JUDGMENT : Bhaskar Bhattacharya, J. These two Letters Patent Appeals were heard together and are disposed of by the common judgment as common questions of law are involved in these appeals. 2. LPA No. 724 of 2013 is at the instance of the employer, the Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation, through Rajkot Divisional Controller, and is directed against an order dated 23rd January 2013 passed by a learned Single Judge of this court in SCA No. 15648 of 2012 thereby modifying the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal in a Reference under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. The learned Single Judge was of the view that the learned Tribunal was too much lenient in favour of the employee and, therefore, modified the award by imposing punishment of stoppage of three increments with future effect. The Tribunal, however, passed an award by placing the employee on his original pay-scale of Conductor with stoppage of two increments with future effect. 2.1 Being dissatisfied, the LPA No. 724 of 2013 has been filed by the employer. 3. In LPA No. 735 of 2013, the selfsame employer, through Vadodara Divisional Controller, has challenged an order passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court dated 12th January 2012 in SCA No. 24351 of 2006 by which the learned Single Judge modified the award passed by the Labour Court by imposing penalty of stoppage of one increment with future effect. The Labour Court, by the award impugned, however, directed reinstatement of the employee to his original post with the continuity of service and without back wages. 3.1 Being dissatisfied, the employer has come up with the LPA No. 735 of 2013 for restoration of the original order of dismissal. 4. It may not be out of place to mention here that in the cause title of the Special Civil Applications, out of which these two appeals arise, those applications were described as one under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India where the Tribunal or the Labour Court, whose order was sought to be challenged, was not made party. In SCA No. 24351 of 2006, out of which LPA NO. In SCA No. 24351 of 2006, out of which LPA NO. 735 of 2013 arises, the appellant prayed for a writ of mandamus or writ of certiorari or any appropriate writ for quashing the award of the Labour Court whereas in SCA No. 15648 of 2012, out of which LPA No. 724 of 2013 arises, the appellant prayed for certiorari or any other appropriate writ. 5. In our opinion, these Letters Patent Appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are not maintainable in view of the fact that the proceedings out of which the present appeals arise cannot be said to be a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India but in fact, the learned Single Judge really exercised jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India by modifying the award. 6. Although Mr. Rawal, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant in these matters, strenuously contended before us that the learned Single Judge really exercised jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by issuing a writ of certiorari, we are not convinced by such submission for the following reasons:- 7. In order to invoke writ jurisdiction for certiorari against an order of Tribunal and/or Labour Court, such proceedings must be an original proceeding and where the award of an Industrial Tribunal or Labour Court is challenged, the only writ that can be invoked under Article 226 of the constitution is the one of certiorari. It is now well-settled law that in order to maintain a writ-application for certiorari against an order of a Tribunal and/or Labour Court, the Tribunal and/or the Labour Court whose order is sought to be quashed must be made a party as laid down in the four-judge-bench decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Udit Narayan Singh v. Board Of Revenue Reported in AIR 1963 SC 786 . The following observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Udit Narayan Singh [supra] are relevant and are quoted below:- "The next question is, what is the nature of a writ of certiorari" What relief can a petitioner in such a writ obtain from the Court? Certiorari lies to remove for the purpose of quashing the proceedings of inferior courts of record or other persons or bodies exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Certiorari lies to remove for the purpose of quashing the proceedings of inferior courts of record or other persons or bodies exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. It is not necessary for the purpose of this appeal to notice the distinction between a writ of certiorari and a writ in the nature of certiorari; in either case the High Court directs an inferior tribunal or authority to transmit to itself the record of proceedings pending therein for scrutiny and, if necessary, for quashing the same. It is well settled law that a certiorari lies only in respect of a judicial or quasi-judicial act as distinguished from an administrative act. The following classic test laid down by Lord Justice Atkin, as he then was, in The King v. Electricity Commrs., (1924) 1 KB 171 and followed by this Court in more than one decision clearly brings out the meaning of the concept of judicial act: "Wherever any body of persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects, and having the duty to act judicially, act in excess of their legal authority they are