Karre Narasimha v. Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District
2013-04-25
G.CHANDRAIAH
body2013
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT 1. Heard Sri K.V. Bhanu Prasad, learned counsel for the writ petitioners, Government Pleader for Revenue for the 1st respondent and Sri N.Suryanarayana Murthy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the party respondents. 2. The petitioners claim to be the legal heirs of the protected tenant late Karre Babaiah @ Balaiah, who was granted certificate under Section 38-E of the A.P. (T.A.) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950. (for short ‘the Act’) for an extent of Acs.17-22 gts. in Sy.No.22 of Mallapur village, Saroornagar Mandal, Rangareddy District. They filed petition before the Mandal Revenue Officer, Saroornagar mandal, Rangareddy District under Section 40 of Act for grant of succession of tenancy rights and under Sections 32 (1) of the Act for recovery of possession. By proceedings No.B/10773/2003 dated 27.9.2003, the Mandal Revenue Officer, ordered succession and recovery of possession. The said order for better appreciation, is extracted as under: “This is the petition filed by Sri Karre Jangaiah, Karre Yadaiah, Karre Venkatesh, Karre Babulu, Karre Krishna, s/o Laxmaiah and Karre Narsimha s/o Babaiah alias Balaiah R/o Mallapur village, U/s 40 of A.P. (T.A.) Tenancy & Agricultural Land Act of 1950 for grant of succession of tenancy rights of late Karre Babaiah alias Balaiah and his family members and U/s 32(1) of A.P. (T.A.) Tenancy and Agricultural Land Act, 1950 for recovery of possession of land in respect of Sy.No.22, admeasuring Ac.17-23 gts., situated at Mallapur village. On receipt of the petition, the matter has been taken on record and issued notices and published at village for receiving of claims and objections over the land in respect of Sy.No.22, extent Ac.17-23 gts of Mallapur village. No objections were received within the stipulated time. The matter has been enquired in the village that the petitioners are the legal heirs of protected tenant late Babaiah alias Balaiah in the land in respect of Sy.No.22 admeasuring Ac.17-23 gts. Of Mallapur village. On perusal of P.T. register Sri Karre Babaiah alias Balaiah name has been recorded as protected tenant and Sri Syed Saber Hussain name has been recorded as a pattedar. As per the latest pahani, N.Anasuya and others were recorded as pattedars for the land to an extent of Ac.17-23 grts., in survey no.22 of Mallapur village.
Of Mallapur village. On perusal of P.T. register Sri Karre Babaiah alias Balaiah name has been recorded as protected tenant and Sri Syed Saber Hussain name has been recorded as a pattedar. As per the latest pahani, N.Anasuya and others were recorded as pattedars for the land to an extent of Ac.17-23 grts., in survey no.22 of Mallapur village. In view of the above it is proved that Sri Karre Babaiah alias Balaih is the protected tenant of land in respect of Sy.No.22 admeasuring Ac.17-23 gts., of Mallapur village, and the petitioners are the successors of protected tenant i.e., late Karre Babaiah alias Balaiah. Therefore, it is hereby ordered to record the names of Sri Karre Narsimha, s/o Babaiah alias Balaiah, and Keere Jangaiah, Karre Yadaiah, Karre Venkatesh, Karre Babulu, and Karre Krishna all sons of Laxmaiah, for succession protected tenancy rights U/s 40 of A.P. (T.A.) Tenancy & Agricultural Land Act, 1950 and recovery of possession of land U/s 32 (1) of A.P. (T.A.) Tenancy and Agricultural Land Act, 1950, to the petitioners in respect of the lands bearing Sy.No.22 Extent Ac.17-23 gts. of Mallapur village. The Additional Revenue Inspector and Mandal Surveyor are hereby directed to handover the possession of the land bearing Sy.No.22, Extent Ac.17-23 gts., of Mallapur village to the Successors of Protected Tenants while conducting a panchanama duly following procedure immediately. Pronounced in the open court and dictated by me.” 3. Aggrieved by the above dated 27.9.2003, the respondents before the Mandal Revenue Officer, filed appeal under Section 90 of the Act. In the appeal, in Case No.F2/174/2004 dated 7.2.2006, the Joint Collector-II, Rangareddy – 1st respondent, passed the following order: “In the instant case, the respondents claim to be protected tenants in respect of the subject land and claim to have acquired ownership rights over the land U/s 38-E of the A.P. (T.A.) Tenancy Act, 1950. The 38-E holders (i.e. respondents herein) have applied to the Mandal Revenue Officer to restore possession of the said lands U/s 32 of the Act. The Mandal Revenue Officer accordingly has invoked Section 32 of the Act and put the respondents herein (38-E holders) in possession of the lands. The principal point that arises for consideration is whether Section 32 of the Act can be invoked to restore possession of protected tenants who have acquired ownership rights under Section 38-E of the Act.
The Mandal Revenue Officer accordingly has invoked Section 32 of the Act and put the respondents herein (38-E holders) in possession of the lands. The principal point that arises for consideration is whether Section 32 of the Act can be invoked to restore possession of protected tenants who have acquired ownership rights under Section 38-E of the Act. The point has to be answered in the negative. Once a ownership certificate under Section 38-E is issued, the P.T. himself becomes the owner and the question of restoration of possession to such an owner is no more within the purview of the revenue authorities. Hence Section 32 has no application in respect of 38-E holders. Further, explanation to sub-section (2) of Section 38-E also provides for restoration of possession. Having regard to the language of the explanation, a protected tenant out of possession could be restored only before a certificate of ownership is issued to him. The fact that the provisions are beneficial would not enable a person to whom a certificate of ownership has been issued to seek restoration if he ceased to be a P.T. and himself becomes as owner. The revenue authorities certainly have no jurisdiction to take any proceedings for restoration of possession after the ownership certificate is issued. Hence, in the instant case, the impugned restoration of possession proceedings of Mandal Revenue Officer in No.B/10773/2003 dated 27-9-2003 is irregular and is therefore, set aside. The appropriate remedy for a 38-E holder who is out of possession is to institute a Civil Suit for recovery of possession. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The status quo order dated 17-1-2004 in Case F2/174/2004 is hereby vacated. Typed to dictation, corrected and pronounced by me in the open court on this the 7th day of February, 2006.” 4. Challenging the order dated 7.2.2006 passed by the Joint Collector, in setting the aside the order of the Mandal Revenue Officer in restoring possession and thereby requiring the Section 38-E certificate holders to institute a civil suit for recovery of possession, the present writ petition has been filed. 5. In the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, it is stated that 1st petitioner is the son of Karre Babaiah @ Balaiah, who was the protected tenant in Sy.No.22 of Mallapur village, Saroornagar mandala, R.R. District.
5. In the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, it is stated that 1st petitioner is the son of Karre Babaiah @ Balaiah, who was the protected tenant in Sy.No.22 of Mallapur village, Saroornagar mandala, R.R. District. He was granted Section 38-E certificate under Act for an extent of Acs.17-22 guntas on 30.5.1975. The original pattadar of the land is one Sri Syed Sabir Hussain. Even the Khasra Pahani of the year 1954-55 also shows Hussain as pattadar and Karre Babaiah as the protected tenant. In view of Section 38-E certificate issued in favour of Karre Babaiah, there cannot be any doubt, that he is the protected tenant. His father died leaving behind him, the 1st petitioner, Karre Lakshmaiah and Karre Narasimha. Karre Lakshmaiah also died and hence, the 1st petitioner and other petitioners 2 to 6 herein who are the sons of his deceased brother Karre Lakshmaiah, are entitled for recovery of possession. All of them have inherited the property of their late father. The Section 38-E certificated in favaour of the father of the 1st petitioner was questioned by the son of the original pattadar by filing an appeal. The District Revenue Officer by order dated 20.7.1977, dismissed the appeal. Aggrieved by the said order, the son of the pattadar i.e., Qutubuddin Hussain, filed revision before this court in C.R.P.No.4326/1977 and the same was allowed on 10.6.1981 remanding the matter to the Revenue Divisional Officer for fresh consideration. After remand, the Revenue Divisional Officer, entertained the objections of Qutubuddin and cancelled the Section 38-E certificate granted in favour of the father of the 1st petitioner, on 24.5.1985. Aggrieved by the same, the father of the 1st petitioner filed appeal before the Joint Collector and the matter was remanded for fresh consideration. When the Revenue Divisional Officer was conducting enquiry with regard to issuance of Section 38-E certificate, one Sri Syed Hashim Hussaini, filed a third party petition claiming to be the owner of the entire extent of land and sought the relief to recognize him as the pattedar of the lands. The Revenue Divisional Officer, having enquired into the matter, declared the father of the 1st petitioner, as the protected tenant and held that there is no irregularity or illegality in granting Section 38-E certificate in favour of the father of the 1st petitioner.
