Judgment : 1. C.R.P.(NPD) No. 3517 of 2009 is filed against an order made in C.M.A. No. 9 of 2005 on the file of the Principal District Judge (Co-operative Tribunal), Villupuram dismissing the appeal preferred under Section 152 of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act thereby confirming the order of the second respondent made under Section 87 of the Tamil Nadu Cooperative Societies Act. 2. C.R.P.(NPD) No. 3518 of 2009 is filed against an order of attachment made by the second respondent herein, which is confirmed by the appellate Tribunal. 3. In both these Civil Revision Petitions, the petitioner is one and the same. As the Civil Revision Petition in C.R.P.(NPD) No. 3517 of 2009 is filed challenging the surcharge proceedings, the same is to be considered first as the second C.R.P. arises out of a consequential proceedings, viz., the attachment order. 4. The petitioner was the President of the first respondent Co-operative Bank during the period from October 1996 to 24th May 2001. The elected Board was abolished by the Government on 24.5.2001. The Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Tirukovilur ordered an enquiry under Section 81 of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act. Based on the enquiry report, a surcharge notice dated 1.9.2003 was issued to the petitioner under Section 87(1) of the said Act. He submitted his explanation on 27.8.2004. The Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies passed the surcharge order against the petitioner and 24 others for realising a sum of Rs.17,37,437.17 with interest. Aggrieved against the said surcharge order, the petitioner filed C.M.A. No. 9 of 2005 before the Co-operative Tribunal/ District Judge. The appeal came to be dismissed on 30.1.2009. Aggrieved against the same, the present Civil Revision Petition in C.R.P.(NPD) No. 3517 of 2009 was filed. 5. Mr. M.S. Palaniswamy, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that no misappropriation has been alleged against the petitioner and others. The petitioner had paid only the salary to the employees in pursuant to the settlement that was arrived at between the parties on 17.11.1998 under Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Therefore, such payment in pursuant to 18(1) settlement cannot be considered as a loss to the society. Consequently, Section 87 of the said Act is not attracted especially when there is no wilful negligence either pleaded or proved against the petitioner. Therefore, such payment in pursuant to 18(1) settlement cannot be considered as a loss to the society. Consequently, Section 87 of the said Act is not attracted especially when there is no wilful negligence either pleaded or proved against the petitioner. It is also contended by him that promotions and payment of salary were made by the petitioner only in pursuant to the resolution passed by the Board. If the settlement is not implemented, it would have attracted penal action under Section 29 of the Industrial Disputes Act. He also submitted that the payment made to the employees in pursuant to the said settlement was ratified by the Government through proceedings dated 24.9.2010. He further submitted that except item Nos.3 and 4 of the charges, all other items are payment of salary to the employees. Even in respect of item No. 3, no wilful negligence was attributed on the part of the petitioner. He further submitted that the appellate authority has not given any reasons for confirming the order of the original authority . The Tribunal has not given any finding on merits as well as with regard to the mandatory requirement of wilful negligence to attract Section 87 of the said Act. He also submitted that no action has been taken against the other employees to recover any money till this date and on the other hand all of them are working in the very same Society. In support of his submissions, learned counsel relied on the decisions reported in 2002 (3) LW 185 ( S.Subramanian Vs. The Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies (Housing),Cuddalore and others) and 2009 (4) MLJ 992 (K. Ajay Kumar Gosh and Others Vs. Triubnal for Co-operative Cases (District Judge of Kanyakumari District) Nagercoil and Another) and an unreported decision of this Court made in C.R.P.(NPD) Nos. 1276 of 2009 and 940 of 2010 dated 24.6.2013 . 6. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the first respondent would submit that the entire society was entrusted to the petitioner as the President. Therefore, he should have acted with much more care and diligence. It is also submitted by him that the petitioner has admitted of having issued the blank signed cheques to the Secretary. Therefore, he has acted with carelessness. Learned counsel admits that except item Nos. 3 and 4, all other items are regarding payment of salary to the employees only. Therefore, he should have acted with much more care and diligence. It is also submitted by him that the petitioner has admitted of having issued the blank signed cheques to the Secretary. Therefore, he has acted with carelessness. Learned counsel admits that except item Nos. 3 and 4, all other items are regarding payment of salary to the employees only. He relied on the decision reported in 2004 (7) SCC 112 (A.Umarani Vs. Registrar, Co-operative Societies and Others). The learned counsel, alternatively, submitted that if this Court comes to a conclusion that the appellate authority has not given reasons, then the matter may be remitted back to the appellate authority for fresh consideration. 