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2013 DIGILAW 326 (PNJ)

Piyush Bharat Saini v. Paras Gupta

2013-03-11

Ranjit Singh

body2013
JUDGMENT Mr. Ranjit Singh, J.:- Whether the rigors of amended provisions of Section 202 Cr.P.C, laying down a requirement of holding an enquiry, where the person sought to be summoned is outside the jurisdiction of the Court, would apply in the cases of offences under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (for short, “the Act”), is an important issue arising in this bunch of Criminal Misc. Petitions filed by the petitioner. 2. The petitioner in these cases has challenged the summoning order primarily on the ground that his summoning was ordered in these cases without holding an enquiry under Section 202 Cr.P.C and hence, prayer is made for quashing of the said summoning order impugned in these different Criminal Misc. M Nos.5325, 5326 and 5327 of 2012 (Piyush Bharat Saini Vs. Paras Gupta), 15609 of 2012 (Peeyush Bharat Saini Vs. Pran Bhayana) and 23724 of 2012 (Peeyoosh Bharat Saini Vs. Raksha Singhal). 3. This Court in the case of S.K.Bhowmik Vs. S.K.Arora and another, 2007 (4) RCR (Criminal) 650, has held the provisions of Section 202 Cr.P.C. to be mandatory and, thus, has viewed that for summoning a person accused in the complaint without holding enquiry, as envisaged under Section 202 Cr.P.C., would be violative of the amended provisions of Section 202 Cr.P.C. The petitioner has, thus, relied upon the ratio of this judgement to plead quashing of the summoning orders on this ground in the abovesaid petitions. It is now to be examined if the rigors of amended provisions of Section 202 Cr.P.C. would apply in the case of offences under Section 138 of the Act as well. 4. Incidentally, Mr.R.S.Cheema, learned Senior counsel of this Court, who was the counsel for the petitioner in S.K.Bhowmik’s case (supra) was present, when these petitions came up for hearing. The Court thought it appropriate to request the senior counsel to assist the Court in these cases as amicus-curiae. The counsel readily accepted the task and has rendered very valuable assistance to the Court. 5. Before taking up this purely legal issue arising in these cases, it would be essential to notice the facts just to get the hang of the issue agitated in these petitions. For this purpose, the facts are noticed from Criminal Misc. M No.5325 of 2012. 6. The petitioner in these cases is a resident of Delhi. A criminal complaint is filed against him at Kurukshetra. For this purpose, the facts are noticed from Criminal Misc. M No.5325 of 2012. 6. The petitioner in these cases is a resident of Delhi. A criminal complaint is filed against him at Kurukshetra. Respondent complainant has filed this complaint under Section 138 of the Act. Allegations against the petitioner are that he being the proprietor of the firm Education Wise had received a sum of Rs.15 lacs for procuring a seat of Post-graduation in Medical Science. On his failure to arrange the seat, he issued a cheque for returning the amount to the complainant from his account maintained in Axis Bank. He then again issued a cheque from HDFC Bank at Delhi. These cheques, when presented, were dishonoured in March 2010 and October 2010 respectively. The complainant contacted the petitioner again, who issued a cheque dated 15.2.2011 for a sum of Rs. 5 lacs as a part payment. This cheque was drawn at ICICI Bank, Shalimar Bagh Branch, New Delhi. This cheque, when presented at Kurukshetra, was returned on 12.5.2011 with the remarks, “funds insufficient”. On this basis, the present complaint was filed against the petitioner. The petitioner has been summoned for an offence under Section 138 of the Act vide order dated 18.7.2011. The petitioner accordingly has approached this Court for quashing the complaint and the summoning order mainly on the ground that he has been summoned without following the procedure laid down in amended Section 202 Cr.P.C. 7. Similar are the facts in the other connected petitions, where the petitioner is accused of having issued cheque drawn at ICICI Bank, New Delhi, which was returned with the same remarks but on some different dates. The petitioner accordingly would plead for quashing of said complaints and the summoning orders as well primarily on the same ground. 8. In S.K.Bhowmik’s case (supra), this Court had a peep into the history of Section 202 Cr.P.C. and noticed the changes that were made in the said Section from time to time and finally to introduce the amendment in the said Section in the year 2006 for holding inquiry before summoning the accused in complaint case, which is now under consideration. The amended Section 202 Cr.P.C. reads as under:- “202. The amended Section 202 Cr.P.C. reads as under:- “202. Postponement of issue of process.-(1) Any Magistrate, on receipt of a complaint of an offence of which he is authorised to take cognizance or which has been made over to him under Section 192, may, if he thinks fit, [and shall, in a case where the accused is residing at a place beyond the area in which he exercises his jurisdiction] postpone the issue of process against the accused, and either enquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer or by such other person as he thinks fit, for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding.” 9. Thus the words reading “and shall, in a case where the accused is residing at a place beyond the area in which he exercises his jurisdiction” have now been introduced in the amended Section. In such cases, the Magistrate is under obligation to postpone the issue of process against the accused and either enquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by the police officer or by such other person as he thinks fit for the purpose of deciding whether or not, there is sufficient ground for proceeding. 