subject to the controlling jurisdiction of the King's Bench Division exercised in these writs." Lord Justice Slesser in The King v. London County Council, (1931) 2 KB 215(243) dissected the concept of judicial act laid down by Atkin, L. J., into the following heads in his Judgment: "wherever any body of persons (1) having legal authority (2) to determine questions affecting rights of subjects and (3) having the duty to act judicially (4) act in excess of their legal authority -a writ of certiorari may issue." It will be seen from the ingredients of judicial act that there must be a duty to act judicially. A tribunal, therefore, exercising a judicial or quasi-judicial act cannot decide against the rights of a party without giving him a hearing or an opportunity to represent his case in the manner known to law. If the provisions of a particular statute or rules made thereunder do not provide for it principles of natural justice demand it. Any such order made without hearing the affected parties would be void. If the provisions of a particular statute or rules made thereunder do not provide for it principles of natural justice demand it. Any such order made without hearing the affected parties would be void. As a writ of certiorari will be granted to remove the record of proceedings of an inferior tribunal or authority exercising judicial or quasi-judicial acts, ex hypothesi it follows that the High Court in exercising its jurisdiction shall also act judicially in disposing of the proceedings before it. It is implicit in such a proceeding that a tribunal or authority which is directed to transmit the records must be a party in the writ proceedings, for, without giving notice to it, the record of proceedings cannot be brought to the High Court. It is said that in an appeal against the decree of a subordinate court, the court that passed the decree need not be made a party and on the same parity of reasoning it is contended that a tribunal need not also be made a party in a writ proceeding. But there is an essential distinction between an appeal against a decree of a subordinate court and a writ of certiorari to quash the order of a tribunal or authority: in the former, the proceedings are regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure and the court making the order is directly subordinate to the appellate court and ordinarily acts within its bounds, though sometimes wrongly or even illegally, but in the case of the latter, a writ of certiorari is issued to quash the order of a tribunal which is ordinarily outside the appellate or revisional jurisdiction of the court and the order is set aside on the ground that the tribunal or authority acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. In this case, the Board of Revenue and the Commissioner of Excise were rightly made parties in the writ petition." (Emphasis supplied). 8. In the case before us, as pointed out earlier, the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal has not been made party, and thus, it is not legally possible to issue a writ of certiorari in the absence of the Tribunal and/or the Labour Court, and, therefore, the learned Single Judge really exercised power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India by modifying the order passed by the Tribunal and/or the Labour Court. 9. 9. Moreover, in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chandra Rai reported in AIR 2003 SC 3044 , the Supreme Court highlighted the special characteristic of the writ of certiorari and distinguished the same from the power of superintendence in the following way: "24. The difference between Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution was well brought out in Umaji Keshao Meshram and others v. Smt. Radhikabai and another, (1986) Supp SCC 401. Proceedings under Article 226 are in exercise of the original jurisdiction of the High Court while proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution are not original but only supervisory. Article 227 substantially reproduces the provisions of Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915 excepting that the power of superintendence has been extended by this Article to tribunals as well. Though the power is akin to that of an ordinary court of appeal, yet the power under Article 227 is intended to be used sparingly and only in appropriate cases for the purpose of keeping the subordinate courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. The power may be exercised in cases occasioning grave injustice or failure of justice such as when (i) the court or tribunal has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have, (ii) has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have, such failure occasioning a failure of justice, and (iii) the jurisdiction though available is being exercised in a manner which tantamounts to overstepping the limits of jurisdiction. 