JUDGMENT A.S. OKA, J.: 1. By this petition, the petitioner has taken an exception to the order dated 16th October, 2012, passed in exercise of powers conferred under Subsection 2 of Section 3 of the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers, Drugoffenders and Dangerous Persons and Video Pirates Act, 1981 (Mah. Act No.LV of 1981) (Amendment 1996) (Mah. Ord. X of 2009) (hereinafter referred to as the said Act of 1981). By the impugned order, the petitioner has been ordered to be detained. 2. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has pressed into the service, two grounds of challenge which are set out as grounds (b) and (d). As far as ground (d) is concerned, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that admittedly, on the date of passing of the impugned order of detention, the petitioner was in judicial custody in connection with C.R. NO.1135 of 2012 under Sections 307, 323, 506 (II) of I.P.C and under Sections 3 and 25 of the Arms Act. His submission is that the detaining authority has not recorded any subjective satisfaction on the basis of material available, that there was possibility of the petitioner being released on bail. He has placed a reliance on the decisions of the Apex Court in the case of Union of India V/s. Paul Manickam and Another (2003) 8 SCC 342 and Rekha V/s. State of Tamil Nadu and Another (2011) 5 SCC 244 . 3. The learned A.P.P. supported the impugned order by relying upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Senthamilselvi V/s. State of Tamil Nadu and Another (2006) 5 SCC 676 . She has also invited our attention to the relevant part of the affidavit of the detaining authority. 4. We have carefully considered the submissions. Law on this aspect has been laid down in the case of Paul Manickam (Supra). Paragraph 14 of the said decision reads thus : 14. So far as this question relating to the procedure to be adopted in case the detenu is already in custody is concerned, the matter has been dealt with in several cases. Law on this aspect has been laid down in the case of Paul Manickam (Supra). Paragraph 14 of the said decision reads thus : 14. So far as this question relating to the procedure to be adopted in case the detenu is already in custody is concerned, the matter has been dealt with in several cases. Where detention orders are passed in relation to persons who are already in jail under some other laws, the detaining authorities should apply their mind and show their awareness in this regard in the grounds of detention, the chances of release of such persons on bail. The necessity of keeping such persons in detention under the preventive detention laws has to be clearly indicated. Subsisting custody of the detenu by itself does not invalidate an order of his preventive detention, and the decision in this regard must depend on the facts of the particular case. Preventive detention being necessary to prevent the detenu from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or to the maintenance of public order of economic stability, etc. ordinarily, it is not needed when the detenu is already in custody. The detaining authority must show its awareness to the fact of subsisting custody of the detenu and take that factor into account while making the order. If the detaining authority is reasonably satisfied with cogent materials that there is likelihood of his release and in view of his antecedent activities which are proximate in point of time, he must be detained in order to prevent him from indulging in such prejudicial activities, the detention order can be validly made. Where the detention order in respect of a person already in custody does not indicate that the detenu was likely to be released on bail, the order would be vitiated. (See N. Meera Rani V. Govt. of T.N. and Dharmendra Suganchand Chelawat V. Union of India). The point was gone into detail in Kamarunnissa v. Union of India. Where the detention order in respect of a person already in custody does not indicate that the detenu was likely to be released on bail, the order would be vitiated. (See N. Meera Rani V. Govt. of T.N. and Dharmendra Suganchand Chelawat V. Union of India). The point was gone into detail in Kamarunnissa v. Union of India. The principles were set out as follows : even in the case of a person in custody, a detention order can be validly passed : (1) if the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody; (2) if he has a reason to believe on the basis of reliable material placed before him (a) that there is a real possibility of his release on bail, and (b) that on being released, he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activities; and (3) if it is felt essential to detain him to prevent him from so doing. If an order is passed after recording satisfaction in that regard, the order would be valid. In the case at hand the order of detention and grounds of detention show an awareness of custody and/or a possibility of release on bail. (underline supplied) Even in the case of Rekha (supra) in paragraph 11 the Apex Court has held thus : 11. In our opinion, the detention order in question only contains ipse dixit regarding the alleged imminent possibility of the accused coming out on bail and there was no reliable