JUDGMENT This appeal has been directed against the judgment and order dated 22-12-2010 passed by the learned Ad hoc Additional Sessions Judge, F. T. C., Nayagarh in S. T. Case No. 40/117/164 of 2007 convicting the appellant under Section 376(2)(f) of the I. P. C. and sentencing him to undergo R. I. for a period of ten years and to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/-, in default of payment of fine to undergo R. I. for one year. 2. In a nutshell, the prosecution case is that the appellant is a neighbour of the informant and his house situates one house apart from that of the informant and that on 3-5-2007 in the evening at about 6.00 p.m. the accused appellant enticed the informant’s young daughter aged about only nine years to his own house and there committed rape on her causing excessive bleeding from her private parts. After coming to know of the incident the informant immediately took his daughter to Ranpur Police Station and lodged F. I. R. and thereafter to Ranpur Hospital for treatment. The police registered a case and during course of investigation issued requisition to the medical officer, examined witnesses, visited the spot, seized some incriminating materials and ultimately submitted charge-sheet against the appellant on completion of investigation. 3. The defence plea is a complete denial of the occurrence and involvement of the appellant in the offence. His further plea is that due to previous enmity with the father of the prosecutrix a false case was instituted against him. 4. In order to bring home the charge, the prosecution examined 13 witnesses in all, whereas the defence examined only one witness. On consideration of the evidence on record, the trial Court has found the appellant guilty and convicted and sentenced him as aforesaid. 5. In assailing the impugned judgment the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant’s conviction has been based primarily on the evidence of the prosecutrix, who is a minor girl of about nine years of age and that without there being any corroboration to her evidence no conviction could have been recorded. He also submits that the medical evidence of the Doctor (P.W.12) and his report Ext. 6 cannot be relied upon as corroborative evidence since Ext. 6 admittedly does not bear the name of the prosecutrix and, therefore, it cannot be related to the prosecutrix. He also submits that the medical evidence of the Doctor (P.W.12) and his report Ext. 6 cannot be relied upon as corroborative evidence since Ext. 6 admittedly does not bear the name of the prosecutrix and, therefore, it cannot be related to the prosecutrix. It is his further submission that the mother of the child having disowned the occurrence as alleged by the prosecution, the evidence of the prosecutrix becomes suspect and unbelievable. 6. The learned Additional Standing Counsel, on the other hand, submits that the evidence of the prosecutrix is very clear and cogent and free from tutoring and therefore wholly trustworthy and that there is no mandate of law that Court must always look for corroboration to the evidence of a child witness in order to act upon the same for recording a conviction against accused. He also contends that mere absence of the name of the prosecutrix in the medical report is not sufficient to discard the report, particularly when the Doctor himself has stated that the report relates to the prosecutrix. 7. I have carefully scrutinized the evidence on record. P. W. 2 is the prosecutrix, who was aged about nine to ten years at the time of occurrence and eleven years on the date of her deposition in Court during September, 2008. By the time of deposition, she was a student in Class-VI. The trial Court in order to find out her power of understanding and her capability to give rational answer asked her some pertinent questions to which she answered rationality. In her evidence, she has clearly stated that on the date of occurrence at about 6.00 p.m. while she was sitting on the outer verandah of the house of her girl friend, Mitu Behera and eating puffed rice (Mudhi), the accused asked her to come to his house and on her refusal, he forcibly carried her away and when she attempted to shout, he pressed his napkin on her mouth and thereafter in his bedroom the accused-appellant bolted the door from inside, took off her panty, made her lie down on the cot and mounted upon her and committed rape, as a result of which her private part started bleeding. Thereafter her mother called her loudly and hearing such calling the accused left her and she came to her house weeping. Thereafter her mother called her loudly and hearing such calling the accused left her and she came to her house weeping. It is also in her evidence that in the house she narrated the incident to her paternal grand-mother, who found her bleeding. Her mother also came to know of the occurrence. Shortly thereafter her father returned from another village and came to know about the incident and with help of his father-in-law and maternal uncle he brought P. W. 2 to Ranpur Police Station in a hired auto. There her father lodged written report about the occurrence and the police sent her to Ranpur Hospital. After examining her, the doctor advised her father to take her to the hospital at cuttack and accordingly she was shifted to hospital at Cuttack and treated there