JUDGMENT : 1. - This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner-tenant, Madan Lal S/o Lokumal Nathani under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against the respondent-landlord, Champa Lal S/o Kishan Lal, being aggrieved by the order dated 23.08.2012 of learned Appellate Rent Tribunal, Jodhpur allowing landlord's Appeal No.103/2008- Champa Lal v. Madan Lal and reversed the judgment and order of learned Rent Tribunal, Jodhpur dated 18.09.2008 in Eviction Case No.24/2005- Champa Lal v. Madan Lal whereby the eviction petition filed by the respondent-landlord, seeking eviction of tenant, Madan Lal from the suit premises, known as 'Madho Das Bhawan" situated at Ummed Hospital Road, Jodhpur, came to be rejected. 2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the respondent-landlord filed eviction petition seeking eviction of the petitioner-tenant from the suit premises (four rooms were let-out to the petitioner-tenant situated on the first floor of the suit premises) known as "Madho Das Bhawan" owned by the landlord, Champa Lal, and the same was initially let-out to the defendant-tenant Madan Lal on 28.10.1986 for a monthly rent of Rs. 600/-, which rent later on was increased w.e.f. 01.07.1997 to Rs. 700/- per month; and thereafter upon enforcement of new Rent Control Act, 2001, was further increased to Rs. 1575/- per month w.e.f. 01.04.2003. The defendanttenant failed to pay the said rent after 01.03.2002 and, therefore, the landlord approached the Rent Tribunal for eviction of the defendanttenant on the ground of default in payment of rent and, so also, bonafide necessity of the suit premises for his son, namely, Mafat Lal to setup a hotel and restaurant in the said premises besides setting up of an "Ayurvedic Hospital" for himself and his son, since the landlord- Champa Lal, was a qualified Ayurvedic Doctor. The said building "Madho Das Bhawan" is a large building in which 2-3 tenants occupied the said building, however, the other tenants had either left the said premises as their own or were evicted through the court process. The dispute in the present writ petition is only for one portion of four rooms, occupied by the defendant-tenant for his residential purposes. The dispute in the present writ petition is only for one portion of four rooms, occupied by the defendant-tenant for his residential purposes. The respondent-landlord claimed that he has retired from the Government services on 28.02.1993 and, therefore, he needed the suit premises for his own bonafide need and he also want to settle his younger son, namely, Mafat Lal, qualified as M. Com and her daughter-in-law, namely, Smt. Mala Rakhecha, qualified as B.Com. by setting up a hotel and restaurant business for them in the said building including the suit premises since the same is situated or a busy on main road opposite Ummed Hospital Road, Jodhpur. 3. The learned Rent Tribunal, however, dismissed the eviction petition vide its judgment order dated 18.09.2008 by finding that near the suit premises- "Madho Das Bhawan", there is a vacant/empty plot of land, owned by the landlord, measuring 50'x50'ft. and there, the landlord can construct a new building for satisfying such need of the family members including himself. The respondent-landlord being aggrieved by the same, went up in appeal before the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal under section 19 of the Rent Control Act, 2001, and the said appeal No.103/2008- Champa Lal v. Madan Lal , came to be allowed by the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal by the impugned judgment and eviction decree dated 23.08.2012, aggrieved with which, the defendant-tenant has filed this writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India before this Court on 30.10.2012. 4. Mr. M.C. Bhoot, Sr. Advocate assisted by Mr. Arpit Bhoot, had entered Caveat on behalf of respondent-landlord and Mr. J.R. Patel, represents the petitioner-tenant and by agreement of both the counsels, the matter was heard finally at the admission stage itself. 5. Mr. J.R. Patel, learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant submitted the following contentions: (i) That the need of the landlord and his son, Mafat Lal, cannot be said to be bonafide and reasonable because the landlord had raised the ground of different needs in different eviction matters filed by him seeking eviction of tenants from the same building. 