JUDGMENT : 1. The writ petition is filed seeking a direction for payment of arrears of salary and all service benefits to the petitioners for the period from 27/07/2007 till their respective dates of retirement from the service of first respondent Corporation. 2. The facts involved in the case would disclose that the petitioners were Officers working in the 1st respondent Corporation and while they were in service, the retirement age of the employees in the Corporation was on attaining the age of 55 years. The Board of Directors of the Corporation by resolution dated 26/02/2004 decided to enhance the retirement age of employees of the Corporation from 55 to 58 years. The Government rejected the said proposal and though a representation was submitted, the same also came to be rejected. Petitioners and certain other persons filed writ petitions before this Court as W.P.C.No.28219 of 2005 and connected cases which were disposed by judgment dated 18/07/2007 declaring that the employees of the Corporation was entitled to continue in service till they attain the age of 58 years. Ext.P1 is the said judgment. There was also a direction to re-induct all those persons who retired after the filing of the writ petition and allowed them to continue till the age of 58 years. Petitioners were persons who retired during the pendency of the writ petition and according to them, they were eligible to be reappointed by virtue of the judgment. 3. The Corporation as well as the State Government filed appeals before the Division Bench and during the pendency of the appeal, the Government decided to enhance the retirement age of the employees of the first respondent Corporation from 55 years to 58 years. Ext.P2 is the said Government Order dated 01/03/2011. On 15/03/2011, the Division Bench dismissed the Writ Appeals taking note of the order passed by the Government Ext.P3 is the said judgment. 4. The 1st petitioner completed 55 years on 31/01/2006. He continued in employment by way of an interim order dated 09/12/2005. The interim order was vacated on 22/2/2006 and he retired on 23/2/2006. The second petitioner retired on 31/03/2006 and the 3rd petitioner retired on 31/08/2006. 5. 4. The 1st petitioner completed 55 years on 31/01/2006. He continued in employment by way of an interim order dated 09/12/2005. The interim order was vacated on 22/2/2006 and he retired on 23/2/2006. The second petitioner retired on 31/03/2006 and the 3rd petitioner retired on 31/08/2006. 5. Petitioners’ complaint is that though there was a direction by the learned Single Judge in Ext.P1 judgment to re-induct those persons who had retired from service till they attain the age of 58 years and the petitioners demanded re-induction by way of a representation, the Division Bench granted an interim order in an appeal filed by the Corporation on 19/09/2007. The said appeal was dismissed on 05/10/2007. The State Government also filed a Writ Appeal against Ext.P1 judgment. The Division Bench referred the Writ Appeal filed by the State Government to the Full Bench. At that time, the Corporation filed a review petition against the dismissal of their Writ Appeal which was allowed recalling the judgment dated 05/10/2007. The Full Bench declined to interfere in the matter and observed that the Appeals were to be heard by the Division Bench. Though an attempt was made by the petitioners to take contempt of court proceedings against non-compliance of Ext.P1 judgment, the same came to be rejected due to the pendency of the appeals before the Full Bench. 6. It is therefore the contention of the petitioners that they were deliberately kept out of employment after the judgment of the learned Single Judge who directed to re-induct the retired persons till they attained the age of 58 years. Though the writ appeals were filed, the same came to be dismissed on account of the Government having sanctioned the change of retirement age as per Ext.P2 order dated 01/03/2011. The contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that when the appeals have been dismissed without considering the correctness of the judgment of the learned Single Judge, the said judgment at Ext.P1 stands confirmed. The contention is that non- compliance of the directions issued in the said judgment of the learned Single Judge resulted in the petitioners not working in the Corporation in their respective posts and thereby they were denied the salary legally due to them. Petitioners therefore submitted various representations at Exts.P10 to P12 to the Corporation which was unattended and hence the writ petition is field. 7. Petitioners therefore submitted various representations at Exts.P10 to P12 to the Corporation which was unattended and hence the writ petition is field. 7. Statement is filed by the first respondent denying the obligation to pay any salary on the principle that the petitioners have not worked for the Corporation and therefore they were not entitled for any salary. It is further indicated that in so far as no action was taken by the petitioners to get re-inducted in service during the pendency of the Writ Appeals, having not worked in that capacity, they cannot make any such claim. According to the respondents, the petitioners were not re-inducted because of the stay granted by the Division Bench in W.A.No.2294 of 2007. It is further contended that the Division Bench passed an interim order on 26/06/2009 directing that as long as the employees are continuing in service they shall be paid the basic wages. According to the respondent, the request made by the petitioners were considered and rejected by way of Ext.R1 (a), R1(b) and R1(c). 