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2013 DIGILAW 3118 (ALL)

RAJENDRA PRASAD YADAV v. RAVINDRA NATH SINGH

2013-12-20

MANOJ MISRA

body2013
JUDGMENT Hon’ble Manoj Misra, J.—The instant writ petition has been filed seeking quashing of the order dated 22.10.2013 passed by the Additional District Judge, Court No. 5, Varanasi in Civil Revision No. 155 of 2013 as also the order dated 29.5.2013 passed by the Additional Civil Judge (Sr. Div.)/Additional Small Causes Judge, Varanasi in Original Suit No. 22 of 2011 by which issue No. 2 has been decided against the plaintiff-petitioner and the suit has been valued at Rs. 11,13, 500/- with direction to the plaintiff-petitioner to suitably amend his plaint. 2. The facts relevant for deciding the instant petition are that Original Suit No. 22 of 2011 was instituted by the petitioner-plaintiff in the Court of Additional Civil Judge (Sr. Div.), Varanasi for declaration that sale-deed dated 22.5.2010 executed by the defendants 2 to 4 in favour of the defendant No. 1 be declared null and void and that information of the above be sent to the Sub-Registrar concerned. The plaint case was that the suit property originally belonged to one Lalji, whose nephew was the plaintiff; that Lalji executed a registered Will of the suit property during his life time in favour of the plaintiff, thereby bequeathing his entire movable and immovable property to the plaintiff; that after the death of Laji, the defendants 2 to 4 got their name fraudulently recorded in Form PA 10; and that by taking advantage of the entry, executed sale-deed dated 22.5.2010 in favour of the defendant No. 1. It was, thus, claimed that the sale-deed executed by the defendants 2 to 4 was void, being without authority. The suit was, initially, valued, at the time of institution of the suit, at Rs. 11,13,500, that is, the sale consideration. However, Court fee was paid as per Article 17(iii) of Schedule II of the Court Fees Act. Thereafter, an application was filed by the plaintiff seeking amendment of the valuation clause in the plaint. By the amendment application, a prayer was made that paragraph 11 of the plaint be amended so as to show that although the sale-deed is for Rs. 11,35,000/- but as the disputed land is subject to payment of land revenue, which is Rs. 24.95 per annum, therefore, the suit is valued at thirty times the annual revenue, which comes to Rs. 748.50p and which, for the purpose of the suit, is put at Rs. 11,35,000/- but as the disputed land is subject to payment of land revenue, which is Rs. 24.95 per annum, therefore, the suit is valued at thirty times the annual revenue, which comes to Rs. 748.50p and which, for the purpose of the suit, is put at Rs. 1,000/- and on the said valuation, Court fee was being paid. This amendment application was allowed by order dated 9.5.2013. The defendant-respondents, however, raised an objection that the suit was undervalued, therefore, issue No. 2 was framed to the effect whether the suit is undervalued. 3. Before the trial Court, the plaintiff-petitioner argued that the valuation of the suit property was as per the Explanation to Section 7(iv-A) of the Court Fees Act, 1870, which provides that the value of the property for the purposes of the concerned sub-section, shall be the market value, which in the case of immovable property shall be deemed to be the value as computed in accordance with the sub-section (v), (v-A) and (v-B). It was submitted that under sub-section (v) of Section 7 of the Court Fees Act, where the subject-matter is land and where the land forms an entire estate or a definite share of an estate paying annual revenue to Government, or forms part of such an estate, and is recorded in the Collector’s register as separately assessed with such revenue and such revenue is permanently settled—the value will be thirty times the revenue so payable. It was thus submitted that the subject-matter of the sale-deed was land, assessed to land revenue, therefore, by virtue of the Explanation read with sub-section (v) of Section 7 of the Court Fees Act, the valuation assigned at 30 times the land revenue was appropriate. 4. The Court of Additional Civil Judge (Sr. Div.), Varanasi, although, noticed the submission of the learned counsel for the plaintiff-petitioner but, relying on various judgments, took the view that the suit is to be valued under Section 7 (iv-A) of the Court Fees Act on the market value of the property, therefore, the suit was undervalued and the plaintiff must value it at Rs. 11,13,500/- and it directed the plaintiff to amend the plaint accordingly. 11,13,500/- and it directed the plaintiff to amend the plaint accordingly. Aggrieved by the order passed by the trial Court, the petitioner filed revision before the revisional Court and the revisional Court also took the same view without considering the import of the Explanation to Section 7(iv-A) of the Court Fees Act. 5. Challenging the order passed by the Courts below, Sri Gulab Chand, learned counsel for the plaintiff-petitioner, submitted that there is no dispute with regards to the fact that Court fee payable in a suit of the nature instituted by the plaintiff would be as per the provisions of Section 7(iv-A) of the Court Fees Act and not as per Article 17(iii) of Schedule II of the Court Fees Act. But as to what would be the suit valuation, would be ascertained on the basis of the Explanation and not on the basis of the sale consideration and as the plaintiff had fixed the market value of the property by placing reliance on the Explanation, the Courts below ought to have considered whether such valuation was correct in terms of the Explanation to Section 7(iv-A) of the Court Fees Act or not. It has, accordingly, been submitted that both the Courts below have erroneously approached the matter without considering the import of the Explanation to Section 7(iv-A) of the Court Fees Act, 1870 and, as such, their orders stand vitiated. 