5. Mr. J.R. Patel, learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant submitted the following contentions: (i) That the need of the landlord and his son, Mafat Lal, cannot be said to be bonafide and reasonable because the landlord had raised the ground of different needs in different eviction matters filed by him seeking eviction of tenants from the same building. He further urged that in one such eviction matter, the landlord claimed that he wants to set up "Ayurverdic Hospital", whereas in the present eviction petition filed against the tenant-petitioner, he said that he want to set up hotel and restaurant business in the said premises including the four rooms occupied by the defendant-tenant situated on the first floor of said building. He, therefore, submitted that such shifting stand by the landlord, disentitles him to the eviction decree. (ii) Mr. J.R. Patel, urged that in the suit premises known as "Madho Das Bhawan", which is a large building, two other tenants have already been evicted and now sufficient and suitable accommodation is available to the landlord-respondent and, therefore, present petitioner-tenant need not be evicted and thus no eviction decree could be passed by the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal against the petitioner. In support of this contention, he relied upon following judgments:- 1. M.M. Quasim v. Manohar Lal Sharma & Ors., reported in AIR 1981 SC 1113 2. The United India Insurance Company Ltd. & Ors. v. Smt. Nirmala & Anr., reported in 2009 (2) WLC 126 (iii) That unless the need of the landlord is bonafide and genuine would conceived in good faith, the eviction decree cannot be passed against the defendant-tenant. In support of this contention, he relied upon following case-laws:- 1. T. Sivasubramaniam & Ors. v. Kasinath Pujari & Ors., reported in 2. Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta reported in 1999 (2) RCJ 388 (iv) Learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant further argued that while reversing the findings of Rent Tribunal, the Appellate Rent Tribunal is duty bound to give good reasons and elaborate findings and in the absence of the same, the Appellate Court cannot be justified in reversing the decree of Rent Tribunal. He relied upon the following judgments:- 1. Santosh Hazari v. Purushotam Tiwari (Dead) by LRs. reported in 2. Madhusudan Das v. Smt. Narayani Bai & Ors., reported in AIR 1983 SC 114 3. He relied upon the following judgments:- 1. Santosh Hazari v. Purushotam Tiwari (Dead) by LRs. reported in 2. Madhusudan Das v. Smt. Narayani Bai & Ors., reported in AIR 1983 SC 114 3. Samir Chandra Das v. Bibhas Chandra Das & Ors., reported in 2010 (2) WLC (SC) 114 6. In the case of M.M. Quasim (supra), it has been held as under:- "18. ..... When examining a case of personal requirement, if it is pointed out that there is some vacant premises with the landlord which he can conveniently occupy, the element of need in his requirement would be absent. To reject this aspect by saying that the landlord has an unfettered right to choose the premises is to negative the very raison detre of the Rent Act. Undoubtedly, if it is shown by the tenant that the landlord has some other vacant premises, in his possession, that by itself may not be sufficient to negative the landlord's claim but in such a situation the Court would expect the landlord to establish that the premises which is vacant is not suitable for the purpose of his occupation or for the purpose for which he requires the premises in respect of which the action is commenced in the Court." 7. In the case of T. Sivasubramaniam (supra), it has been held as under:- "4. ..... It is often seen that a desire often taken its origin from what one likes and dislikes and necessarily it is not depended upon his need. But we cannot lose sight of the fact that sometimes the desire may be outcome of one's need. So when a landlord desires a premises, the requirement of law is that the landlord must set out his need for the premises in his petition and establish that such a need is bonafide. The need must be bonafide, genuine, honest and conceived in good faith." 8. In the case of Madhusudan Das (supra), it has been held as under:- "8. ..... At this stage, it would be right to refer to the general principle that, in an appeal against a trial Court decree, when the appellate Court considers an issue turning on oral evidence it must bear in mind that it does not enjoy the advantage which the trial Court had in having the witnesses before it and of observing the manner in which they gave their testimony. When there is a conflict of oral evidence on any matter in issue and its resolution turns upon the credibility of the witnesses, the general rule is that the appellate Court should permit the findings of fact rendered by the trial Court to prevail unless it clearly appears that some special feature about the evidence of a particular witness has escaped the notice of the trial Court or there is a sufficient balance of improbability to displace its opinion as to where the credibility lies." 9. On the other hand, Mr. M.C. Bhoot, Sr. Advocate assisted by Mr. Arpit Bhoot, learned counsel for the respondent S. B. Civil Writ Petition No.11741/2012 Madan Lal v. Champa Lal Order dated 07/02/2013 7/20 landlord submitted that the landlord himself is the best judge about his requirements and it is not for the tenant to dictate the terms to the landlord as to how he should have satisfied the bonafide need of his sons and himself, he could not seek eviction of tenant