Research › Search › Judgment

Allahabad High Court · body

2013 DIGILAW 3135 (ALL)

Rupai and Others v. D. D. C. and Others

2013-12-20

RAM SURAT RAM (MAURYA)

body2013
Ram Surat Ram (Maurya), J. 1.Heard Sri R.B. Tripathi, counsel for the petitioners and Sri Shashi Ranjan Srivastava, for respondents-3 to 5. 2.The writ petition has been filed against the order of Deputy Director of Consolidation (respondent-1) dated 09.09.1985, passed in title proceedings, under U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 3.The dispute relates to the land recorded in basic consolidation year khatas 36 and 78 of village Pokhar Bhinda tappa Gaura, pargana Silhat, district Deoria. Rupai (petitioner-1) (hereinafter after referred to as the petitioner) filed objections (registered as Case Nos. 1282 and 1283) under Section 9-A (2) of the Act, claiming co-tenancy of 1/2 share in the land in dispute. The petitioner took the case that the land in dispute belonged to Ram Lal, who left behind him his son Rupai and grand sons Abhiraj, Patiraj and Atiraj sons of Swami Nath (respondents-3 to 5) (hereinafter referred to as the respondents). The petitioner has 1/2 share in the disputed land according to the pedigree. The respondents contested the case on the ground that Rupai was not the son of Ram Lal. Rupai was born to Smt. Mudli with Jagesar of village Karaundi, tappa Kachuar, pargana Salempur Majhauli, district Deoria. Jagesar divorced Smt. Mudli, then she remarried to Ram Lal. At the time of remarriage of Smt. Mudli to Ram Lal, Rupai came with Smt. Mudli to the house of Ram Lal. The name of Rupai was Rekha at village Karaundi, tappa Kachuar, pargana Salempur Majhauli, district Deoria. After becoming major Rupai went to village Karaundi, tappa Kachuar, pargana Salempur Majhauli, district Deoria and began to live with his father Jagesar and after death of Jagesar, inherited his properties and his name was mutated in the revenue record. 4.The case was tried by Consolidation Officer (respondent-2). Apart from documentary evidence, the petitioner examined Rupai as PW-1 and the respondents examined Smt. Tetri daughter of Ram Lal as DW-1, Narain son of Ram Swarup as DW-2 and Abhiraj as DW-3. The Consolidation Officer, by order dated 16.06.1975, held that Rupai filed un-certified copies of the Voter List and Kutumb Register. Age of Rupai has been mentioned as 45 years in Voter List and 63 years in Kutumb Register. The name of Rupai has been recorded in the khatauni 1376 F-1378 F, by the order of Naib Tahsildar dated 24.12.1970 passed in Case No. 940. Age of Rupai has been mentioned as 45 years in Voter List and 63 years in Kutumb Register. The name of Rupai has been recorded in the khatauni 1376 F-1378 F, by the order of Naib Tahsildar dated 24.12.1970 passed in Case No. 940. The respondents filed documents showing that name of Rekha was mutated as son of Jagesar of village Karaundi, tappa Kachuar, pargana Salempur Majhauli, district Deoria, by order dated 13.12.1973. In the Complaint Case No. 202 of 1972, Munsif Magistrate Deoria found that Rupai of village Pokhar Bhinda and Rekha of village Karaundi, tappa Kachuar, pargana Salempur Majhauli, district Deoria were one and same person, which was proved from Finger Print Expert report filed in the complaint case. From the oral evidence of Smt. Tetri and Narain it was proved that Rupai was born to Smt. Mudli with the bedlock of Jagesar of village Karaundi, tappa Kachuar, pargana Salempur Majhauli, district Deoria and after divorce, when Smt. Mudli remarried to Ram Lal, Rupai came with her and was brought up by Smt. Mudli and Ram Lal. After becoming major, Rupai went to village Karaundi, tappa Kachuar, pargana Salempur Majhauli, district Deoria, where he inherited the properties of Jagesar in the name of Rekha, Rekha and Rupai was one and same person. On these findings, Consolidation Officer, by order dated 16.06.1975, directed for deleting the name of Rupai, from the khatas in dispute and the names of the respondents alone were recorded. 5.Rupai filed an appeal (registered as Appeal No. 596/1083) from the aforesaid order. The appeal was heard by Assistant Settlement Officer Consolidation, Deoria, who by order dated 19.12.1975, held that from Voter List, Kutumb Register and Riksha Driving License issued by Municipality Deoria, it was proved that Rupai was son of Ram Lal. The order of Munsif Magistrate Deoria, passed in Complaint Case No. 202 of 1972 was not proved in accordance with law. Smt. Tetri was younger to Rupai as such her statement was not relevant to prove parentage of Rupai. Apart from oral evidence, there was no evidence to prove that Rupai came with his mother at the time of her remarriage to Ram Lal. The order passed in the proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C. was not relevant. Smt. Tetri was younger to Rupai as such her statement was not relevant to prove parentage of Rupai. Apart from oral evidence, there was no evidence to prove that Rupai came with his mother at the time of her remarriage to Ram Lal. The order passed in the proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C. was not relevant. On these findings, the appeal was allowed and order of Consolidation Officer dated 16.06.1975 was set aside and it was held that Rupai was son of Ram Lal and had 1/2 share in disputed khatas. 