6. Sri Ajay Kumar Singh, who represented the respondents, submitted that according to the provisions of sub-section (iv-A) of Section 7 of the Court Fees Act, the plaintiff-petitioner has no option but to value the suit on the basis of the amount for which the instrument has been executed and since the sale-deed in question was executed for Rs. 11,13,500/-, the Court below was justified in directing the plaintiff-petitioner to amend his plaint and to value the suit as per the amount for which the instrument was executed i.e. at Rs. 11,3,500/-. Sri Ajay Kumar Singh further submitted that the Explanation to sub-section (iv-A) of Section 7 of the Court Fees Act is not attracted to a case where it relates to a suit involving cancellation of or for adjudging void an instrument where the amount for which the instrument was executed is disclosed. 11,3,500/-. Sri Ajay Kumar Singh further submitted that the Explanation to sub-section (iv-A) of Section 7 of the Court Fees Act is not attracted to a case where it relates to a suit involving cancellation of or for adjudging void an instrument where the amount for which the instrument was executed is disclosed. It has been submitted that the Explanation is applicable only when the suit is for cancellation of or for adjudging void or voidable a decree or an instrument where the amount is not disclosed. It has, thus, been submitted that the Courts below were justified in deciding the issue No. 2 against the plaintiff-petitioner. 7. Having considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, the Court finds that neither it is disputed nor can it be disputed that the Court fee payable on the suit instituted by the plaintiff-petitioner was as per the provisions of Section 7(iv-A) of the Court Fees Act and not as per Article 17(iii) of Schedule II of the Court Fees Act, inasmuch as, the said question is no longer res integra as it has been settled by the Apex Court in the case of Shailendra Bhardwaj and others v. Chandra Pal and another, (2013) 1 SCC 579 . The dispute, therefore, which requires consideration, is as to what should be the valuation provided to the suit. That is, whether it should be as per the sale consideration given in the instrument or as per the market value to be assessed as per the Explanation to Section 7 (iv-A). The plaintiff has valued the suit by taking advantage of the Explanation to sub-section (iv-A) of Section 7 of the Court Fees Act, whereas the submission of the defendant-respondents is that the Explanation to sub-section (iv-A) of Section 7 is not attracted in a suit where the relief involved is for cancellation of or for adjudging void an instrument such as a sale-deed where the amount for which such an instrument has been executed is disclosed. 8. 8. Thus, the question that arises for adjudication in the instant petition is whether in a suit involving cancellation of or adjudging void or voidable, a sale-deed securing property, the suit is to be valued as per the amount for which the sale-deed is executed or as per the market value of the subject-matter of sale, ascertained as per the provisions of the Explanation to sub-section (iv-A) of Section 7 of the Court Fees Act. 9. Before answering the aforesaid question, it would be useful to reproduce sub-section (iv-A) of Section 7 of the Court Fees Act, which provides as follows : “Section 7. Computation of fee payable in certain suits for money.—The amount of fee payable under this Act in the suits next hereinafter mentioned shall be computed as follows: “For cancellation or adjudging void instruments and decrees—(iv-A)—In suit for or involving cancellation of or adjudging void or voidable a decree for money or other property having a market value, or an instrument securing money or other property having such value : (1) where the plaintiff or his predecessor-in-title was a party to the decree or the instrument, according to the value of the subject-matter; and (2) where he or his predecessor-in-title was not a party to the decree or instrument, according to one-fifth of the value of the subject-matter, and such value shall be deemed to be—— if the whole decree or instrument is involved in the suit, the amount for which or value of the property in respect of which the decree was passed or the instrument executed, and if only a part of the decree or instrument is involved in the suit, the amount or value of the property to which such part relates. Explanation.—”The value of the property” for the purposes of this sub-section, shall be the market value, which in case of immovable property shall be deemed to be the value as computed in accordance with sub-section (v), (v-A) of (v-B), as the case may be.” 10. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Raj Kumar and others (minors) through Mst. Krishna Devi v. Damodar Das and others, 1949 AWR 67, had the occasion to consider and interpret the provisions of Section 7 (iv-A) of the Court Fees Act. