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2013 DIGILAW 320 (CHH)

Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. v. Abdul Rashid

2013-11-07

SANJAY K.AGRAWAL

body2013
JUDGMENT : SANJAY K. AGRAWAL, J. 1. The appellant herein/Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. has filed this appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short 'the M.V. Act') questioning the impugned award dated 31-3-2003 passed by 8th Additional Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Raipur, Chhattisgarh (for short 'the Claims Tribunal) in Claim Case No. 13/2002, partly granting the claim application filed by the respondent Nos. 3 & 4/claimants. Brief facts : 2. Brief facts necessary for adjudication of this appeal are as under : 2.1 Respondent Nos. 3 & 4/Claimants being the father and brother of deceased-Kamal Sahu filed claim application under Section 166 of the M.V. Act before the Claims Tribunal seeking compensation stating inter alia that on 26-9-1998 deceased-Kamal Sahu while welding the offending vehicle (Petrol Tanker) bearing registration No. MP-23/D/9540, owned by late Sardar Shri Hardeep Singh and insured with the appellant/insurance Company in "Motor Workshop" said Petrol Tanker caught fire and by which, Kamal Sahu suffered injury and succumbed to the death. It was further pleaded that at the time of accident, Kamal Sahu was aged about 20 years and was earning Rs. 3,000/- per month as Welder in Mannu Motor Workshop and claimed compensation to the extent of Rs. 5,42,000/- from the respondents therein jointly and severally along with interest. 2.2 Respondent Nos. 1 & 2 herein/driver & owner of the offending vehicle did not file any written statement as they proceeded ex pArticle. However, appellant/insurance Company has filed written statement stating inter alia that the offending vehicle (Petrol Tanker) was under repairing in the exclusive control of Motor Workshop owner parked in workshop (private place) and not in use at the time of accident and the deceased being the employee of the Motor Workshop owner, the appellant/insurance Company is not liable to make payment of compensation to the respondent Nos. 3 & 4/claimants. 2.3 During the course of trial, claimants have examined Harishankar Sahu (A.W. 1) and Mohd. Habib (AW-2 and filed documents vide Exhibit P-l to Exhibit P-5 in support of their case, whereas., appellant/insurance Company has examined Jagdish Uskere (NAW-1), Administrative Officer in support of his case. 3. Learned Claims Tribunal on a close security of the evidence on record granted the claim application partly by recording the following findings : (i) The claimants are entitled for total compensation of Rs. 3,22,000/- along with 9% interest. 3. Learned Claims Tribunal on a close security of the evidence on record granted the claim application partly by recording the following findings : (i) The claimants are entitled for total compensation of Rs. 3,22,000/- along with 9% interest. (ii) Death of Kamal Sahu occurred while welding the offending vehicle (Petrol Tanker) on 26-9-1998 arising out of use of motor vehicle. (iii) The offending vehicle (Petrol Tanker) was duly insured with the appellant/insurance Company, is liable to make payment of compensation to the respondent Nos. 3 & 4/ Claimants. Submissions : 4. Mr. Vinay Harit, learned senior counsel with Mr. Surya Kant Mishra, learned counsel appearing for the appellant/insurance Company would submit that the learned Claims Tribunal has committed legal error in holding that death of Kamal Sahu occurred arising out of use of motor vehicle i.e. while welding the Petrol Tanker. He would further submit that the accident did not occur in public place as has been occurred in "Motor Workshop", which was in exclusive control of Manohar Sharma owner of workshop and deceased-Kamal Sahu was the employee of the Motor Workshop owner, therefore the award directing the liability upon appellant/ Insurance Company deserves to be set aside. 5. Per contra, Mr. Amiyakant Tiwari, learned counsel appearing for the respondent Nos. 3 & 4/claimants would submit that the death of Kamal Sahu occurred arising out of the use of motor vehicle i.e. while welding the Petrol Tanker, owned by respondent No. 2 and insured with appellant/insurance Company and therefore, liability rightly been fastened upon appellant/insurance Company. Mr. Tiwari would further submit that the impugned award is strictly in accordance with law and no interference is called for in exercise of appellate jurisdiction under Section 173 of the M.V. Act. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered the rival submissions and have perused the records of the Claims Tribunal. Point for determination : 7. Mr. Tiwari would further submit that the impugned award is strictly in accordance with law and no interference is called for in exercise of appellate jurisdiction under Section 173 of the M.V. Act. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered the rival submissions and have perused the records of the Claims Tribunal. Point for determination : 7. On the basis of factual and legal submissions raised on behalf of the parties, following points would arise for determination : (i) Whether finding of fact recorded by the Claims Tribunal that Kamal Sahu died "arising out of use of motor vehicle" is just and proper in facts and circumstances of the case?" (ii) Whether "Motor Workshop" owned by Motor Workshop owner where accident took place can be said to be "Public Place" as to attract the liability of appellant/insurance Company to make payment of compensation? Answer to point No. (i) : 8. To appreciate the contention of the parties, it is relevant to notice sub-section (1) of Section 165 of M.V. Act, which reads thus : "165. Claims Tribunals, (1) A State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute one or more Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals (hereafter in this Chapter referred to as Claims Tribunal) for such area as may be specified in the notification for the purpose of adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of, or bodily injury to, persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles, or damage to any property of a third party so arising, or both. Explanation. For the removal of doubts, it is herby declared that the expression "claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of or bodily injury to persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles" includes claims for compensation under Section 140 and Section 163-A." 9. The moot question to be considered in this case is whether the death of Kamal Sahu who died as a result of accident due to tanker caught fire while it was in a state of rest, could be said to be arising out of the 'use' of motor vehicle. The moot question to be considered in this case is whether the death of Kamal Sahu who died as a result of accident due to tanker caught fire while it was in a state of rest, could be said to be arising out of the 'use' of motor vehicle. The answer to the question depends upon the meaning of the word 'use' in the expression 'arising out of the use of motor vehicle' as employed in Section 165(1) of the M.V. Act, the meaning of the word use given in the Compact Edn. of the Oxford English Dictionary (Vol. II), reads thus : "act of using, or fact of being used; the act of employing the thing for any (especially a profitable) purpose; the fact, State or condition of being so employed; utilisation or employment, for or with some aim or purpose, application or conversation to some (esp. good or useful) end." In Webster's Unified Dictionary and Encyclopedia (Vol. 6) the word 'use' means 'State of being in employment as the car is in constant use'." 10. It appears from the meaning of word "use" defined in the dictionary that Motor Vehicle which is in state of being an employment for any purpose could be said to be Motor Vehicle in use. 11. The expression employed by the Legislature is "accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle" in the place of "accident caused by the use of a motor vehicle". Evidently the Legislature wanted to enlarge the scope of the word 'use' and not to restrict it for denying compensation in deserving cases. The test should be whether the accident was reasonably proximate to the use of a motor vehicle, whether or not the motor vehicle was in motion. After all the provisions for dealing with the compensation cases are intended for a sublime social objective. 12. The Supreme Court in Shivaji Dayanu Patil v. Smt. Vatschala Uttam More, AIR 1991 SC 1769 , their Lordships held that the expression "use of a motor vehicle" covers accidents which occur both when the vehicle is in motion and when it is stationary. 12. The Supreme Court in Shivaji Dayanu Patil v. Smt. Vatschala Uttam More, AIR 1991 SC 1769 , their Lordships held that the expression "use of a motor vehicle" covers accidents which occur both when the vehicle is in motion and when it is stationary. "The work "use" has a wider connotation to cover the period when the vehicle is not moving and is stationary and the use of a vehicle does not cease on account of the vehicle having been rendered immobile on account of a breakdown or mechanical defect or accident and held as under : 26. These decisions indicate that the word "use", in the context of motor vehicles, has been construed in a wider sense to include the period when the vehicle is not moving and is stationary, being either parked on the road and when it is not in a position to move due to some break-down or mechanizal defect. Relying on the above mentioned decisions, the Appellate Bench of the High Court had held that the expression "use of a motor vehicle" in Section 92-A covers accidents which occur both when the vehicle is in motion and when it is stationary. With reference to the facts of the present case the learned Judges have observed that the tanker in question while proceeding along National Highway No. 4 (i.e. while in use) after colliding with a motor lorry was lying on the side and that it cannot be claimed that after the collision the use of the tanker had ceased only because it was disabled. We are in agreement with the said approach of the High Court. In our opinion, the word "use" has a wider connotation to cover the period when the vehicle is not moving and is stationary and the use of a vehicle does not cease on account of the vehicle having been rendered immobile on account of a break-down or mechanical defect or accident. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that the petrol tanker was not in the use at the time when it was lying on its side after the collision with the truck. 37. Was the accident involving explosion and fire in the petrol tanker connected with the use of tanker as a motor vehicle? In our view, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, this question must be answered in the affirmative. 