upon availability of the other portion of the suit premises during the course of present litigation. He mainly relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of Jamnadass v. Rajendra Kumar reported in 1989 (1) RLW 119 and submitted that the Appellate Rent Tribunal has passed a detailed and speaking judgment, running into 25 pages, and dealtwith all the contentions raised by the defendant-tenant. While reversing the findings of Rent Tribunal, the Appellate Rent Tribunal has given cogent reasons of his own while finding that need established by the landlord was bonafide, reasonable and genuine. He submitted that even though the suit premises is a large building but to establish the twin establishment of "Ayurvedic Hospital" and a Hotel & Restaurant, the entire building including the vacant plot of land, situated adjacent to the same, measuring 50'x50' as aforesaid, would be required and for the joint bonafide need of father and son and daughter-in-law, the family members, the various eviction suits were filed by the landlord and in two of which, landlord had succeeded so far. Although the other tenants have vacated the suit premises through court process, but only now the present petitioner against whom the Appellate Rent Tribunal has passed the eviction decree, is occupying the four rooms on the first floor of the house; and unless he is also evicted, the bonafide and reasonable need of the landlord cannot be satisfied. He also relied upon following judgments:- 1. Ahmed Farooq & Ors. v. Harish Chandra & Ors. reported in 2012 (3) DNJ (Raj.) 1640 2. Chandra Prakash v. Hasti Mal reported in 2012 (3) DNJ (Raj.) 1267 3. Ajaib Singh & Ors. v. Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd., New Delhi reported in 2012 (3) DNJ (Raj.) 1281 10. Mr. M.C. Bhoot further submitted that there is no question of changing any stand by the landlord in different eviction suits filed by the landlord and these twin requirements have been established and pleaded before the courts of law and Rent Tribunal and, therefore, on overall view of the matter only, the Appellate Rent Tribunal in the impugned judgment and eviction decree has found that the bonafide need for the son of the landlord and himself, is duly established with the evidence in the form of witnesses of various persons. Therefore, such findings of facts cannot be said to be perverse at all and same do not require any interference by this Court in limited and narrow scope in supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He also submitted that findings of facts of bonafide need arrived at by the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal even reversing the findings of learned Rent Tribunal, do not require any interference under the writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 11. I have heard learned counsels for the parties at length and perused the impugned orders, material on record and judgments cited at bar. 12. In the considered opinion of this Court, there is no merit in the writ petition filed by the petitioner-tenant against the order of the Appellate Rent Tribunal allowing the landlord's appeal vide the impugned order dated 23.08.2012. 12. In the considered opinion of this Court, there is no merit in the writ petition filed by the petitioner-tenant against the order of the Appellate Rent Tribunal allowing the landlord's appeal vide the impugned order dated 23.08.2012. The Appellate Rent Tribunal has given detailed and cogent reasons and has discussed all the relevant facts and evidence on record; and the defence set up by the petitioner-tenant and thereafter returned its own reasons and findings of facts that bonafide need of the landlord and his family members was established and the Rent Tribunal had erred in rejecting the eviction petition of the landlord. No narrow and pedantic approach in this regard could be taken by the Rent Tribunal that since a vacant/empty plot of land was available to the landlord, he should satisfy his need with that. The need of setting up of "Ayurvedic Hospital" and a Hotel and restaurant, jointly taken can require a large space or accommodation and the defendant-tenant certainly cannot dictate terms that the Hotel or Restaurant should be of a particular limited size or so also the "Ayurvedic Hospital" to be set up by the landlord should be constructed newly on the vacant plot of land. The requirement of the family can always be pleaded and then established by the statements of various witnesses, who are family members and others, and once the genuineness of that is felt by the Rent Tribunal, then no dissection of such statements can be made by the Tribunal or the court as it is well settled that the landlord alone is the best judge of his needs business needs or personal needs and even courts cannot substitute their own opinion Therefore, only the bonafideness or reasonableness of the same has to be seen and if such reasonable and bonafide need is established, eviction decree has to follow and such findings of facts are binding on this Court in supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 13. This Court in the case of Ahmed Farooq & Ors. (supra), has held as under:- "20. 