25. Upon a review of decided cases and a survey of the occasions wherein the High Courts have exercised jurisdiction to command a writ of certiorari or to exercise supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 in the given facts and circumstances in a variety of cases, it seems that the distinction between the two jurisdictions stands almost obliterated in practice. Probably, this is the reason why it has become customary with the lawyers labelling their petitions as one common under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, though such practice has been deprecated in some judicial pronouncement. Without entering into niceties and technicality of the subject, we venture to state the broad general difference between the two jurisdictions. Probably, this is the reason why it has become customary with the lawyers labelling their petitions as one common under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, though such practice has been deprecated in some judicial pronouncement. Without entering into niceties and technicality of the subject, we venture to state the broad general difference between the two jurisdictions. Firstly, the writ of certiorari is an exercise of its original jurisdiction by the High Court; exercise of supervisory jurisdiction is not an original jurisdiction and in this sense it is akin to appellate revisional or corrective jurisdiction. Secondly, in a writ of certiorari, the record of the proceedings having been certified and sent up by the inferior court or tribunal to the High Court, the High Court if inclined to exercise its jurisdiction, may simply annul or quash the proceedings and then do no more. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only quash or set aside the impugned proceedings, judgment or order but it may also make such directions as the facts and circumstances of the case may warrant, may be by way of guiding the inferior court or tribunal as to the manner in which it would now proceed further or afresh as commended to or guided by the High Court. In appropriate cases the High Court, while exercising supervisory jurisdiction, may substitute such a decision of its own in place of the impugned decision, as the inferior court or tribunal should have made. Lastly, the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is capable of being exercised on a prayer made by or on behalf of the party aggrieved; the supervisory jurisdiction is capable of being exercised suo motu as well." (Emphasis supplied). 10. In the cases before us, the fact that the learned Single Judge has not exercised jurisdiction of certiorari will appear from the fact that these are not the cases where the learned Single Judge has simply annulled or quashed the proceedings and did no more; on the other hand, the learned Single Judge has, in fact, modified the award of the Tribunal and/or Labour Court and substituted his own view which the Tribunal ought to have adopted and this can be done only in exercise of power of superintendence. The above fact is also an indication that the learned Single Judge really exercised jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India; otherwise, the modification of the awards of the Tribunal and/or Labour Court below by substituting those with the own views of the learned Single Judge was not possible. 11. In a recent case of Revaben Wd/o Motibhai v. V.P. Patel reported in 2013 (1) GLH 440 , this Division Bench has highlighted the above question among others in detail. 12. Mr. Rawal, however, tried to convince us that another Division Bench of this Court in the case of Principal S. V. Doshi Girls High School And Another v. Lilaben Somabhai Gadasa reported in ( 2012 (2) GLH 428 ), took a different view that even for issue of a writ in the nature of certiorari against the orders of courts and tribunals subordinate to High court, those tribunals or courts should not be made party in the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution, and such being the position, we should follow the said decision which is earlier to the passing of the latter decision in the case of Revaben Wd/o Motibhai [supra]. 13. It appears that in the case of Principal S. V. Doshi Girls High School And Another [supra], the Division Bench although referred to the decision in the case of Udit Narayan Singh [supra], yet, totally ignored the portion of the observations made therein which has been quoted by us hereinabove. Moreover, the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Bhagyodaya Co-Operative Bank Ltd. v. Natvarlal K Patel Reported 2011 (3) GLH [FB] 89 has specifically held that in the absence of the Tribunal as party, a writ of certiorari cannot be invoked and the said Full Bench decision is very much binding upon us. On that ground also, we are unable to accept the principle laid down in the case of Principal S.V. Doshi Girls High School And Another [supra] as a valid precedent. 14. On consideration of the above facts and the decisions, we are of the view that in the cases before us, the learned Single Judge really exercised the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution of India as it was not possible for the learned Single Judge to issue a writ of certiorari in the absence of the Tribunal and/or Labour Court. Such being the position, the proceedings before the learned Single Judge was not an original proceeding but a proceeding of supervisory jurisdiction where the award of the Tribunal and/or Labour Court was substituted by that of the learned Single Judge, and in such circumstances, Clause 15 of the Letters Patent is not attracted. 15. These appeals are thus dismissed as not maintainable. In view of the dismissal of the appeals, the connected Civil Applications do not survive and stand dismissed accordingly. 15.1 We, however, make it clear that we have not gone into the merits of the cases and the dismissal of these appeals will not stand in the way of the appellants in seeking appropriate remedy before the appropriate forum in accordance with law. Appeal dismissed.