JUDGMENT 1. The petitioner is an Assistant Professor of Surgery in Government Medical College and Hospital, Vellore. He was placed under suspension by an order dated 8.3.2011 by the Director of Medical Education/ respondent under Rule 17(e)(ii) of the Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, as he was remanded to judicial custody in a criminal case for having received the bribe to the tune of Rs.1,200/- and the case is under investigation by the Inspector of Police, Vigilance and Anti Corruption, Vellore Detachment, Vellore. 2. The petitioner has made a representation dated 7.4.2011 to revoke the suspension. The same was declined by the impugned order dated 28.11.2011 stating that his request for revocation of suspension cannot be complied with, since clearance has not been given by the Department of Vigilance and Anti Corruption. 3. The petitioner has filed this Writ Petition to quash the order dated 28.11.2011 passed by the respondent. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently contended that the respondent abdicated his powers and he should have decided on his own as to whether the suspension should be continued or not. On the other hand, he refused to consider the petitioner's request for revocation on the ground that no clearance was given by the Vigilance and Anti Corruption Department. 5. I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 6. The petitioner was placed under suspension by the order dated 8.3.2011. Within a short period, i.e., on 7.4.2011, the petitioner made the representation to revoke the suspension. I am not able to understand as to how the petitioner could seek the revocation of suspension that too when he was facing grave charges, within a short period of one month. Of course, the respondent is not correct in abdicating his power by stating that he did not get clearance from the Department of Vigilance and Anti Corruption. Since the petitioner made the representation to revoke the suspension within a period of one month, that too, when he was facing a serious allegation in the criminal case and the case was under investigation, I am not inclined to interfere with the order passed by the respondent though the respondent was not correct in declining the request on the ground that the Vigilance and Anti Corruption Wing did not give clearance, to consider the request for revocation. 7. 7. While dismissing the Writ Petition, it is made clear that the respondent could decide as to whether the petitioner should be kept under suspension or not, during the pendency of the criminal case. Normally, an employee who is facing the serious charge in the criminal case, that too under the Prevention of Corruption Act, cannot seek for revocation of suspension during the pendency of the criminal case. 8. It is relevant to take note of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the following cases:- i) In Allahabad Bank v. Deepak Kumar Bhola reported in (1997) 4 SCC 1 ., the Apex Court had held that if investigation is conducted by the CBI, which resulted in filing of charge sheet before the Special Court for various offences, that is sufficient for concluding that the Government servant should be suspended and the fact that there was delay of 10 years cannot be a ground for the Government servant to come back to duty unless he was exonerated of charges. The following passages found in paragraphs 10 and 11 may be usefully reproduced below:- “10. In our opinion the aforesaid observations correctly spell out the true meaning of the expression “moral turpitude”. Applying the aforesaid test, if the allegations made against the respondent are proved, it will clearly show that he had committed an offence involving moral turpitude and, therefore, the appellant had the jurisdiction to suspend him under the aforesaid clause 19.3. The High Court observed that there was nothing on record to suggest that the management had formed an opinion objectively on the consideration of all relevant material available against the petitioner that in the circumstances of the case the criminal acts attributed to the petitioner implied depravity and vileness of character and are such as would involve moral turpitude. It did not regard entering into a criminal conspiracy to commit the aforesaid offences as being an offence involving moral turpitude. We are, to say the least, surprised at the conclusion which has been arrived at by the Allahabad High Court. There was material on record before the appellant, in the form of the report of the CBI/SPE, which clearly indicated the acts of commission and omission, amounting to “moral turpitude” alleged to have been committed by the respondent. We are, to say the least, surprised at the conclusion which has been arrived at by the Allahabad High Court. There was material on record before the appellant, in the form of the report of the CBI/SPE, which clearly indicated the acts of commission and omission, amounting to “moral turpitude” alleged to have been committed by the respondent. Furthermore the respondent has been charged with various offences allegedly committed while he was working in the Bank and punishment for which could extend up to ten years' imprisonment (in case the respondent is convicted under Section 467 IPC). 