13. This Court in the case of Ahmed Farooq & Ors. (supra), has held as under:- "20. In view of settled legal position, it is for the landlord to choose the premises which would suit his requirement and it hardly lies with the tenant to dictate the terms to landlord and suggest the landlord to satisfy his business need with available premises, which may or may not belong to the person for whose need the eviction is sought. The trial court in the present case at page 10 had clearly found that this first floor is not at all suitable for setting up the crockery business for appellant no.2. 21. However, the learned first appellate court not emphasising much about the said first floor space, reversed the eviction decree on the ground that a triangular shop in Abdulla Building 'B' has become available to the father of the appellant no.2 - Abdulla Farooq, which fact was subsequently brought on record by way of application under Order 41 Rule 27 Civil Procedure Code filed by the defendant tenant and since the said shop no.1 had already became available in the year 1990, on which point learned counsel for the plaintiff landlord differred and submitted that vacant position of the said shop was only received after execution proceedings only in 1993 and after his retirement as TTE from the Railways in 1992 the plaintiff landlord Ahmed Farooq himself wanted to set up his own travel agency business in the name of M/s Jodhpur Travels, but the learned first appellate court held on the basis of evidence of R.W.4 Kailash Chand Jain, employee of M/s Jodhpur Travels that since on the receipt book/bill book "Shri Mahaveerai Namah" was handwritten on some carbon copies of Bills, vide Ex.D, R.W.1/1, which would indicate that business in the said premises was carried on by a person belonging to Jain community as against the Muslim community to which the plaintiff landlord belonged in the present case, therefore, the appellate court wrongly concluded that the appellant no.1 himself was not carrying business in the name and style of M/s Jodhpur Travels and in fact the said shop no.1 after eviction by Danmal was let out again to one Mohan Lal Jain. This premise taken by the learned first appellate court is wholly erroneous in the opinion of this Court. This premise taken by the learned first appellate court is wholly erroneous in the opinion of this Court. Merely because in the cross examination of R.W.4 - Kailash Jain has stated that there was handwritten inscription "Shri Mahaveerai Namah" on Ex.DR. W.1/1 - on one & two leafs of the Bill Book, even though name of Ahmed Farooq with Jodhpur Travels is printed & this inscription was not printed at all, without clearly stating that Ahmed Farooq has no connection with M/s. Jodhpur Travels, as against the documentary evidence led by appellant no.1 - Ahmed Farooq for registration of M/s Jodhpur Travels with the Government Authorities like Shop & Establishment Act etc., the learned first appellate court could not have concluded that appellant-plaintiff no.1 was not doing his own business in the said shop no.1, which had become available in the year 1990/1993. Even assuming for argument sake that appellant plaintiff - Ahmed Farooq instead of doing his own business of Travel Agency had entered into any business arrangement with one Mohan Lal Jain, though such an inference is not called for in the present case, even then it does not lie with the defendant tenant to contend that such business was not belonging to appellant no.1 himself and said shop no.1 may be deemed to be available for satisfying the need of setting up the crockery business for appellant no.2 - Abdulla Farooq, son of Ahmed Farook, once landlord says that such shop is not suitable for setting up his crockery business. The learned first appellate court in para 33 of its judgment itself has ultimately not relied upon the statement of R.W.4 - Kailash Chand Jain finding him to be making contradictory statements. 22. As aforesaid, it is for the landlord to adjudge & satisfy his need and the said shop no.1 which is triangular in shape and of awkward measurements, as given above, cannot be said to be appropriate and suitable shop available to the landlord as against the suit shop measuring 15'x20', which is in possession of the defendant tenant situated in same area & road on the opposite side. 23. 23. Therefore, the learned first appellate court has apparently fallen in error in substituting its own wisdom and decision for that of the landlord, who alone is the best judge in this regard as held in various decisions discussed above and the learned trial court was justified in decreeing the suit upon establishing of the bonafide and reasonable necessity of the landlord. 