The Revenue Divisional Officer, having enquired into the matter, declared the father of the 1st petitioner, as the protected tenant and held that there is no irregularity or illegality in granting Section 38-E certificate in favour of the father of the 1st petitioner. Aggrieved by the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer, the said Qutubuddin Hussain, filed appeal before the Joint Collector and the Joint Collector again confirmed the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer and thereby, Section 38-E certificate granted in favour of the father of the 1st petitioner attained finality. It is further stated that the respondents 2 to 7 are claiming rights through Hashim Hussaini, whose application was rejected by the Revenue Divisional Officer. Having purchased the land from an unconcerned person, the respondents 2 to 7 are claming to be the owners and took possession of the lands. At that juncture, the petitioners filed an application before the Mandal Revenue Officer for restoration of possession of the lands under Section 32 of the Act. The Mandal Revenue Officer after conducing enquiry, allowed their application. Aggrieved by the same, the respondents 2 to 7 have preferred an appeal before the 1st respondent on several grounds. The 1st respondent having kept the matter for a long period, ultimately allowed the appeal on a flimsy ground that once Section 38-E certificate was granted, the holder of the certificate becomes the owner of the land, the provisions of the Act will not help the owners to seek for restoration of possession under the provisions of the Act and that the revenue authorities do not have jurisdiction to take up any proceedings for restoration of possession. Ultimately, the 1st respondent held that once the certificate is issued in favour of an individual, he becomes the owner of the property and if for any reason, he is not in possession of the land, he cannot ask for restoration of possession under Section 32 of the Act and only recourse open to him, is to approach the civil court for appropriate relief. By giving such a findings, the 1st respondent allowed the appeal on 7.2.2006. Aggrieved by the same, the present writ petition is filed. 6.
By giving such a findings, the 1st respondent allowed the appeal on 7.2.2006. Aggrieved by the same, the present writ petition is filed. 6. It is contended that even though Section 38-E certificate was issued in favour of an individual, if he is claiming restoration of possession, the only course open to him is to file an application under Section 32 of the Act, but not by way of suit in civil court. In the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, proviso to section 38 (2) was extracted. It is stated the amendment to Section 38 of the Act was brought by amendment of A.P. 2/1979. Then, several writ petitions were filed and a Full Bench of this court in the decision reported in SADA vs. TAHSILDAR UTNOOR ( 1987(2) ALT 749 (FB), held that whether the issuance of 38-E certificate was before or after 11.1.1979, still it is for the Tahsildar to restore possession to the protected tenant. Therefore, it is clear that protected tenant who obtained certificate under Section 38-E can get back physical possession only under Section 32, but he need not approach civil court. Therefore, when the petitioners made an application under Section 32 of the Act, the Collector ought to have confirmed the order of the M.R.O. who passed the order of restoration. Therefore, the impugned order of the Joint Collector in allowing the appeal in case No.F2/174/2004 dated 7.2.2006 is illegal and arbitrary and sought to set aside the same. 7. The 1st petitioner also filed an additional affidavit and while reiterating the averments made in the writ affidavit, further stated that as their father was never in possession of the land after the grant of Section 38-E certificate, it is the revenue authorities who have to restore possession and not the civil court. With these averments, the impugned order was sought to be set aside. 8. The 7th respondent filed counter affidavit on behalf of respondents 2 to 7. In the counter affidavit it is stated that against the order passed by the 1st respondent – Joint Collector, Rangareddy District, as per Section 91 of the Act, revision has to be filed, but the petitioners without availing the remedy, filed the writ petition and hence the same is liable to be dismissed.
In the counter affidavit it is stated that against the order passed by the 1st respondent – Joint Collector, Rangareddy District, as per Section 91 of the Act, revision has to be filed, but the petitioners without availing the remedy, filed the writ petition and hence the same is liable to be dismissed. It is stated that the petitioners have already sold the lands in question long back and also very recently during the pendency of the proceedings, have again sold in favour of one C.Karunakar S/o C.R.Mohan Rao vide document no.14899/2003 dated 10-12-2003 and as such they have no locus standi to file the present writ petition. In the writ petition, the petitioners alleged that their father was Karre Babaiah @ Balaiah. It means the original name is Babaiah and he is also called as Balaiah. In fact, always nick name follows original now. Here, the original name is followed by nick name. As because the alleged ownership certificate under Section 38E of the Act was issued in the name of Karre Balaiah, but not in the name of Babaiah. Thus Karre Babaiah is different from Karre Balaiah, as such, the petitioners cannot say that Karre Babaiah @ Balaiah. Karre Babaiah died long back. The petitioners have not filed a single document showing as ‘Karre Babaiah alias Balaiah” or “Karre Balaiah alias Babaiah”, thus they have created the word of “alias”. The petitioners alleged that the land in Sy.No.22 of Mallapur village is covered by protected tenancy. They also alleged that Karre Babaiah @ Balaiah was granted the ownership certificate under Section 38-E of the Act. It means that he became the owner of the land in question. But one Karre Jangaiah and others have filed a petition before the Deputy Collector & Mandal Revenue Officer, Saroornagar in the year 2003 bearing file No.B/10773/2003 for grant of succession under Section 40 of the Act and under Section 32(1) of the Act for recovery of possession of the subject land without making the pattedar as parities and without filing the death certificate and without showing all the legal heirs. By the time of filing of such application, the names of these respondents reflected in all the revenue records and pattadar pass books and title deeds have also been issued in their favour.
By the time of filing of such application, the names of these respondents reflected in all the revenue records and pattadar pass books and title deeds have also been issued in their favour. But the Mandal Revenue Officer passed the orders on 27.9.2003 in a hurried manner, without following the procedure, without giving notice to the pattadars, interested persons, possessors as contemplated under the Act and Rules. Aggrieved by the said order, the respondents have preferred an appeal bearing No.F2/174/2003 before the 1st respondent Joint Collector, Rangareddy District, eliciting all the facts and legal position and also filed all the relevant documents. After hearing the parties, the 1st respondent has passed orders on 7.2.2006 without considering Section 40, and the order has emphasized Section 38-E certificate of the Act. The petitioners are not entitled to claim any right under Sections 40 and 32(2) of the Act for the following reasons: i) The Section 40 and Section 32(1) are independent Sections. Separate enquiry has to be made and as such if he is the protected tenant, the Section 40 and 32(1) attracts. The following conditions should be satisfied for grant of succession under Section 40 of the Act. a) There should be protected tenancy in respect of the land. The name of protected tenant should find place in the final record of tenancy. b) The protected tenancy should have subsisted at the time of demise of the protected tenant; Section 40(2) clearly states that ‘heirs shall be entitled to hold the tenancy on the same terms and conditions on which such protected tenant was holding the land at the time of his death.” c) Death certificate is to be filed. No date of death is mentioned. The expressing “holding” clearly indicates that the protected tenancy viz., landholder-tenancy relationship ought to have subsisted at the time of the demise of the original protected tenant. In the present case, the requirement (a) is not in favour of the writ petitioners, as the land in question is not protected tenancy land. The name of Karre Babaih was no more and the petitioners herein are not legal heirs of alleged protected tenant Karre Babaiah. (Karre Balaiah is not P.T.) By the time, even otherwise, the ownership certificate under Section 38-E was issued there is no protected tenancy.