8. The learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon the following judgments in order to support the arguments. (i) South Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. State of M.P., (2003) 8 SCC 648 ) Reference is made to paragraphs 26 and 27 which reads as under: “26. In our opinion, the principle of restitution takes care of this submission. The word “restitution” in its etymological sense means restoring to a party on the modification, variation or reversal of a decree or order, what has been lost to him in execution of decree or order of the court or in direct consequence of a decree or order (see Zafar Khan v. Board of Revenue, U.P.) In law, the term “restitution” is used in three senses: (i) return or restoration of some specific thing to its rightful owner or status; (ii) compensation for benefits derived from a wrong done to another; and (iii) compensation or reparation for the loss caused to another. (See Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th Edn., p. 1315). The Law of Contracts by John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo has been quoted by Black to say that “restitution” is an ambiguous term, sometimes referring to the disgorging of something which has been taken and at times referring to compensation for injury done: “Often, the result under either meaning of the term would be the same. The Law of Contracts by John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo has been quoted by Black to say that “restitution” is an ambiguous term, sometimes referring to the disgorging of something which has been taken and at times referring to compensation for injury done: “Often, the result under either meaning of the term would be the same. Unjust impoverishment as well as unjust enrichment is a ground for restitution. If the defendant is guilty of a non-tortious misrepresentation, the measure of recovery is not rigid but, as in other cases of restitution, such factors as relative fault, the agreed-upon risks, and the fairness of alternative risk allocations not agreed upon and not attributable to the fault of either party need to be weighed.” The principle of restitution has been statutorily recognized in Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Section 144 CPC speaks not only of a decree being varied, reversed, set aside or modified but also includes an order on a par with a decree. The scope of the provision is wide enough so as to include therein almost all the kinds of variation, reversal, setting aside or modification of a decree or order. The interim order passed by the court merges into a final decision. The validity of an interim order, passed in favour of a party, stands reversed in the event of a final decision going against the party successful at the interim stage. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, the successful party at the end would be justified with all expediency in demanding compensation and being placed in the same situation in which it would have been if the interim order would not have been passed against it. The successful party can demand (a) the delivery of benefit earned by the opposite party under the interim order of the court, or (b) to make restitution for what it has lost; and it is the duty of the court to do so unless it feels that in the facts and on the circumstances of the case, the restitution far from meeting the ends of justice, would rather defeat the same. Undoing the effect of an interim order by resorting to principles of restitution is an obligation of the party, who has gained by the interim order of the court, so as to wipe out the effect of the interim order passed which, in view of the reasoning adopted by the court at the stage of final decision, the court earlier would not or ought not to have passed. There is nothing wrong in an effort being made to restore the parties to the same position in which they would have been if the interim order would not have existed. 27. Section 144 CPC is not the fountain source of restitution, it is rather a statutory recognition of a pre-existing rule of justice, equity and fair play. That is why it is often held that even away from Section 144 the court has inherent jurisdiction to order restitution so as to do complete justice between the parties. In Jai Berham v. Kedar Nath Marwari Their Lordships of the Privy Council said: (AIR p. 271) “It is the duty of the court under Section 144 of the Civil Procedure Code to ‘place the parties in the position which they would have occupied, but for such decree or such part thereof as has been varied or reversed’. Nor indeed does this duty or jurisdiction arise merely under the said section. It is inherent in the general jurisdiction of the court to act rightly and fairly according to the circumstances towards all parties involved.” Cairns, L.C. said in Rodger v. Comptoir D’Escompte de Paris: (ER p. 125) “One of the first and highest duties of all courts is to take care that the act of the court does no injury to any of the suitors, and when the expression, ‘the act of the court’ is used, it does not mean merely the act of the primary court, or of any