24. Accordingly, the present second appeal of the appellant landlords deserves to be allowed and the same is hereby allowed & answering the substantial questions of law framed as above in favour of the plaintiff landlords & against the respondent-defendant tenants and setting aside the appellate court's judgment and decree dated 3/12/1995, the eviction decree of the learned trial court dated 28/3/1987 is restored. The second appeal of plaintiff is allowed with no order as to costs." 14. This Court in the case of Chandra Prakash (supra) has held as under:- "8. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and upon perusal the record of the case, this Court is of the considered opinion that the present second appeal filed by the defendant - tenant has no force and no substantial question of law arises in the present second appeal. The finding of bonafide need of the landlord is a finding of fact. 9. Normally, evidence on record is not re-appreciated in the second appeal under Section 100 Civil Procedure Code which cannot be made a third round of trial in such rent control and eviction matters. Unless the findings of the courts below are shown to be ex-facie perverse and palpably erroneous, normally such findings of finds do not require any interference by this Court under Section 100 Civil Procedure Code. It has been well settled by umpteen number of judgments of this Court as well as Hon'ble Supreme Court, some of which are referred below that the tenant cannot dictate the terms as to how the landlord should adjust his need and whether he should do particular business in the particular manner or at a particular place or not. 10. The landlord is the best judge of his need in this regard. 10. The landlord is the best judge of his need in this regard. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant - tenant that since the son of the plaintiff, namely, Sanjay is also an income tax payee and belongs to a rich family and is not expected to do cloth business, is not at all acceptable. It is for the landlord and his son to decide as to what business they are going to set up in the disputed premises. The defendant himself has been admittedly doing the cloth business in that shop and if by renovating the same and converting into a proper show-room, the son of the plaintiff respondent wants to open cloth showroom, there is no lack of bonafides or reasons to disbelieve such a contention of the plaintiff. The findings regarding bonafide need of the landlord are findings of facts and unless they are palpably wrong and perverse, they do not require any interference by this Court in the second appeal. 11. The tenant is not the best judge of the need of the landlord, but on the other hand, the plaintiff landlord himself is the best judge of his business need and tenant cannot dictate terms in this regard. In this regard, following judgments may be referred to: (i) 2011(3) DNJ (Raj.) 1217 - Denzil Nagrath v. LRs. of Balwant Singh (ii) SB CSA NO.132/2009 - LRs. of Prakash v. Poornima decided on 11.5.2011. (iii) SBCSA No.174/2006 - Abdul Salam v. Arvind Kumar decided on 17.1.2009 (iv) SBCSA No.159/2005 - Raj Kumar v. Shevi Bai decided on 22.1.2009 reported in 2009 (3) RLW 2663. (v) SBCSA No.203/2010 - Om Prakash Bhati v. LRs. of Har Kanwar decided on 11.8.2011. 12. This Court in the case of LR's of Prakash v. Poornima (SBCSA No.132/2009, decided on 11.05.2011) also emphasised that landlord was the best judge of his needs in the following terms:- "5. Learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiffs, Mr. (v) SBCSA No.203/2010 - Om Prakash Bhati v. LRs. of Har Kanwar decided on 11.8.2011. 12. This Court in the case of LR's of Prakash v. Poornima (SBCSA No.132/2009, decided on 11.05.2011) also emphasised that landlord was the best judge of his needs in the following terms:- "5. Learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiffs, Mr. S.N. Pungalia strongly opposed these submissions and urged that no substantial question of law arises in the present second appeal and the finding of facts returned by the courts below are based on cogent and relevant evidence and the second appeal deserves to be dismissed as the bonafide need of the landlord was fully established before the learned trial court and as per the catenae of judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court, it is not for the tenant to dictate the landlord as to how and in what manner he should satisfy his bonafide need for his business place and from the facts found by the courts below it was clear that the very source of livelihood of plaintiffs was the STD PCO Booth, which is presently run under the staircase and they need bigger premises for carrying out this business. 6. Having heard the learned counsels and upon perusal of the impugned orders passed by learned courts below, this Court is of the opinion that no substantial question of law arises for determination by this Court and the present second appeal is liable to be dismissed and same is accordingly dismissed." 