JUDGMENT : Rajiv Sharma, J. Petitioner was appointed as Regional Manager on 31.7.1995. He joined his duties on 9.8.1995. He was promoted to the post of Deputy Divisional Manager (Non-Technical) on 5.10.2006. He was promoted to the post of Divisional Manager (Non-Technical) on 31.5.2006. Petitioner was given the charge of Legal, HRD and Man Power Planning on 12.12.2011. The order dated 12.12.2011 was superseded on 16.12.2011 and the petitioner was asked to look after the work of Legal Cell and Inquiry at Head Office level. 2. Petitioner submitted an application seeking permission to sit in the entrance test of three years regular LLB course and also for the issuance of No Objection Certificate. Respondent-corporation sought clarification from the petitioner, vide Annexure P-6 how he would attend the classes during the day time. Petitioner informed the respondent-corporation vide Annexure P-7 that he would apply for study leave, if selected, according to the Central Civil Services (Leave) Rules, 1972. Prayer of the petitioner was declined in view of shortage of officers in the Corporation on 17.5.2012. Thereafter, petitioner also filed a representation. Petitioner was again informed that the decision has already been taken and conveyed to him vide office order dated 15.5.2012. 3. Mr. Dilip Sharma, learned Senior Advocate has vehemently contended that the action of respondent-corporation declining study leave to his client to pursue LLB three years course from Himachal Pradesh University is illegal, arbitrary, discriminatory and thus violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. He also contended that similarly situate persons have been granted study leave. He also contended that there is no shortage of officers since one Sh. Ranjit Singh, Regional Manager (Legal) has been sent on secondment basis to PGIMER, Chandigarh. 4. Mr. Adarsh Sharma has vehemently argued that the study leave cannot be claimed as a matter or right. He then contended that Sh. Ranjit Singh has been sent on secondment basis and the salary would be paid by the borrowing authority, i.e. PGIMER. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the pleadings carefully. 6. Mr. Adarsh Sharma has vehemently argued that the study leave cannot be claimed as a matter or right. He then contended that Sh. Ranjit Singh has been sent on secondment basis and the salary would be paid by the borrowing authority, i.e. PGIMER. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the pleadings carefully. 6. This Court on 30.7.2012, after referring to leave rules, has directed the Chief Secretary to submit a report that how many officers have been granted study leave for pursuing various courses and whether they have been granted study leave in the exigency of service for the purpose of efficient administration for the past ten years. Petitioner was permitted to avail earned leave in order to pursue the LLB three years course since he had 180 days of earned leave and 80 days half pay leave to his credit. The Chief Secretary has filed the supplementary affidavit as directed on 30.7.2012. According to him, 398 officers of the different departments have been granted study leave. 7. The fact of the matter is that respondent-corporation is not a department of the Government. Himachal Road Transport Corporation has been created under the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950. Himachal Road Transport Corporation is a separate entity. As far as respondent-corporation is concerned, four incumbents have been granted study leave as per the information supplied to the petitioner under Right to Information Act. 8. Their Lordships of the Honble Supreme Court in J.Y. Kondala Rao and others v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation and others, AIR 1961 SC 82 have held that the employees of the corporation are not Government servant. Their Lordships have held as under: "14. Re. (4): By the next contention the learned counsel attacks the validity of the scheme on the ground that the Government is actuated by bias against the private operators of buses in West Godavari District and indeed had pre-determined the issue. In the petitions it was alleged that the Government had complete control over the Road Transport Corporation, that the entire administration and control over such road transport undertaking vested in the Government, that the Chief Secretary to the Government of Andhra Pradesh was its chairman and that, therefore, the entire scheme, from its inception to its final approval, was really the act of the Government. On this hypothesis it was contended that the Government itself was made a judge in its own cause and that, therefore, its decision was vitiated by legal bias. That apart, it was also pleaded that a sub-committee, consisting of Ministers, Secretaries and officers of connected departments and presided over by the Minister in charge of transport, decided in its meeting of January 28, 1960, that under the scheme of nationalisation of bus service, the State Government would take over the bus services in West Godavari District and Guntur District before the end of that year and, therefore, the Minister in charge of the portfolio of transport, he having pre-determined the issue, disqualified himself to decide the dispute between the State Transport Undertaking and the petitioners. The self same questions were raised in Nageswara Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1960-1 