The name of Karre Babaih was no more and the petitioners herein are not legal heirs of alleged protected tenant Karre Babaiah. (Karre Balaiah is not P.T.) By the time, even otherwise, the ownership certificate under Section 38-E was issued there is no protected tenancy. The requirement (b) is also not in favour of the writ petitioner, as because, the Section 38-E certificate was issued to the alleged Karre Balaiah, thus there is no subsistence of relationship of protected tenant and landlord. After a lapse of more than 30 years, after the death of alleged protected since, the date of demise of protected tenant is not given, succession cannot be determined in a summer revenue enquiry. ii) That on the date of filing of the said petition, the petitioners are not the protected tenants as because as per the alleged ownership certificate under Section 38-E of the said Act, they became the owners and as such the Section 40 does not attract. Besides this, once the Section 38-E certificate is issued; Section 32(1) does not attract; he has to file such petition even otherwise, under provisions of Act 2 of Amendment, but not under Section 32(1) of the Act. Moreover, the Mandal Revenue Officer has no power under Section 40 of the Act to grant succession. In the decision reported in J.BHUSHANAM vs. JOINT COLLECTOR ( 1997(1) ALT 627 ), it is held that once certificate is issued under Section 38-E (2), protected tenant becomes owner. For any subsequent dispossession, he cannot rely upon provisions of Tenancy Act for recovery of possession and he has to approach civil court for such relief. iii) That these respondents have purchased the subject lands from its pattadars, possessessors and even from the petitioners herein. After purchase, they developed the same by investing huge amounts and hard labour. Admittedly these respondents are the pattadars and possessors and their names have also been entered into the revenue records and as such the Mandal Revenue Officer, who is the custodian of the record is well aware of the said fact and as such it is his primary duty to give notice to these respondents, and ought to have conducted a detailed enquiry, but he has not given such notice to these respondents. iv) That the Mandal Revenue Officer ought not have entertained single application for the reliefs of different independent section.
iv) That the Mandal Revenue Officer ought not have entertained single application for the reliefs of different independent section. He would have conducted separate enquiry in respect of Section 40 petition and 32(1) petition and would have passed separate orders. v) These respondents most respectfully submit that the petitioners/alleged protected tenants i.e., during the life time of alleged Karre Babaih nor the petitioners were never in possession of the subject land right from 1950 onwards, at any point of time. This fact is quite evident from the revenue records and orders passed by revenue courts and other tribunals. Further, the alleged protected tenant during his life time has not file any such petition claiming possession. Now the petitioners have filed the petition before the Deputy Collector and M.R.O. in the year 2003 i.e., after a lapse of more than 50 years. In fact such belated applications cannot be entertained as because the applications under Section 32 must be filed within a reasonable time. As because number of changes have taken place and number of developments took place. As per the judgment of the Apex Court reported in PONNALA NARSING RAO v. NALLOLLA PANTAIAH (1998)9 SCC 183 )it is categorically held that such belated applications cannot be entertained. 9. It is stated that during the pendency of the proceedings, petitioners have sold the subject land to C.Karunakar under registered sale deed document no.14899/2003 dated 10-12-2006 and as such the writ petitioner who are no more the protected tenants or the owners having any kind of right, title, interest or whatsoever, have no locus standi to file the present writ and moreover, they have not disclosed this fact before this court and hence the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 10. Originally, in the ownership certificate under Section 38-E of the Act the name is shown as Karre Balaiah. The petitioners termed it as Karre Babaiah @ Balaiah and claiming the right. In the said certificate, the father’s name is not mentioned and as such there is ambiguity in the said certificate and the petition for possession was filed in the year 2003 i.e, after a period of about 53 years and such petition deserves to be dismissed.
The petitioners termed it as Karre Babaiah @ Balaiah and claiming the right. In the said certificate, the father’s name is not mentioned and as such there is ambiguity in the said certificate and the petition for possession was filed in the year 2003 i.e, after a period of about 53 years and such petition deserves to be dismissed. In the further counter affidavit, it is stated that the petitioners also entered into agreements and received payments under receipts and thus relinquished their rights etc., But these facts have been denied by the petitioners. 11. With these averments, and supporting the impugned order in directing the petitioners to approach the civil court for restoration of possession, the writ petition was sought to be dismissed. 12. The learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioners reiterating the averments made in the writ affidavit submitted that in respect of agricultural lands in Sy.No.22 of Mallapur village, Saroornagar, one Sri Syed Sabir Hussain is the pattadar and in the Khasra Pahani for the year 1954-55 his name is shown as pattadar and Karree Babaiah was shown as protected tenant. Karree Babaiah @ Balaiah, who is the father of the 1st petitioner, was granted certificate under Section 38-E of the Act on 30.5.1975 by the Additional R.D.O., Hyderabad East in file No.B/313/LRE/75, for an extent of Acs.17-22 gts. in Sy.No.22 of Mallapur village, Saroornagar Mandal, Rangareddy District, which is the subject land. The said Karre Babaiah @ Balaiah died leaving behind him the 1st petitioner, Karre Laxmaiah and Karre Narasimha and Karre Laxmaiah also died leaving behind his sons and hence the petitioners, who are the legal heirs of the original protected tenant, became entitled for tenancy certificate. Challenging the Section 38-E certificate, the son of original pattadar Syed Qutubuddin Hussain filed appeal before the District Revenue Officer, Hyderabad and by proceedings No.B1/13854/95 dated 20.7.1977 the appeal ended in dismissal. Aggrieved by the same, a revision in C.R.P.No.4326/1977 was filed before this court and by order dated 10.6.1981, the matter was remanded. After remand, the Revenue Divisional Officer, by proceedings No.A/6421/81 dated 24.5.1985 dated rejected the claim of the respondents, who are the protected tenants and held that they are not entitled for the grant of ownership certificate under Section 38-E of the Act.
After remand, the Revenue Divisional Officer, by proceedings No.A/6421/81 dated 24.5.1985 dated rejected the claim of the respondents, who are the protected tenants and held that they are not entitled for the grant of ownership certificate under Section 38-E of the Act. Aggrieved by the same, the protected tenants, filed appeal before the Joint Collector, Rangareddy and in proceedings No.B4/7227/85, the matter was remanded to the Revenue Divisional Officer for fresh enquiry. During the process of enquiry, one Sri Syed Hashim Hussaini filed a claim petition, claiming to be the owner of the entire extent of land and sought for relief to recognize him as the pattadar of the land. The Revenue Divisional Officer in Case No.A/6421/81 dated 11.8.1993 held that Section 38-E certificate granted in favour of the petitioners holds good and the claim of the third party was dismissed. Aggrieved by the said order of the Revenue Divisional Officer, the legal heirs of Qutubuddin Hussaini, who is the son of the pattadar, filed appeal before the Joint Collector, Rangareddy District and by proceedings in case No.F2/191/94 dated 5.7.1999, the appeal was dismissed, confirming the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer. Thus the order of the Joint Collector dated 5.7.1999 attained finality, as no further appeal was filed. He submitted that the tenancy certificate under Section 38-E granted in favour of the 1st petitioner attained finality in the year 1999, after the prolonged battle since, 1975. He further submitted that the respondents 2 to 7 are claiming their title under registered sale deeds of the year 1993, through Syed Hashim Hussain, whose third party claim was rejected. Therefore, when vendor of the respondents 2 to 7 has no title, they cannot derive any title. He submitted that the petitioners are the legal heirs of Karre Babaiah alias Balaiah, who was declared as protected tenant. Either the original protected tenant or the legal heirs were never in possession of the property. During these proceedings, the father of the 1st petioner died and after the conclusion of the proceedings before the Joint Collector in case No.F2/191/94 dated 5.7.1999, the petitioners who are the legal heirs of Karre Babaiah @ Baliah, filed a petition before the Deputy Collector and Mandal Revenue Officer, Saroornagar Mandal, Rangareddy District, for grant of succession of tenancy rights of late Karre Babaiah @ Balaiah and for restoration of possession under Sections 40 and 32(1) of the Act.