13. This Court in the case of Denzil Najrath v. LR's of Balwant Singh & Ors. reported in 2011 (3) DNJ (Raj.) 1217 , in which this Court held in para 6 as under:- "Having heard learned counsels for the parties and having gone through the impugned judgment and evidence recorded by the learned trial court, this Court is satisfied that the findings of the fact about the bonafide need of the landlord recorded by the learned trial court are not perverse in any manner. They are based on cogent reasons and evidence and no interference in the impugned judgment is required to be made in the present first appeal of the defendant-tenant. They are based on cogent reasons and evidence and no interference in the impugned judgment is required to be made in the present first appeal of the defendant-tenant. The owner-plaintiff, Swarn Singh has clearly stated in paras 7 and 8 of his affidavit that the available house with the plaintiff's family was very small of three rooms and for a family of two married brothers and three married sisters and parents of them, the said accommodation was very short of the requirement and, therefore, they needed the suit house for their own residential purposes. Nothing in the cross-examination was even asked from the said deponent about the relationship and number of family members and, therefore, the averments made in the affidavit was sufficient proof unshaken in the cross-examination of the said deponent, namely, Swarn Singh. It is well settled that findings about the bonafide need of the landlord are findings of fact and unless they can be said to be perverse or without any foundation, the same cannot be interfered with by the appellate court; and even though this is first appeal as the trial Court was that of learned Additional District Judge, Sri Karanpur and requirement of substantial question of law may not be there as such as is required for second appeal under Section 100 Civil Procedure Code, still this Court is satisfied that decree under appeal deserves no interference and the present appeal filed by the defendant-tenant has no merit." 14. The judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant - defendant are distinguishable on facts and therefore, are of no avail to the appellants. 15. In the present case, this Court is fully satisfied that on the basis of pleadings and statements, which were read before this Court also, the courts below were perfectly justified in arriving at the findings of bonafide and reasonableness of the need of plaintiff for setting up cloth business of his son Sanjay. 16. Consequently, the present second appeal of the defendant - tenant deserves to be dismissed and the same is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs." 15. This Court in the case of Ajaib Singh & Ors. (supra) has held as under:- "14. A bare perusal of the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the respondent-tenant indicates that the facts of those judgments are absolutely distinguishable from the facts of the present case. No order as to costs." 15. This Court in the case of Ajaib Singh & Ors. (supra) has held as under:- "14. A bare perusal of the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the respondent-tenant indicates that the facts of those judgments are absolutely distinguishable from the facts of the present case. In one case, tin shed was installed by the tenant outside the rented premises, and such temporary tin shed could not be compared with the nature of the material alterations done in the present case. In the present case, the tenant has made material alterations in the suit premises/shop without permission or consent of the landlord, referred to supra. Similarly, in Rajasthan High Court decision in the case of Smt. Supyar Bai (supra), the nature of construction raised was absolutely of temporary nature, which could be removed at any time, however, such facts are not obtaining in the case in hand. Therefore, both these judgments cited and relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent-tenant are of no avail to him. 15. On an overall reading of the reasons given by the learned lower appellate court, this Court is satisfied that the findings returned the learned lower appellate court in the impugned judgment and decree dated 14.11.1990 are perverse and not sustainable. The suit seeking eviction deserves to be decreed on both the grounds as aforesaid. 16. Accordingly, the present second appeal filed by the appellants-plaintiffs is allowed and substantial questions of law, framed above, are answered in favour of plaintiffs-landlord and against the respondent defendant- tenant. No costs. The present second appeal itself has been allowed, therefore, application filed by the respondent-tenant during the course of arguments, being IA No. 11336/2012 is rejected." 