JUDGMENT : S. Manikumar, J. Being aggrieved by the finding of the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation/Deputy Commissioner of Labour, Salem, made in W.C. No. 168 of 1995, dated 2-12-1996, exonerating the National Insurance Company Ltd., Branch Office, Bodinayakanur, Madurai District, the, second respondent herein, from payment of compensation to the accident victim, on the ground that the driver of the vehicle did not possess a valid and effective driving licence for the offending vehicle and consequently, directing the 1st opposite party, owner of the vehicle, to pay compensation of Rs.94,780/-, with interest at the rate of 12% per annum, the driver of the vehicle, an employee, has preferred this appeal and prayed for a direction against the Insurance Company to pay compensation to the victim. 2. Record of proceedings further shows that despite the appeal being listed before the' Deputy Registrar, High Court, Madras, on various occasions, there was no representation, on behalf of the appellant and hence, the appeal came to be listed before this Court on 10-12-2001. On the said date, since there was no representation, on behalf of the appellant, this Court was constrained to dismiss the appeal for non-prosecution. Seeking condonation of delay of 3261 days in filing the petition to set aside the order, dated 10-12-2001, made in the above appeal, to restore the appeal and to dispose the same, on merits, C.M.P. No. 179 of 2011, has been filed. 3. In the supporting affidavit for condonation, the appellant has contended that when the appeal was listed for final hearing on 10.12.2001, the same was dismissed for default. According to him, the learned counsel for the appellant did not inform the respondent and that he came to know about the dismissal for non-prosecution, only from the original authority. He has further stated that dismissal of the appeal for default, has caused inexplicable agony and though he has suffered permanent disablement, due to the accident, for which, compensation has been quantified, the same could not be recovered. According to the appellant, for the fault committed by his Advocate, his remedy to claim compensation from the insurer, should not be denied. Hence, in the interest of justice, he has prayed for condonation of delay, to set aside the order, dated 10-12-2001 and hear the appeal, on merits. 4. According to the appellant, for the fault committed by his Advocate, his remedy to claim compensation from the insurer, should not be denied. Hence, in the interest of justice, he has prayed for condonation of delay, to set aside the order, dated 10-12-2001 and hear the appeal, on merits. 4. The Deputy Manager, Working in the Office of the Branch Manager, Bodinayakanur, Madurai District, in his counter-affidavit, has admitted that the appellant had filed W.C. No.168 of 1995 before the Deputy Commissioner of Labour, Salem, claiming of Rs. 1,89,560/- as compensation, for the injuries sustained in the accident. He further submitted that accepting the contention of the Insurance Company that the driver did not possess a valid and effective licence to drive a heavy goods vehicle and therefore, the said authority has rightly held that the appellant was not entitled to compensation of Rs. 94,780/- from the Insurance Company, but fastened the liability on the owner of the vehicle, involved in the accident/first opposite party. The Insurance Company has further submitted that the appeal has been dismissed for default on 10-12-2001 and that the petition to restore the same, has been filed with a enormous delay of 3264 days. The Company has also submitted that though it has been consistently held by the Courts that each day delay has to be explained, no sufficient cause has been shown in the supporting affidavit filed by the appellant. On the above pleadings, Mrs. Kala Ramesh, learned counsel appearing for National Insurance Company Ltd. submitted that the application for condonation, does not merit any consideration and prayed for dismissal. 5. Per contra, inviting the attention of this Court to the merits of the case, Mr. Sankarasubbu, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that when the vehicle, bearing Registration No. TAA 7479, owned by the 1st opposite party, was driven by the appellant from Kottayam towards Tuticorin, near Thiruthuvapuram R.C. Church on Trivandrum-Nagercoil Main Road, the vehicle met with an accident and that the appellant sustained a fracture of right humerus bone and consequently, suffered continuous disablement of the limb assessed at 80%. 6. He further submitted that though Ex. 6. He further submitted that though Ex. P9, Copy of the Driving Licence, was produced to prove that the driver had the requisite licence, the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation/Deputy Commissioner of Labour, Salem, instead of fixing liability on the insurer, directed the 1st opposite party, owner of the vehicle, to pay compensation to the appellant. He also submitted that even assuming, without admitting, for argument sake, that the appellant did not possess a valid and requisite licence, when the vehicle was insured, the insurer is liable to indemnify the 1st opposite party, owner of the vehicle and in such circumstances, the award of the Commissioner of Workmen's Compensation/Deputy Commissioner of Labour, Salem, requires modification, holding the insurer, as liable to pay compensation. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that though an award has been passed on 2nd December 1996, the 1st opposite party had not disputed the amount and in the said circumstances, the appellant, who has suffered a permanent disablement and lost his earning capacity, is put to severe hardship and in the above said circumstances, is entitled to, for reparation, corresponding to the damages, assessed by the Commissioner for workmen, from the insurer. On the above pleadings, he submitted that though there was a mistake on the part of the learned counsel, in not appearing before this Court on 10-12-2001, the same was due to unavoidable circumstances and pleaded that the mistake committed by the learned counsel on record, be condoned and the same need not be put against the litigant. 8. Per contra, opposing the relief sought for, against the Company and inviting the finding, as regards issue No. 4 by the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation/ Deputy Commissioner for Labour, Salem, at Paragraph 24 of the award, Mrs. Kala Ramesh, learned counsel for the Insurance Company submitted that the issue, as to whether, the appellant/applicant possessed a requisite licence, at the time of accident, has been duly considered by the authority under the Workmen's Compensation Act and having found that he did not possess the requisite licence to drive a heavy goods vehicle, he has rightly exonerated the Insurance Company from payment of compensation. She further submitted that if the 1st opposite party, owner of the offending vehicle, involved in the accident, has failed to deposit the compensation amount, as determined by the Commissioner of Workmen's Compensation Act/Deputy Commissioner of Labour, Salem, it is always open to the appellant to seek for recovery of the said amount from him, under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act and merely because, there was failure on the part of the 1st opposite party, owner of the vehicle, in not depositing the amount, within the stipulated time, that would not give rise to a cause of action, to seek for modification of the order, fastening liability on the Insurance Company. She also reiterated that as the delay is inordinate, without just and reasonable cause, the same need not be condoned. According to her, there is no manifest illegality in the award, warranting interference. 9. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. 10. Before adverting to the facts of the case, as to whether, the delay of 3261 days, in filing an application to set aside the order, dated 10-12-2001, to restore the appeal on file, for hearing the same on merits, should be ordered or not, this Court deems it fit to consider few decisions on the aspect of delay. The main reason assigned by the appellant for the delay is that he did not receive any communication from his counsel. 11. In Rafiq v. Munshilal, reported in AIR 1989 SC 1400, while considering a similar plea, the Supreme Court, at paragraph 7, held as follows : "3. .......... After engaging a lawyer, the party may remain supremely confident that the lawyer will look after his interest. At the time of the hearing of the appeal, the personal appearance of the party is not only required but hardly useful. Therefore, the party having done everything in his power to effectively participate in the proceedings can rest assured that he has neither to go to the High Court to inquire as to what is happening in the High Court with regard to his appeal nor is he to act as a watch-dog of the advocate that the latter appears in the matter when it is listed. It is no part of his job. Mr. It is no part of his job. Mr. A.K. Sanghi stated that a practice has grown up in the High Court of Allahabad amongst the lawyers that they remain absent when they do not like a particular Bench. May be we do not known, he is better informed in this matter. Ignorance in this behalf is our bliss. Even if we do not put our seal of imprimatur on the alleged practice by dismissing this matter which may discourage such a tendency, would it not repute. What is the fault of the party who having done everything in his power and expected of him would suffer because of the default of his advocate. If we reject this Appeal, as Mr. A.K. Sanghi invited us to do, the only one would suffer would not be the lawyer who did not appear but the party whose interest he represented. The Problem that agitates us is whether it is proper that the party should suffer for the inaction, deliberate admission, or misdemeanor of his agent. The answer obviously is in the negative. May be that the learned advocate absented himself deliberately or intentionally. We have no material for ascertaining that aspect of the matter. We say nothing more on that aspect of the matter. However, we cannot be a party to an innocent party suffering injustice merely because his chosen advocate defaulted." 12. In Shanmuga Sadachara Servai v. Thirugnanam Servai & Muthiah, reported in 1993 (3) LW 649, there was a delay in filing the appeal. The Court below dismissed the petition filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, for condonation of delay. When the said order was tested in a Civil Revision Petition, following decisions of the Supreme Court in Shakuntala Devi v. Kuntal Kumari reported in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Katiji, reported in AIR 1987 SC 1353 , a learned single Judge of this Court, at paragraph 6, held as follows : "6. It is settled law that the discretion 2013 AAC / 148 IX vested in the Court in the matter of dealing with the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is to be exercised in the way in which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised upon principles which are well understood. It is settled law that the discretion 2013 AAC / 148 IX vested in the Court in the matter of dealing with the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is to be exercised in the way in which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised upon principles which are well understood. The words "sufficient cause" receiving a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fides is imputable to the appellant." 