37. Was the accident involving explosion and fire in the petrol tanker connected with the use of tanker as a motor vehicle? In our view, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, this question must be answered in the affirmative. The High Court has found that the tanker in question was carrying petrol which is a highly combustible and volatile material and after the collision with the other motor vehicle the tanker had fallen on one of its sides on sloping ground resulting in escape of highly inflammable petrol and that there was grave risk of explosion and fire from the petrol coming out of the tanker. In the light of the aforesaid circumstances the learned Judges of the High Court have rightly concluded that the collision between the tanker and the other vehicle which had occurred earlier and the escape of petrol from the tanker which ultimately resulted in the explosion and fire were not unconnected but related events and merely because there was interval of about four to four and half hours between the said collision and the explosion and fire in the tanker, it cannot be necessarily inferred that there was no causal relation between explosion and fire. In the circumstances, it must be held that the explosion and fire resulting in the injuries which led to the death of Deepak Uttam More was due to an accident arising out of the use of the motor vehicle viz. the petrol tanker No. MKL 7461. 13. In Samir Chanda v. Managing Director, Assam State Trans. Corpn., 1998 ACJ 1351 (SC), a bomb exploded inside the bus as a result of which claimant sustained injuries on his legs. Before the Tribunal negligence on the part of owner and driver was pleaded. Claims Tribunal awarded Rs. 1,20,000/- as compensation holding that injuries sustained by the claimant were permanent. High Court set aside the award of Tribunal holding that there was no negligence on the part of owner or driver. The Supreme Court held that the explosion took place inside the bus and the usual police escort was not there. Atmosphere during the period of accident was so polluted requiring care on the part of conductor and driver of the bus. The Supreme Court held that the explosion took place inside the bus and the usual police escort was not there. Atmosphere during the period of accident was so polluted requiring care on the part of conductor and driver of the bus. The Supreme Court justified the claim of the claimant and affirmed the judgment of the Tribunal holding that the accident 'arose out of use of motor vehicle' and held as under : 15. After going through the judgment of the High Court, we are of the view that the High Court was not right on facts that there was no negligence on the part of the owner or the driver of the bus especially when the appellant has specifically pleaded about the negligence which was accepted by the Tribunal in the light of the pleadings and of the evidence produced before it. The explosion took place inside the bus is an admitted fact and the usual police escort was not there. The High Court, except observing that there was no negligence has not upset the finding of the Tribunal that the atmosphere during the period of accident was so polluted requiring care on the part of the conductor and driver of the bus. There cannot be any doubt that the accident arose out of the use of the motor vehicle justifying the claim of the appellant. We are satisfied with the assessment of the Tribunal in quantifying the compensation in a sum of Rs. 1,20,000/- with interest at the rate of 12%. 14. I may also refer to Elliott v. Grey, 1959 (3) All ER 733, where the Queen's Bench considered the meaning of the phrase "to use a motor vehicle on a road" appearing in section 35(1) of the Road Traffic Act, 1930. That was a case where the appellant had been charged under Section 35(1) of the said Act for using a motor car on a road on February 7, 1959, without there being in force in relation to the user, an insurance policy in respect of third particle risks. On February 7, 1959, the car was standing on the road outside the appellant's house, having been placed there by the appellant after it had broken down on December 20, 1958. Before February 7, 1959, the appellant had jacked up the wheels, removed the battery and terminated his insurance cover. On February 7, 1959, the car was standing on the road outside the appellant's house, having been placed there by the appellant after it had broken down on December 20, 1958. Before February 7, 1959, the appellant had jacked up the wheels, removed the battery and terminated his insurance cover. On February 7, 1959 he had un-jacked the wheels, cleaned the car and sent its battery to be recharged, but the car could not be mechanically propelled because the engine would not work. In fact, he had no intention of driving it on that day or of moving it from its position on the road. The question was whether on that day the car was being used by him within the meaning of Section 35(1), which reads thus : "Subject to the provisions of this part of this Act, it shall not be lawful for any person to use, or to cause or permit any other person to use, a motor vehicle on a road unless there is in force." Lord Parker, C.J. speaking for the Court observed : "In the present case, although this car could not be driven, there is nothing to suggest that it could not be moved. As I pointed out in argument, for all we known it was on the top of a hill and a little boy could release the brake and the car could go careering down the hill. In the absence, at any rate, of a finding that it was immovable as, for instance, that the wheels were removed or something of that sort, I cannot bring myself to think that this car was not fairly and squarely within the words which I have used, "have the use of a motor vehicle on the road". Counsel for the respondent further contended that, even if the car was completely immobilized, an offence would be committed, but for my part I find it unnecessary in the present case to go so far. Here was a car which could be moved, albeit not driven and, in those circumstances I think that the owner had the use of it on a road within the meaning of Section 35(1)." 