16. A coordinate bench of this Court in the case of Jamnadas v. Rajendra Kumar reported in 1989 (1) RLW 119 has held as under:- "15. In the aforesaid observations the Addl. District Judge, while emphasising that there must be an element of need as opposed to mere which or desire has, observed that it must be "backed by extreme want or destitution." Again he has gone to observe that "facts should be proved from which irresistible inference can be drawn that plaintiff has a pressing necessity." In my view, the Addl. District Judge, while emphasising that there must be an element of need as opposed to mere which or desire has, observed that it must be "backed by extreme want or destitution." Again he has gone to observe that "facts should be proved from which irresistible inference can be drawn that plaintiff has a pressing necessity." In my view, the Addl. District Judge was not right in placing the qualifications, namely, "extreme want or destitution" and "pressing necessity" while dealing with the reasonableness of the need of the landlord. The said qualifications do not appear to be justified from the decisions of the Supreme Court and this Court. It is, therefore, appears that in judging the reasonableness of the need of the appellant, the Addl. District Judge has applied a more stringent standard than that is applicable and the findings that have been recorded by the Addl. District Judge by applying this standard cannot be held to be conclusive in second appeal. It is, therefore, necessary to examine as to whether on the basis of the tests which are applicable, the appellant has established that he requires the suit premises reasonable and bonafide for his personal use, namely, for the purpose of carrying on his business in electrical goods. 19. As regards better suitability of Tripolia Bazar for the purpose of carrying on the business in electrical goods, it may be stated that from the evidence it appears that the appellant is carrying on wholesale and retail business and there are shops dealing in electrical goods both in Johari Bazar as well as in Tripolia Bazar. It has come in evidence that in Tripolia Bazar two other dealers of Philips Company, namely, Gangabux Ratan Lal and Radha Ballabh and sons, have their business and in addition there are other shops of electrical goods which shows that Tripolia Bazar is a market for electrical goods. The appellant wants to shift his business to Tripolia Bazar where other dealers of the goods of Philips Co., have their shops. The courts below have held that Johari Bazar is equally suitable for carrying on business in electrical goods because there are a number of shops of electrical goods in Johari Bazar and the side lanes and that the appellant had maximum sale of the products of Philips Co. In the year 1975. The courts below have held that Johari Bazar is equally suitable for carrying on business in electrical goods because there are a number of shops of electrical goods in Johari Bazar and the side lanes and that the appellant had maximum sale of the products of Philips Co. In the year 1975. In my view, the fact that the appellant was able to have maximum sale of the products of Philips Co. at his shop at Johari Bazar does not mean that the need of the appellant to shift his business to Tripolia Bazar, where the other two dealers of goods of Philips Co. are having their shops, is not genuine. The appellant feels that he would be in a position to further increase his sales if he shifts his business to Tripolia Bazar where the other two dealers of Philips goods are also having their shops. It cannot be said that the appellant is not justified in proceeding on that basis." 17. So far as the case-laws cited at bar by the learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant, Mr. J.R. Patel, are concerned, they are of little help to the petitioner and the same arose in different context and facts of the case, are also different. On the contrary, the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant about bonafide need, if closely examined, would reveal that the ratio of such judgments support the case of the landlord and not the petitioner tenant. 18. It is well settled that jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, specially in the special laws like the Rent Control Act, has to be very narrow and unless glaring perversity is shown in the impugned order of the Appellate Rent Tribunal even upon a reversal or even concurrent decisions of both the Rent Tribunals, the said findings of facts cannot be interfered with. Merely because the Appellate Rent Tribunal has reversed the findings of Rent Tribunal, it does not per se becomes a fit case of interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India always, unless the Appellate Rent Tribunal has grossly erred or has given the findings of facts are bereft of any evidence in this regard. Merely because the Appellate Rent Tribunal has reversed the findings of Rent Tribunal, it does not per se becomes a fit case of interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India always, unless the Appellate Rent Tribunal has grossly erred or has given the findings of facts are bereft of any evidence in this regard. The assailing of such findings on the grounds like raised in