JUDGMENT : This revision has been filed by the petitioner being aggrieved of the order passed by the Revisional Court in having dismissed the revision petition which was filed against the order of JMFC, in having discharged respondents on the ground of there being no sanction under Section 197 of Cr.PC. The relevant portion of the order reads as under : - XXX XXX XXX 2. This petition filed by the petitioner is in the nature of second revision. Nothing substantial has been brought in this Court which may show that it is a fit case where the Court should interfere in its extra-ordinary jurisdiction. 3. It is well settled now that to bring a case under Section 482, Cr.PC when a bar is expressly provided by Section 397 (3), Cr.PC the case must be of a sparing nature and it should be shown that miscarriage of justice has been done as laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Kailash Verma Vs. Punjab State Civil Supplies Corporation and another, (2005) 2 SCC 571 :- "5. It may also be noticed that this Court in Rajathi Vs. C. Ganesan said that the power under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code has to be exercised sparingly and such power shall not be utilised as a substitute for second revision. Ordinarily, when a revision has been barred under Section 397 (3) of the Code, the complainant or the accused cannot be allowed to take recourse to revision before the High Court under Section 397 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code as it is prohibited under Section 397 (3) thereof. However, the High Court can entertain a petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code when there is serious miscarriage of justice and abuse of the process of the Court or when mandatory provisions of law were not complied with and when the High Court feel that the inherent jurisdiction is to be exercised to correct the mistake committed by the Revisional Court." 4. This issue has also been discussed in the case of Krishnan and another Vs. Krishnaveni and another, (1997) 4 SCC 241 . Some of the observations made in this regard are reproduced here-in-below for the sake of reference :- "10.
This issue has also been discussed in the case of Krishnan and another Vs. Krishnaveni and another, (1997) 4 SCC 241 . Some of the observations made in this regard are reproduced here-in-below for the sake of reference :- "10. Ordinarily, when revision has been barred by Section 397 (3) of the Code, a person - accused/complainant - cannot be allowed to take recourse to the revision to the High Court under Section 397 (1) or under inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code since it may amount to circumvention of the provisions of Section 397 (3) or Section 397 (2) of the Code. It is seen that the High Court/has suo motu power under Section 401 and continuous supervisory jurisdiction under Section 483 of the Code. So, when the High Court on examination of the record finds that there is grave miscarriage of justice or abuse of process of the Courts or the required statutory procedure has not been complied with or there is failure of justice or order passed or sentence imposed by the Magistrate requires correction, it is but the duty of the High Court to have it corrected at the inception lest grave miscarriage of justice would ensue. It is, therefore, to meet the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process that the High Court is preserved with inherent power and would be justified, under such circumstances, to exercise the inherent power and in an appropriate case even revisional power under Section 397 (1) read with Section 401 of the Code. As stated earlier, it may be exercised sparingly so as to avoid needless multiplicity of procedure, unnecessary delay in trial and protraction of proceedings. The object of criminal trial is to render public justice, to punish the criminal and to see that the trial is concluded expeditiously before the memory of the witness fades out. The recent trend is to delay the trial and threaten the witness or to win over the witness by promise or inducement. These malpractices need to be curbed and public justice can be ensured only when expeditious trial is conducted." 5.
The recent trend is to delay the trial and threaten the witness or to win over the witness by promise or inducement. These malpractices need to be curbed and public justice can be ensured only when expeditious trial is conducted." 5. The facts of this case needs to be analysed in the light of the ratio of the aforesaid judgments which circumscribe the powers vested in this Court under Sections 482,483 of Cr.PC, whenever an attempt is made to again invoke the power of revision though in the garb of petition under Sections 482,483 in view of the bar created under Section 397 (3), Cr.PC once the petitioner has already availed the remedy of revision in respect of his grievance by approaching the Sessions Court. The ratio of the judgment, as quoted above, makes it abundantly clear that while the powers vested in this Court under Sections 482,483, Cr.PC are wide enough to still interfere in a case where even the revisional jurisdiction has already been invoked by the Sessions Court on a petition filed by the petitioner under Section 397 (1) of the Cr.PC, but it has to be exercised only in a case where there is grave miscarriage of justice or abuse of the process of Court or where the required statutory procedure has not been complied with or where there is failure of justice or that the order passed or sentence imposed requires correction. 6. As discussed above, the cognizance has not been taken by the Magistrate against respondent Nos. 2 and 3 only because cognizance against them needed sanction under Section 197 of Cr.PC as they are the Government servants. This is the reason which has been given by the Revisional Court also. I find no infirmity in the aforesaid order which may call for interference by this Court under Section 498 of Cr.PC. 7. Accordingly, this petition is dismissed.