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2013 DIGILAW 3240 (MAD)

Govindarajan Padayatchi v. Premananda Vijayakumar @ Prem Anand

2013-09-10

P.R.SHIVAKUMAR

body2013
JUDGMENT 1. The submissions made by Chitra Sampath, learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant are heard. 2. The Plaintiff in O.S.No. 16 of 2011 on the file of the Principal District Judge, Ariyalur is the Appellant in this Civil Miscellaneous Appeal. The Respondents herein are the defendants in the said Suit. The Defendants preferred an Application in I.A.No. 3 of 2012 under Order 7, Rule 11, C.P.C. praying for the rejection of the Plaint on the basis of claim that the Suit claim was barred by limitation. 3. The learned Trial Judge upon hearing both sides, allowed the Application and rejected the Plaint. 4. As against the Order allowing the Application under Order 7, Rule 11, C.P.C., the Appellant herein (Plaintiff), at the first instance preferred a Civil Revision Petition in C.R.P.No. 2124 of 2012 on the file of this Court. Hon’ble Thiru Justice R.S. Ramanathan, dismissed the Civil revision Petition as not maintainable, holding that as against the impugned Order of the trial Court rejecting the Plaint, an Appeal only would lie. The said Order came to be passed on 11.1.2013. Meanwhile, the Appellant herein chose to file an Appeal before this Court in A.S.No. 708 of 2012 as against the Order rejecting the Plaint which was drafted as decree. The same has been admitted and is pending. 5. Despite the fact that the Order rejecting the Plaint, which is deemed to be decree under the definition found in Section 2(2) of C.P.C. which is excluded from the category of appealable Orders, under Order 43, C.P.C., either on wrong advise or due to over cautiousness, the Appellant has chosen to prefer the present Civil Miscellaneous Appeal. 6. Chitra Sampath, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Appellant would fairly concede that an Order rejecting the Plaint is to be challenged by way of an Appeal against a decree as per the deeming provision found in Section 2(2) of C.P.C. At the same time, the learned Senior Counsel would submit that in view of the Order passed in C.R.P.No. 2124 of 2012 to the effect that the Order passed in I.A.No. 3 of 2012 filed under Order 7, Rule 11, C.P.C. was an appealable Order, the Appellant may be found fault with for not challenging the Order, which resulted in the consequential Order of rejection of the Plaint. 7. 7. In this regard, this Court wants to point out that Appeals shall lie not against findings, but against the Decree or decreetal Orders. Even though the Trial Court might have chosen to pass fair Order and decreetal Order in the Interlocutory Application and consequently, a Judgment referring to the Order passed in I.A.No.3 of 2012 on the ground of which the Plaint was to be rejected and drafted a Decree on the same lines, this Court finds the very procedure adopted may not be proper, when an Order rejecting the Plaint is passed either without an Application being filed by the Defendants to the proceedings or on an Application filed by the Defendants. Nonetheless, it is a decision made in the Suit that the Plaint is liable to be rejected on any one of the grounds mentioned in Rule 11 of Order 7, C.P.C. Instead of passing a fair Order and a decretal Order in the Interlocutory Application and again pronouncing a Judgment based on same and drafting a Decree in the Suit, the Trial Court ought to have passed an Order in the Suit itself, rejecting the Plaint which shall be deemed to be a Decree. Even otherwise, pronouncing Judgment on the basis of the Order directing the rejection of Plaint and drafting of a Decree are only superfluous, because very Order allowing the Application and directing the rejection of the Plaint itself shall be deemed to be a Decree as per Order 7, Rule 11, C.P.C. 8. In this case, as against the rejection of the Plaint, the Appellant has already filed an Appeal. For the sake of convenience, the definition of Decree found in Section 2(2) is reproduced as follows: “Decree” means the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy, in the Suit and may be either preliminary or final. It shall be deemed to include the rejection of a Plaint and the determination of any question within section 144, but shall not include – (a) any adjudication from which an Appeal lies as an Appeal from an order, or (b) any Order of dismissal for default. Explanation: A decree is preliminary when further proceedings have to be taken before the Suit can be completely disposed of. Explanation: A decree is preliminary when further proceedings have to be taken before the Suit can be completely disposed of. It is final when such adjudication completely disposes of the Suit. It may be partly preliminary and partly final.” 9. A Careful reading of the said clause will make it clear that the definition of Decree shall include rejection of a Plaint. The rider provided thereto shows that definition of Decree shall not include any adjudication from which an Appeal lies as an Appeal from orders will make it clear that Order rejecting the Plaint which is deemed to be a decree shall not be included in the category of orders, which are appealable under order 43, C.P.C. 10. For the above said reasons, this Court holds that the Order passed in I.A.No.3 of 2012 holding that the Plaint is liable to be rejected itself shall be deemed to be a decree and if at all any Judgment and Decree has been pronounced consequent to such Order, that will be only superfluous and an Appeal filed against the rejection of the Plaint as a decree shall be enough to challenge the findings made in the Interlocutory Application to the effect that the Plaint is liable to be rejected. Since challenge is already made in the Appeal in A.S.No. 708 of 2012, the present Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is misconceived and hence, the same is dismissed. The Appellant shall work out his remedy in the Appeal Suit, by raising all the grounds of challenge to the rejection of the Plaint.