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Raj Kumar and others (minors) through Mst. Krishna Devi v. Damodar Das and others, 1949 AWR 67, had the occasion to consider and interpret the provisions of Section 7 (iv-A) of the Court Fees Act. While dealing with Section 7(iv-A) of the Court Fees Act, the Court in the case of Raj Kumar (supra), observed as follows : “It is clear that the determination of such value has been divided into two parts, firstly according to the amount for which the decree has been passed or the instrument executed and secondly with respect to the value of the property in respect of which the decree was passed or instrument executed. It seems to us, on a reading of the entire section, that amount refers to those decrees which are for money or to those instruments which secure money, while the value of the property in respect of which the decree was passed or instrument executed, refers to those cases where the decree was for the other property having such value. This seems to us to be the proper interpretation to be put on this section. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs appellants argues that the section really gives an alternative to the plaintiffs either to value this suit on the amount of the sale consideration or on the value of the property. We do not think that such an alternative is contemplated by the framers of the Act. We may add that wherever an alternative is contemplated, it is always mentioned whether the amount is greater or less out of the two possible amounts. For example, in Section 7(iv-B), it has been mentioned, while dealing with suit for injunction etc., the value is mentioned as half the amount for which attachment was made or half of the value of the property or interest attached, whichever is less. We are, therefore, of opinion that where the decree is for money or the instrument secures money, the value of the subject-matter is the amount of the decree or the amount of the money secured by the instrument. We are, therefore, of opinion that where the decree is for money or the instrument secures money, the value of the subject-matter is the amount of the decree or the amount of the money secured by the instrument. Where, on the other hand, the decree is for other property having a market value or the instrument secures other property having such value, the value of the subject-matter for the purposes of Court-fee is the value of the property in respect of which the decree was passed or in respect of which the instrument was executed.” 11. The aforesaid decision of the Division Bench was noticed by a Single Judge of this Court in the case of Rameshwar Dayal v. Harish Chandra and others, 1972 AWR 808. Before the learned Single Judge in Rameshwar Dayal’s case (supra) a contention was raised that the value of the subject-matter, under the provisions of Section 7(iv-A) of the Court Fees Act, must be deemed to be the consideration for which the sale-deed was executed. The Court though felt that there was some substance in the argument, so advanced, but it found itself bound by the Division Bench decision of this Court in Raj Kumar’s case (supra) and the contention was, therefore, rejected and the Court upheld the impugned order by which the plaintiff was required to pay Court fee on the market value of the land and building and not on the sale consideration fixed in the sale-deed, the cancellation of which was sought. 12. None of the learned counsel for the parties could show any decision holding to the contrary. Although the learned counsel for the respondent has cited various judgments but they are authority on the point that the Court fee payable on such suit is as per the provisions of sub-section (iv-A) of Section 7 and not as per Article 17(iii) of Schedule II. As that question is not in issue here, the authorities cited are not being discussed separately. Suffice it to say that the aforesaid issue is now settled by the decision of Apex Court in Shailendra Bharadwaj’s case (supra). 13. In the case of Satheedevi v. Prasanna, (2010) 5 SCC 622 , the Apex Court was required to interpret Section 40 (1) of the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as Kerala Act). 13. In the case of Satheedevi v. Prasanna, (2010) 5 SCC 622 , the Apex Court was required to interpret Section 40 (1) of the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as Kerala Act). For ready reference the provision of Section 40 of the Kerala Act, as quoted in the report, is being reproduced herein below: “40. Suits for cancellation of decrees, etc.—(1) In a suit for cancellation of a decree for money or other property having a money value, or other document which purports or operates to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title or interest in money, movable or immovable property, fee shall be computed on the value of the subject-matter of the suit, and such value shall be deemed to be— if the whole decree or other document is sought to be cancelled, the amount or value of the property for which the decree was passed or other document was executed; if a part of the decree or other document is sought to be cancelled, such part of the amount or value of the property. (2) If the decree or other document is such that the liability under it cannot be split up and the relief claimed relates only to a particular item of property belonging to the plaintiff or to the plaintiff’s share in any such property, fee shall be computed on the value of such property, or share or on the amount of the decree, whichever is less. Explanation.—A suit to set aside an award shall be deemed to be a suit to set aside a decree within the meaning of this section.” 