Judgment 1. Has the State Transport Appellate Tribunal (the ‘Tribunal’ for short) the jurisdiction to grant an order of stay ex-parte of the proceedings impugned in a revision petition under S.90 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (the ‘Act’ for short)? I find that a discordant note has been struck by a learned single Judge of this Court which however militates against the binding precedent of a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court on the point. 2. The petitioner challenges the proceedings of the Regional Transport Authority settling the time schedule for the second respondent to operate his Stage Carriage service on the route Ranni-Pathanamthitta. The petitioner contends that there was no necessity to alter the time schedule when the same had been settled by the Regional Transport Authority hardly nine months ago. Reliance is placed on R.212 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 (the ‘Rules’ for short) to urge that there was no change of circumstance in the interregnum warranting the alteration of the time schedule. The petitioner does concede that the propriety of convening such a timing conference and altering the time schedule could be scrutinised by the Tribunal in a revision petition under S.90 of the Act. But the petitioner laments that the Tribunal is powerless to grant an order of stay ex parte in view of the decision in Johnson v. Regional Transport Authority, Vadakara ( 2006 (2) KLT 1016 ). It is the case of the petitioner that a revisional jurisdiction sans the power to grant an order of stay ex parte is not so effective as to deny the writ jurisdiction. The petitioner points out that the second respondent may even evade notice and it would be impossible for the Tribunal to consider the interim application for stay in the revision petition soon. The petitioner thus justifies the invocation of the writ jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India to challenge the proceedings of the Regional Transport Authority. The second respondent on the other hand asserts that the necessity to convene a timing conference in a short interval and allot a time schedule can be better adjudicated in a revision petition. The second respondent adds that only a time schedule hitherto lying vacant was allotted to him and the Tribunal is well competent to decide that issue in a revision petition. 3. I Heard Mr. The second respondent adds that only a time schedule hitherto lying vacant was allotted to him and the Tribunal is well competent to decide that issue in a revision petition. 3. I Heard Mr. O.D. Sivadas, Advocate on behalf of the petitioner, Mr. P.M. Saneer, Advocate on behalf of the first respondent and Mr. Stalin Peter Davis, Advocate on behalf of the second respondent. I also had the advantage of hearing Mr. P. Deepak, Advocate as amicus curiae in this Writ Petition who made a copious reference to the various decisions of this Court and the Apex Court on the issue. 4. A close comparison of S.64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 as it stood before amendment and S.90 of the Act (after amendment) dealing with the power of revision by the Tribunal is apposite to the context. S.64-A of the Motor vehicles Act, 1939 reads as under : “64-A. Revision. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal may either on its own motion or on an application made to it call for the record of any case in which on order has been made by a State Transport Authority or Regional Transport Authority and in which no appeal lies; and if it appears to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal that the order made by the State Transport Authority or Regional Transport Authority is improper or illegal, the State Transport Appellate Tribunal may pass such order in relation to the case as it deems fit and every such order shall be final: Provided that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal shall not entertain any application from a person aggrieved by an order of a State Transport Authority or Regional Transport Authority unless the application is made within thirty days from the date of the order: Provided further that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal may entertain the application after the expiry of the said period of thirty days, if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time: Provided also that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal shall not pass an order under this section prejudicial to any person without giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard.” Section 90 of the Act reads as under: “90 Revision. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal may on an application made to it, call for the record of any case in which on order has been made by a State Transport Authority or Regional Transport Authority against which no appeal lies, and if it appears to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal that the order made by the State Transport Authority or Regional Transport Authority is improper or illegal, the State Transport Appellate Tribunal may pass such order in relation to the case as it deems fit and every such order shall be final: Provided that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal shall not entertain any application from a person aggrieved by an order of a State Transport Authority or Regional Transport Authority, unless the application is made within thirty days from the date of the order: Provided further that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal may entertain the application after the expiry of the said period of thirty days, if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by good and sufficient cause from making the application in time: Provided also that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal shall not pass an order under this section prejudicial to any person without giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard.” Thus the only substantial change by way of amendment is that the Tribunal is denuded of the power to revise orders or proceedings suo motu under the Act which it enjoyed under S.64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. 