1) Petitioners have invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court for quashing order dated 06.12.2012 passed by Principal District Judge, Reasi in a case titled Deepak Kumar v. Mst. Tripta Devi and another (hereinafter for short as impugned order) by which application filed by the petitioners for conducting DNA test of respondent No.1 came to be dismissed, on the grounds taken in the memo of petition. 2) It appears that respondent No.1 has filed a civil suit for declaration against the petitioners seeking declaration to the effect that petitioner no.1 is not his wife and petitioner no.2 is not born out of their wedlock. In the said suit, petitioners appeared and filed their written statement. Parties were directed to lead their evidence. On 09.03.2012, Principal District Judge, Reasi closed the right of petitioners to produce their witnesses and fixed the case for final arguments, though the petitioners pleaded that one more opportunity to produce the witnesses be provided to them. 3) During pendency of the suit, petitioners filed application for conducting DNA test of respondent No.1-plaintiff for ascertaining the paternity of petitioner No.2 as she is daughter of petitioner No.1 and respondent No.1 and born out of their wedlock. Said application came to be dismissed by Principal District Judge, Reasi vide order dated 06.12.2012 on the ground that evidence of petitioners already stands closed on 09.03.2012 and case is fixed for final arguments. It is this order, which is called in question by the petitioners in the present petition. 4) Precisely, the case of the petitioners is that impugned order has been passed in hot haste; without application of mind and without taking into consideration the grounds taken by the petitioners-defendants in application. 5) Petitioners have not questioned the competence-jurisdiction of the trial Court. Petitioners have also not averred in the wit petition that trial Court or appellate court have passed the order without or in excess of jurisdiction. 6) The maintainability of the petition is put under cloud by its very own averments on the ground that Civil Procedure Code, hereinafter for short as CPC, has undergone a sea change with the amendment of 2009. The amendment has restricted the powers of the revisional Court. Virtually, petition is in the nature of revision petition and if such a practice is adopted and allowed that will render the aim and object of the amendment infructuous and meaningless. The amendment has restricted the powers of the revisional Court. Virtually, petition is in the nature of revision petition and if such a practice is adopted and allowed that will render the aim and object of the amendment infructuous and meaningless. The fact of this Court having vast powers under Article 226 and 227 is undisputed, but care has to be taken when the same is warranted to be exercised, because the powers under such Articles has to be utilized very cautiously, carefully, sparingly and in rarest of the rare cases. 7) Admittedly, during the pendency of the suit, application came to be filed by the petitioners for conducting DNA test, which came to be dismissed on the ground that evidence of the petitioners-defendants stands already closed, and the suit is for final arguments. 8) The Apex Court in case titled Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil reported as 2010 AIR SCW 6387 has observed that there is tendency in High Courts to entertain petition under Article 227 of the Constitution against the orders against which revision is barred in terms of amended Act of CPC. It is apt to reproduce Para 80, 81 and 82 of the judgment supra herein:- “80. We may also observe that in some High Courts there is tendency of entertaining petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution by terming them as writ petitions. This is sought to be justified on an erroneous appreciation of the ratio in Surya Dev (supra) and in view of the recent amendment to Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999. It is urged that as a result of the amendment, scope of Section 115 of CPC has been curtailed. In our view, even if the scope of Section 115 CPC is curtailed that has not resulted in expanding High Court’s power of superintendence. It is too well known to be reiterated that in exercising its jurisdiction, High Court must follow the regime of law. 81. As a result of frequent interference by Hon’ble High Court either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution with pending civil and at times criminal cases, the disposal of cases by the civil and criminal courts gets further impeded and thus causing serious problems in the administration of justice. 82. 81. As a result of frequent interference by Hon’ble High Court either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution with pending civil and at times criminal cases, the disposal of cases by the civil and criminal courts gets further impeded and thus causing serious problems in the administration of justice. 82. This Court hopes and trusts that in exercising its power either under Article 226 or 227, Hon’ble High Court will follow the time honoured principles discussed above. Those principles have been formulated by this Court for ends of justice and the High Courts as the highest Courts of justice within their jurisdiction will adhere to them strictly.” 9) The Apex Court in a case titled Kokkanda B. Poondacha & others v. K. D. Ganapathi & another reported as AIR SCW 2011, 1737, held that invoking of writ or supervisory jurisdiction against interlocutory orders is permissible only when subordinate Court has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction not otherwise. 10) This Court also in case titled Abdul Rehman Dar and others v. Showkat Ali Bhat and others reported in 2011 (IV) JKJ 334 (HC) while following the aforesaid judgments of the Apex Court has laid down the same principle. 11) If a party which loses the case before the trial Court or before the appellate Court is allowed to file writ petition and thereafter if such writ petitions are entertained without any check and balance that will amount to beating litigation and in breach of the purpose, aim and object of the legislation which was made basis for amendment of the CPC. 12) Apex Court in case Shalini Shyam Shetty supra also held that if the litigating parties are private and not State functionaries, the writ is not maintainable and a distinction has been made with respect to the powers of High Court under Article 226 and 227. It is apt to reproduce Para 62:- “62. On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles on the exercise of High Court’s jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be formulated: (a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by High Court under these two Articles is also different. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The mode of exercise of power by High Court under these two Articles is also different. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of Superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above. (c) High Courts cannot, on the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or Courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a Court of appeal over the orders of Court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. (d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of its power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh (supra) and the principles in Waryam Singh (supra) have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh (supra), followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and Courts subordinate to it, ‘within the bounds of their authority’. (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) High Court’s power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India & others, reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 and therefore abridgement by a Constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the 4Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court’s power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court’s jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo moto. (l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this Article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this Article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and Courts subordinate to High Court. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counter-productive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality.” 13) Parties before the Court are private persons and not the State and, therefore, a question arises as to whether writ petition is maintainable against an individual in his personal capacity? The answer is in negative. 14) It is beaten law of the land that writ petition is a remedy in public law which can be filed by any person but the main respondent should either be Govt. Agency or a State or its instrumentalities within the meaning of Article 10. Private persons cannot be said to be the State or instrumentalities of the State and all the respondents in the writ petition cannot be private parties. Under Article 226, High Court can issue writ against any person but the persons must have some statutory or public function to perform. It is apt to reproduce Para 64 of the judgment supra herein:- “64. It is well settled that a writ petition is a remedy in public law which may be filed by any person but the main respondent should be either Government, Governmental agencies or a State or instrumentalities of a State within the meaning of Article 12. Private individuals cannot be equated with State or instrumentalities of the State. All the respondents in a writ petition cannot be private parties. Private individuals cannot be equated with State or instrumentalities of the State. All the respondents in a writ petition cannot be private parties. But private parties acting in collusion with State can be respondents in a writ petition. Under the phraseology of Article 226, High Court can issue writ to any person, but the person against whom writ will be issued must have some statutory or public duty to perform.” 15) Neither petitioners’ allege of the courts below to have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction; nor State is made the party, therefore, the writ petition cannot stand the test laid down by the Apex Court in the judgment reproduced hereinbefore. 16) Accordingly, this petition fails and is dismissed as such along with connected CMA.