as an indoor patient for seven days. She has identified material objects such as blood stained bed sheet (M. O. I.) which was spread on the cot at the time of occurrence and she also identified the lungi of the accused which he had put on at the time of occurrence, the Gamuchha in which she had kept puffed rice, and the pink colour panty which the accused had removed and which had some stains of blood and the blood stained frock which she had put on at the time of occurrence. Nothing substantial has been brought out in cross-examination to suspect her credibility. She has clearly stated in her cross examination that none had tutored her to give evidence in Court. She also denied the suggestion that she was not medically examined or treated in the Ranpur Hospital. She also denied the suggestion that she received bleeding injury on her private part by reason of coming in forcible contact with one of the wooden frames meant for tying mosquito net attached to one of their cots. There is nothing to disbelieve P. W. 2, the prosecutrix. Her evidence is free from any embellishment or exaggeration and it inspires full confidence. 8. With regard to the nature of evidence of a child witness and its acceptability the Apex Court in the decision reported in (2011) 4 SCC 786 : (2011 AIR SCW 1956) State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramesh and another has very succinctly reviewed and reiterated the position of law as follows : 9. 8. With regard to the nature of evidence of a child witness and its acceptability the Apex Court in the decision reported in (2011) 4 SCC 786 : (2011 AIR SCW 1956) State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramesh and another has very succinctly reviewed and reiterated the position of law as follows : 9. In Panchhi v. State of U. P. ( AIR 1998 SC 2726 ) this court while placing reliance upon a large number of its earlier judgments observed that the testimony of a child witness must find adequate corroboration before it is relied on. However, it is more a rule of practical wisdom than of law. It cannot be held that : the evidence of a child witness would always stand irretrievably stigmatised. It is not the law that if a witness is a child, his evidence shall be rejected, even if it is found reliable. The law is that evidence of a child witness must be evaluated more carefully and with greater circumspection because a child is susceptible to be swayed by what others tell him and thus a child witness is an easy prey to tutoring (SCC P. 181 P. 2728 of AIR, Para 11). 10. In Nivrutti Pandurang Kokate v. State of Maharashtra ( AIR 2008 SC 1460 ) this Court dealing with the child witness has observed as under : (SCC Pp-567-68, para-10) (P1462, Para 9 of AIR). 10. .....7....The decision on the question whether the child witness has sufficient intelligence primarily rests with the trial Judge who notices his manners, his apparent possession or lack of intelligence, and the said Judge may resort to any examination which will tend to disclose his capacity and intelligence as well as his understanding of the obligation of an oath. The decision of the trial Court may, however, be disturbed by the higher Court if from what is preserved in the records, it is clear that his conclusion was erroneous. This precaution is necessary because child witnesses are amenable to tutoring and often live in a world of make believe. The decision of the trial Court may, however, be disturbed by the higher Court if from what is preserved in the records, it is clear that his conclusion was erroneous. This precaution is necessary because child witnesses are amenable to tutoring and often live in a world of make believe. Though it is an established principle that child witnesses are dangerous witnesses as they are pliable and liable to be influenced easily, shaped and moulded, but it is also an accepted norm that if after careful scrutiny of their evidence the Court comes to the conclusion that there is an impress of truth in it, there is no obstacle in the way of accepting the evidence of a child witness. 11. The evidence of a child must reveal that he was able to discern between right and wrong and the Court may find out from the cross-examination whether the defence lawyer could bring anything to indicate that the child could not differentiate between right and wrong. The Court may ascertain his suitability as a witness by putting questions to him and even if no such questions had been put, it may be gathered from his evidence as to whether he fully understood the implications of what he was saying and whether he stood discredited in facing a stiff cross-examination. A child witness must be able to understand the sanctity of giving evidence on oath and the import of the questions that were being put to him. (Vide Himmat Sukhadeo Wahurwagh v. State of Maharashtra) ( AIR 2009 SC 2292 ). 