SCR 580: ( AIR 1959 SC 1376 ) There, as in this case, it was contended that the Chief Minister, who was in charge of the portfolio of transport, could not be a judge in his own cause, as he was biased against the private operators. This Court pointed out the distinction between official bias of an authority which is inherent in a statutory duty imposed on it and personal bias of the said authority in favour of, or against, one of the parties. In dealing with official bias this Court, after considering the relevant English decisions, observed at p. 587 (of SCR) : (at p. 1379 of AIR), thus: "These decisions show that in England a statutory invasion of the common law objection on the ground of bias is tolerated by decisions, but the invasion is confined strictly to the limits of the statutory exception. It is not out of place here to notice that in England the Parliament is supreme and therefore a statutory law, however repugnant to the principles of natural justice, is valid; whereas in India the law made by Parliament or a State Legislature should stand the test of fundamental rights declared in Part III of the Constitution." Then this Court proceeded to state that the provisions of the Act did not sanction any dereliction of the principles of natural justice, for the Act visualised in case of conflict between the undertaking and the operators of private buses that the State Government should sit in judgment and resolve the conflict. Much to the same effect has been stated by Shah, J., in Petn. No. 2 of 1960, D/- 28-4-1960: ( AIR 1960 SC 1073 ), though in slightly different phraseology. The learned Judge stated: "It is also true that the Government on whom the duty to decide the dispute rests, is substantially a party to the dispute but if the Government or the authority to whom the power is delegated acts judicially in approving or modifying the scheme, the approval or modification is not open to challenge on a presumption of bias. The Minister or the officer of the Government who is invested with the power to hear objections to the scheme is acting in his official capacity and unless there is reliable evidence to show that he is biased, his decision will not be liable to be called in question, merely because he is a limb of the Government." In the above cases the transport department of the Government was the transport undertaking, but here the State Road Transport Corporation, which is a body corporate having a perpetual succession and common seal, is the transport authority. Though under the provisions of the Act, the State Government has some control, it cannot be said either legally or factually that the said Corporation is a department of the State Government. The State Government therefore, in deciding the dispute between the said undertaking and the operators of private buses is only discharging its statutory functions. This objection, therefore, has no merits. Nor can we say that it has been established that the Minister in charge of the portfolio of transport has been actuated by personal bias. The fact that he presided over the sub-committee constituted to implement the scheme of nationalisation of bus services in the West Godavari District does not in itself establish any such bias. Indeed, in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the first respondent the contents and authenticity of the reports of the proceedings of the sub-committee published in the Telugu daily "Andhra Patricia" were not admitted. Even if the subcommittee came to such a decision, it is not possible to hold that it was a final and irrevocable decision in derogation of the provisions of the Act. Even if the subcommittee came to such a decision, it is not possible to hold that it was a final and irrevocable decision in derogation of the provisions of the Act. It was only a policy decision and in the circumstances could only mean that the sub-committee advised the State Government to implement the policy of nationalisation of bus services in that particular district. The said decision could not either expressly or by necessary implication involve a predetermination of the issue; it can only mean that the policy would be implemented subject to the provisions of the Act. It is not suggested that the Minister in charge of the concerned portfolio has any personal bias against the operators of private buses or any of them. We, therefore, hold that it has not been established that the Minister in charge of the portfolio of transport had personal bias against the operators of private buses and, therefore, disqualified himself from hearing the objections under Ch. IVA of the Act." 9. It is not in dispute that leave of the employees of the respondent-corporation is governed under the Central Civil Services (Leave) Rules, 1972. There is a detailed procedure the manner in which study leave is to be sanctioned. According to sub-rule (1) of rule 50, study leave may be granted to a Government servant with due regard to the exigencies of public service to enable him to undergo, in or out of India, a special course of study consisting of higher studies or specialised training in a professional or a technical subject having a direct and close connection with the sphere of his duty. According to sub-rule (3) of rule 50, study leave cannot be granted unless it is certified by the authority competent to grant leave that the proposed course of study or training shall be of definite advantage