15. Thus, the word 'use' in the Section means 'to have the use of, and even if the vehicle could not be driven the appellant had use of it'. 16. Thus, the word 'use' in the Section means 'to have the use of, and even if the vehicle could not be driven the appellant had use of it'. 16. Claimants have examined Hari Shankar Sahu (AW-1) and Mohd. Habib (AW-2) in support of their case. Harishankar Sahu (AW-1) has deposed that his son i.e. deceased-Kamal Sahu was working as welder in Mannu Motor Workshop, owned by Manohar Sharma. On the date of accident, he was welding the Petrol Tanker and during the welding, Petrol Tanker caught fire, in which, Kamal Sahu sustained injuries and thereafter died. Mohd. Habib (AW-2) Coworker and eye-witness of the accident has deposed that on instruction of respondent No. 1/driver of the Petrol Tanker, he cleaned the Tanker and finding no gas inside the Tanker, asked deceased-Kamal Sahu to undertake welding work, and as soon as he started welding work in Tanker, it caught fire on account of gas inside the Tanker, by which, Kamal Sahu sustained bum injuries and thereafter died. 17. The aforesaid two witnesses were subjected to lengthy cross-examination by the appellant/insurance Company, but nothing has been brought on record to hold that the death of Kamal Sahu did not occur during welding of Petrol Tanker, which was owned by respondent No. 2 and insured with appellant/insurance Company. The statement of aforesaid two witnesses also clearly establishes that the accident occurred in the workshop, namely Mannu Motor Workshop, which was owned by Manohar Sharma, in which, public had access for repairing of their vehicles. Apart from this, claimants have filed documents Exhibit P-l to Exhibit P-5 in support of their case, Exhibit P-2, is a memo issued by the owner of Motor Workshop, in which it was stated that while welding the Petrol Tanker bearing registration No. MP-23/D/9540, Kamal Sahu had suffered injuries and thereafter died. Exhibit P-3 is the merg intimation, also supports the case of the claimants. Not only this, Exhibit D-l filed by appellant/insurance Company, in which, Surveyor has intimated to appellant/insurance Company that during the course of repairing work in the Petrol Tanker, accident happened, in which death of Motor Workshop employee Kamal Sahu occurred. 18. Appellant/Insurance Company has examined Jagdish Uskere (NAW-1) in support of his case. Jagdish Uskere (NAW-1) has deposed that own damage claim was made by the owner of Petrol Tanker was considered and Rs. 18. Appellant/Insurance Company has examined Jagdish Uskere (NAW-1) in support of his case. Jagdish Uskere (NAW-1) has deposed that own damage claim was made by the owner of Petrol Tanker was considered and Rs. 70,000/- was granted to the owner, i.e. late Sardar Hardeep Singh. The said witness of the Insurance Company has not uttered any word that accident did not occur arising out of the use of motor vehicle i.e. welding in the Petrol Tanker or accident did not occur in public place. Be that as it may, by no stretch of imagination, it can be said that the accident did not occur 'arising out of the use of motor vehicle'. 19. Thus, I hold that death of Kamal Sahu, occurred while welding the Petrol Tanker, owned by respondent No. 2 arising out of the use of motor vehicle, in which, the Claims Tribunal has jurisdiction to entertain and decide the claim petition. Consequently, do not find any force in the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant/insurance Company and I hereby affirm the findings so recorded by the Claims Tribunal. Thus, this point is answered accordingly. Answer to point No. (ii) 20. In order to answer this question, it would be proper to notice the meaning of word public place. The word 'public place' has been defined in Section 2(34) of the Motor Vehicles Act which reads as follows : (i) "public place means a road, street, way or other place, whether a thorough-fare or not, to which the public have a right of access, and includes any place or stand at which passengers are picked up or set down by a stage carriage." (ii) In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Lakshmi, 1997 ACJ 489 (Kerala) after quoting the observations of Barry, J. in R. v. Kane, (1985) 1 All ER 705, it was held as follows : "In substance, a place is a 'public place' though it is private property when it is shown that the public are in the habit of resorting to it and no one is prevented there from so resorting to it......." (iii) In Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 5th Ed., p. 2094 public place' has been defined as follows : "A 'public place' is a place to which the public