10. The purpose behind this amendment was also noticed and in this regard the draft accompanying the amendment was taken note of which is as under:- “Clause 19.-False complaints are filed against persons residing at far off places simply to harass them. In order to see that innocent persons are not harassed by unscrupulous persons, this clause seeks to amend Subsection (1) of Section 202 to make it obligatory upon the Magistrate that before summoning the accused residing beyond his jurisdiction he shall enquire into the case himself or direct investigation to be made by a police officer or by such other person as he thinks fit, for finding out whether or not there was sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.” 11. The Court considered the various words used in the Section and the significance thereof had gone into the scope of investigation envisaged by the said Section. The Court considered the various words used in the Section and the significance thereof had gone into the scope of investigation envisaged by the said Section. In regard to the scope of investigation, the Court has held as under:- “It can, thus, be said that degree of formality of the proceedings and the width and depth of the enquiry are entirely in the discretion of the Magistrate. It was also held that this provision is enabling and not obligatory. Though it was observed that it is not necessary that a Magistrate should hold an enquiry under this section in every case and it is only when he “thinks fit” that he may do so, but it was viewed that it would be advisable that an enquiry be held where the complainant is not speaking from his own knowledge. Even before amendment, there were some cases where such enquiry was held obligatory. Under Section 10 of the Child Marriage Restraint Act of 1929, such enquiry is obligatory and the failure to do was held to vitiate the whole trial. In this regard, reference may be made to State of Gujarat v. Patel Jivraj Khimji and Ors. 1966 Gujarat Law Reporter 935. This may be sufficient to appreciate the parameters in regard to the requirement of an enquiry now made obligatory in cases where an accused resides beyond the jurisdiction of a Magistrate. It would, thus, be proper to hold that in a case of person residing beyond jurisdiction of a Magistrate, if the process is issued without holding enquiry, it may vitiate the whole trial.” 12. No doubt, finally the Court has viewed that it would be safe to say that the manner in which this amendment has been introduced and wording thereof, when read in the light of objects behind the same, would make it clear that the legislature intended this provision to be made as obligatory/mandatory in nature. The Court accordingly held that an enquiry and the other options available to the Magistrate in this regard under Section 202 Cr.P.C., would be obligatory where it is found that the person is residing beyond its jurisdiction. 13. Mr. The Court accordingly held that an enquiry and the other options available to the Magistrate in this regard under Section 202 Cr.P.C., would be obligatory where it is found that the person is residing beyond its jurisdiction. 13. Mr. Cheema, though would support the ratio of law in S.K.Bhowmik’s case (supra) but would contend that this inquiry may not be the requirement while summoning an accused person in a complaint filed under Sections 138 of the Act, though he may be staying outside its jurisdiction. The counsel would highlight the trial under special legislation like Negotiable Instruments Act, where speedy disposal of such cases is one of prime purpose and aim thereof, has to be kept in view while applying rigours of Section 202 Cr.P.C. As per the counsel, the proceedings under Section 138 of the Act are quasi-criminal in nature. Before filing a complaint in such cases, the complainant is required to complete certain formalities, in the absence of which the complaint itself is not maintainable. It is also possible to settle the dispute and the offences under the Act are made out only when the accused persons refuses to discharge the liability despite being put to notice. Where a person accused decides to discharge the liability, then he can not be prosecuted for offence under Section 138 of the Act. 14. Mr.Cheema is justified in urging that this Section really is creating a civil liability emasculating as criminal cases. The object of punishment prescribed under this Section is punitive as well as compensatory and restitutive. No wonder, the offences under the Act are compoundable. To highlight this aspect and the special nature of the proceedings under the Act, Mr.Cheema has made reference to the case of Damodar S. Prabhu Vs. Sayed Babalal H, [2010(3) Law Herald (SC) 1874] : (2010) 5 SCC 663 . In this case, the Hon’ble Supreme court has issued guidelines and directions to encourage litigants in the cheque dishonour cases to opt for compounding during earlier stages of litigation to ease chocking