7. Heard the learned counsel on either side. 8. Both the counsels filed a comparative chart showing the charges framed against the petitioner and his liability therein. From the perusal of the said charges, it is seen that totally 27 charges were framed against the petitioner, out of which charge Nos. 1, 2, 5,6,7,8, 18 and 19 were dropped against him. As against the dropping of those charges, it appears that the Society has not filed any appeal. Thus, dropping of those charges became final and conclusive. 9. In so far as the charge No.3 is concerned, it is stated therein that the Secretary of the Society has misappropriated the fund to the tune of Rs.3,61,002.90 to which the petitioner was held responsible. In so far as Charge No.4 is concerned, here again, the Secretary was charged with loss of fund to the Society to the tune of Rs. 2,01,442.25 to which the petitioner was held responsible. Item No.3 is in respect of purchase of stationery items from 21.11.1996 to 31.3.2001 whereas item No.4 is in respect of hiring the car by the Secretary for collecting the loan amounts from 31.3.1997 to 31.3.2001. While considering these two charges, the Tribunal except by reiterating the findings rendered by the original authority, has not given any independent finding by a detailed discussion of the facts and circumstances as well as the grounds raised by the appellant. The appellate authority has not considered the matter on merits except by reiterating those charges as found in its original order. The same thing had happened in respect of other charges also. The appellate authority has not considered the matter on merits except by reiterating those charges as found in its original order. The same thing had happened in respect of other charges also. A bare perusal of the order of the Tribunal would show that the appellate authority has, in fact, reiterated the findings rendered by the original authority and ultimately at paragraph No.10 of the order has given a finding that notice in the surcharge proceedings was issued to the petitioner and others and their objections had been considered by the original authority. Except by saying so, the appellate authority has not considered the merits of the matter for each charge in detail and given a finding. Needless to say that the appellate authority is also a fact finding authority and is expected to render its own finding after applying his mind independently to the facts, charges and findings of the original authority. 10. In fact, the learned counsel for the first respondent has also admitted that the finding of the appellate authority is without discussion. Learned counsel for the first respondent also pleaded that the matter may be remitted back to the appellate authority for considering the matter afresh. Likewise one of the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the appellate authority has not given any reasons for confirming the order of original authority. 11. Therefore, without expressing any view on the merits and contentions of the rival parties, I am only remitting the matter back to the Tribunal below by setting aside the impugned order for reconsidering the appeal afresh on merits and in accordance with law and pass orders on the same by giving specific finding in respect of each charges levelled against the petitioner. Needless to say that the petitioner as well as the contesting respondents are entitled to raise additional grounds, if required, to substantiate their contentions before the appellate authority. It is also made clear that setting aside the order of the appellate authority and remitting the matter back to him for fresh consideration should not be construed as accepting the contentions of the petitioner, as I have already said that the matter is remitted back without expressing any view on the merits and contentions of rival parties. It is also made clear that setting aside the order of the appellate authority and remitting the matter back to him for fresh consideration should not be construed as accepting the contentions of the petitioner, as I have already said that the matter is remitted back without expressing any view on the merits and contentions of rival parties. It is also to be noted that the appellate authority also being a fact finding authority is required to make a decision based on sound reasons and findings. If no such reasons and findings are available, then the order passed by the appellate authority has to be treated as a nonspeaking order which cannot be sustained. As I am only remitting the matter back to the appellate authority for fresh consideration without expressing any view on the merits and contentions of rival parties, I am not referring to the judgments cited by both sides. 12. Hence, the order of the appellate authority is set aside and the matter is remitted back to the appellate authority for fresh consideration and disposal of the appeal within a period of three months from the date of receipt of copy of this order. With these observations, the Civil Revision Petition in C.R.P. (NPD)No. 3517 of 2009 is allowed. Consequently, the connected M.Ps. are closed. No costs. 13. Since C.R.P.(NPD) No. 3517 of 2009 is allowed and the matter is remitted back to the appellate authority, the order impugned in the other Civil Revision Petition in C.R.P (NPD) No.3518 of 2009 arising out of the attachment proceedings is also set aside and the matter is remitted back to the appellate authority for fresh consideration as stated above. The Civil Revision Petition in C.R.P. (NPD)No. 3518 of 2009 is allowed. Consequently, the connected M.P. is closed. No costs.