13. At this juncture, it is also worthwhile to consider the decision of the Supreme Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Katiji, reported in AIR 1987 SC 1353 , in the matter of entertaining an application for condonation of delay, under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. "(1) Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. (2) Reiusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. (3) "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. (4) When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. (5) There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by restoring to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. (6) It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is, expected to do so." 14. In G. Krishnamoorthy v. Arulmighu Sri Pataleeswarar Devasthanam, rep. By its Executive Officer, Thirupapuliyur, Cuddalore, reported in 2010 (1) MWC 837 (Civil), a suit was decreed ex parte, for non-prosecution and non-filing the written statement. Execution proceedings were also launched. In G. Krishnamoorthy v. Arulmighu Sri Pataleeswarar Devasthanam, rep. By its Executive Officer, Thirupapuliyur, Cuddalore, reported in 2010 (1) MWC 837 (Civil), a suit was decreed ex parte, for non-prosecution and non-filing the written statement. Execution proceedings were also launched. An application to condone the delay in setting aside the ex parte decree, was filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, on the ground that the Advocate did not inform him properly and that there was also no communication from the lawyer. Accepting the reasons stated and following Rafiq Munshilal's case, AIR 1989 SC 1400 (cited supra), a learned single Judge of this Court has condoned the delay, on payment of costs. 15. Thus, from the above judgment, it is discernible that while considering an application for condonation, it is the duty of the Courts to consider, as to whether the applicant has made out a prima facie case for condonation and that when substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice, deserves to be preferred. An acquisition of right of any third party, during the interregnum period is also one of the factors to be considered, while considering with excuse delay petition. In the case on hand, no third party right is involved. 16. No doubt, in the case on hand, delay is inordinate, but while considering the contention, as to whether the Commissioner for Workmen's/Deputy Commissioner of Labour, Salem, has committed an error in not directing the Insurance Company, to make the payment to the appellant, one cannot lose sight of the fact that the Commissioner has found that the appellant has suffered disablement and lost his earning capacity and in such circumstances, even though there is an inordinate delay, when no third party right is created, as observed by the Supreme Court in Ananth Nag's case, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the words "sufficient cause" should receive liberal construction, so as to render substantial justice, when there was no negligence or in-action on the part of the applicant, who seeks for condonation. When the appellant has already suffered physical disability, by dismissing the petition for condonation, there should not be emotional injury also. 17. Perusal of the award shows that while the appellant was driving a vehicle, bearing Registration No. TAA 7479, it met with an accident and that the appellant sustained a fracture of humerus bone lower 1/3rd. When the appellant has already suffered physical disability, by dismissing the petition for condonation, there should not be emotional injury also. 17. Perusal of the award shows that while the appellant was driving a vehicle, bearing Registration No. TAA 7479, it met with an accident and that the appellant sustained a fracture of humerus bone lower 1/3rd. The owner remained ex parte before the Commissioner. The Doctor, under Ex.A4, Disability Certificate, has stated that there was a fracture of humerus bone, which was not united properly. He has further opined that the appellant would not be in a position to drive the lorry, in future. As per Ex. A4, Disability Certificate, the fracture of right humerus bone, lower 1/3rd, has caused functional disability up to 80%. Having perused the documents, vz., Ex.A3, Wound Certificate, Ex. A4 Disability Certificate and after seeing the physical condition of the appellant, the Commissioner for Workmen's/Deputy Commissioner of Labour, Salem, has assessed the disability at 100% and held that the appellant cannot work as driver, in future. 18. Taking into consideration the minimum wages, notified in G.O. (2D)No. 14, Labour and Employment, dated 19-5-1991, the Commissioner has fixed the income at Rs. 1,000/-, as per Section 4(l)(b) to explanation II of the Workmen's Compensation (Amendment) Act, 1984 and accordingly, computed the compensation at Rs. 94,780/- (Rs. 1,000 x 50 x 189.56 x 100/100 x 100). Upon perusal of Ex.A6, wherein, the date of birth of the appellant, is shown, as 15-1-1956 and the date of accident, i.e. 7-8-1994, the Commissioner has determined the age of the applicant as 38 years. On the basis of oral and documentary evidence adduced by the appellant, the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation/Deputy Commissioner of Labour, Salem, has recorded a finding that the appellant was a workman, under the 1st opposite party. 