from the point of view of public interest and it is for prosecution of studies in subjects other than academic or literary subject. The maximum amount of study leave is provided under rule 51. The manner in which the application for study leave is to be submitted is provided under rule 52. According to rule 52, every application for study leave has to be submitted through proper channel to the authority competent to grant leave. The maximum amount of study leave is provided under rule 51. The manner in which the application for study leave is to be submitted is provided under rule 52. According to rule 52, every application for study leave has to be submitted through proper channel to the authority competent to grant leave. The course or courses of study contemplated by the Government and any examination which he proposes to undergo is required to be clearly specified in application. The manner in which study leave is to be sanctioned has been provided under rule 53. Under sub-rule (1) of rule 53, the report regarding the admissibility of the study leave is to be obtained from the Audit Officer provided that the study leave, if any, already availed of by the Government servant has to be included in the report. According to sub-rule (1) of rule 54, study leave is not to be debited against the leave account of the Government servant. Rule 55 provides for regulation of study leave extending beyond course of study. According to sub-rule (2) of rule 56, the Government servant during study leave availed of in India, shall draw leave salary equal to the pay which he drew while on duty with Government immediately before proceeding on such leave and in addition the dearness allowance and house rent allowance as admissible in accordance with the provisions of rule 60. 10. In the instant case, there is no material on record to establish that the competent authority to grant leave has certified that the proposed course of study, i.e. three years LLB course shall be of definite advantage from the point of view of public interest. Study leave has to be granted after giving due regard to the exigency of service. The specialised training in a professional or a technical subject must have direct and close connection with the sphere of duties to be discharged by the Government servant. In the case in hand, petitioner has merely submitted an application seeking no objection certificate from the respondent-corporation. Respondent-corporation has told him that the study leave could not be sanctioned in his favour. Case of the respondent-corporation is also that there is shortage of officer. As far as the case of Sh. Ranjit Singh, relied upon by the petitioner is concerned, he was sent on secondment basis to PGIMER on 23.7.2012 as Administrative Officer. Respondent-corporation has told him that the study leave could not be sanctioned in his favour. Case of the respondent-corporation is also that there is shortage of officer. As far as the case of Sh. Ranjit Singh, relied upon by the petitioner is concerned, he was sent on secondment basis to PGIMER on 23.7.2012 as Administrative Officer. His salary is to be paid by the PGIMER and not by the respondent-corporation for three years. In case the study leave of the petitioner is sanctioned, he is entitled as per rule 56 to salary which he was drawing on duty immediately before proceeding on study leave. In case of study leave, the salary has to be paid to the petitioner by the employer along with other allowances admissible as per rule 60. 11. Petitioner has also moved an application bearing CMP No.2346 of 2013 seeking direction to the respondent-corporation to grant him study leave. Respondent-corporation has filed reply to the same. Petitioner at the time when he approached this Court had only 180 days earned leave and 80 days half pay leave to his credit. In the meantime, petitioner has cleared the entrance test and has deposited fees on 12.7.2012. 12. Now, as far as the material placed on record, the petitioner has left 35 days earned leave to his credit though he has appeared in first semester of LLB course. 13. Petitioner was appointed as Regional Manager on 31.7.1995. He was promoted to the post of Deputy Divisional Manager (Non-Technical) on 5.10.1996. He was further promoted to the post of Divisional Manager (Non-Technical) on 31.5.2010. It is, thus, evident that from 31.7.1995 to 31.5.2010, he was not Incharge of Legal Cell. He was permitted to look after Legal Cell and Inquiry at Head Office level vide office order dated 16.12.2011. It is for the employer to see whether the special course has direct and close connection with the sphere of the duties of an incumbent. The petitioner has failed to establish that acquiring of decree in LLB course by him has direct and close connection with the sphere of his duties and it is advantageous from the point of view of public interest. It is not necessary to the respondent-corporation to always deploy the petitioner in Legal Cell. He can be transferred to other branches. This Court will not substitute its judgment in the wisdom of the employer. It is not necessary to the respondent-corporation to always deploy the petitioner in Legal Cell. He can be transferred to other branches. This Court will not substitute its judgment in the wisdom of the employer. It is required to be certified by the competent authority that the training would be advantageous from the point of view of public interest. The report regarding the admissibility of the study leave is to be obtained from Audit Officer as per rule 53. In the instant case, the competent authority has not certified that it would be advantageous from the point of view of public interest, if the petitioner is granted permission to pursue three years LLB course nor any report has been furnished by the Audit Officer. 