14. In Satheedevi’s case (supra), the Apex Court was required to answer as to whether on the interpretation of Section 40 of the Kerala Act, the plaintiff in a suit for cancellation of sale-deed would be required to pay Court fee on the market value of the subject-matter of sale or on the sale consideration set forth in the instrument. While deciding the said issue, Apex Court observed, in paragraphs 18, 19, 20 and 21 of the report, observed as follows: “18. While deciding the said issue, Apex Court observed, in paragraphs 18, 19, 20 and 21 of the report, observed as follows: “18. Section 40(1) lays down that in a suit for cancellation of a decree for money or other property having a money value, or other document which purports or operates to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in the present or in future, any right, title or interest in money, movable or immovable property, fee shall be computed on the value of the subject-matter of the suit and further lays down that such value shall be deemed to be, if the whole decree or other document sought to be cancelled, the amount or value of the property for which the decree was passed or other document was executed. If a part of the decree or other document is sought to be cancelled, such part of the amount or value of the property constitute the basis for fixation of Court fee. Sub-section (2) lays down that if the decree or other document is such that the liability under it cannot be split up and the relief claimed relates only to a particular item of the property belonging to the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s share in such property, fee shall be computed on the value of such property, or share or on the amount of the decree, whichever is less. 19. The deeming clause contained in the substantive part of Section 40(1) makes it clear that in a suit filed for cancellation of a document which creates any right, title or interest in immovable property, the Court fee is required to be computed on the value of the property for which the document was executed. To put it differently, the value of the property for which the document was executed and not its market value is relevant for the purpose of Court fee. If the expression “value of the subject-matter of the suit” was not followed by the deeming clause, it could possibly be argued that the word “value” means the market value, but by employing the deeming clause, the legislature has made it clear that if the document is sought to be cancelled, the amount of Court fee shall be computed on the value of the property for which the document was executed and not the market value of the property. The words “for which” appearing between the words “property” and “other documents” clearly indicate that the Court fee is required to be paid on the value of the property mentioned in the document, which is the subject-matter of challenge. 20. If the legislature intended that fee should be payable on the market value of the subject-matter of the suit filed for cancellation of a document which purports or operates to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish any present or future right, title and interest, then it would have, instead of incorporating the requirement of payment of fees on the value of subject-matter, specifically provided for payment of Court fee on the market value of the subject-matter of the suit as has been done in respect of other types of suits mentioned in Sections 25, 27, 29, 30, 37, 38, 45 and 48. The legislature may have also, instead of using the expression “value of the property for which the document was executed”, used the expression “value of the property in respect of which the document was executed”. However, the fact of the matter is that in Section 40(1) the legislature has designedly not used the expression “market value of the property”. 21. If the interpretation placed by the trial Court and the High Court on the expression “value of the property for which the document was executed” is accepted as correct then the word “value” used in Section 40(1) of the Act will have to be read as “market value” and we do not see any compelling reason to add the word “market” before the word “value” in Section 40(1) of the Act.” 15. Comparing the provisions of Section 40 of the Kerala Act with that of Section 7 (iv-A) of the Court Fees Act, as applicable in the State of U.P., the difference is apparent. In Section 40 of the Kerala Act expression “market value” is conspicuous by its absence whereas in Section 7(iv-A) of Court Fees Act, as applicable in the State of U.P., it finds mention at two places. Moreover, the Explanation to Section 7 (iv-A) makes it clear that the value of the property shall be the market value of the property. In Section 40 of the Kerala Act expression “market value” is conspicuous by its absence whereas in Section 7(iv-A) of Court Fees Act, as applicable in the State of U.P., it finds mention at two places. Moreover, the Explanation to Section 7 (iv-A) makes it clear that the value of the property shall be the market value of the property. Another difference, which comes to the fore, is the use of the words: “value of the property in respect of which the decree was passed or the document was executed” instead of the words: “for which the decree was passed or other document was executed”. The Apex Court in paragraphs 20 and 21 of its judgment in Satheedevi’s case (supra), noticed the aforesaid difference and observed that if the legislature intended that fee should be payable on the market value of the subject-matter of the suit filed for cancellation of a document then it would have, instead of incorporating the requirement of payment of fees on the value of subject-matter, specifically provided for payment of Court fee on the market value of the subject-matter of the suit and that instead of using the expression “value of the property for which the document was executed”, used the expression “value of the property in respect of which the document was executed”. 