can and do have access; it does not matter whether they come at the invitation of the occupier or merely with his permission, or whether some payment or the performance of some formality is required before access can be had....... (iv) In Black's law Dictionary, 6th Edn., P. 1230 public place' has been defined as follows : "Public place : A place to which the general public has a right to resort; not necessarily a place devoted solely to the uses of the public, but a place which is in point of fact public rather than private, a place visited by many persons and usually accessible to the neighboring public (e.g., a park or public beach). Also, a place in which the public has an interest as affecting the safety, health, morals, and welfare of the community. A place exposed to the public and where the public gather together or pass to and fro." 21. The first thing with regard to the definition is that it is an inclusive one. Secondly, it in term makes it clear that any road, street, way or other place, whether a thorough fare or not, is a public place for the purposes of the Act, the only condition being that the public should have a right of access to it. Thirdly, the expression used in the definition is "a right of access" and not "access as of right". Lastly, when it states that any place or stand at which passengers are picked up or set down by a stage carriage, is a public place, it shows that it is not so much concerned with the ownership of the place as with its user. Lastly, when it states that any place or stand at which passengers are picked up or set down by a stage carriage, is a public place, it shows that it is not so much concerned with the ownership of the place as with its user. Stage Carriage is defined in sub-clause (29) of Section 2 and it means a motor vehicle which is used to carry or adapted to carry more than six persons excluding the driver and which carries passengers for hire or reward at separate fares paid by or for individual passengers, either for the whole journey or for stages of the journey. In short, it means a public passenger carry. In other words, by virtue of the last part of the definition, the expression would include any place including private, where public passenger carrier picks up or sets down passenger. 22. The definition of 'public place' under the Act is. therefore, wide enough to include any place which members of public use and to which they have a right of access. The right of access may be permissive, limited, restricted or regulated by oral or written permission, by tickets, passes or badges or on payment of fee. The use may be restricted generally or to particular purpose or purposes. What is necessary is that the place must be accessible to the members of public and be available for their use enjoyment, avocation or other purpose. 23. In the instant case accident occurred during the course of repairing of the Petrol Tanker in the Motor Workshop. The only question of law which arises for consideration is whether the insurer is liable to make payment to the claimants. Section 146(1) provides for necessity against 3rd particle risks. Section 146(1) reads thus : 146. Necessity for insurance against third particle risk. (1) No person shall use, except as a passenger, or cause or allow any other person to use, a motor vehicle in a public place, unless there is in force in relation to the use of the vehicle by that person or that other person, as the case may be, a policy of insurance complying with the requirements of this Chapter : (provided that in the case of a vehicle carrying, or meant to carry, dangerous or hazardous goods, there shall also be a policy of insurance under the Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991 (6 of 1991). Explanation. Explanation. A person driving a motor vehicle merely as a paid employee, while there is in force in relation to the use of the vehicle no such policy as is required by this sub-section, shall not be deemed to act in contravention of the sub-section unless he knows or has reason to believe that there is no such policy in force. 24. The aforesaid provision requires every person who uses Motor Vehicle in public places except as a passenger to take out a policy of the insurance complying with the requirement of Chapter XI. The relevant portion of Section 147 of the Act, which provides for requirement of such policy and limits of the policy which reads thus : 147. Requirements of policies and limits of liability. (1) In order to comply with the requirements of this Chapter, a policy of insurance must be a policy which (a) is issued by a person who is an authorised insurer; and (b) insures the person or classes of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in sub-section (2) (i) against any liability which may be incurred by him in respect of the death of or bodily (injury to any person, including owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle) or damage to any property of a third particle caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place. (ii) against the death of or bodily injury to any passenger of a public service vehicle caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place; 25. Thus, the liability to pay compensation in respect of death or injury caused to the person or property of a third particle undoubtedly arises when such injury is caused when the insured was using the vehicle in a public place. It also arises when the insured has caused or allowed any other person to use his vehicle in a public place and the death of or injury to the person or property of a third particle is caused on account of the said vehicle during such period, unless such other person has himself taken out a policy of insurance the cover the liability arising out of such an accident. 