intermediate court of appeal, but the act of the court as a whole, from the lowest court which entertains jurisdiction over the matter up to the highest court which finally disposes of the case.” This is also on the principle that a wrong order should not be perpetuated by keeping it alive and respecting it (A. Arunagiri Nadar v. S.P. Rathinasami). In the exercise of such inherent power the courts have applied the principles of restitution to myriad situations not strictly falling within the terms of Section 144.” (ii) Karnataka Rare Earth v. Senior Geologist, Deptt. of Mines & Geology, (2004) 2 SCC 783 ). Reference is made to paragraphs 9 and 10 of the judgments which reads as under: “9. It is true that by the interim orders passed by this Court the appellants were allowed during the pendency of the earlier appeals to operate under the mining leases, whether freshly granted or renewed and to effectuate the interim orders the authorities were also directed to issue transport permits. Admittedly, the transport permits were obtained by the appellants after the dismissal of their appeals. The appellants claim that both the parties were ignorant of the dismissal of the appeals when the transport permits were issued and the granite blocks were exported. It is difficult to accept the plea of the appellants that the dismissal of the appeals was not in their knowledge inasmuch as the judgments must have been pronounced in an open court and their counsel at Delhi must have gathered the knowledge thereof. In any case the appellants cannot be heard taking shelter behind their own convenient ignorance. In our opinion, whether they had the knowledge of the judgment or not and whether the transport permits were obtained by the appellants before the dismissal of the appeals during which the interim orders were in operation or after the dismissal of the appeals when the interim orders had ceased 13 to operate would not make any difference. For the purposes of the law it is enough that the appellants have enjoyed the benefit under the interim orders of the Court which have stood vacated with the dismissal of their appeals. It is also noteworthy that this Court had not, in the earlier appeals, directed the judgment of the High Court to remain stayed in its entirety and this is an additional factor which tells adversely on the appellants. 10. In South Eastern Coalfields Ltd. this Court dealt with the effect on the rights of the parties who have acted bona fide, protected by interim orders of the court and incurred rights and obligations while the interim orders stood vacated or reversed at the end. 10. In South Eastern Coalfields Ltd. this Court dealt with the effect on the rights of the parties who have acted bona fide, protected by interim orders of the court and incurred rights and obligations while the interim orders stood vacated or reversed at the end. The Court referred to the doctrine of actus curiae neminem gravabit and held that the doctrine was not confined in its application only to such acts of the court which were erroneous; the doctrine is applicable to all such acts as to which it can be held that the court would not have so acted had it been correctly apprised of the facts and the law. It is the principle of restitution which is attracted. When on account of an act of the party, persuading the court to pass an order, which at the end is held as not sustainable, has resulted in one party gaining advantage which it would not have otherwise earned, or the other party has suffered an impoverishment which it would not have suffered but for the order of the court and the act of such party, then the successful party finally held entitled to a relief, assessable in terms of money at the end of the litigation, is entitled to be compensated in the same manner in which the parties would have been if the interim order of the court would not have been passed. The successful party can demand: (a) The delivery of benefit earned by the opposite party under the interim order of the court, or (b) to make restitution for what it has lost. (iii) Commissioner, Karnataka Housing Board v. C. Muddaiah, (2007) 7 SCC 689 ). Reference is made to paragraphs 31 and 34 which reads as under: 31. Bare reading of the above order makes it more than clear that the salary to be paid to the writ petitioner was from 27-10-1997 to 28-2-1998. It was expressly stated that the writ petitioner would not be entitled to arrears of pay and allowances for any earlier period “since he has not actually worked in the cadre of Superintendents and Assistant Revenue Officers”. It is thus obvious that in spite of clear direction issued by a competent court, no payment was made and an express order was passed to the effect that the writ petitioner would not be entitled to pay as he had not worked. It is thus obvious that in spite of clear direction issued by a competent court, no payment was made and an express order was passed to the effect that the writ petitioner would not be entitled to pay as he had not worked. The writ petitioner, therefore, had legitimate grievance against such direction. A fresh substantive petition, hence, could be filed by him and since he was entitled to such relief, the Division Bench was justified in granting the prayer. 