5. The power to grant an order of stay is inherent in any Tribunal and the same is ancillary or incidental to the exercise of appellate or revisional jurisdiction by it as has been held time and again. There is no necessity to multiply the case law on the point except citing the following decisions rendered by this court and that too in regard to the power of the Tribunal constituted under the Act: (i) Sri Themmalapuram Bus Transport Ltd. v. The Regional Transport Officer, Malabar ( 1957 KLT 516 ); (ii) Ramakrishnan v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Ernakulam ( 1960 KLT 136 ); and (iii) Dharmadas v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal ( 1962 KLT 505 (F.B.)) The further question is as to whether the Tribunal can grant an order of stay ex parte of the proceedings impugned pending revision prejudicial to the interest of another without hearing him in view of the statutory prescription. Rules 9 and 10 of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1988 govern the grant of interim relief by the Tribunal pending disposal of the revision petition. R.9 stipulates that the copy of the petition for stay and the affidavit shall be served on the standing counsel and acknowledgment obtained before it is moved. R.10 empowers are Tribunal to grant an interim order for a period not exceeding fourteen days even without hearing the standing counsel (who has been defined in R.2(k) as one appointed by the State Government). R.10 however clarifies that such interim orders could be modified or revoked on motion made by the parties to the proceedings before the Tribunal. Neither R.9 nor R.10 of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1988 has any relevance to the grant of an order of stay ex-parte in a revision petition where the standing counsel has no role. The standing counsel has no role and can have no say in the proceedings when the interests of private operators alone are involved as in the instant case giving rise to the Writ Petition. 6. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Municipal Board v. State Transport Authority ( AIR 1965 SC 458 ) has interpreted the third proviso to S.64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939. It was held therein as follows: “The other point which was brought to our notice during the argument at the Bar is that the order of the State Transport Authority dated 6th January, 1961 was made without compliance with the third proviso to S.64-A. That proviso is in these words: Provided further that the State Transport Authority shall not pass order under this Section prejudicial to any person without giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard. This appears to us to make it necessary that before making any revisional order under S.64-A the State Transport Authority has to see that a person likely to be affected by that revisional order receives notice of the matter and is given a reasonable opportunity to be heard. The requirement of this proviso was admittedly not complied with before the State Transport Authority made order on January 6, 1961 in the present case. The requirement of this proviso was admittedly not complied with before the State Transport Authority made order on January 6, 1961 in the present case. If the High Court’s attention had been drawn to this failure on the part of the State Transport Authority to comply with this statutory requirement, we have no doubt that the High Court would have felt compelled to quash the revisional order made.” (emphasis supplied) The above decision of the Constitution Bench though rendered in the context of S.64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 applies on all fours to S.90 of the Act as well particularly in regard to the third proviso thereof. The third proviso to S.90 of the Act is a verbatim reproduction of the third proviso to S.64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939 which was interpreted by the Constitution Bench. The irresistible conclusion therefore is that the embargo under the third proviso to S.90 of the Act can have any application only in regard to the passing of a revisional order. The Tribunal is free to pass an order of stay ex-parte of the proceedings impugned in a Revision Petition and the obligation to hear the affected party arises only before a revisional order is passed finally. It is reiterated that an interim order of stay merely postpones the operation or implementation of the proceedings impugned pending exercise of revisional or appellate jurisdiction. 7. The decision in Johnson v. Regional Transport Authority, Vadakara ( 2006 (2) KLT 1016 ) that even an interim order of stay cannot be passed in a revision petition without notice to the affected party is not good law. The same rendered in ignorance of the dictum laid down by the Supreme Court is declared per incurium (See Panduranga v. State of Karnataka (2013 (1) KLT 874 SC)). 8. The petitioner has thus an effective alternate remedy by way of a revision petition to the Tribunal which can grant an order of stay ex-parte of the proceedings of the Regional Transport Authority if there are sufficient grounds. I decline jurisdiction in this Writ Petition without prejudice to the right of the petitioner to file a Revision Petition under S.90 of the Act and apply for stay of the proceedings impugned. The Writ Petition is dismissed. No costs.