of the criminal justice system. For this purpose, the Court has advocated a graded scheme of imposing costs on the parties, who unduly delay the compounding of the offences. The aim of these guidelines is also to control filing of complaints in multiple jurisdiction relatable to same transactions. For this purpose, the Court has advocated a graded scheme of imposing costs on the parties, who unduly delay the compounding of the offences. The aim of these guidelines is also to control filing of complaints in multiple jurisdiction relatable to same transactions. The Court has further held that compounding of offences under the Act is controlled by Section 147 of the Act and the scheme contemplated by Section 320 Cr.P.C. will not apply in strict sense to such cases. Talking about the nature of punishment, the Court has held that compensatory aspect of the remedy should be given priority over punitive aspect. These special feature peculiar to the offences under the act certainly would have to be considered as these are some sort of exception to the procedural law followed in criminal trials. 15. Hon’ble Supreme Court in this case has observed the object of bringing Section 138 of the Act in the statute, which was to inculcate the faith in the efficacious banking operation and credibility in transacting business on negotiable instruments. Initially, the provision, when enacted in 1988, it carried a punishment of imprisonment upto one year, which was revised upto two years by way of amendment in 2002. Legislative intend, thus, was to provide strong criminal remedy in order to deter the high incidents of dishonour of cheque cases. It is noticed that the remedy of imprisonment takes care of punitive nature whereas the provision for imposing fine to the extent of twice the amount of cheque serves as a compensatory purpose. This offence is described as regulatory offence and that has been created to serve the public interest in ensuring the reliability of these instruments. 16. No doubt, this newly added punitive provision, which was brought on the statute book to serve a public interest, has led to chocking of the criminal justice system at the level of Magistrates. A disproportionately large number of cases are pending before Magistrates in various Courts, which has been a cause of concern for every one dealing with the criminal delivery justice system. This litigation has put an unprecedented strain on the judicial system. It is in this background that the Attorney General appearing in this case as amicus-curiae advocated the importance of using compounding as an expedient method to hasten the disposal of cases under this Act. This litigation has put an unprecedented strain on the judicial system. It is in this background that the Attorney General appearing in this case as amicus-curiae advocated the importance of using compounding as an expedient method to hasten the disposal of cases under this Act. He pleaded before the Court to frame some guidelines and to provide certain disincentives for the litigants, who may not opt for compounding of offences or may do so at an unduly late stage of litigation. This was sought as a nudge to the litigants in the cheque bounce cases to opt for compounding of offences. 17. Section 147 of the Act introduced by way of amendment in 2002 has permitted the compounding of offences under Section 138 of the Act during the late stage of litigation. This Section provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, every offence punishable under this Act shall be compoundable. Section 147 of the Act is in the nature of enabling provision, which provides for compounding of offences prescribed under the same Act. This provision was found to be serving as an exception to the general rule incorporated in sub-section (9) of Section 320 Cr.P.C., which states that no offence shall be compounded except as provided by this Section. 18. What Mr.Cheema would emphasis from the above ratio of law is that offences under the Act are not to be equated with criminal offences under the other Acts, which are punitive in nature. Thus, the exceptions are carved out for trial of these offences and accordingly some of the provisions under the Procedural Code applicable in criminal trials are exempted for their application to trial under the provisions of this Act. Learned counsel is again justified in emphasizing that expedient disposal of the cases under the Act is the aim to introduce various provisions and various amendment therein. It has been noticed that valuable time of the Court is spent on the trial of these cases and the parties are even not liable to pay any Court fee. The impact of such offences is largely confined to private parties. In this regard, the counsel would point out that in Section 138 of the Act, as initially introduced, a subsequent amendment is made in 2002 to ensure expeditious disposal of the cases. 19. The impact of such offences is largely confined to private parties. In this regard, the counsel would point out that in Section 138 of the Act, as initially introduced, a subsequent amendment is made in 2002 to ensure expeditious disposal of the cases. 