32. We are of the considered opinion that once a direction is issued by a competent court, it has to be obeyed and implemented without any reservation. If an order passed by a court of law is not complied with or is ignored, there will be an end of the rule of law. If a party against whom such order is made has grievance, the only remedy available to him is to challenge the order by taking appropriate proceedings known to law. But it cannot be made ineffective by not complying with the directions on a specious plea that no such directions could have been issued by the court. In our judgment, upholding of such argument would result in chaos and confusion and would seriously affect and impair administration of justice. The argument of the Board, therefore, has no force and must be rejected. 33. The matter can be looked at from another angle also. It is true that while granting a relief in favour of a party, the court must consider the relevant provisions of law and issue appropriate directions keeping in view such provisions. There may, however, be cases where on the facts and in the circumstances, the court may issue necessary directions in the larger interest of justice keeping in view the principles of justice, equity and good conscience. Take a case, where ex facie injustice has been meted out to an employee. In spite of the fact that he is entitled to certain benefits, they had not been given to him. His representations have been illegally and unjustifiably turned down. He finally approaches a court of law. The court is convinced that gross injustice has been done to him and he was wrongfully, unfairly and with oblique motive deprived of those benefits. In spite of the fact that he is entitled to certain benefits, they had not been given to him. His representations have been illegally and unjustifiably turned down. He finally approaches a court of law. The court is convinced that gross injustice has been done to him and he was wrongfully, unfairly and with oblique motive deprived of those benefits. The court, in the circumstances, directs the authority to extend all benefits which he would have obtained had he not been illegally deprived of them. Is it open to the authorities in such case to urge that as he has not worked (but held to be illegally deprived), he would not be granted the benefits? Upholding of such plea would amount to allowing a party to take undue advantage of his own wrong. It would perpetrate injustice rather than doing justice to the person wronged. 34. We are conscious and mindful that even in absence of statutory provision, normal rule is “no work no pay”. In appropriate cases, however, a court of law may, nay must, take into account all the facts in their entirety and pass an appropriate order in consonance with law. The court, in a given case, may hold that the person was willing to work but was illegally and unlawfully not allowed to do so. The court may in the circumstances, direct the authority to grant him all benefits considering “as if he had worked”. It, therefore, cannot be contended as an absolute proposition of law that no direction of payment of consequential benefits can be granted by a court of law and if such directions are issued by a court, the authority can ignore them even if they had been finally confirmed by the Apex Court of the country (as has been done in the present case). The bald contention of the appellant Board, therefore, has no substance and must be rejected. (iv) Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania, (2010) 9 SCC 437 ) Reference is made to paragraphs 15 to 19 which reads as under: 15. No litigant can derive any benefit from the mere pendency of a case in a court of law, as the interim order always merges into the final order to be passed in the case and if the case is ultimately dismissed, the interim order stands nullified automatically. No litigant can derive any benefit from the mere pendency of a case in a court of law, as the interim order always merges into the final order to be passed in the case and if the case is ultimately dismissed, the interim order stands nullified automatically. A party cannot be allowed to take any benefit of his own wrongs by getting an interim order and thereafter blame the court. The fact that the case is found, ultimately, devoid of any merit, or the party withdrew the writ petition, shows that a frivolous writ petition had been filed. The maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit, which means that the act of the court shall prejudice no one, becomes applicable in such a case. In such a situation the court is under an obligation to undo the wrong done to a party by the act of the court. Thus, any undeserved or unfair advantage gained by a party invoking the jurisdiction of the court must be neutralised, as the institution of litigation cannot be permitted to confer any advantage on a party by the delayed action of the court. (Vide A.R. Sircar (Dr.) v. State of U.P., Shiv Shankar v. U.P. SRTC, Arya Nagar Inter College v. Sree Kumar Tiwary, GTC Industries Ltd. v. Union of India and Jaipur Municipal Corpn. v. C.L. Mishra.) 16. In Ram Krishna Verma v. State of U.P. this Court examined the issue while placing reliance upon its earlier judgment in Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. ITO and held that no person can suffer from the act of the court and in case an interim order has been passed and the petitioner takes advantage thereof, and ultimately the petition stands dismissed, the interest of justice requires that any undeserved or unfair advantage gained by a party invoking the jurisdiction of the court must be neutralised. A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Mahadeo Savlaram Shelke v. Pune Municipal Corpn. 