material to this effect. Hence, the detention order in question cannot be sustained. Though the learned A.P.P has relied on the decision of Senthamilselvi etc. (supra), the decision makes no departure from the view taken earlier by the Apex Court. it will be necessary to make reference to paragraph 10 of the said decision, which reads thus :“ 10. It was also submitted that since the detenu had not filed any bail application, the detaining authority could not have inferred that there was possibility of his being released on bail. Strong reliance is placed on several decisions of this Court. It has to be noted that whether prayer for bail would be accepted depends on circumstances of each case and no hard and fast rule can be applied. Strong reliance is placed on several decisions of this Court. It has to be noted that whether prayer for bail would be accepted depends on circumstances of each case and no hard and fast rule can be applied. The only requirement is that the detaining authority should be aware that the detenu is already in custody and is likely to be released on bail. The conclusion that the detenu may be released on bail cannot be ipse dixit of the detaining authority. On the basis of materials before him, the detaining authority came to the conclusion that there is likelihood of the detenue being released on bail. (underline supplied) Therefore, this decision does not make any departure from the law which is laid down in the case of Paul Manickam (supra). At this stage, we may make reference to the relevant part of the reply filed by the detaining authority dealing with this aspect. Paragraph 10 of the reply shows that the detaining authority was aware of the fact that the petitioner was in judicial custody in C.R. No.I135 of 2012. The relevant part of the reply reads thus : I say that I had gone through the proposal submitted by Sr. P.I. Wagle Estate Police Station in which the apprehension regarding release of the detenu on bail was expressed in routine course. I had considered the material placed before me which indicates that the detenu was externed out of District Thane for a period of one year vide Externment Order No.DCP/Zone5/ externment/(2111)/ 11, dated 21.10.2011. During course of externment order the detenu had entered the prohibited area on 2.2.2012 and 10.5.2012 and thereby cases were registered against the detenu under Section 142 of Bombay Police Act at Wagle Estate Police Station vide C.R. No.II 31/2012 and C.R. No.II 62/2012. I say that the anonymous application and two incamera statements also expressed the terror of detenu. Even though the detenu was in custody in C.R. NO.I135/ 2012, the apprehension of release of the petitioner was not ruled out in routine course. Taking the contents of the aforesaid part of the reply as correct, we find that except for referring to proposal of the sponsoring authority which records the apprehension of release of petitioner on bail in routine course, there is no other material referred to in the affidavit of detaining authority. Taking the contents of the aforesaid part of the reply as correct, we find that except for referring to proposal of the sponsoring authority which records the apprehension of release of petitioner on bail in routine course, there is no other material referred to in the affidavit of detaining authority. In fact, the detaining authority has only relied upon the opinion of the sponsoring authority that the release of the petitioner on bail was not ruled out in routine course. Thus, the detaining authority has merely referred to the opinion of the sponsoring authority. There is no cogent or reliable material referred by the detaining authority. There is no satisfaction recorded by the detaining authority on the basis of any material regarding possibility of release of the petitioner on bail. In fact, there is no satisfaction recorded that there was real possibility of release of the petitioner on bail. 5. The learned A.P.P relied upon the allegations stated in the affidavit that the petitioner committed breach of the order of externment. However, that will not be a material, by any stretch of imagination, to come to conclusion that the release of the petitioner on bail was a real possibility. In the case of Senthamilselvi (supra), the Apex Court found that on the basis of the material before the detaining authority, a conclusion was drawn by the detaining authority that there is likelihood of the detenue being released on bail. In the present case except for the opinion of the sponsoring authority, there was absolutely no other material which was considered by the detaining authority. Only on this ground, the impugned order of detention is vitiated. Hence, it is not necessary to consider the other grounds of challenge. 6. Hence, we pass the following order : ORDER I) Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer clause (c) which reads thus : (c) That the order of detention being No.TC/PD/MPDA/ 09/2012 dated 16.10.2012 issued under Section 3(1) of M.P.D.A. Act, 1981 by Commissioner of Police, Thane against the detenu, be quashed and set aside and on quashing the order of detention the detenu be released forthwith; Parties to act on the authenticated copy of the operative part of this order.