Judgment : 1. The petitioner was employed as a Development Officer in L.I.C. of India, Tirunelveli Unit I. His S.R.No. is 529985 and DO.Code No. is 81075. According to the petitioner, he submitted an application seeking voluntary retirement through proper channel on 31.05.2012. But there was no order passed by the respondents refusing to grant permission for retirement before the expiry of 90 days period as prescribed in Rule 31 (2) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India Employees Pension Rules, 1995. According to the petitioner, on the expiry of 90 days period, he shall be deemed to have retired from service on voluntary basis. Thus, according to the petitioner, as on 01.09.2012, the petitioner is retired from service as per Rule 31 of the said Rules. While so, according to the petitioner, a disciplinary proceeding had been initiated against him while he was in service on 27.08.2012, levelling certain allegations against him. The petitioner submitted his explanation on 10.09.2012. Finally, the first respondent by his proceedings in Mktg/D-I dated 19.10.2012, has issued a show cause notice to the petitioner calling upon him to show cause as to why he should not be terminated from service. Challenging the said show cause notice, the petitioner is before this Court with this Writ Petition. 2. According to the petitioner, as on date, the petitioner is not in service, because his voluntary retirement had come into effect on the expiry of 90 days period from 31.05.2012. Thus, when he is not at all in service, the impugned show cause notice, which is by way of disciplinary proceedings, is not at all maintainable as there is no relationship of employer and employee between the respondents and the petitioner as on the date of the said notice. Therefore, according to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, the impugned proceeding is liable to be quashed. 3. In the counter affidavit filed by the respondents, it is stated that of course, it is true that the application seeking voluntary retirement, was made by the petitioner on 31.05.2012. It is also true that there was no express order passed refusing to grant permission to the petitioner to go on voluntary retirement. 3. In the counter affidavit filed by the respondents, it is stated that of course, it is true that the application seeking voluntary retirement, was made by the petitioner on 31.05.2012. It is also true that there was no express order passed refusing to grant permission to the petitioner to go on voluntary retirement. But, according to the respondents, under Rule 31 of the said Rules, of course, the petitioner is entitled for the benefit of deemed voluntary retirement on the expiry of 90 days' period from the date of the application for voluntary retirement. But, the petitioner has waived the said benefit by his conduct. The learned Counsel would point out that even after expiry of 90 days from the date of application for voluntary retirement, the petitioner was attending the office regularly, drawing his salary and also applied for medical leave. Thus, the petitioner never treated himself to have retired from 01.09.2012 and all along, he himself attended the office waiving the above deemed right conferred upon him under Rule 31(2) of the said Rules. Now, waiving the said right, according to the learned Counsel, it is not open for the petitioner to say that he is no more in service as his voluntary retirement had become effective from 01.09.2012. The learned Counsel would further submit that though there was no express order passed refusing to grant permission to the petitioner to go on voluntary retirement, since the disciplinary proceeding was continued even after the submission of the application for voluntary retirement, it shall be deemed that the request for voluntary retirement has been refused. Thus, according to the respondents, the petitioner is still in service and therefore, the impugned show cause notice cannot be stated to be without jurisdiction. For these reasons, according to the learned Counsel, this writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 4. I have considered the above submissions. 5. The fact remains that the petitioner submitted the application for voluntary retirement on 31.05.2012 and there was no order passed in writing refusing permission to the petitioner to go on voluntary retirement. It is also admitted that the petitioner was attending duty even after the expiry of 90 days' period and he was also drawing salary for some time and he also went on medical leave. It is also admitted that the petitioner was attending duty even after the expiry of 90 days' period and he was also drawing salary for some time and he also went on medical leave. Whether, by this conduct, the petitioner has waived the deemed benefit of voluntary retirement under Rule 31(2) of the Rules, is the question to be answered in this writ petition. 