As there was no dispute with regard to the grant of succession, the Mandal Revenue Officer, after enquiry in the village, found that the petitioners are the legal heirs of the protected tenant of late Babaiah alias Balaiah in respect of the land in Sy.No.22 admeasuring Acs.17-23 guntas and though notices were issued to the respondents, who names were recorded as pattedars for the subject land in the revenue records, no objections were received and the Mandal Revenue Officer ordered for recording the names of the petitioners as successors of the protected tenant and ordered to handover the possession under a panchanama duly following the procedure. Accordingly, the panchanama was conducted and the possession of the land was delivered. Aggrieved by the order of the Mandal Revenue Officer, the respondents 2 to 7 filed appeal before the Joint Collector and a status quo order was granted in Proceedings No.F2/174/2004 dated 17.1.2004 and eventually, the Joint Collector by the impugned order though found that the petitioners acquired ownership rights under Section 38-E of the Act, framed the issue that “whether Section 32 of the Act can be invoked to restore possession to protected tenants who have acquired ownership rights under Section 38-E of the Act?” and answered the issue in the negative holding that a protected tenant out of possession could be restored only before a certificate of ownership is issued to him and that the revenue authorities have no jurisdiction to take any proceedings for restoration of possession after the ownership certificate issued and that the appropriate remedy for a 38-E holder who is out of possession is to institute a civil suit for recovery of possession. By referring to Sections 32 and 38 of the Act, the learned counsel submitted that the understanding of the Joint Collector is contrary to the language of the said sections and also contrary to the law laid down by the Full Bench of this court reported in Sada’s case (1 supra).
By referring to Sections 32 and 38 of the Act, the learned counsel submitted that the understanding of the Joint Collector is contrary to the language of the said sections and also contrary to the law laid down by the Full Bench of this court reported in Sada’s case (1 supra). He contended that the original protected tenant and the petitioners were never in possession of the property and after conclusion of the proceedings in the year 1999, they filed petition for restoration of possession and as per the provisions of Sections 32 and 38, the Tahsildar has to deliver possession and accordingly the Tahsildar/ Mandal Revenue Officer, by considering the provisions and the material on record, has rightly directed for deliver of possession and same ought not have been set aside by the Joint Collector in the appeal. He contended that before the Joint Collector, the unofficial respondents did not raise any issue with regard to possession soon after the grant of certificate and their contention was that they are the owners of the subject property having purchased the same under registered sale deed and that without proper notice to them, restoration of possession was ordered and that it is the Joint Collector, under wrong notion of law, directed the petitioners to approach the civil court for restoration of possession. With regard to maintainability of the writ petition, the learned counsel submitted that though a revision is provided under Section 91 of the Act, since there is no specific prohibition, it cannot be said that writ petition is not maintainable. In support of his contention, he relied on the judgment of a learned single Judge of this court reported in NARANGI BAI AND OTHERS v. YADAGIRI BAL RAJ @ AUSHA BALRAJ ( 2011(1) ALD 665 ), wherein the learned single Jude considering Section 91 of the Act, held that in the absence of any specific indication in Section 91, it cannot be said that jurisdiction of High Court under Section 226 is barred and as the writ petition therein was pending since for last eleven years, rejection thereof at that stage on that ground, would certainly protract the litigation besides causing prejudice to petitioners. 13. He submitted that the unofficial respondents have purchased during the year of 1993 and the petitioners have no knowledge about the said purchases.
13. He submitted that the unofficial respondents have purchased during the year of 1993 and the petitioners have no knowledge about the said purchases. As per the revenue records, the Mandal Revenue Officers issued notices to the persons who names were found in the pattadar columns and as no objections were received, passed the orders recording names of the petitioners as successors of the protected tenant and ordered for deliver of possession. He further contended that the schedule of property shown in the sale deeds of the unofficial respondents is also different, since in the schedule of property it is shown as the said lands are situate at Sultanpur H/o Mallapur village, Saroornagar Mandal, whereas the Section 38-E was granted in respect of the land in Sy.No.22 of Mallapur village, Saroornagar Mandal. With these contentions, he sought to set aside the impugned order passed by the Joint Collector. 14. On the other hand, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents 2 to 7 contended that against the order passed by the Joint Collector, as per Section 91 of the Act, revision has to be filed and without availing the said remedy, filing of the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is not maintainable and hence the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of maintainability. He contended that under Section 91, a revision has to be filed before the High Court and against the order in revision, an appeal lies before the Supreme Court. If a writ petition is allowed, against the orders in writ petition, writ appeal would lie to the Division Bench and hence what is not contemplated under the statute, cannot be provided. He contended that as per the certificate granted under Section 38-E, the name of the protected tenant is shown as Kerre Balaiah and the petitioners are claiming that they are the legal heirs of Karre Babaiah @ Balaiah and no document is filed showing the name of the protected tenant as Karre Babaiah @ Balaiah hence, there is any amount of discrepancy with regard to the name of the protected tenant and hence the claim of the petitioners ought not have been considered by the Mandal Revenue Officer either for succession or for delivery of possession.
He contended that the date of death of the father of the 1st petitioner is also not specifically given and no death certificate was filed by the petitioners. The Mandal Revenue Officer has not followed the procedure as contemplated under Rules 3 and 4 of the Transfer of Possession and Eviction Rules, 1957 before order for delivery of possession and hence, the order of the Mandal Revenue Officer cannot be sustained. He submitted that the unofficial respondents after verifying the revenue records, purchased the property and at this length of time, the applications for succession and delivery of possession cannot be entertained. He stated that after the purchase, the unofficial respondents have developed the property and at this belated stage, proceedings under Sections 32 and 40 cannot be entertained. In support of his contention, the learned counsel relied on the judgment of the Apex Court reported in Ponnala Narsing Rao’s case (3 supra). He stated that the petitioners have sold away the subject property to one C.Karunakar under registered sale deed dated 10-12-2003 and thus they lost the status of the protected tenants and hence, they cannot invoke the provisions of the Act and further they have sold the away the land for non-agricultural purpose, hence Section 38-E stands cancelled and the petitioners have to file the suit. In support of this contention, the learned senior counsel relied on the judgments reported in D.YADAMMA AND OTHERS v. G.SURYANARAYANA ( 2008(3) ALD 605 ) and A.NARASIMHA v. A.KRISHNA AND OTHERS ( 2005(5) ALD 9 ). 15. He further contended that even assuming for the sake of argument that the petitioners are protected tenants, as per their case before the Mandal Revenue Officer, they were dispossessed by the respondents 2 to 7. Whereas in the writ petition, their case is that is that they were never in possession. Their stand before the Mandal Revenue Officer and before this court, is quite contradictory.