19. No materials have been placed before this Court to indicate, as to whether, any appeal has been preferred by the 1st opposite party, owner of the vehicle. Even taking it for granted that an appeal has been filed, challenging the abovesaid finding, certainly, this Court would not entertained the same, as the finding of employer-employee relationship does not involve any substantial question of law and the findings recorded by the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, on the above aspect, in the case on hand, cannot be said to be perverse or without any basis. Finding of fact that he was an employee of the 1st opposite party is a pure question of fact and in the absence of any perversity, in interference can be called for. Useful reference can be made to a decision of this Court in Baskar v. G. Selvaraj, C.M.A. No. 1620 of 2001, dated 15.4.2009, wherein, this Court held as follows : "Normally, the High Court, in appeal under Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, shall not interfere in a finding on a question of fact. The Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation has given a finding on a question of fact that the deceased Sivakumar was under the employment of the appellant herein. 20. At the outset it may look like a pure question of fact in which this Court cannot interfere in exercise of its appellate powers under Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. However, it has been repeatedly held in a number of cases that a question of fact will assume the character of a substantial question of law if the finding is perverse. If a finding of fact is based on no evidence or based on inadmissible evidence alone or on the basis of the evidence, no reasonable person would have arrived such a conclusion, then such finding, though a finding of fact, shall be elevated to the level of a substantial question of law." 20. Negligence, under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, on the part of the injured, is not a general defence to deny payment of compensation to a workman and such defence can be taken only in exceptional cases, as provided for in the Statute. In the case on hand, neither the 1st opposite party nor the Insurance Company has marked any document, to disprove the version of the appellant-workman, regarding the manner of accident, in which, the appellant sustained injuries, resulting in disablement and in the said circumstances, when the appellant has substantiated his case, as to (1) that he was a workman (2) there was an accident, (3) he suffered injuries or disablement, arising out of and during the course of accident, then he is entitled to seek for appropriate compensation, as per he formula provided under the Motor Vehicles Act. ' 21. In United India Insurance Co. ' 21. In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Ponnuvel, reported in 2010 (4) MLJ 1201 , on a question, as to whether the employer or the insurer can be exonerated from their liability, by raising a plea of negligence on the part of the workman, when the workman sustained a personal injury in the accident, which took place during the course of his employment, this Court, at paragraph 16, held as follows : "16. In the light of the above decisions, the contention that the tortfeasor/first respondent cannot make a claim for compensation, against the insured and the insurer, cannot be countenanced. All that the workman has to prove is that he suffered a personal or bodily injuries, while he was working and that the accident had occurred during the course of and arising out of the employment. If the accident had occurred and that too, while doing his work, the question of mere negligence on the part of the workman, is irrelevant. The employer or insurer, cannot be exonerated from their liability, by raising a plea of negligence on the workman in discharging his duties. Even if the workmen himself was negligence in driving, leading to an accident, a claim for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, would still be maintainable against the employer and the insurer, if the workman sustains a personal injury, as a result of an accident, which took place during the course of an employment. The mere fact that the accident was due to the negligence of a Workman, is not a ground to the employer or the Insurance Company liable to escape from their liability to pay compensation, under the Workmen's Compensation Act. That could be a valid defence under the Motor Vehicles Act." 22. In the case on hand, the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation/Deputy Commissioner of Labour, Salem, upon analysis of evidence, arrived at the conclusion that the appellant has sustained functional disability at 100% and quantified the compensation of Rs. 94,780/-, to be paid by the owner of the vehicle and exonerated the company, on the sole ground that the appellant did not possess an effective and valid driving licence to drive the heavy goods vehicle. Ex.A9 is the driving licence. 