19. The special requirement for prosecuting the offence under Section 138 of the Act is that the burden heavily lies on the complainant to prove that the accused borrowed various amounts on various dates and the cheque was presented to the Bank within a period of six months from the date from which it was drawn. The complainant has also to show that the cheque was returned by the bank as unpaid. He is also then required to make a demand for payment by giving notice in writing within 15 days. Only when drawer fails to make payment within 30 days of the receipt of the notice that the offence is made out. Even to entertain the complaint, it is necessary for the complainant to produce original dishonoured cheque and the burden is on him to show the service of notice etc. 20. Continuing to emphasise the special provision under the Act, counsel would make reference to Section 142 of the Act, which underlines the procedure for taking cognizance of offences under the Act. The requirement is that the complaint must be made in writing by the payee and such complaint must be made within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises. Section 143 of the Act introduced on 6.2.2003 gives power to the Court to try cases under the Act summarily. This Section, thus, reenforces that every trial shall be conducted as expeditiously as possible and endevour shall be made to conclude the trial within six months from the date of filing of the complaint. Reference is also made to Section 145 of the Act, which permits the evidence to be taken on affidavit, if the Court thinks fit, on the application of the prosecution of the accused. In this regard, only Section 146 is highlighted, which contemplates that bank slip or memo having official mark denoting that the cheque has been dishonoured, shall constitute prima-facie evidence of dishonour of the cheque, unless and until, such fact is disapproved. In this regard, only Section 146 is highlighted, which contemplates that bank slip or memo having official mark denoting that the cheque has been dishonoured, shall constitute prima-facie evidence of dishonour of the cheque, unless and until, such fact is disapproved. These are the special features of the provision under the Act highlighted by the Amicus-curiae to bring home his point that there are certain special provisions made for expediting the trial in such cases and to achieve this, certain provisions of the Procedural Code are exempting for their application by way of special procedure as provided under the Act. 21. Another aspect, which would emerge from the discussion is that in a summons case under Section 138 of the Act, the enquiry contemplated may have to be different from an investigation of an accused, which would require the services of a trained police officer or an expert. The plea accordingly is that it will be unsafe to prescribe any rule of uniform application with regard to nature of enquiry or investigation and it should be left to depend on nature of each case. Ofcourse, the purpose of holding such enquiry is to help the Magistrate to ascertain whether he is to proceed further in the case or not. 22. Thus, the enquiry as contemplated under Section 202 Cr.P.C., where the accused persons or some of them are residing beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the Court may have been held to be mandatory but whether this mandatory requirement can be insisted upon in a complaint under Section 138 of the Act may have to be viewed differently as the offences under the Act are of specialized category providing for somewhat different procedure. The Magistrate in these cases may be seen to have some discretion. 23. So far as nature of enquiry is concerned, the same may have to be viewed differently in view of the special provision made under the Act, which includes certain inherent safeguards in this regard. There are certain precedents, where it is viewed on these lines which Mr. Cheema has placed before me. The counsel rather has placed before me the cases, which have expressed some different view also stating that holding that enquiry under Section 202 Cr.P.C. in such cases would also be a necessity. 24. Reference is made to the case of Mohammed Basheer Vs. The State of Kerala and another, 2009 Crl.L.J. 246. Cheema has placed before me. The counsel rather has placed before me the cases, which have expressed some different view also stating that holding that enquiry under Section 202 Cr.P.C. in such cases would also be a necessity. 24. Reference is made to the case of Mohammed Basheer Vs. The State of Kerala and another, 2009 Crl.L.J. 246. While considering the amended provisions of Section 202 (2) of Cr.P.C., the Court in this case has observed that the requirement coached in mandatory language like use of expression “shall” was only to insist that the Magistrate exercises due care and caution before issuing process under Section 204 Criminal Procedure Code obliging an indignity resident outside the jurisdiction to come to the jurisdiction and defend such indictment. The caution and safeguard were only to Magistrate and certainly the introduction of amendment was not to protect any right of the accused for reasonable opportunity to defend himself, as the case with the provision to Section 202 (2) Cr.P.C. The Court has summarized the conclusion by stating that alert application of mind must be made by criminal Court at the stage of Sections 203, 204 Cr.P.C., while taking cognizance and issuing process to satisfy itself that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against an accused person. Though the Court has held that Section 202 Cr.P.C. as amended