9. The main contention urged by the petitioners claiming salary is on the premise that when the Appeals were dismissed the interim order is vacated. The correctness of the judgment of the learned Single Judge was not considered by the Division Bench and the Appeals were dismissed thereby confirming the judgment of the learned Single Judge. 9. The main contention urged by the petitioners claiming salary is on the premise that when the Appeals were dismissed the interim order is vacated. The correctness of the judgment of the learned Single Judge was not considered by the Division Bench and the Appeals were dismissed thereby confirming the judgment of the learned Single Judge. If that be the situation, the petitioners were not given the benefit of continuing in service despite the direction issued by the learned Single Judge. Hence the petitioners have been put to an unfair disadvantage by denying an opportunity to work in the Corporation by filing an appeal and obtaining an interim order. The argument is that Ext.P2 has application only with effect from the date of the said order. But those persons who were already in service at the time when Ext.P1 judgment was passed was permitted to continue and they were paid their wages also. In respect of persons who retired during the pendency of the writ petition, the learned Single Judge though directed them to be re-inducted, the same was not done by the Corporation based on the interim order in the Writ Appeal. Therefore according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, this is an instance where they were prevented from being re-inducted into service by filing an appeal and getting an interim order which was later dismissed. This situation is apparently a wrong done to the petitioners due to intervention of Court which requires to be corrected and that it can be corrected only by placing the petitioners in a position as if they have worked in the Company during the relevant time. 10. No doubt the petitioners were not in a position to get the benefit of the judgment of the learned Single Judge as no orders were passed by the Corporation for re-inducting them. But the fact remains that the Appellate court had granted a stay of operation of the judgment as a result of which the re-induction of the petitioners could not take place. By the time the appeals were dismissed, they had already covered the age of superannuation even as per the judgment of the learned Single Judge. Therefore the re- induction of the petitioners could not take place on account of the fact that there was a stay of proceedings. By the time the appeals were dismissed, they had already covered the age of superannuation even as per the judgment of the learned Single Judge. Therefore the re- induction of the petitioners could not take place on account of the fact that there was a stay of proceedings. The petitioners were also parties to the proceedings of this Court, but they did not choose to get the stay vacated or get a positive direction from this Court to reappoint them or re- induct them into service. Now they are seeking salary as damages for the period upto which they were kept out of employment. The principle of no work no pay is well accepted. Therefore the question is whether without working in the capacity as Officers of the Corporation, a direction could be issued to the Corporation to pay salary to the petitioners. It cannot be stated that the Corporation was at fault in not reappointing them. They have passed a resolution to increase the retirement age which was not sanctioned by the Government. It was only by virtue of Ext.P1 judgment that the retirement age was directed to be enhanced. It cannot be stated that the Corporation should not file an appeal. That being the reason, filing an appeal and getting a stay cannot work out to the disadvantage of the petitioners. 11. The contention that the petitioners could not derive an advantage out of the judgment is possibly correct on account of the fact that there was a stay of proceedings. But that cannot be attributed to the respondents. The State has preferred an appeal and the matter was pending before this Court. From the point of view of the State, enhancement in the retirement age had come into effect when Ext.P2 order is passed. It might be true that certain persons did not get advantage of the judgment. But several persons who did not attain the age of superannuation during the pendency of the writ petition had derived an advantage out of the judgment and continued in service. 12. The question raised by the petitioner can be answered only with reference to the judgments relied upon. But several persons who did not attain the age of superannuation during the pendency of the writ petition had derived an advantage out of the judgment and continued in service. 12. The question raised by the petitioner can be answered only with reference to the judgments relied upon. In South Eastern Coalfields Ltd.