6.The respondents filed a revision (registered as Revision No. 266/629) from the aforesaid order. The revision was heard by Deputy Director of Consolidation, who by order dated 09.09.1985 held that Rupai filed un-certified copies of Voter List of the year 1959 in which his age has been mentioned as 45 years while in Register Part-II of the year 1956, his age has been mentioned as 63 years. The name of Rupai has been recorded in khatauni 1376 F-1378 F, by the order of Naib Tahsildar dated 24.12.1970 passed in Case No. 940. The respondents filed documents showing that the name of Rekha was mutated as son of Jagesar of village Karaundi, tappa Kachuar, pargana Salempur Majhauli, district Deoria, by order dated 13.12.1973. In the Complaint Case No. 202 of 1972, Munsif Magistrate Deoria found that Rupai of village Pokhar Bhinda and Rekha of village Karaundi, tappa Kachuar, pargana Salempur Majhauli, district Deoria were one and same person, which was proved from Finger Print Expert report filed in the complaint case. In the rextract of Register maintaining the names of the citizen of the village, which has been filed in revision, the name of Rupai was not mentioned. From the oral evidence of Smt. Tetri and Narain it was proved that Rupai was born to Smt. Mudli from Jagesar of village Karaundi, tappa Kachuar, pargana Salempur Majhauli, district Deoria and after divorce, when Smt. Mudli remarried to Ram Lal, Rupai came with her and was brought up by Smt. Mudli and Ram Lal. On these findings, the revision was allowed, by order dated 09.09.1985. Hence this writ petition has been filed. Earlier the writ petition was allowed by this Court by judgment dated 25.2.2002, holding that Deputy Director of Consolidation had no jurisdiction to set aside the findings of facts recorded by Settlement Officer Consolidation after reappraisal of the evidence. On these findings, the revision was allowed, by order dated 09.09.1985. Hence this writ petition has been filed. Earlier the writ petition was allowed by this Court by judgment dated 25.2.2002, holding that Deputy Director of Consolidation had no jurisdiction to set aside the findings of facts recorded by Settlement Officer Consolidation after reappraisal of the evidence. However, the judgment of this Court has been set aside by Supreme Court by judgment dated 03.05.2011 and the matter has been remanded to this Court for fresh decision on merit. 7.The counsel for the petitioners submitted that apart from oral evidence, there is no evidence on record to prove that Rupai was son of Jagesar. On the other hand from Voter List, Kutumb Register, Riksha Driving License and order of Naib Tahsildar dated 24.12.1970 filed by the petitioner it was proved that Rupai was son of Ram Lal. Oral evidence of Smt. Tetri and Narian were hear-say and not admissible in evidence. Smt. Tetri admitted that she was 10 years younger to Rupai as such she cannot say that Rupai came with mother Smt. Mudli at the time of her remarriage to Ram Lal. There is no evidence to prove that Smt. Mudli was ever married to Jagesar. No witness of the village of Jagesar or maternal place of Mudli was examined to prove her marriage to Jagesar. Judgment of the complaint case was not admissible in evidence for the purposes of title suit. The alleged Finger Print Expert report miserably failed to prove that the photographs of the finger prints. Deputy Director of Consolidation had no jurisdiction to set aside the findings of facts recorded by Settlement Officer Consolidation after reappraisal of the evidence, without pointing out any error in it. He relied upon the judgment of Supreme Court in Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad, AIR 2001 SC 386 judgments of this Court in Sri Kishun v. DDC and others, 2001 (92) RD 824, Aina Devi Vs. Bachan Singh, AIR 1980 All. 174 and judgments Supreme Court in Dolgovinda Parich v. Nirmal Charan Misra, AIR 1959 SC 1954 and State of Bihar Vs. Radha Krishna Singh, (1983) 3 SCC 118 . 8.In reply to the aforesaid arguments, the counsel for the respondents submitted that statement of Smt. Tetri, who is daughter of Ram Lal is admissible in evidence under Section 50 of the Evidence Act. Radha Krishna Singh, (1983) 3 SCC 118 . 