applies to the prosecution under Section 138 of the Act, also in the light of Section 4(2) of the Code and in the absence of any specific contra-provision in Section 138 of the Act but has further observed that ordinarily for prosecution under this Section, if a proper complaint is filed supported by necessary documents and a proper affidavit is filed under Section 145 of the Act, it may not be necessary for the Magistrate to proceed to hold enquiry under Section 202 Cr.P.C., as requisite satisfaction can be entertained at the end of enquiry under Section 200 Cr.P.C. At the same time, the Court has further held that in case where there is possibility of dispute regarding territorial jurisdiction or a dispute regarding complicity alleged with the help of Section 141 of the Act, it will be proper, necessary and admissible for the Magistrate to hold enquiry under Section 202 Cr.P.C., if requisite satisfaction is not induced by the material placed before it in the above noted manner. What can be concluded is that the applicability of Section 202 Cr.P.C. would depend upon the facts in each case. 25. Reference is then made to Bishwanath Maheshwari Vs. Navbharat Tea Processing Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. 2011 Cri.L.J. 2373. In this case, the Court has held that Section 204 Cr.P.C deals with the issue of process and when there are no sufficient ground for proceeding, the Magistrate might dismiss the complaint. It is, thus, observed that no restriction was sought to be made in respect of accused person residing outside territorial jurisdiction of any particular Court or Magistrate. The Court in this case, thus, was of the view that it did not find any reason as to why the Court if primafacie satisfied would not be in a position to proceed under Section 200 to 204 Cr.P.C. It is observed that Section 202 (1) Cr.P.C. did not deserve to be stretched to a point that same adversely effect the interest of justice. 26. Judgement in the case of Amarjit Singh Vs. Jagjit Singh, 2011 (4) RCR (Civil) 147 is also referred. Prayer for quashing in this case was made on the ground that the Court had taken cognizance against the petitioner without complying with the mandatory provisions contained in Section 202 (1) Cr.P.C. Finding that the petitioner therein has not been able to show as to what prejudice was caused to him by non-complying with the provisions of Section 202 Cr.P.C., the Court has observed that Chapter XXVII of the Act provided substantive procedure for enquiry and trial for offences punishable under Sections 142, 143, 144 of the Act, whereby the evidence in the form of affidavit of the complainant and bank slips were sufficient to take the cognizance of the offence and as such for taking cognizance of offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act, nothing was required for enquiry or for directing investigation before taking cognizance. Magistrate, thus, was found to have not committed any illegality while taking cognizance of the offence. 27. Two decisions of this Court titled Amandeep Singh Vs. Balwinder Singh, [2012(1) Law Herald (P&H) 141] : (Crl. M 39010 of 2011) decided on December 23, 2011 and M/s Bharat Trading Company and others Vs. State of Haryana and another (Crl. Misc. Magistrate, thus, was found to have not committed any illegality while taking cognizance of the offence. 27. Two decisions of this Court titled Amandeep Singh Vs. Balwinder Singh, [2012(1) Law Herald (P&H) 141] : (Crl. M 39010 of 2011) decided on December 23, 2011 and M/s Bharat Trading Company and others Vs. State of Haryana and another (Crl. Misc. M No.32045 of 2010), decided on 1.11.2010 are also pressed in support of submissions on these lines that the provisions of Section 202 Cr.P.C may not strictly apply to the cases under the Act. 28. In ASR Systems Pvt. Ltd., Mayapuri New Delhi & Anr. Vs. Kimberly Clark Hygiene Products Pvt. Ltd. & Anr., 2011 CriLJ 3558, the Court has viewed that provisions of Section 202 Cr.P.C are directory in nature and the purpose of the same is to avoid unnecessary annoyance and harassment to the accused living outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Court. Where contents of the complaint, verification of the statement and other documents produced alongwith the complaint make out prima-facie case and the Court is satisfied about the prima-facie nature of the case, then process can be issued to the accused. Again the Court in this case has primarily viewed that the documents like original cheque, return of the same as dishonoured, notice issued by the complainant and verification to the effect that the payment was not made despite notice are sufficient ground to issue process to the accused. These aspects of this special provision under the Act are being taken as an exception to the procedure prescribed under Section 202 Cr.P.C. 29. Support is also sought from the decision of Bombay High Court in Raj Kumar Harwani Vs. Sagar and another, (Criminal Writ Petition No.909 of 2011), decided on 13.6.2012 and Sh.Manoj Kumar Vs. Navita Chug, (Crl. MMO No.250 of 2011) Decided on 15.3.2012. 