Judgment :- 1. I.A.No.1/2013 is filed by Sri Upendra Nayak, one of the elected members of the Udupi Zilla Panchayat. There is no opposition to the said application. Accordingly, I.A. No. 1/2013 is allowed. The applicant is permitted to be impleaded as respondent No.3 to the petition. Amendment be carried out forthwith. 2. The petitioner is assailing the action of respondent No.2 in issuing the notice dated 21.12.2012 convening the meeting for the election to the post of Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha of the Udupi Zilla Panchayat by scheduling the meeting to be held on 04.01.2013 at 11 a.m. 3. The case put forth by Sri Shashikiran Shetty, learned counsel for the petitioner is that the notice impugned herein is contrary to the directions issued by this Court in W.P.Nos.41546-41547/2012 disposed of on 15.11.2012. In that regard, a perusal of the order passed by this Court would indicate that a direction had been issued by this Court to respondent No.2 therein to proceed further from Rule 3 (c) stage and conclude the election in accordance with law. The said order came to be passed by this Court when the petitioner herein along with another had approached this Court assailing the action of respondent No.2 in postponing the meeting which had been convened on 04.10.2012 for want of quorum. This Court while accepting the contention put forth was of the view that the meeting had not reached Rule 3(e) stage and therefore, the question of adjourning the meeting for want of quorum did not arise and therefore, directed that the meeting be proceeded from Rule 3 (c) stage. It is in that context, it is necessary for this Court to consider the ambit of the proceedings as contemplated to be held from Rule 3 (c) stage. 4. In that regard, Sri Shashikiran Shetty, learned counsel would contend that as on the date when the meeting had been convened earlier i.e., on 04.10.2012, only nine members were present in the said meeting which was also the position when it was adjourned for want of quorum. Therefore, the direction issued by this Court to continue from Rule 3 (c) stage would mean that the said nine members only would be entitled to participate in the meeting to be convened. Therefore, the direction issued by this Court to continue from Rule 3 (c) stage would mean that the said nine members only would be entitled to participate in the meeting to be convened. It is therefore contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned notice issued to all the members is contrary to the direction issued by this Court and by such action, respondent No.2 has enlarged scope of consideration for elections to the post of Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha by altering the situation of Rule 3(c) stage which existed at the earlier instance when the meeting was postponed and had been directed by this Court to continue from the said stage. 5. To buttress the contention put forth, the learned counsel would make reference to Rule 3(a) upto (e) contained in the Karnataka Panchayath Raj (Election of Zilla Panchayath Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha (Rules) 1994 ('Rules' for short). In that context, it is contended by the learned counsel that the present notice would violate not only the requirement of the Rules, but also the order passed by this Court. 6. Sri K.M. Nataraj, learned Additional Advocate General and Sri Chandranath Ariga, learned counsel for respondent No.3 would however seek to sustain the action of respondent No.2. The learned counsel would also refer to the said Rules and would point out that at the stage as contained in Rule 3 (c) it only contemplates the scrutiny of the nominations for the post of Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha. On scrutiny of the application, if there are more than one candidate for the post, it would still be open for any of the candidates to withdraw from the contest as provided under Rule 3(d). It is only after the said process is over, the procedure as contemplated under Rule 3(e) would commence and therefore on perusing Rule 3(e) (4) read with proviso, it would be clear that the members who would be entitled to vote in the election are the members who would be present when the meeting commences after the process of withdrawal of the nominations is complete and the number of members present earlier will not be relevant. Therefore, if that process is to commence pursuant to the order passed by this Court, even though this Court has indicated that the procedure would commence from the Rule 3(c) stage, all the members would be entitled to participate in the meeting after the process of withdrawal of nominations are over. Therefore, in any event, all the members were required to be notified as they were required to be present for the purpose of voting if it becomes necessary. The learned Additional Advocate General therefore contended that respondent No.2 after taking into consideration this aspect of the matter and having made a detailed discussion has come to the appropriate conclusion and the same does not call for interference. 7. In the light of the rival contentions and keeping in view the fact that the parties were before this Court in the earlier proceedings in a circumstance when the meeting had been postponed and this Court had directed that the proceedings would commence from Rule 3(c) stage, the only question for consideration by this Court is as to the correct understanding of the stage which the proceedings is to progress and the manner in which the meeting is to be held from the stage it was postponed. 8. As already noticed, Rule 3(a) of the Rules would provide that the nominations are to be made to the posts of Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha two hours prior to the commencement of the meeting. It is thereafter the position as provided in Rule 3 (c) would arise with regard to the scrutiny of the nominations. If this aspect is kept in view, from the earlier order of this Court, it would be clear that the meeting would have to commence from the stage of scrutiny of the nominations. Thereafter there would also be opportunity for such of the nominees/candidates whose nomination is found to be in order to withdraw from the contest as provided under Rule 3(d) of the Rules. If this aspect of the matter is also kept in perspective, the direction issued by this Court would only mean that the re-commencement of the procedure would not be from the stage of accepting fresh nominations but would commence from the stage of scrutiny of the nominations which had already been received when the earlier meeting had been convened on 04.10.2012. 9. 9. Considering this aspect of the matter, if Rule 3(e)(4) and the explanation thereto is taken into consideration, the explanation would make it clear that all the members would be entitled to be present and vote if there is a contest with regard to either posts of Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha or both i.e., the members who would be present in the meeting after the process of withdrawal of the nominations is completed as contemplated in Rule 3(d) of the Rules. If that be the position, even if only nine members as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner were present on 04.10.2012 at the stage when it was for the scrutiny of the nominations, the contention that only such of those members should be notified at present cannot be accepted. That is for the reason that the said stage is only a stage for the scrutiny of the nominations and the requirement for the members who are present to vote would arise only after the stage of withdrawal of the nominations is complete as contemplated under Rule 3 (d) and at this stage even the members who were not present at the Rule 3(c) stage would be entitled to participate. 10. Therefore, in a situation where the stage was at the scrutiny of nominations, presently, when the process of election is to commence from that stage when it was interrupted if a contest is necessitated after the procedure under Rule 3(c), all the members would be entitled to be present thereafter and vote in the meeting that may proceed after the process of withdrawal of nominations. If that be the position, all the members were required to be notified to enable them to attend the proposed meeting. In that view of the matter, I am of the opinion that the impugned notice at Annexure-A does not call for interference. Accordingly, the petition being devoid of merit is disposed of. No costs.