8.In reply to the aforesaid arguments, the counsel for the respondents submitted that statement of Smt. Tetri, who is daughter of Ram Lal is admissible in evidence under Section 50 of the Evidence Act. Rupai, in his statement, admitted that at the time of remarriage of Mudli to Ram Lal, he was two years old. It was admitted to the parties that Smt. Mudli at the time of her remarriage to Ram Lal brought Rupai along with her and Rupai was brought up by Smt. Mudali and Ram Lal and after attaining the age of majority he went to the house of Jagesar as such Voter List, Kutumb Register and Riksha Driving License are not relevant to prove that Rupai was son of Ram Lal. Admission of Rupai can be relied upon against him. When Rupai got his name mutated as the son of Ram Lal by order dated 24.12.1970, then the respondents filed a criminal complaint (registered as Complaint Case No. 202 of 1972) under Section 419 and 420 I.P.C. Munsif Magistrate Deoria took the finger prints of Rupai (the petitioner) and Rekha son of Jagesar of village Karaundi and got it examined by Finger Print Expert, who submitted report that finger prints of Rupai (the petitioner) and Rekha son of Jagesar of village Karaundi were the same. Munsif Magistrate Deoria found that Rupai of village Pokhar Bhinda and Rekha of village Karaundi, tappa Kachuar, pargana Salempur Majhauli, district Deoria were one and same person. The judgment of Munsif Magistrate Deoria and Finger Print Expert report have been filed in this case also and have been relied upon by respondents-1 and 2. Assistant Settlement Officer Consolidation has illegally held that these documents were not proved and ignored them and based his findings only upon Voter List and Kutumb Register although certified copies of these documents were not filed and no reliance could have been placed on it. In any case, no one has been examined to prove the correctness of the entries in the Voter List and Kutumb Register. Deputy Director of Consolidation has rightly set aside the judgment of Assistant Settlement Officer Consolidation. No interference is required by this Court. 9.I have considered the arguments of the parties and examined the record. In any case, no one has been examined to prove the correctness of the entries in the Voter List and Kutumb Register. Deputy Director of Consolidation has rightly set aside the judgment of Assistant Settlement Officer Consolidation. No interference is required by this Court. 9.I have considered the arguments of the parties and examined the record. First question arises for consideration is the scope of jurisdiction of Deputy Director of Consolidation under Section 48 of the Act to reappraise the oral and documentary evidence and record his independent finding. Section 48 of the Act is quoted below:- "48. Revision and reference.--(1) The Director of Consolidation may call for and examine the record of any case decided or proceedings taken by any subordinate authority for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the regularity of the proceedings; or as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any order other than an interlocutory order passed by such authority in the case or proceedings and may, after allowing the parties concerned an opportunity of being heard, make such order in the case or proceedings as he thinks fit. Explanation (3).--The power under this section to examine the correctness, legality or propriety of any order includes the power to examine any finding, whether of fact or law, recorded by any subordinate authority and also includes the power to re-appreciate any oral or documentary evidence. (Added by U.P. Act No. 3 of 2002 w.e.f. 10.11.1980) 10. Supreme Court in Sheo Nand Vs. DDC and others, AIR 2000 SC 1141 held that section 48 gives very wide powers to the Deputy Director of Consolidation. It enables him either suo motu on his own motion or on the application of any person to consider the propriety, legality, regularity and correctness of all the proceedings held under the Act and to pass appropriate orders. These powers have been conferred on the Deputy Director in the widest terms so that the claims of the parties under the Act may be effectively adjudicated upon and determined so as to confer finality to the rights of the parties and the revenue records may be prepared accordingly. These powers have been conferred on the Deputy Director in the widest terms so that the claims of the parties under the Act may be effectively adjudicated upon and determined so as to confer finality to the rights of the parties and the revenue records may be prepared accordingly. Normally, the Deputy Director, in exercise of his powers, is not expected to disturb the findings of fact recorded concurrently by the Consolidation Officer and the Settlement Officer (Consolidation), but where the findings are perverse, in the sense that they are not supported by the evidence brought on record by the parties or that they are against the weight of evidence, it would be the duty of the Deputy Director to scrutinise the whole case again so as to determine the