16. Thus, the view taken by the Division Bench of this Court in Raj Kumar’s case (supra), with regards to the interpretation of Section 7(iv-A), appears to be based on a reasoning which finds support from the observations of the Apex Court in Satheedevi’s case (supra). Accordingly, it is held that the valuation of a suit involving cancellation of or adjudging void or voidable a sale-deed of immovable property would be on the market value of the subject-matter of sale and not on the sale consideration shown in the instrument. 17. As to what would be the market value of the property, the same has to be ascertained by keeping into consideration the Explanation to sub-section (iv-A) of Section 7 of the Court Fees Act. 17. As to what would be the market value of the property, the same has to be ascertained by keeping into consideration the Explanation to sub-section (iv-A) of Section 7 of the Court Fees Act. The Explanation to sub-section (iv-A) of Section 7 of the Court Fees Act provides that the value of the property for the purposes of this sub-section shall be the market value which, in the case of immovable property, shall be deemed to be the value as computed in accordance with sub-section (v), (v-A) and (v-B) as the case may be. The Explanation to sub-section (iv-A) of Section 7 of the Court Fees Act provides that the value of the property for the purposes of this sub-section shall be the market value which, in the case of immovable property, shall be deemed to be the value as computed in accordance with sub-section (v), (v-A) and (v-B) as the case may be. Sub-section (v), (v-A) and (v-B) of Section 7 of the Court Fees Act, are reproduced herein below : “For possession of land, houses and gardens-(v)—In suits for the possession of land, houses and gardens— according to the value of the subject-matter; and such value shall be deemed to be— (I) where the subject-matter is land, and— (a) Where the land forms an entire estate, or a definite share of an estate, paying annual revenue to Government, or forms part of such an estate and is recorded in the Collector’s register as separately assessed with such revenue; and such revenue is permanently settled— thirty times the revenue so payable; b. Where the land forms an entire estate, or a definite share of an estate, paying annual revenue to Government, or forms part of such estate and is recorded as aforesaid; and such revenue is settled, but not permanently- ten times the revenue so payable; c. Where the land pays no such revenue, or has been partially exempted from such payment, or is charged with any fixed payment in lieu of such revenue, and net profits have arisen from the land during the three years immediately preceding the date of presenting the plaint - twenty times the annual average of such net profits; but when no such net profits have arisen therefrom the market value which shall be determined by multiplying by twenty the annual average net profits of similar land for the three years immediately preceding the date of presenting the plaint; d. Where the land forms part of an estate paying revenue to Government, but is not a definite share of such estate and does not come under clause (a) (b) or (c) above— the market-value of the land which shall be determined by multiplying by fifteen the rental value of the land, including assumed rent on proprietary cultivation, if any; (II) Where the subject-matter is a building or garden— according to the market-value of the building or garden, as the case may be. Explanation.—The word ‘estate’ as used in this sub-section, means any land subject to the payment of revenue for which the proprietor or farmer or raiyat shall have executed a separate engagement to Government or which, in the absence of such engagement, shall have been separately assessed with revenue. [For possession of superior proprietary and under-proprietary land-(v-A)—In suits for possession— (1) of superior proprietary rights where under-proprietary or sub-proprietary rights exists in the land— according to the market value of the subject-matter, and such value shall be determined by multiplying by fifteen the annual net profits of the superior proprietor; (2) of under-proprietary or sub-proprietary land as such— according to the value of the subject-matter, and such value shall be determined by multiplying by ten the annual under-proprietary or sub-proprietary rent, as the case may be, recorded in the Collector’s register as payable for the land for the year next before the presentation of the plaint. If no such rent is recorded in the Collector’s register the value shall be determined in the manner laid down in clause (c) of sub-section (v) of this section save that the multiple will be ten. Explanation.