94,780/-, to be paid by the owner of the vehicle and exonerated the company, on the sole ground that the appellant did not possess an effective and valid driving licence to drive the heavy goods vehicle. Ex.A9 is the driving licence. At paragraph 24, the Commissioner of Labour, has observed as follows : "The applicant failed to prove the versions of the opposite party-2 to the effect that he was having goods vehicle driving licence. During cross-examination of the applicant by the opposite party-2 on 14-8-1996 stated that the vehicle drove by him is a heavy goods vehicle. Licence Heavy passenger. The owner of the vehicle got his R.C., and D. L., while he was in hospital." 23. As per the award, the vehicle involved was a heavy goods vehicle. It is the contention of the Insurance Company that the appellant ought to have possessed a valid and effective driving licence, i.e. heavy goods vehicle endorsement, otherwise, he is not entitled to get compensation from the Insurance Company. Though in the condonation delay petition, arguments have been advanced by either parties, for and against, on the issue of possession of proper licence, at the time of accident, scrutiny of paragraph 24 of the award, a contention has been made that the 1st opposite party/owner of the offending vehicle, had taken back the Registration Certificate and the driving licence of the appellant, when he was in the hospital. Admittedly, the owner of the vehicle remained ex parte. 24. From the defence taken by the insurer, it could be deduced that the vehicle involved in the accident, was a heavy goods vehicle and that there was no endorsement in Ex. A9, Driving Licence. Paragraph 24 of the award, indicates that the licence possessed by the appellant was for driving heavy passenger vehicle. Even assuming that the appellant did not have an endorsement in Ex. A9, Diving Licence, the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, ought to have adverted to the fact, as to whether, non-possession of an endorsement in the licence, was a fundamental breach, on the part of the 1st opposite party/ owner of the vehicle, which resulted in the accident and on that basis, whether the Insurance Company is entitled to seek for total exoneration from payment of compensation to the appellant. 25. 25. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the abovesaid aspect has not been properly adverted to by the authority under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Reading of Paragraph 24 of the award only indicates that at the time of accident, the appellant did possess a licence for driving a heavy passenger vehicle. It cannot be disputed that there is no much of serious difference in operating a heavy passenger or heavy goods vehicle. The Insurance Company has not adduced any evidence to prove that there was a wilful breach of policy condition by the 1st opposite party/insured, due to which, the accident occurred, so as to extricate themselves from payment of compensation, under the cover of Insurance Policy, marked as Ex. A8. 26. In the abovesaid circumstances, this Court is of the view that unless and until, the Insurance Company has adduced valid and acceptable evidence to prove that there was a wilful violation of the condition of the policy, as held in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaran Singh, reported in 2004 ACJ 1 the Company has to indemnify the insured from payment of compensation, to the accident victim, Therefore, this Court is of the view that when substantial question is involved, the technical objection of inordinate delay, deserves to be ignored. Following the decisions stated supra, the delay in seeking to set aside the ex parte decree, is condoned. 27. The finding exonerating the Insurance Company from payment of compensation to the appellant, is reversed. Both the 1st opposite party, being the owner of the vehicle and the 2nd opposite party, insurer, are jointly and severally liable to pay compensation of Rs. 94,780/- with interest at the rate of 12% per annum. 28. The only question that remains to be considered is, whether the Insurance Company should be saddled with interest for the period of 3261 days in filing the petition to set aside the ex parte order of dismissal. No doubt, this Court has chosen to condone the delay, but fastening liability to pay interest for the delay, caused by the appellant, would cause prejudice to the appellant. Hence, there shall not be any interest for payment of compensation, during the period of delay. No doubt, this Court has chosen to condone the delay, but fastening liability to pay interest for the delay, caused by the appellant, would cause prejudice to the appellant. Hence, there shall not be any interest for payment of compensation, during the period of delay. Nevertheless, the appellant is entitled to interest, from the date of claim, till the date of award and also interest at the rate of 12% per annum, from the date of filing of the condonation petition, i.e., 4-3-2011, till the amount is realised, except for the period of 3261 days. Consequent to the reversal of the liability, the third respondent-Insurance Company is directed to deposit the entire award amount of Rs. 94,780/- with interest at the rate of 12% per annum, as stated above, to the credit of W.C. No. 168 of 1995, dated 2-12-1996, on the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation/Deputy Commissioner of Labour, Salem, within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. On such deposit, the appellant is permitted to withdraw the same, by making necessary applications before the Tribunal. 29. The result, the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is allowed. C.M.P. No. 179 of 2011 is ordered. No costs.