correctness, legality or propriety of the orders passed by the authorities subordinate to him. In a case, like the present, where the entries in the revenue records are fictitious or forged or they were recorded in contravention of the statutory provisions contained in the U.P. Land Records Manual or other allied statutory provisions, the Deputy Director would have full power under Section 48 to reappraise or re-evaluate the evidence-on-record so as to finally determine the rights of the parties by excluding forged and fictitious revenue entries or entries not made in accordance with law. 11. The matter again came for consideration in Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad, AIR 2001 SC 386 , Supreme Court after taking note of the case of Sheo Nand (supra) held that it is clear that notwithstanding the fact that Section 48 has been couched in wide terms, it only permits interference, where the findings of the subordinate authority are perverse in the sense that they are not supported by the evidence brought on record or they are against the law or where they suffer from the vice of procedural irregularity. 12. Supreme Court again in Guljar Singh v. Dy. Director (Consolidation), (2009) 12 SCC 590 , relied upon the case of Sheo Nand (supra) and held that from the above quoted observations of this Court in Sheo Nand it is clear that the DDC has wide range of discretionary powers mandated under the Act by which he could proceed to modify even the basic year entries if found to be wrongly derived at. Therefore, the contention that the DDC could not have modified the basic year entries was not correct. 13.Due to some contradictory decisions, Explanation (3) has been added, clarifying the powers of Deputy Director of Consolidation under Section 48 of the Act to examine the correctness, legality or propriety of any order includes the power to re-appreciate any oral or documentary evidence. In the present case, Supreme Court in the judgment dated 03.05.2011, specifically relied upon Explanation (3) and set aside the earlier judgment of this Court. When the Court of superior jurisdiction, clothes with the powers to re-appreciate any oral or documentary evidence, has to form its opinion regarding issue of a fact, it has to re-examine and reassess the evidence on record. If without examining the evidence on record, it looks into the reasons and findings of the subordinate court its mind may be prejudiced. When it comes to a contrary conclusion, after reassessing of the evidence on record, judicial discipline requires that before setting aside the findings of subordinate court, the reasons recorded by the subordinate court, should also be considered. 14.When the findings are based upon assessment of oral evidence then findings of the trial court, which had an occasion to watch the demeanour of the witnesses have to be given weight. Supreme Court in Sarju Ram Deo Sahu Persad Vs. Jwaleshwari Pratap Narain Singh, AIR 1951 SC 120 , Radha Prasad Singh Vs. Gajadhar Singh, AIR 1960 SC 115 , Madhusudan Das Vs. Narainibai, AIR 1983 SC 114 and Jagdish Singh Vs. Madhuri Devi, AIR 2008 SC 2296 held that the decision of which depends upon the appreciation of the oral evidence adduced in the case, in such cases, the appellate court has got to bear in mind that it has not the advantage which the trial Judge had in having the witnesses before him and of observing the manner in which they deposed in court. This certainly does not mean that when an appeal lies on facts, the appellate court is not competent to reverse a finding of fact arrived at by the trial Judge. This certainly does not mean that when an appeal lies on facts, the appellate court is not competent to reverse a finding of fact arrived at by the trial Judge. The rule is--and it is nothing more than a rule of practice--that when there is conflict of oral evidence of the parties on any matter in issue and the decision hinges upon the credibility of the witnesses, then unless there is some special feature about the evidence of a particular witness which has escaped the trial Judge's notice or there is a sufficient balance of improbability to displace his opinion as to where the credibility lies, the appellate court should not interfere with the finding of the trial Judge on a question of fact." 15.Thus consideration of the findings and reasons of the subordinate court is not a legal compulsion but is a judicial disciple. Where the findings are perverse in the sense that they are not supported by the evidence brought on record or they are against the law or where they suffer from the vice of procedural irregularity, Deputy Director of Consolidation, who has been specifically conferred with the powers to re-appreciate any oral and documentary evidence, can record its own findings. The order of Deputy Director of Consolidation cannot be set aside, in exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, only for the reason that it has not considered the reasons recorded by subordinate authority, if the judgment is otherwise not illegal. In case, of contrary view, legislative intention of conferring wide powers under Section 48 of the Act, to reassess the entire evidence on record, will be frustrated. The arguments of the counsel for the petitioner that Deputy Director of Consolidation has no jurisdiction to re-appreciate oral or documentary evidence, is not liable to be accepted. 