30. Contrary view expressed in Smt. Neeta Sinha Vs. P.S.Raj Steels Private Ltd., [2010(3) Law Herald (P&H) 2415] : 2010 (3) RCR (Criminal) 509 and Usha Sanghi and another Vs. Dr.George Jacob and Anr., Crl. M.C. No.2746 of 2008, decided on 6.9.2008 and Netcore Solutions Pvt. Ltd. Vs. M/s Pinnacle Teleservices Pvt. Ltd., 2012 (BC) 540 are also placed before me. 31. P.S.Raj Steels Private Ltd., [2010(3) Law Herald (P&H) 2415] : 2010 (3) RCR (Criminal) 509 and Usha Sanghi and another Vs. Dr.George Jacob and Anr., Crl. M.C. No.2746 of 2008, decided on 6.9.2008 and Netcore Solutions Pvt. Ltd. Vs. M/s Pinnacle Teleservices Pvt. Ltd., 2012 (BC) 540 are also placed before me. 31. This Court in Neeta Sinha’s case (supra) has primarily relied on earlier decision of this case in S.K.Bhowmik’s case (supra) and has followed the same without looking into the effect of the special provisions made in the Act. In Usha Sanghi’s case (supra), the Court has viewed that enquiry under Section 202 Cr.P.C is pre-requisite for issuing summon to the accused residing outside the jurisdiction of Magistrate before whom the complaint is filed. In this case also, the Court apparently has not considered the effect of the special provision made under the Act, which provides for some different procedure as has been noticed above. Similar is the position in other cases. 32. The view expressed by this Court in S.K.Bhowmik’s case (supra) has subsequently been followed by this Court in Prem Kaur @ Premo Vs. Balwinder Kaur, [2009(1) Law Herald (P&H) 278] : 2009 (2) R.C.R. (Criminal) 4. In Savesa Sidhu Vs. Harleen Sidhu and Anr., 2011 (2) RCR (Criminal) 442. It may need a notice here that in all these cases the offences were not under the Act, where the Courts have taken a view that enquiry under Section 202 Cr.P.C. would be essential. In fact, this has been the line of submission made by the Amicus-curiae whereas the counsel for the petitioner would plead that view expressed in these cases should equally apply to the offences under the provisions of Act. Amicus-curiae, however, has differed with this line of submission pressed by counsel for the petitioner. 33. There are precedents available on both sides. All the cases where the provisions of Section 202 Cr.P.C. have not been insisted by the Courts while declining the prayer for quashing, primarily were on the ground that offences under the Act are special offences where compensatory part is equally essential alongwith punitive aspect. Undoubtedly, there are certain provisions made under the Act, which have diluted the procedural requirement laid down in the Code of Criminal Procedure. Detailed reference to these special provisions have been made in the earlier part of this judgement. Undoubtedly, there are certain provisions made under the Act, which have diluted the procedural requirement laid down in the Code of Criminal Procedure. Detailed reference to these special provisions have been made in the earlier part of this judgement. Just to recapitulate, it is noticed that Section 142 of the Act makes a provision for taking cognizance of offences. As per this Section, no Court shall take cognizance of offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act except upon a complaint in writing made by the payee or the holder of the cheque, then such complaint is required to be made within one month. Section 143 of the Act makes a provision for trying the cases summarily. Section 144 of the Act makes a provision for modes of service of summons and summons can, thus, be served on the accused or witness at a place where he ordinarily resides or carry on business. Then there is a provision for giving evidence on affidavits. As per Section 146 of the Act, Bank’s slip is made as a prima-facie evidence, denoting that the cheque has been dishonoured from which a presumption of the fact of dishonour of cheque can be made, unless it is disapproved. There is also a special provision for compounding of offences at any stage. These special provisions would certainly make out a case for some special treatment of cases under the Act. 34. The aim of these provisions is to ensure a speedy trial and expeditious disposal of cases, which are found to have clogged the criminal justice system. If strict adherence in such cases where certain evidences can be led under the enabling provisions made under the Act is insisted upon then it would negate the requirement of expeditious disposal of the cases, which is the aim under the Act. Thus, the view expressed in the line of cases that enquiry as envisaged under the amended provisions of Section 202 Cr.P.C may not necessarily be insisted upon in those cases tried under the Act where the accused person resides outside the jurisdiction of the Magistrate is reasonable. However, the ratio of law laid down in S.K.Bhowmik’s case (supra) and other line of decisions still will hold good and can not be taken to have been diluted in any manner in view of the observations made above. However, the ratio of law laid down in S.K.Bhowmik’s case (supra) and other line of decisions still will hold good and can not be taken to have been diluted in any manner in view of the observations made above. I am inclined to hold that the strict requirement of Section 202 Cr.P.C. may not be the need in cases under the Act as that may tend to negate the very purpose of expeditious disposal of the cases under the Act and may also nullify the effect of special provisions made under the Act. The plea of the petitioner in all these petitions to quash the complaints and the summoning orders, thus, can not be accepted. In view of the observations made above, all the petitions are dismissed. ---------0.B.S.0------------