Whereas in the writ petition, their case is that is that they were never in possession. Their stand before the Mandal Revenue Officer and before this court, is quite contradictory. As per their case before the Mandal Revenue Officer, they were dispossessed and dispossession, pre-supposes possession and, therefore, for restoration of possession, the petitioners have to file a suit and they cannot invoke the provisions of the Act and the Full Bench judgment in Sada’s (1 supra) is not applicable to them and as per the judgments of the learned single Judges of this court reported in J.BHUSHANAM vs. JOINT COLLECTOR (2 supra) and RAMULU AND OTHES v. SUMITRA BAI ( 2013(1) ALD 215 ), the petitioners have to approach the civil court. Therefore, as the petitioners contended before the Mandal Revenue Officer that they were dispossessed by the unofficial respondents after grant of certificate under Section 38-E, they have to approach the civil court for restoration of possession and the Joint Collector has rightly held that the petitioners have to approach the civil court for possession. The learned Senior Counsel contended that though in the counter affidavit it is stated that they petitioners are not in possession of the property, such statements cannot be taken into consideration and the petitioners have to stand on their own case and they cannot take the advantage of the weakness of the respondents, which is the settled legal position. 16. He further submitted that even the petitioners received the monies from the unofficial respondents and executed receipts and further they entered into agreements with the other protected tenants and relinquished their rights and the unofficial respondents after verifying revenue records, purchased the property and at this belated stage, the claim of the petitioners cannot be entertained. 17. He further contended that against the orders passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer, Hyderabad East Division, Rangareddy in Case No.A/6421/81, whereunder the grant of Section 38-E certificate was held to be correct, a revision was filed before this court in C.R.P.No.5473/1999 and thus it is clear that Section 38-E certificate has not attained finality. When the certificate under section 38-E has not attained finality, it cannot be said that the petitioners are the protected tenants and hence the petition before the Mandal Revenue Officer for possession and succession, is not maintainable.
When the certificate under section 38-E has not attained finality, it cannot be said that the petitioners are the protected tenants and hence the petition before the Mandal Revenue Officer for possession and succession, is not maintainable. In support of this contention, the learned Senior Counsel relied on the judgment of a learned single Judge of this court reported in S.VENKATAREDDY v. JOINT COLLECTOR, RANGAREDDY DISTRICT ( 2003(2) ALT 377 ). With these submissions, he sought to dismiss the writ petition. 18. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners by way of reply submitted that the case of the petitioners is that the father of 1st petitioner was not in possession and after his death, they were also never in possession. The tenancy certificate under Section 38E was granted in the year of 1975 i.e., on 30.5.1975 and since then they were never in possession and the landlord and his son were continuously filing different proceedings before the revenue authorities and eventually, the 38-E certificate attained finality on 5.7.1999, when the Joint Collector Rangareddy District by proceedings in case No.F2/191/94 dated 5.7.1999, dismissed the appeal confirming the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer. Therefore, in the year 2003, the petitioners filed the present petition before the Mandal Revenue Officer for succession and possession. Their case is that they were never in possession. Even the respondents 2 to 7 in the counter affidavit have categorically admitted this fact. He contended that in the petition filed before the Mandal Revenue Officer, it is stated that after the purchase by the unofficial respondents, they were forcibly dispossessed from the land. This sentence cannot be taken in isolation and overall facts and circumstances have to be taken into consideration. Therefore, as the petitioners are out of possession, as provided under Section 32 and 40 they sought for recovery of possession and for succession and, as per the procedure under the Act, the restoration has to be made. With regard to filing of the revision in C.R.P.No.5473/1999, he submitted that this court dismissed the said revision petition for default on 27.1.2012 and even the restoration petition filed was also dismissed in the year 2013. He contended that to the said revision, the petitioners, who were pursing the litigation, were not made parties and the father of the 1st petitioner was made as party.
He contended that to the said revision, the petitioners, who were pursing the litigation, were not made parties and the father of the 1st petitioner was made as party. The original protected tenant Karre Babaiah @ Balaiah died during the pendency of the proceedings and a dead person is made as party to the revision petition before this court and it is a fraud played by the respondents 2 to 7 and such proceedings to which the petitioners are not parties and did not receive any notices, will have no bearing. He further submitted that the protected tenancy certificate was granted in the year 1975 and either the protected tenant or the petitioners were never in possession of the property and after the conclusion of the proceeding in the year 1999, petition for succession and possession was filed during the year 2003 and after the order of the Mandal Revenue Officer and taking delivery of possession under a panchanama, on 10.12.2003, the petitioners sold away the property, since all these years, they were incurring huge expenditure for legal litigation and subsequently, in the appeal status quo order was passed and eventually, the petitioners were relegated to the civil court, which is contrary to the provisions of the Act. He stated that such sale, will not disentitle the petitioners from invoking the provisions of the Act, since it is the obligation of the petitioners to delivery possession to their vendee. This court in similar facts and circumstances in NARANGI BAI AND OTHERS ( supra) considering the lis in between the tenants and their alienee on one hand and the landlord and the derivative title holders on the other hand, and thus considering the dispute between subsequent purchasers held that “Nevertheless, the issue raised and argued are in relation to the rights of the tenancts under the Tenancy Act. The controversy in relation to the ROR Act is, therefore, consequential, which may not and should not detain the court when once the core issues under the Tenancy Act are decided.” The learned counsel further disputed the receipt of monies by the petitioners and the relinquishment of tenancy rights. With these averments, he sought to allow the writ petition. 19. Before adverting the relevant contentions, certain admitted facts are required to be noticed.
With these averments, he sought to allow the writ petition. 19. Before adverting the relevant contentions, certain admitted facts are required to be noticed. It is an admitted fact that Korre Balaih was granted certificate under Section 38E certificate by the Additional R.D.O., Hyderabad East by proceedings in B/313/LRE/75 dated 30.5.1975 in respect of the land in Sy.No.22 admeasuring Acs.17-22 guntas of Mallapur village, Saroornagar mandal, Rangareddy District. The said proceedings attained finality by the dismissal of the appeal by the Joint Collector Rangareddy District in Case No.F2/7781/93 dated 5.7.1999. During these proceedings, it appears that the original protected tenant died since as per the cause title, it is shown as Korre Balaiah (died) and is represented by his legal representative Korre Narsimha, who is the 1st petitioner herein. Further a perusal of the cause title in the revision filed before this court in C.R.P.No.5473/199, the name of the original protected tenant is shown as respondent no.26. When the said protected tenant died during the pendency of proceedings before the revenue authorities, his legal heirs ought to have been impleaded. This shows that the petitioners are not aware of the revision pending before this court and the respondents have not filed any material to show that the petitioners have been served with any notice. However, the said revision ended in dismissal twice for default on 12.9.2007 and even the restoration petition also was dismissed on 1.3.2013. Therefore, as far as the petitioners are concerned, it can be said that the Section 38-E certificate attained finality on 5.7.1999, therefore, they moved the application before the Mandal Revenue Officer under Sections 40 and 32(1) of the Act in the year 2003. For this reason also it cannot be said that the petition under Section 32 is filed belatedly and the argument of the senior counsel for the respondents 2 to 7 that belated applications cannot be entertained, cannot be sustained and the judgment reported in Ponnala Narsing Rao,( supra) cannot be made applicable to the facts on record. 20.
For this reason also it cannot be said that the petition under Section 32 is filed belatedly and the argument of the senior counsel for the respondents 2 to 7 that belated applications cannot be entertained, cannot be sustained and the judgment reported in Ponnala Narsing Rao,( supra) cannot be made applicable to the facts on record. 20. Though the learned counsel for the respondents 2 to 7 disputed the Section 38-E certificate, the same cannot be taken into consideration, for the reason that they did not raise these contentions before the authorities below and their contention was that these respondents were the purchasers of the land from the original pattadar and protected tenant- Section 38-E holders and that they were not served with notices. The Mandal Revenue Officer, has categorically recorded that after receipt of the petition, the matter has been taken on record and issued notices and published at village for receiving of claims and objections over the land in respect of Sy.No.22, extent Ac.17-23 of Mallapur village, and as no objections were received within the stipulated time and after enquiry, ordered for recording of the names of the petitioners for succession of protected tenancy rights under Section 40 and for recovery of possession under Section 32(1) of the Act. In the appeal, the Joint Collector framed the following issue: “The Principal point that arises for consideration is whether Section 32 of the Act can be invoked to restore possession to protected tenants who have acquired ownership rights under Section 38-E of the Act.” 21. The Joint Collector answered the issue in the negative holding that once a ownership certificate under Section 38-E is issued, protected tenant himself becomes owner and the question of restoration of possession to such an owner is no more within the purview of the revenue authorities and hence Section 32 has no application in respect of 38-E holders and further held that the appropriate remedy for a 38-E holder who is out of possession, is to institute a civil suit for recovery of possession. Aggrieved by the order of the Joint Collector, in requiring the petitioners to approach the civil court, the present writ petition is filed. 22.