14. Their Lordships of the Honble Supreme Court in Union of India and others v. No.664950 IM Havildar/Clerk SC Bagari, (1999) 3 SCC 709 has upheld the decision of the Government to grant study leave to Commissioned Officer and not to Non-Commissioned Officers. Their Lordships have further held that the object to grant study leave to Commissioned Officer is to enhance their knowledge in performance of their duties as Commissioned Officers. Their Lordships have held as under: "15. Situated thus, broadly speaking, concept of equality has an inherent limitation arising from very nature of the guarantee under the Constitution and those who are similarly circumstanced are entitled to equal treatment. If there is a rational classification consistent with the purpose for which such classification was made, equality is not violated. Article 16 of the Constitution does not bar a reasonable classification of employees or reasonable tests for selection. Equality of opportunity of employment means equality as between members of the same class of employees and not equality between members of separate independent classes. 20. It has also been stated in the counter that there cannot be any dispute that character and duties of Junior Commissioned Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers are different as compared to that of regular Commissioned Officers. If the competent authority thought it fit and proper that case for study leave for Commissioned Officers should be considered and this benefit should not be given to other categories of Officers, as for this category Army Authorities take adequate care for training them in their own institutions or outside, it cannot be said that impugned Order No. 11 of 1987 is arbitrary or irrational. The object as stated in the counter, of granting study leave is to enhance the knowledge of Commissioned Officers who have an important role to play not only to maintain discipline but also for performing their duties as Commissioned Officers. Therefore, it cannot be said that Army Order No. 11 of 1987 was not founded on intelligible differentia and it has no relation with the object sought to be achieved and we hold that the Order in question is not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution." 15. Their Lordships of the Honble Supreme Court in State of Punjab and others v. Dr. Rajeev Sarwal, (1999) 9 SCC 240 while interpreting Punjab Study Leave Rules, 1963 have held that the relaxation cannot be read into a provision of this nature when the rule itself mandates 24 months as the maximum period of study leave during the entire service. 16. Their Lordships of the Honble Supreme Court in National Institute of Technology, Jamshedpur and others v. Chandra Shekhar Chaudhary, (2007) 1 SCC 93 have held that while granting the leave norms cannot be departed merely because there had been such departure in some cases. 17. Mr. Dilip Sharma, learned Senior Advocate has also argued that since the petitioner has been permitted to pursue his studies by this Court, he may be permitted to complete the same and the respondent-corporation may be directed to sanction the study leave. This plea cannot be accepted. Petitioner knew the exact position when he applied for the no objection certificate". Petitioner was dealing with the legal matters and thus he cannot be presumed to be oblivious to the mandatory provisions of leave rules. 18. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Asha v. Pt. B.D. Sharma University of Health Sciences and others, (2012) 7 SCC 389 have held that the students who pursue the courses under the orders of the Court would not be entitled to claim any equity at the final decision of the case. Their Lordships have held as under: "39. With all humility, we reiterate the request that we have made to all the High Courts in Priya Gupta's case (supra) that the courts should avoid giving interim orders where admissions are the matter of dispute before the Court. Their Lordships have held as under: "39. With all humility, we reiterate the request that we have made to all the High Courts in Priya Gupta's case (supra) that the courts should avoid giving interim orders where admissions are the matter of dispute before the Court. Even in case where the candidates are permitted to continue with the courses, they should normally be not permitted to take further examinations of the professional courses. The students who pursue the courses under the orders of the Court would not be entitled to claim any equity at the final decision of the case nor should it weigh with the courts of competent jurisdiction." 19. Accordingly, in view of the observations and discussions made herein above, there is no merit in the writ petition and the same is dismissed. However, since the petitioner has already completed first semester of three years LLB course, by taking extreme equitable view, respondent-corporation is directed to sanction the petitioner leave without pay to enable him to complete the three years LLB course. Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of. No costs.