11. We are unable to agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that there has been no application of mind or the objective consideration of the facts by the appellant before it passed the orders of suspension. As already observed, the very fact that the investigation was conducted by the CBI which resulted in the filing of a charge-sheet, alleging various offences having been committed by the respondent, was sufficient for the appellant to conclude that pending prosecution the respondent should be suspended. It would be indeed inconceivable that a bank should allow an employee to continue to remain on duty when he is facing serious charges of corruption and misappropriation of money. Allowing such an employee to remain in the seat would result in giving him further opportunity to indulge in the acts for which he was being prosecuted. Under the circumstances, it was the bounden duty of the appellant to have taken recourse to the provisions of clause 19.3 of the First Bipartite Settlement, 1966. The mere fact that nearly 10 years have elapsed since the charge-sheet was filed, can also be no ground for allowing the respondent to come back to duty on a sensitive post in the Bank, unless he is exonerated of the charge.” (Emphasis added) ii) In A.K.K. Nambiar v. Union of India reported in (1969) 3 SCC 864 , the Apex Court had held that unless malafides are attributed to the Government and established, the Court cannot interdict an order of suspension. The following passages found in paragraphs 7 and 10 may be usefully reproduced below:- “7..... The appellant contended that the appellant was not suspended under sub-rule (3) of Rule 7. That is a contention. The following passages found in paragraphs 7 and 10 may be usefully reproduced below:- “7..... The appellant contended that the appellant was not suspended under sub-rule (3) of Rule 7. That is a contention. The facts are that there was an investigation and the trial is awaiting relating to a criminal charge against the appellant. The order of suspension has to be read in the context of the entire case and combination or circumstances. This order indicates that the Government applied its mind to the allegations, the enquiries and the circumstances of the case. The appellant has failed to establish that the Government acted mala fide. There is no allegation against any particular officer of the Government of India about acting mala fide..... 10..... We are not concerned with the correctness and the propriety of the report. We have only to examine whether the order of suspension was warranted by the rule and also whether it was in honest exercise of powers.....” iii) In D.G. and I.G. of Police v. K. Ratnagiri reported in (1990) 3 SCC 60 , the Apex Court had held that a wrong terminology in the order did not take away the power if it is available otherwise. In paragraph 7, the Supreme Court held as follows:- “7.....The Rule 13(1) empowers the authority to keep the respondent under suspension pending investigation or enquiry into the criminal charges where such suspension is necessary in the public interest. When the first information report is issued, the investigation commences and indeed it has commenced when the respondent was kept under suspension. The order of suspension cannot, therefore, be said to be beyond the scope of Rule 13(1) merely because it has used the word ‘prosecution’ instead of investigation into the charges against the respondent. A wrong wording in the order does not take away the power if it is otherwise available. The Tribunal seems to have ignored this well accepted principle.” (Emphasis added) iv) Taking similar view in Union of India v. Rajiv Kumar reported in (2003) 6 SCC 516 , the Supreme Court held that if suspension is for a long period that by itself cannot make the suspension invalid. In paragraphs 15 and 29, it was observed as follows:- “15...... In paragraphs 15 and 29, it was observed as follows:- “15...... it is clear that the order of suspension does not lose its efficacy and is not automatically terminated the moment the detention comes to an end and the person is set at large. It could be modified and revoked by another order as envisaged under Rule 10(5)(c) and until that order is made, the same continues by the operation of Rule 10(5) (a) and the employee has no right to be reinstated in service. This position was also highlighted in Balvantrai Ratilal Patel v. State of Maharashtra. Indication of the expression “pending further order” in the order of suspension was the basis for the aforesaid view. 29.Another plea raised relates to a suspension for a very long period. It is submitted that the same renders the suspension invalid. The plea is clearly untenable. The period of suspension should not be unnecessarily prolonged but if plausible reasons exist and the authorities feel that the suspension needs to be continued, merely because it is for a long period that does not invalidate the suspension.” (Emphasis added) 9. At this juncture, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner is not paid subsistence allowance for the suspension period. If the subsistence allowance is not paid to the petitioner, a direction is issued to the respondent to pay Subsistence Allowance to the petitioner from the date of suspension, in accordance with the Rules, within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. 10. The Writ Petition is dismissed with the above observation. No costs. The connected Miscellaneous Petitions are closed.