Aggrieved by the order of the Joint Collector, in requiring the petitioners to approach the civil court, the present writ petition is filed. 22. The case of the petitioners is that they are the legal heirs of the protected tenant and the Mandal Revenue Officer, on enquiry found them to be the legal heirs of protected tenant and ordered for recording of their names for succession and for restoration of possession. The Joint Collector also proceeded that the petitioners are the protected tenants. The respondents 2 to 7 never raised or disputed that there is any discrepancy with name of the protected tenant Karre Babaiah @ Balaiah and their grievance was with regard to notice and that they purchased the property from the pattadar. The pattadar was held to have no right over the subject property and the proceedings attained finality. As noted above, the Joint Collector, proceeded on the ground that the petitioners are the protected tenants and required them to approach the civil court for possession. Challenging the operative portion of the order in requiring the petitioners to approach the civil court, the present writ petition is filed. If the respondents 2 to 7 sought to dispute the description of the protected tenant, they ought to have raised the ground before the authorities below. But from the material on record, it could be seen that such a ground was not taken and they also did not challenge the portion of the order of the Joint Collector in holding that the writ petitions are the Section 38-E holders. Therefore, the contentions of the senior counsel for the respondents 2 to 7 in that regard, cannot be entertained. 23. With regard to maintainability of the writ petition, a learned single Judge of this court in Narangi Bai and Others (4 supra) held at paragraphs 11 and 12 as under: None of these judgments support the respondents’ plea on the maintainability of the writ petition. It is no doubt true that when an effective remedy of appeal or revision is available, ordinarily, the Court does not entertain a writ petition. Section 91 no doubt provides for a revision to the High Court from any order passed on appeal by Joint Collector or the Commissioner. In the absence of any specific indication therein, it cannot be said that the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 is barred.
Section 91 no doubt provides for a revision to the High Court from any order passed on appeal by Joint Collector or the Commissioner. In the absence of any specific indication therein, it cannot be said that the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 is barred. There is yet another strong reason to reject the respondents’ contentions. The writ petition has been pending in this Court for the last eleven years. At this point of time, if the writ petition is rejected on that ground, it would certainly protract the litigation besides causing prejudice to the petitioners. In a recent judgment, Supreme Court held that if the writ petition is pending for a considerable length of time in the High Court, it would not be proper to decline the exercise of jurisdiction on the ground of availability of alternative remedy (see Basanti Prasad v Bihar School Examination Board (2009) 6 SCC 791 ). The submission of the respondent is therefore, rejected. The Baby v Travancore Devaswom Board ( AIR 1999 SC 519 ) is a case which arose under Kerala Land Reforms Act. Section 103 of the said Act conferred revisional powers on the High Court. It was held therein that the power of the High Court under the constitution is always in addition to the power of revision conferred by a statute and therefore, the High Court can always interfere with the orders of the Tribunals. As could be seen from the above judgment, the learned single Judge held that it is true that that when an effective remedy of appeal or revision is available, ordinarily, the court does not entertain the writ petition and though Section 91 provides for a revision to the High Court from the order passed in appeal by the Joint Collector or the Commissioner, in the absence of any specific indication, it cannot be said that the jurisdiction of this court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is barred. Further, the above case was pending for about eleven years and considering this factor also, the learned single Judge held that at this point of time if the writ petition is rejected on the ground of alternative remedy, it would certainly protract the litigation, besides causing prejudice to the petitioners.
Further, the above case was pending for about eleven years and considering this factor also, the learned single Judge held that at this point of time if the writ petition is rejected on the ground of alternative remedy, it would certainly protract the litigation, besides causing prejudice to the petitioners. In the instant case, the writ petition is filed in the year 2006 and by now, nine years have passed and at this juncture, if the writ petition is rejected on the ground of alternative remedy, it would not only protract the litigation but also causes prejudice to the petitioners. Therefore, it cannot be said that writ petition is not maintainable and the objection of the learned Senior Counsel in this regard, cannot be sustained. 24. In view of the above law laid down by this court, it cannot be said that the writ petition is not maintainable and the objection in this regard, cannot be sustained. 25. The learned Senior Counsel for the respondents raised many grounds, which are in the nature of disputed questions of fact and which were not raised before the authorities below and hence they cannot be taken into consideration. The Joint Collector set aside the order of the Mandal Revenue Officer on the ground that once the Section 38-E certificate was issued, the protected tenant himself becomes owner and the question of restoration of possession to such an owner is no more within the purview of the revenue authorities and hence Section 32 has no application and that the remedy of 38-E holder, who is out of possession, is to institute a civil court for recovery of possession. This court is inclined to examine the validity of the said finding in the light of the provisions of the Act and the law laid down by this court and the case of the respective parties. 26. At this juncture it is pertinent to note Sections 32 (1) and 38-E (1) of the Act, which are extracted as under: 32. Procedure of taking possession:-- (1) A tenant or an agricultural labourer or artisan entitled to possession of any land or dwelling house under any of the provisions of this Act may apply to the Tahsildar in writing in the prescribed form for such possession.
Procedure of taking possession:-- (1) A tenant or an agricultural labourer or artisan entitled to possession of any land or dwelling house under any of the provisions of this Act may apply to the Tahsildar in writing in the prescribed form for such possession. (2) No landholder shall obtain possession of any land or dwelling house held by a tenant except under an order of the Tahsildar, for which he shall apply in the prescribed form. (3) On receipt of an application under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), the Tahsildar shall, after holding an enquiry pass such order thereon as he deems fit. (4) Any person taking possession of any land or dwelling house otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of sub- section (1) or sub-section (2), as the case may be, shall, without prejudice to his liability to the penalty provided in Division 96, be liable to forfeiture of the crops, if any, grown on the land to the payment of such costs as may be awarded by the Tahsildar or by the Collector on appeal from the Tahsildar. 38-E. Ownership of lands held by protected tenants to stand transferred to them from a notified date:-- (1) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter or any law for the time being in force or any custom, usage, judgment, decree, contract or grant to the contrary, the Government may, by notification in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette, declare in respect of any area and from such date as may be specified therein, that ownership of all lands held by protected tenants which they are entitled to purchase from their landholders in such area under any provision of this Chapter shall, subject to the condition laid down in sub section (7) of Section 38, stand transferred to and vest in the protected tenants holding them and from such date the protected tenants shall be deemed to be the full ownes of such lands; Provided that where in respect of any such land, any proceeding under Sec. 19 or Section 32 or Section 44 is pending on the date so notified, the transfer of ownership of such land shall take effect on the date, on which such proceedings is finally decided, and when the tenant retains possession of the land in accordance with the decision in such proceeding.
Explanation:-- If a protected tenant, on account of his being dispossessed otherwise than in the manner and by order of the Tahsildar as provided in Sec. 32, is not in possession of the land on the date of the notification issued hereunder, then for the purposes of the sub-section, such protected tenant shall, notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any Court, or the order of the Board of Revenue or Tribunal or other authority, be deemed to have been holding the land on the date of the notification ; and accordingly, the Tahsildar shall notwithstanding anything contained in the said Section 32, either suo-motu or on the application of the protected tenant hold a summary enquiry, and direct that such land in possession of the landholder or any person claiming through or under him in that area, shall be taken from the possession of the landholder or such person, as the case may be, and shall be restored to the protected tenant and the provisions of this section shall apply thereto to every respect as if the protected tenant had held the land on the date of such notification. (2) A certificate in the prescribed form declaring him to be owners shall be issued by the Tribunal after holding such as may be prescribed, to every such protected tenant and notice of such issue shall simultaneously be issued to the landholder. Such certificate shall be conclusive evidence of the protected tenant having become the owner of the land with effect from the date of the certificate as against the landholder and all other persons having any interest therein; Provided that where the land, the ownership of which has been transferred to the protected tenant under sub-section (1), is in the occupation of a person other than the protected tenant or holder of the certificate issued under this sub-section, it shall be lawful for the Tahsildar to restore the possession of the said land to the protected tenant or holder of the certificate, after giving notice of eviction to the occupant thereof, in the prescribed manner. (3). . . (4). . . (5). . . 27.