12. In State of U. P. v. Krishna Master ( AIR 2010 SC 3071 ) this Court held that there is no principle of law that it is inconceivable that a child of tender age would not be able to recapitulate the facts in his memory. A child is always receptive to abnormal events which take place in his life and would never forget those events for the rest of his life. The child may be able to recapitulate carefully and exactly when asked about the same in the future. In case the child explains the relevant events of the crime without improvements or embellishments, and the same inspire confidence of the Court, his deposition does not require any corroboration whatsoever. The child at a tender age is incapable of having any malice or ill will against any person. In case the child explains the relevant events of the crime without improvements or embellishments, and the same inspire confidence of the Court, his deposition does not require any corroboration whatsoever. The child at a tender age is incapable of having any malice or ill will against any person. Therefore, there must be something on record to satisfy the Court that something had gone wrong between the date of incident and recording evidence of the child witness due to which the witness wanted to implicate the accused falsely in a case of a serious nature. 13. Part of the statement of a child witness, even if tutored, can be relied upon, if the tutored part can be separated from the untutored part, in case such remaining untutored part inspires confidence. In such an eventuality the untutored part can be believed or at least taken into consideration for the purpose of corroboration as in the case of a hostile witness. (Vide Gagan Kanojia v. State of Punjab (2006) 13 SCC 516). 14. In view of the above, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that the deposition of a child witness may require corroboration, but in case his deposition inspires the confidence of Court and there is no embellishment or improvement therein, the Court may rely upon his evidence. The evidence of a child witness must be evaluated more carefully with greater circumspection because he is susceptible to tutoring. Only in case there is evidence on record to show that a child has been tutored, the Court can reject his statement partly or fully. However, an inference as to whether child has been tutored or not, can be drawn from the contents of his deposition. 9. It is therefore clear that the evidence of a child witness which has stood the test of scrutiny and which is clear, cogent, unembellished and free from tutoring and acceptable can form the basis of conviction. Corroboration to the evidence of the child witness is required only as a matter of caution and not as a rule of mandate. 10. It is submitted on behalf of the appellant that P. W. 4, who is the mother of the prosecutrix has not supported the prosecution case and that there was enmity between the appellant and the informant and, therefore, the evidence of the victim girl is not credible. 10. It is submitted on behalf of the appellant that P. W. 4, who is the mother of the prosecutrix has not supported the prosecution case and that there was enmity between the appellant and the informant and, therefore, the evidence of the victim girl is not credible. The mother of the victim has been examined as P. W. 4, who stated that in the evening at about 6.00 p.m. on the date of occurrence the victim went out carrying puffed rice and half an hour thereafter she called her out aloud to come back for her studies whereafter the victim returned when it was discovered that she was bleeding from her private part. It is also in her evidence that the frock which she was wearing had been smeared with blood. On being asked, the victim narrated that while she was eating puffed rice on the outer varandah of Bhagabata Sahu, the appellant took her to his house, made her lie down on the cot inside his bed room and that by means of a razor blade torn her vulva causing bleeding injury and that on hearing the call of her mother she came back. Pointing out to such evidence of P. W. 4 it is urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that the victim sustained injury not due to rape committed by the accused but due to tearing by blade by the accused. With regard to this part of the deposition of P. W. 4 given in her examination-in-chief, the public prosecutor put questions to her with the leave of the Court in terms of Section 154 of the Evidence Act and to the suggestion by the prosecutor, P. W. 4 admitted that she stated before the police during investigation that the accused caused bleeding injury to the private part of the victim by acting/dealing immorally with her. In common parlance, immoral act done by a man with the private part of a woman only refers to offence of rape. P. W. 4 instead of describing before the I. O. the private parts of the victim and the accused by their names has indirectly supported the allegation of rape which she learnt from the victim, her daughter. In common parlance, immoral act done by a man with the private part of a woman only refers to offence of rape. P. W. 4 instead of describing before the I. O. the private parts of the victim and the accused by their names has indirectly supported the allegation of rape which she learnt from the victim, her daughter. Probably in order to save the honour of her child P. W. 4 was tempted to state in her examination-in-chief that the injury was caused by the accused by blade which she did not state before the Investigating Officer during investigation, but subsequently she has admitted that during investigation she had stated before the I. O. that the appellant committed immoral act with the victim which caused serious bleeding injury on her private part. Therefore, such evidence of P. W. 4 cannot be taken to be