6. Before going to answer the said question, let us have a close look into the relevant Rule, viz., Rule 31 of the said Rules: "31. Pension on voluntary retirement:- (1) At any time after an employee has completed twenty years of qualifying service he may, by giving notice of not less than ninety days, in writing, to the appointing authority, retire from service: Provided that this sub-rule shall not apply to an employee who is on deputation unless after having been transferred or having returned to India he has resumed charge of the post in India and has served for a period of not less than one year: Provided further that this sub-rule shall not apply to an employee who seeks retirement from service for being absorbed permanently in an autonomous body or a public sector undertaking to which he is on deputation at the time of seeking voluntary retirement. (2) The notice of voluntary retirement given under sub-rule (1) shall require acceptance by the appointing authority: Provided that where the appointing authority does not refuse to grant the permission for retirement before the expiry of the period specified in the said notice the retirement shall become effective from the date of expiry of the said period. (3) (a) An employee referred to in sub-rule (1) may make a request in writing to the appointing authority to accept notice of voluntary retirement of less than ninety days giving reasons therefor; (b) On receipt of a request under clause (a), the appointing authority may, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2), consider such request for the curtailment of the period of notice of ninety days on merits and if it is satisfied that the curtailment of the period of notice will not cause any administrative inconvenience, the appointing authority may relax the requirement of notice of ninety days on the condition that the employee shall not apply for commutation of a part of his pension before the expiry of the notice of ninety days. (4) An employee, who has elected to retire under this rule and has given necessary notice to that effect to the appointing authority, shall be precluded from withdrawing his notice except with the specific approval of such authority: Provided that the request for such withdrawal shall be made before the intended date of his retirement. (5) The qualifying service of an employee retiring voluntarily under this rule shall be increased by a period not exceeding five years, subject to the condition that the total qualifying service rendered by such employee shall not in any case exceed thirty-three years and it does not take him beyond the date of retirement. (6) The pension of an employee retiring under this rule shall be based on the average emoluments as defined under clause (d) of rule 3 of these rules and the increase, not exceeding five years in his qualifying service, shall not entitle him to any notional fixation of pay for the purpose of calculating his pension." 7. A cursory perusal of Rule 31(2) of the Rules, would go to show that there is no indication enabling an employee to waive the benefit of voluntary retirement which shall take effect on the expiry of 90 days' period from the date of submission of the application for voluntary retirement. The language used is unambiguous and it is imperative, which shows that on the expiry of the said period, the voluntary retirement shall become effective, if no order of refusal has been passed by the Authority. A close reading of the said provision would clearly go to show that it is not at all possible for an employee to waive the said benefit. The moment 90 days period expires, the voluntary retirement shall become effective and thereafter, he shall not be an employee of the L.I.C. In view of the above said clear position of the Rule, I hold that the argument that the petitioner has waived the deemed benefit of voluntary retirement under Rule 31(2) of the Rules, has no basis. 8. It is not in controversy before this Court that even after the expiry of 90 days' period, the petitioner attended duty, received the salary and also for some time, he went on medical leave. 8. It is not in controversy before this Court that even after the expiry of 90 days' period, the petitioner attended duty, received the salary and also for some time, he went on medical leave. By the said conduct, the voluntary retirement, which has come into effect on the expiry of 90 days' period, cannot be nullified, because there is no such enabling provision under the said Rules. The respondents ought not to have allowed the petitioner to work, after the expiry of 90 days period', because he was not an employee of the L.I.C., after the expiry of the said period. The conduct of the petitioner as well as the conduct of the respondents in allowing the petitioner to work after the expiry of 90 days' period, cannot be approved and it cannot be contended that the conduct of both parties has nullified the voluntary retirement, which had taken effect on the expiry of 90 days' period. 9. The next argument advanced by the learned Counsel for the respondents is that though there was no express order passed refusing permission to the petitioner to go on voluntary retirement, the continuation of the disciplinary proceedings which was initiated on 27.08.2012, will amount to implied refusal of permission to the petitioner to go on voluntary retirement. This argument does not persuade me, because there is no provision in the said Rules under which, it can be said that there can also be a deemed refusal of voluntary retirement by the conduct of parties. Therefore, this argument is also rejected. 10. Now, turning to the relief sought for by the petitioner, as already pointed out, since the petitioner is not in service, the disciplinary proceedings cannot be continued. The learned Counsel for the respondents is not in a position to point out any provision under which the first respondent is empowered to continue the disciplinary proceedings against the employee, who has gone on voluntary retirement. In such view of the matter, I hold that the impugned notice is wholly without jurisdiction and the same is liable to be quashed. 11. Regarding the pension and other benefits arising out of voluntary retirement, it is for the petitioner to work out separately. 12. In the result, the Writ Petition is allowed, the proceedings of the first respondent in Mktg/D-I dated 19.10.2012 is quashed. Consequently the connected Miscellaneous Petition is also closed. No costs.