(3). . . (4). . . (5). . . 27. A reading of Section 32(1) and (3) and the proviso to sub section 2 of Section 38-E it could be seen that a tenant who is entitled to possession of the land under the provisions of the Act may apply to the Tahsildar in writing in the prescribed form for such possession and on receipt of such application, the Tahsildar, shall conduct a enquiry and pass such order thereon as he deems fit. Further under sub section 1 of Section 38-E, it is not necessary that the protected tenant should have been in physical possession on the date of the notification and it is sufficient if he comes to hold the status of a protected tenant as on the notified date even if not in physical possession and he satisfied the requirements of Section 38(7) of the Act and this is also subject to the proviso to Section 38-E (1). Further, restoration of possession to the protected under later part of the explanation to Section 38-E (1), is not a condition precedent for initiation or grant of ownership certificate under Section 38-E. Under sub section (2) of Section 38-E, the certificate if it has become final, becomes conclusive evidence and all objections to the very grant of the certificate must be raised before it is granted or in appeal or revision and cannot be permitted to be raised at the stage of delivery proceedings under the proviso to sub section 2 of Section 38-E of the Act. 28. Further, the proviso to sub section 2 of Section 38-E provides that if the land, the ownership of which has been transferred to the protected tenant under sub-section (1), is in the occupation of the person other than the protected tenant or holder of the certificate issued under this sub-section, the Tahsildar shall restore the possession of the said land to the protected tenant or holder of the certificate, after giving notice of eviction to the occupant thereof, in the prescribed manner. 29. The proviso to sub section 2 of Section 38-E was added by A.P. Act 2 of 1979, which came into force with effect from 11.1.1979 A Full Bench of this court reported in Sada’s case ( supra), while considering the issue, held at paragraphs nos.55 and 58 as under: “55.
29. The proviso to sub section 2 of Section 38-E was added by A.P. Act 2 of 1979, which came into force with effect from 11.1.1979 A Full Bench of this court reported in Sada’s case ( supra), while considering the issue, held at paragraphs nos.55 and 58 as under: “55. Point No.4:-- The point is whether the new proviso to Sec. 38-e (2) added by Act 2 of 1979 is retrospective and permits restoration of possession where ownership certificate issued before 11-1-1979 when Act 2/79 has come into force. 58. It is, however, argued that this amendment is prospective from 11-1-1979 and that the benefit of restoration of possession through the Tahsildar is available only to those protected tenants who have been given ownership certificates after 11-1-1979. In our view, this is not correct. It was, in our view, not the intention of the legislature that these protected tenants who obtained ownership certificates before 11-1-1979 should go to the Civil Court and those obtained certificates after 11-1-1979 should go to the Tahsildar. The intention of the Legislature was to benefit all cases, whether the ownership certificates were issued before or after Act 2/79. As already stated, the actual date of issuance of the ownership certificate has, no bearing on the statutory transfer of ownership under Sect. 38-E (1) with effect from the date of the notification for the certificate dates back to the date of the notification under Section 38-E(1).” 30. As per the provisions under Section 32 (1) and (3), and the proviso to sub section 2 of Section 38-E, and per the law laid down by the Full Bench, it is clear that the protected tenant who obtained ownership certificate before 11.1.1979 or after the said date and who is out of possession and the said land is in occupation of a person other than the protected tenant, shall approach the Tahsildar for restoration of possession and he need not approach the civil court for the said relief. 31.
31. In view of the above provisions and the law laid down by the Full Bench of this court in Sada’s case (supra), the finding of the 1st respondent – Joint Collector that once ownership certificate under Section 38-E is issued, the protected tenant himself becomes owner and the question of restoration of possession to such an owner is no more within the purview of the revenue authorities and hence Section 32 has no application in respect of 38-E holders and that the appropriate remedy for a 38-E holder who is out of possession is to institute a civil suit for recovery of possession; cannot be sustained and is liable to be set aside. 32. The father of the 1st petitioner was granted certificate under Section 38-E of the Act on 30.5.1975. The said certificate attained finality on 5.7.1999, when the appeal filed in F2/191/94 was dismissed by the Joint Collector. Though it is sought to be contended that a revision was filed, as already noticed above, the petitioners were not made parties and the revision was filed against the original protected tenant, who was no more and the revision also ended in dismissal for non-prosecution and petition filed for restoration, also ended in dismissal. Therefore, pendency of the revision cannot be taken to hold that Section 38-E certificate has not attained finality. 33. The case of the petitioners is that either the protected tenant or the present petitions, who are his legal heirs, were never in possession and therefore, sought for restoration of possession under Section 32(1) of the Act and also to grant succession of tenancy under Section 40 by recording their names in the revenue records. The said relief was ordered by the Mandal Revenue Officer and in the appeal the Joint Collector took a view, that protected tenants out of possession have to approach the civil court for possession and the said finding is unsustainable. 34. The alternative contention of the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents 2 to 7 is that if the petitioners who are the legal heirs of the protected tenants are out of possession, a petition under Section 32 of the Act, may be maintainable.
34. The alternative contention of the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents 2 to 7 is that if the petitioners who are the legal heirs of the protected tenants are out of possession, a petition under Section 32 of the Act, may be maintainable. But in the present case, in the application filed by the petitioners before the Mandal Revenue Offcier, it is stated that “It is submitted that the respondents by obtaining invalid and unenforceable proceedings in their favour forcibly dispossessed the petitioners from the land which is much against to law and they are liable to be evicted from the land in which the petitioners are to be inducted.” From this statement, the learned counsel pointed out that the petitioners stated that they were dispossessed and dispossession pre-supposes possession. Therefore, for the subsequent dispossessions after issuance of certificate under Section 38-E of the Act, the petitioners have to approach the civil court. In support of this contention, the learned counsel relied on the judgments reported in J.BHUSHANAM vs. JOINT COLLECTOR (2 supra) and RAMULU AND OTHERS v. SUMITRA BAI (DIED) BY L.RS ( 2013(1) ALD 215 ). 35. The law laid down in the above two judgments of this court passed by learned single Judges that for subsequent dispossession, the protected tenants have to approach the civil court and protection of the provisions of the Act are not available, is unexceptionable, but cannot be made applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case. In the present case, the case of the petitioners is that either the father of the 1st petitioner, or the petitioners, who are his legal heirs, were never in possession of the property. It is further stated that as the father of the 1st petitioner was recognized as the protected tenant, the said certificate was granted in his favour. The further case of the petitioner No.1 is that the original pattedar, Sri Syed Sabir Hussaini never allowed his father to take possession of the land and enjoy the same, that soon after the issuance of certificate, his father could not take possession of the land in view of the constant battle with the pattedar till 1999 who was opposing the grant of 38-E certificate in favour of his father.