(Supra), the Supreme Court, while considering the principle of restitution observed that if an interim order is passed by a court merges into a final decision and the interim order so passed stands reversed in the final decision against the party successful at the interim stage, unless the court otherwise directs the successful party would be justified with all expediency in demanding compensation and being placed in the same situation in which he would have been if the interim order was not passed against him. The situation in the present case is almost similar to the said observations of the Supreme Court. In that case, Supreme Court further observed that an effort should be made to restore the parties to the same position in which they would have been if the interim order would not have existed. 13. Similar view is expressed by the Supreme Court in Karnataka Rare Earth (Supra) wherein it is held that if the appellant had enjoyed the benefit under the interim orders of the Court which stood vacated with the dismissal of the appeals, the appellants having enjoyed the benefit of the interim order cannot turn round and contend that they were not aware of the disposal of the appeals. In the said decision, the Supreme Court also relied upon the judgment of the South Eastern Coalfields Ltd (Supra). 14. In Commissioner, Karnataka Housing Board (Supra), the Supreme Court had made a distinction between the normal rule of ‘no work no pay’ with reference to cases where there was prevention in doing the work. It is found that in appropriate cases, the Court must take into account all the facts in their entirety and pass appropriate orders in consonance with law. In a given case, the Court could hold that the person was willing to work but was illegally and unlawfully not allowed to do the work. In such circumstances, the Court can direct the authority to grant him all the benefits as if he had worked. 15. In a given case, the Court could hold that the person was willing to work but was illegally and unlawfully not allowed to do the work. In such circumstances, the Court can direct the authority to grant him all the benefits as if he had worked. 15. In Kalabharati Advertising (Supra), the Supreme Court had relied upon the maxim actus curiae neminem grababite thereby mean that the act of the court shall prejudice no one. The proposition laid down in the case is that, where the party to the case obtains an advantage by virtue of an interim order and later does not prosecute the case and by virtue of the said interim order if the successful party suffers a loss necessarily the said loss can be compensated. 16. Taking the view expressed by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgments, I am of the view that this is a fit case in which, the factual circumstances involved would show that the petitioners were denied the benefit which they have really obtained by virtue of Ext.P1 judgment, by the action of the respondents in filing the appeal, obtaining an interim order and later not prosecuting the appeal. No attempt was made by the respondents to get a decision in their favour in the Writ Appeal judgment. The same was simply withdrawn without any reservation regarding the rights that accrued to the petitioners with reference to the judgment of the learned Single Judge at Ext.P1. Hence the respondents are liable to compensate the petitioners in that regard. 17. The next question is the quantum of compensation. Having regard to the factual circumstances involved in the matter, I do not think that payment of the entire salary with all necessary perks will be a just compensation since apparently the petitioners did not work during the relevant time and that apart, there was an interim order which prevented the respondent Corporation from appointing them and the petitioners were not successful in getting the interim order vacated during the period when they attained the age of 58 years. That apart, the judgment of the learned Single Judge had come at a stage when they were already retired from service and it was a case where one has to look into the question whether the judgment was complied with in the light of the said factual circumstances. 18. That apart, the judgment of the learned Single Judge had come at a stage when they were already retired from service and it was a case where one has to look into the question whether the judgment was complied with in the light of the said factual circumstances. 18. As I have already held, there is justification on the part of the petitioners in claiming compensation; but the demand for entire salary may not be a right approach. Normally, this is a case which has to be adjudicated by a Civil court as it is a matter of proof regarding the quantum of compensation. However, taking into consideration the plight of the petitioners who are retired personnels during 2006, I am of the view that the compensation can be fixed at 25% of the last drawn salary which the petitioners were entitled to as on their effective date of retirement, from 27/07/2007, the date of Ext.P1 judgment till their date of completion of 58 years. This process may be completed by the 1st respondent within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. The Writ petition is hence allowed as follows: (i) The 1st respondent shall pay the petitioners 25% of their last drawn salary as compensation from 27/07/2007 till the date of their completing the age of 58 years. (ii) The payment shall be made within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment.

Krishnan v. Kerala Forest Development Corporation Ltd.