—Land held by any permanent lessees shall be treated for the purposes of this sub-section, as under -proprietary or sub-proprietary land. Possessory suits between tenants—(v-B)—In suits for possession of land between rival tenants and by tenants against trespasser— according to the value of the subject-matter and such value shall be determined if such land is the land of— (a) a permanent tenure-holder or a fixed rate tenant—by multiplying by twenty the annual rent recorded in the Collector’s register as payable for the land for the year next before the presentation of the plaint; (b) an ex-proprietary or occupancy tenant—by multiplying by two such rent in case of suits for possession of land between rival tenants, and by annual rent in suits by tenants against trespassers; (c) any other tenant—by annual rent. If no such rent is recorded in the Collector’s register, the value shall be determined in the manner laid down in clause (c) of sub-section (v) of this section save that the multiple shall be that entered in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of this sub-section according as the class of tenancy affected is governed by clause (a), (b) or (c)of this sub-section.” 18. In the instant case, the plaintiff valued the suit as per sub-section (v) (I) (a) of Section 7 of the Court Fees Act by claiming that as the property in suit was assessed to land revenue, therefore, it was being valued at thirty times the annual revenue. Such a valuation assigned to a suit for cancellation of sale-deed by placing reliance on the Explanation to sub-section (iv-A) of Section 7 of the Court Fees Act, has been accepted by Uttaranchal High Court in the case of Smt. Savita Agarwal v. Sharda Math Nyas, 2006 (100) RD 568, where similar provisions are applicable as they are applicable in the State of Uttar Pradesh. The paragraph 5 of the judgment in Smt. Savita Agarwal’s case (supra) is reproduced herein below : “5. Under Section 7(iv-A) of the Court Fees Act, 1870 (as amended by State of U.P. applicable to Uttaranchal), in a suit for cancellation of an instrument (including sale-deeds), the property involved is required to be valued at the amount mentioned in instrument or value of the property to which such instrument relates. It is further provided in the explanation to said sub-section (iv-A) that ‘value of the property’ for the purposes of the sale-deed shall be market value which in the case of immovable property shall be deemed to be the value computed in accordance with sub-section (v), (v-A) or (v-B), as the case may be. Section 7(v) of the Court Fees Act, 1870, provides that where the revenue is settled in respect of a land the market value of such land shall be assessed at 30 times of such revenue. In view of said provision of law, neither the suit appears to be undervalued, nor the Court fee paid appears to be insufficient. Therefore, finding on issue No. 3 given by the Trial Court need no interference.” 19. In view of said provision of law, neither the suit appears to be undervalued, nor the Court fee paid appears to be insufficient. Therefore, finding on issue No. 3 given by the Trial Court need no interference.” 19. The Courts below though were correct that the valuation of such a suit, as is involved in the instant petition, is to be done on the market value of the subject-matter of sale, but while deciding the issue No. 2 they fell in error by taking the sale consideration set forth in the instrument as the sole determinant of the market value instead of considering whether the market value assigned by the plaintiff was in conformity with the provisions of the Explanation to Section 7(iv-A) of the Court Fees Act, as applicable in the State of U.P. 20. No doubt, there may be a case where the sale consideration may reflect the market value of the subject-matter, and in the event of there being no objection to its market value, the same may be taken as the market value for the purpose of valuing the suit. But where the plaintiff has assigned a valuation, by determining the market value on the basis of the Explanation, the same cannot be discarded merely because it is different from the sale consideration set forth in the instrument, inasmuch as, it is the market value of the subject-matter on which the suit referable to Section 7(iv-A) of the Court Fees Act is to be valued and not on the sale consideration set forth in the instrument. 21. In view of the reasons given above, the orders passed by the Courts below stand vitiated. The writ petition is, therefore, allowed. The order dated 22.10.2013 passed by the Additional District Judge, Court No. 5, Varanasi in Civil Revision No. 155 of 2013 and the order dated 29.5.2013 passed by the Additional Civil Judge (Sr. Div.)/Additional Judge Small Causes, Varanasi in Suit No. 22 of 2011, are hereby quashed. The trial Court shall decide the issue No. 2, afresh, in the light of the observations made herein above. Div.)/Additional Judge Small Causes, Varanasi in Suit No. 22 of 2011, are hereby quashed. The trial Court shall decide the issue No. 2, afresh, in the light of the observations made herein above. It is, however, clarified that this Court has not expressed its opinion on the claim of the petitioner that the land is assessed to land revenue or that the valuation assigned by the plaintiff to the subject-matter of the suit is correct or in accordance with the Explanation to sub-section (iv-A) of Section 7 of the Court Fees Act, as applicable in the State of U.P. The Court below will do its own independent exercise so as to ascertain as to how the market value of the subject-matter is to be ascertained in accordance with the Explanation to sub-section (iv-A) of Section 7 of the Court Fees Act. There is no order as to costs.