After the death of pattedar, his son, Qutubuddin Hussain dragged on the litigation till 1999 and in that view of the matter, the case of the petitioners is that their father was never in possession of the land soon after the grant of 38(E) certificate in his favaour; that when the dispute was finally ended in the year 1999 and the certificate was confirmed in favour of their father, being legal heirs, they made an application before the Tahsildar under Section 32 of the Act for possession and the same is is perfectly maintainable and the revenue authorities alone are competent to restore possession of the subject lands. 36. In the counter affidavit filed by the respondents 2 to 7 at paragraph no.9(v) it is stated as under: “These respondents most respectfully submit that the petitioners/alleged protected tenants i.e., during the life time of alleged Karre Babaiah nor the petitioners never in possession of the subject land right from 1950 onwards, at any point of time. This fact is quite evident from the revenue records and orders passed by the revenue court and other tribunals. Further, the alleged P.T. during his life time has not filed any such petition claiming possession. Now the petitioners have filed the petition before the Deputy Collector & M.R.O. in the year 2003, i.e, after a lapse of more than 50 years. In fact such belated applications cannot be entertained as because the applications U/s 32 must be filed within reasonable time. As because number of changes have been taken placed and number of developments took place.” 37. From the above averments made in the counter affidavit it is clear that the case of the respondents 2 to 7 is that the protected tenant was never in possession since 1950 and that petition in the year 2003 under Section 32 of the Act for restoration cannot be entertained at this length of time. As already noted above, the certificate under Section 38-E was granted on 30.5.1975 and it attained finality on 5.7.1999 therefore, the contention with regard to belatedness cannot be accepted. Further, from the above averments on record, it is clear that the respondents have also admitted that the protected tenant was never in possession.
As already noted above, the certificate under Section 38-E was granted on 30.5.1975 and it attained finality on 5.7.1999 therefore, the contention with regard to belatedness cannot be accepted. Further, from the above averments on record, it is clear that the respondents have also admitted that the protected tenant was never in possession. No material is also placed on record to show that the petitioners were ever in possession of the subject property and on other hand the case of the respondents 2 to 7 is that they were inducted into possession and that they are in possession of the property. In view of these circumstances, the averment made by the petitioners before the Mandal Revenue Officer that the respondents forcibly dispossessed them, cannot be taken in isolation, to mean that they were in prior possession of the subject land before dispossession. Further, before the Joint Collector, the respondents 2 to 7 never raised any issue with regard to possession soon after the grant of certificate and their only contention was that they are the owners and the restoration of possession was ordered without prior notice and opportunity. However, the first respondent took the view that for restoration of possession, Section 38-E holders have to approach the civil court. Therefore, the contention of the unofficial respondents with regard to possession, cannot be entertained for the first time in the writ petition. In view of these circumstances, the contention of the learned Senior Counsel in this regard, is rejected. 38. The other contention of the learned counsel for the respondents 2 to 7 is that as the petitioners have sold away the property to one Karunakar, they lost the status of protected tenants and they cannot seek for restoration of possession under the provisions of the Act and it is a dispute between two purchasers. In support of this contention, the learned counsel relied on the judgments reported in A.NARASIMHA v. A. KRISHNA AND OTHERS (6 supra) and KAITHA NARSIMHA AND OTHERS v. SUSHEELA DEVI AND OTHERS ( 2004(3) ALD 851 ). 39.
In support of this contention, the learned counsel relied on the judgments reported in A.NARASIMHA v. A. KRISHNA AND OTHERS (6 supra) and KAITHA NARSIMHA AND OTHERS v. SUSHEELA DEVI AND OTHERS ( 2004(3) ALD 851 ). 39. The learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioners submitted that in similar facts and circumstances, in Narangi Basi (4 supra), considering the facts and circumstances therein, wherein the lis therein was between the tenants and their alienees on one hand and the landlord and the derivative title holders on the other hand, allowed the claim of the protected tenants for restoration of possession under Sections 32 and 40 and hence, the objection that the petitioners lost the status of protected tenants, cannot be sustained. He stated that though the certificate under Section 38-E was granted in the year 1975, till 2009, different legal proceedings were initiated by the landlord and his heirs and the protected tenant and the petitioners, had to incur huge amounts and fell in debts and to discharge them, after allowing the petition filed by them before the Mandal Revenue Officer, and after delivery of possession under panchanam, they sold the property and subsequently status quo order was granted and hence, it forms obligation on the part of the petitioners to sustain the order passed in their favour by the Mandal Revenue Officer. 40. In the judgment relied on by the learned Senior Court in A.Narasimha case (6 supra), the facts disclose that the landholder sold the land at the instance of the protected tenant to his second son and the said sale was regularized and he sold the land to subsequent purchasers. The sale of land by the landholder to the second son of protected tenant was acquiesced by two other sons of protected tenant and hence when the petitioner, who is the other son of the protected tenant filed application for restoration of possession under Section 32 of the Act, this court held that land ceases to possess any characteristics of tenancy and hence held that restoration of possession is impermissible. In the other case reported in Kaithna Narsimha (12 supra) the facts disclose that the petitioners therein who are the protected tenants sold the land to others through G.P.A. holder and subsequently they sought for restoration of the land under Section 38 of the Act.
In the other case reported in Kaithna Narsimha (12 supra) the facts disclose that the petitioners therein who are the protected tenants sold the land to others through G.P.A. holder and subsequently they sought for restoration of the land under Section 38 of the Act. This court held that if the claim of the petitioners is that the sale effected by G.P.A. holder are not binding on them, they have to only approach the civil court. 41. The law laid down in the above judgments cannot be made applicable to the facts of the present case. In the present case, the petitioners filed petition claiming possession under Section 32 of the Act, which was ordered and subsequently before filing of the appeal, the petitioners have sold away the land and the learned single Judge of this court in the decision cited 4 supra, while considering the claim filed for restoration of possession under Section 32 and the while examining the appeal proceedings under Section 90 and 91 of the Act and also R.O.R. proceedings and further taking into consideration the subsequent sales made by the protected tenants, held that the controversy in relation to the ROR Act is, therefore, inconsequential, which may not and should not detain the Court when once the core issues under the Tenancy Act are decided. The relevant portion of the order is as under: “1. This order shall dispose of both the writ petitions as they are interrelated, and the petitioners and respondents are the same. The first writ petition is filed assailing the order dated 08.02.1999 passed by respondent No.5, namely, the Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District (hereafter referred to as, JC) under Section 90 of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy & Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 (hereafter called, Tenancy Act). Second one is filed against the order of the JC, dated 27.03.1999, passed under Section 9 of the Andhra Pradesh Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books Act, 1971 (hereafter called, ROR Act). The land in dispute is the same, and the lis is between the tenants and their alienee on one hand and the landlord and the derivative titleholders on the other hand. By the time these matters came to be filed in the Court or in any event they are heard by this Court, the original landlords and original tenants are not in picture. The dispute is between subsequent purchasers.
By the time these matters came to be filed in the Court or in any event they are heard by this Court, the original landlords and original tenants are not in picture. The dispute is between subsequent purchasers. Nevertheless, the issues raised and argued are in relation to the rights of the tenants under the Tenancy Act. The controversy in relation to the ROR Act is, therefore, consequential, which may not and should not detain the Court when once the core issues under the Tenancy Act are decided.” 42. In the present case, the petitioners sought for restoration of possession and for succession of tenancy rights under Sections 32 and 40 and the Mandal Revenue Officer, after enquiry and as there was no dispute with regard to legal heir ship of the petitioners, ordered for recording of their names in the revenue records and directed for delivery of possession and subsequently, the petitioners sold the land under registered sale deeds and the respondents filed appeal before the 1st respondent Joint Collector, and the Joint Collector, holding that Section 38-E holders have to approach the civil court for possession and Section 32 is not available for such protected tenants, set aside the order of the Mandal Revenue Officer. Challenging this finding, the petitioners have filed writ petition before this court. When this court is examining the issue with regard to restoration of possession to the protected tenants who were never in possession of the subject property and who were directed to approach the civil court for such relief, the sale in favour of the subsequent purchaser, shall not detain this court from examining the core issue raised in the writ petition and the objection of the senior counsel in this behalf, cannot be countenanced and the same merits for rejection. 43. For the foregoing reasons, the impugned order of the 1st respondent is set aside and the order of the Mandal Revenue Officer in proceedings No.B/10773/2003 dated 27.9.2003 is restored. 44. The writ petition is accordingly allowed. No costs. Miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, stands closed.