16. The other arguments raised by the counsel for the petitioners that statement of Smt. Tetri and Narian, being hearsay were not admissible in evidence, is concerned admittedly Smt. Tetri was daughter of Ram Lal born to Smt. Mudli. Thus she was a member of family, she had special means of knowledge by conduct that Rupai was son of Jagesar as informed by her parents. Her statement is admissible in evidence, under Section 50 of the Evidence Act. Thus she was a member of family, she had special means of knowledge by conduct that Rupai was son of Jagesar as informed by her parents. Her statement is admissible in evidence, under Section 50 of the Evidence Act. Supreme Court in Dolgovinda Parich v. Nirmal Charan Misra, AIR 1959 SC 1954 held that Section 50 affords an exceptional way of proving a relationship and by no means prevents any person from stating a fact of which he or she has special means of knowledge. Supreme Court again in M. Yogendra v. Leelamma N., (2009) 15 SCC 184 , held that Section 50 of the Evidence Act in that sense is an exception to the other provisions of the Act where a persons who could depose in respect of relationship on the basic of the conduct. The evidence Smt. Tetri, member of the family is admissible. 17. Supreme Court again in State of Bihar Vs. Radha Krishna Singh, (1983) 3 SCC 118 , held that before, however, opening this chapter it may be necessary to restate the norms and the principles governing the proof of a pedigree by oral evidence in the light of which the said evidence would have to be examined by us. It is true that in considering the oral evidence regarding a pedigree a purely mathematical approach cannot be made because where a long line of descent has to be proved spreading over a century, it is obvious that the witnesses who are examined to depose to the genealogy would have to depend on their special means of knowledge which may have come to them through their ancestors but, at the same time, there is a great risk and a serious danger involved in relying solely on the evidence of witnesses given from pure memory because the witnesses who are interested normally have a tendency to draw more from their imagination or turn and twist the facts which they may have heard from their ancestors in order to help the parties for whom they are deposing. The court must, therefore safeguard that the evidence of such witnesses may not be accepted as is based purely on imagination or an imaginary or illusory source of information rather than special means of knowledge as required by law. The court must, therefore safeguard that the evidence of such witnesses may not be accepted as is based purely on imagination or an imaginary or illusory source of information rather than special means of knowledge as required by law. The oral testimony of the witnesses on this matter is bound to be hearsay and their evidence is admissible as an exception to the general rule where hearsay evidence is not admissible. This is culled out from the law contained in clause (5) of Section 32 of the Evidence Act which must be construed to the letter and to the spirit in which it was passed. In order to appreciate the evidence of such witnesses, the following principles should be kept in mind : "(1) The relationship or the connection however close it may be, which the witness bears to the persons whose pedigree is sought to be deposed by him. (2) The nature and character of the special means of knowledge through which the witness has come to know about the pedigree. (3) The interested nature of the witness concerned. (4) The precaution which must be taken to rule out any false statement made by the witness post litem motam or one which is derived not by means of special knowledge but purely from his imagination, and (5)The evidence of the witness must be substantially corroborated as far as time and memory admit." 