a ground for suspecting the credibility of P. W. 2, the prosecutrix. With regard to the question of enmity between the informant (P.W.3) and the appellant, it appears that a mere suggestion was given to P. W. 3 about his prior enmity with the appellant without indicating the cause of such enmity, but such suggestion has been stoutly denied by P. W. 3. Similar suggestion was also given to P. Ws. 2 and 4, who have also denied the same. The solitary defence witness (D. W. 1), who is co-villager of the accused as well as the informant reveals that the accused was the Ward Member of the village in the year 2007 and one Jogi Baliarsingh was contesting against him and that the informant was a supporter of Jogi Baliarsingh. It is quite unthinkable that merely because the informant was supporting the defeated Ward Member candidate, he would go to the extent of putting the honour of his minor daughter at stake by making false accusation of rape against the appellant. It cannot be believed for a moment that P. W.3 has, for such reason, tutored P. W. 2 to state falsehood against the appellant. The evidence of P. W. 2, which is very clear, cogent and trustworthy, is, therefore, sufficient to uphold the conviction of the appellant. 11. Even if as a matter of prudence the Court is called upon to find out corroboration, there are plenty of such corroborative evidence. The evidence of P. Ws. The evidence of P. W. 2, which is very clear, cogent and trustworthy, is, therefore, sufficient to uphold the conviction of the appellant. 11. Even if as a matter of prudence the Court is called upon to find out corroboration, there are plenty of such corroborative evidence. The evidence of P. Ws. 3, 4, 5 and 6, who are the family members of the victim reveal that as soon as the victim returned in the evening of the occurrence and was found bleeding profusely from her private part, on their query she narrated the incident. Such immediate disclosure of the occurrence to the family members by the victim is relevant and a strong corroborative circumstance. That apart the medical evidence of P. W. 12, who was the Gynaecology Specialist in the Area Hospital, Ranpur on the date of occurrence and also his report, Ext. 6 reveal that he found a hole injuring forchette, post part of hymen leading to a cavity where blood clots were present. There was profuse bleeding from the hole. P. W. 12 therefore immediately referred the victim to Sisu Bhawan, Cuttack opining that her condition was life threatening. The final opinion of P. W. 12 is that the injuries to forchette, hymen, vaginal canal and rectal canal were caused by thrust of the penis. Ext.6 does not bear the name of the victim and, therefore it is argued on behalf of the appellant that this cannot be related to the victim of the present case. The injury requisition issued by the I. O. has also not been proved though the I. O. (P.W. 13) stated in his evidence that he issued injury requisition in favour of P. W. 2, but on the date of his evidence the injury requisition was not available in the case record to be marked exhibit. It might be that P. W. 12 has forgotten to mention the name of P. W. 2 on Ext. 6. But the injury report shows that Column No. VI of the report which is meant for giving brief history of the case, refers to commission of rape by the present appellant. There is nothing on record that on the date of the occurrence there was allegation of rape of any other woman by the present appellant. 6. But the injury report shows that Column No. VI of the report which is meant for giving brief history of the case, refers to commission of rape by the present appellant. There is nothing on record that on the date of the occurrence there was allegation of rape of any other woman by the present appellant. P. W. 2 was examined by P. W. 12 in the medical on the very night of the occurrence and as per Ext. 6, she was sent to the Ranpur Hospital through one Sanjulata Parida, a lady Home Guard of the Police Station and another constable, Pratap Ch. Das. The evidence of P. W. 3 the informant also reveals that on police requisition P. W. 2 was examined by the doctor at Ranpur Hospital. In the aforesaid circumstances, mere non-mention of the name of the victim in Ext. 6 cannot be a ground to disbelieve the medical evidence of P. W. 12 and the correctness of Ext. 6. The medical evidence is another strong evidence which corroborates the evidence of the prosecutrix. The blood stained material objects such as panty, frock, bed sheet etc. were seized by the police during investigation and the seizure lists have been proved vide Exts. 1, 2 and 4. The material objects had been sent to the State Forensic Science Laboratory, Bhubaneswar for chemical examination. The chemical examination report of the SFSL vide Ext. 11 reveals that the panty of the girl was stained with human blood as well as semen and her frock and bed sheet were also stained with human blood. This is also clinching corroborative evidence, which strengthens the credibility of P.W. 2. 12. In the aforesaid circumstances, I find no infirmity in the impugned order of conviction. The trial Court imposed the minimum sentence prescribed by law for the offence under Section 376(2) (f) of the I. P. C., which warrants no interference. 13. The Criminal Appeal is devoid of merit and accordingly dismissed. Appeal dismissed.