26. 26. Thus it is clear that the third party risks are covered if there is an access to the public in the place where the accident occurred and therefore the Motor Workshop is also a "public place" within the meaning of Section 2(34) of the Act as public have access to that place and appellant/insurance Company cannot escape from liability on the ground that accident happened in a private place such as "Motor Workshop". 27. The contention taken here was that since the vehicle was entrusted with a repairer or a workshop, the owner is not liable and, therefore, the appellant/insurance Company is also not liable is covered by the decision of the Supreme Court rendered in case of Guru Goekar v. Filomena F. Labo, 1988 ACJ 585 (SC). The Supreme Court held as follows : " .....When the owner of a motor vehicle entrusts his vehicle to a repairer to carry out repairs he is in fact allowing the repairer to use his vehicle in that connection. It is also implicit in the said transaction that unless there is any contract to the contrary the owner of the vehicle also causes or allows any servant of the repairer who is engaged in the work of repairs to use the motor vehicle for the purpose of or in connection with the work of repairs and when such work of repair is being carried out in a public place if on account of the negligence of either the repairer or his employee, who is engaged in connection with the work of repair, a third party dies or suffers any injury either to his person or property, the insurer becomes liable to pay the compensation under the provisions of the Act " The Court further held as under that : "This means that once the insurer had issued a certificate of insurance in accordance with sub-section (4) of Section 95 of the Act, the insurer had to satisfy any decree which a person receiving injuries from the use of the vehicle insured had obtained against any person insured by the policy. He was liable to satisfy the decree when he had been served with a notice under sub-section (2) of Section 96 of the Act about the proceedings in which the judgment was delivered. 14. He was liable to satisfy the decree when he had been served with a notice under sub-section (2) of Section 96 of the Act about the proceedings in which the judgment was delivered. 14. Thus on the facts of the case before us we are of the view that the insurer is liable to pay the compensation found to be due to the claimant as a consequence of the injuries suffered by her in a public place on account of the car colliding with her on account of the negligence of the mechanic who had been engaged by the repairer who had undertaken to repair the vehicle by virtue of the provisions contained in Section 94 of the Act which provides that no person shall use except as a passenger or cause or allow any other person to use a motor vehicle in a public place, unless there is in force in relation to the use of the vehicle by that person or that other person, as the case may be a policy of insurance complying with the requirements of Chapter VIII of the Act. Any other view will expose the innocent third parties to go without compensation when they suffer injury on account of such motor accidents will defeat the very object of introducing the necessity for taking out the insurance Policy under the Act. 28. In case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Uttara Devi and others, 2013 ACJ 1357 ), the Division Bench of this Court has held that workshop is a "public place" as defined in Section 2(34) of the Act, 1988. The relevant portion of the said judgment reads thus : 9. In the present case also the accident had occurred in a motor workshop where there is no restriction for the entry of any person of vehicle. In the evidence also it has come that the driver had entered in the area, i.e., workshop where the deceased was working under the instruction of his employer. Therefore, in light of the above, we are of the opinion that the 'motor workshop' comes within the definition of 'public place' as defined in Section 2(34) of the Act, 1988 and as such, the first argument advanced by learned counsel for the appellant that the accent had not occurred in a public place has no force. 29. Therefore, in light of the above, we are of the opinion that the 'motor workshop' comes within the definition of 'public place' as defined in Section 2(34) of the Act, 1988 and as such, the first argument advanced by learned counsel for the appellant that the accent had not occurred in a public place has no force. 29. Thus, it is held that "Motor Workshop" owned by workshop owner, where the accident occurred resulting into death of Kamal Sahu is a "public place" within the meaning of Section 2(34) of the Act and as such appellant/insurance Company is liable to make payment of the compensation to the claimants for death of Kamal Sahu, arising out of use of motor vehicle and the finding of the Claims Tribunal in this regard is hereby affirmed. Thus, this point is answered accordingly. Conclusion 30. Resultantly, the appeal deserves to and accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.