18. Rupai in his statement, himself admitted that the time of remarriage of his mother Smt. Mudli to Ram Lal, he was two years old. The word "admission" has been defined under Section 17 of the Evidence Act, 1872 as "an admission is a statement, oral or documentary or contained in electronic form, which suggests any inference as to any fact in issue or relevant fact, and which is made by any of the persons and under the circumstances, hereinafter mentioned". These circumstances are enumerated under Sections 18 to 30 of the Evidence Act, 1872. Section 59 of the Evidence Act, 1872, provides that all facts, except the contents of documents may be proved by oral evidence. Thus the admission comes in three ways, namely the admissions which are admissible under Section 18 to 30 of the Evidence Act, admission in pleadings and admission in oral evidence of the witness in the Court. Section 59 of the Evidence Act, 1872, provides that all facts, except the contents of documents may be proved by oral evidence. Thus the admission comes in three ways, namely the admissions which are admissible under Section 18 to 30 of the Evidence Act, admission in pleadings and admission in oral evidence of the witness in the Court. The admission of the categories falling under Section 18 to 30 of the Evidence Act are required to be proved according to the provisions enumerated therein. However admission of the pleadings and the witnesses can be directly relied upon as held by Supreme Court in Uttam Singh Duggal Vs. United Bank of India, AIR 2000 SC 2740 and Karam Kapahi Vs. Lal Chand Public Charritable Trust, AIR 2010 SC 2077 . 19. The other arguments raised by the counsel for the petitioner that judgment of the criminal court in complaint case and in the proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C. were not admissible in evidence for the purposes of title suit. So far as order passed in the proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C. is concerned, Supreme Court in Shanti Kumar Panda v. Shakuntala Devi, (2004) 1 SCC 438 , held that a decision given under Section 145 of the Code has relevance and is admissible in evidence to show: (i) that there was a dispute relating to a particular property; (ii) that the dispute was between the particular parties; (iii) that such dispute led to the passing of a preliminary order under Section 145(1) or an attachment under Section 146(1), on the given date; and (iv) that the Magistrate found one of the parties to be in possession or fictional possession of the disputed property on the date of the preliminary order. In respect of judgment of criminal court, Supreme Court in Seth Ramdayal Jat v. Laxmi Prasad, (2009) 11 SCC 545 , held that it is now almost well settled that save and except for Section 43 of the Evidence Act which refers to Sections 40, 41 and 42 thereof, a judgment of a criminal court shall not be admissible in a civil suit. What, however, would be admissible is the admission made by a party in a previous proceeding. Thus the order passed in the proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C. is relevant to prove possession of the respondents over the land in dispute. What, however, would be admissible is the admission made by a party in a previous proceeding. Thus the order passed in the proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C. is relevant to prove possession of the respondents over the land in dispute. Finger Print Expert report obtained in Criminal Complaint Case is admissible to prove that Rupai and Rekha were one and same person. 20. In this case, the petitioner relied upon Kutumb Register of the year 1956, Voter List of the year 1959, Riksha Driving License and mutation order. So far as Voter List and Kutumb Register are concerned, it was admitted to the respondents that Rupai came along with Smt. Mudli at the time of her remarriage to Ram Lal and was brought up by them and after becoming major he went to village Karaundi and began to reside there with Jagesar. Thus residing of Rupai along with Ram Lal and Smt. Mudli in village Pokherbhinda was admitted. But the entry of parentage of Rupai in these documents are not admitted. Apart from the fact that Voter List and Kutumb Register were not certified copies and not admissible in evidence, the petitioner could not examine any witness to prove the correctness of the entries. The respondents filed mutation order dated 23.12.1973 showing that name of Rekha was mutated after death of Jagesar as his son. From the Finger Print Expert report it was proved that Rekha and Rupai was one and same person. Statement of Smt. Tetri was admissible in evidence under Section 50 of the Evidence Act, by which, it was proved that Rupai came along with Smt. Mudli at the time of her remarriage to Ram Lal and was brought up by them and after becoming major he went to village Karaundi and began to reside there with Jagesar. This fact has been admitted by Rupai in his statement. Assistant Settlement Officer Consolidation totally ignored the evidence of the respondents. Deputy Director of Consolidation considered the entire evidence on record. Findings of fact recorded by Deputy Director of Consolidation do not suffer from any illegality and no interference is required by this Court. 21. In view of the aforesaid discussions, the writ petition has no merit and is dismissed.