the present case, that there is no finding of unsuitability of accommodation for the landlord, or that the landlord should adjust his bonafide needs in the vacant rooms in the said building now available, which were vacated during the pendency of the present suit, are not sufficient for interference in such findings of learned Appellate Rent Tribunal, which essentially remain the findings of facts and are binding even on this Court. If the findings of the Rent Tribunal below have been traversed and dealtwith by the Appellate Rent Tribunal, which has a co-extensive and superior jurisdiction over the Rent Tribunal below, it can always give its reasons and reverse the findings of Rent Tribunal, as has been done in the present case as well. 19. Recently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty & Anr. v. Rajendra Shankar Pateil reported in 2010 AIR SCW 6387 has held as under:- "Writ petition in dispute between landlord and tenant where only respondent is landlord is not maintainable. Supreme Court deprecated the practice of entertaining petition under Article 227 over disputes relating to partition suits, matters relating to execution of decree, disputes between landlord and tenant, in cases of money decree and other case where disputed questions of property are involved. A writ petition is a remedy in public law which may be filed by any person but the main respondent should be either Government, Governmental agencies or a State of instrumentalities of a State within the meaning of Article 12. Private individuals cannot be equated with State or instrumentalities of the State. All the respondents in a writ petition cannot be private parties. But private parties acting in collusion with State can be respondents in a writ petition. Under the phraseology of Article 226, High Court can issue writ to any person, but the person against whom writ will be issued must have some statutory or public duty to perform." 20. All the respondents in a writ petition cannot be private parties. But private parties acting in collusion with State can be respondents in a writ petition. Under the phraseology of Article 226, High Court can issue writ to any person, but the person against whom writ will be issued must have some statutory or public duty to perform." 20. Accordingly, in view of above, the present writ petition of the petitioner-tenant deserves to be dismissed and the same is, accordingly, dismissed. The eviction decree granted by the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal, Jodhpur dated 23.08.2012 is upheld. 21. The petitioner-tenant shall hand over the peaceful and vacant possession of the suit premises (four rooms occupied by the petitioner-tenant) in question to the respondent-landlord within a period of Six Months from today i.e. on or before 0 1st August, 2013, and shall pay mesne profit @ Rs. 3000/- per month commencing from February, 2013 for use and occupation till the vacant and peaceful possession is handed over. The arrears of mesne profit shall be cleared within three months from today and the petitioner-tenant will further continue to pay the mesne profits each month by 15th day of the next succeeding month or in advance to the respondent-landlord till the vacant and peaceful possession is handed over to the respondent-landlord and in case there is any default in payment of mesne profit, the period of six months for eviction shall stand reduced and the decree of eviction would become executable forthwith. The petitioner-tenant shall also clear, if not already paid and all the arrears of the rent or mesne profit within three months from today, otherwise the amount shall bear simple interest @ 9% p.a. and the executing Court may quantify such amount and recover the same as a money decree. The amount already deposited, may be disbursed to the respondent-landlord forthwith. The petitioner-tenant shall also not sub-let, assign or part with the possession of the suit premises or any part thereof in favour of any one else and would not create any third party interest in the same during the aforesaid period and the same, if so created, would be treated as void. The petitioner tenant shall furnish a written undertaking incorporating the aforesaid conditions in the trial court within three months and one copy thereof along with affidavit, in this Court. The petitioner tenant shall furnish a written undertaking incorporating the aforesaid conditions in the trial court within three months and one copy thereof along with affidavit, in this Court. It is made clear that if the peaceful and vacant possession of the suit premises is not handed over or rent or mesne profits are not paid to the respondent-landlord within a period of specified above, besides the expeditious execution of the decree in normal course, the respondent-landlord shall also be entitled to invoke the contempt jurisdiction of this Court. Copy of this order be sent to both the Rent Tribunals and both the parties concerned forthwith. No costs. *******