure no. A annexed with plaint as the area of 2219 is 4.739 hectares. Plaintiffs have 3.924 Hectares and ABCDEFGHIJKLMN OPQRSTUV is about 4.8792 Hectares, which is more than 0.142. Accordingly, the trial Court came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs have failed to establish the situation and position of gata numbers. In the matter in dispute, thus, the plaintiffs have failed to prove its case prima facie in order to obtain relief of interim injunction as they failed to indicate the details to identify the gata numbers in dispute as per provisions under Order VII Rule 3 of CPC. 29. Looking to the aforesaid findings, it appears that prima facie, the reasons given by the Trial Court in rejecting the prayer made in the injunction application has been germane and the same has rightly been passed by learned trial Court, after considering the materials on record in proper perspective. Thus, we are of the considered opinion that there is nothing to interfere with the said order of rejection of the prayer of temporary injunction. 30. For the aforesaid reasons, the appeal lacks merit is hereby dismissed. 31. However, we hope and trust that the trial Court will make earnest endeavour in deciding Regular Suit No.96 of 2013, in accordance with law, expeditiously. 32. There is no order to costs. _____________