JUDGMENT : Sanju Panda, J. - The appellant has filed this Government Appeal challenging the judgment dated 15.3.1994 passed by the learned 1st Addl. Sessions Judge, Berhampur in Sessions Trial No. 9/92 (S.C. No. 40/92 GDC) acquitting the accused persons of the charges under Sections 148/302/149 IPC and charges under Sections 336/337 IPC. The prosecution case, in a nutshell, is that P.W. 4 was the informant. He lodged a written report at Bhejiput Out Post on 16.10.1991 at about 11 P.M. It was alleged in the FIR (Ext. 5) that on 16.10.1991 at about 8 P.M. while his cousin brother Panchu Sahu-deceased was coming from the paddy field, the accused persons, being armed with deadly weapons came out from the house of Santosh Kumar Swain (A-1) due to previous enmity and obstructed him. It was further alleged that A-2 abused him and instigated others to kill him. At that time, wife of A-1, Promodini Swain charge sheet accused not being faced the trial has been declared as absconder, handed over a Bhali (MO I) to her husband and instigated him to kill the deceased. Suddenly, A-1 pierced the weapon of offence on the chest of the deceased as a result of which he fell down there and other accused persons threw brickbats. The informant along with others, who was present at the spot, tried to rescue the deceased. However, due to pelting of brickbats, they failed to rescue the deceased. After knowing the deceased died, accused persons left the place to kill another person, namely, Krushna Swain and attacked his house. One Kailash Sahu, wife of Krushna Swain and others sustained injuries due to pelting of brickbats. Apprehending further disturbances, they shifted the injured and the deceased to Bhejiput Out Post in an Auto and with the help of Thana Babu, they shifted the deceased and injured to Khallikote Hospital. It was also alleged in the FIR that the informant named P.Ws. 5 and 6 (Sibaram Pradhan and Maguni Swain) as eye witnesses to the occurrence. Accordingly, the informant submitted the written report to the ASI, Bhejiput Out Post, who made a station diary entry and sent the FIR to Khallikote Police Station for registration of police case, where it was registered as Khallikote P.S. Case No. 69 of 1991 for commission of offence under Sections 147/148/336/337/302/149 IPC and the investigation taken up. Accordingly, the informant submitted the written report to the ASI, Bhejiput Out Post, who made a station diary entry and sent the FIR to Khallikote Police Station for registration of police case, where it was registered as Khallikote P.S. Case No. 69 of 1991 for commission of offence under Sections 147/148/336/337/302/149 IPC and the investigation taken up. After completion of investigation, charge sheet was filed for commission of offence under the aforesaid Sections of the I.P.C. Out of the accused persons, namely, Banambar Swain and Promodini Swain were shown as absconders. Except those two accused persons, rest of the accused persons faced the trial. The case was split up against the aforesaid two accused persons as they could not be apprehended. 2. In support of its case, prosecution examined as many as nine witnesses out of whom P.Ws. 4, 5 and 6 were eye witnesses to the occurrence. P.W. 7 was the Police Officer who received the written FIR at Bhejiput Out Post and he sent the same to Khallikote Police Station. P.W. 8 was the I.O. who registered the FIR as Khallikote P.S. Case No. 69 of 1991. P.W. 9 was the doctor who conducted the post-mortem over the dead body of the deceased. 3. The defence case was that the informant party including deceased attacked the house of accused A-1 being armed with various deadly weapons and hearing hulla, some of the villagers came there and protested such action on which there was a fight between those two groups. During the said fight, the deceased accidentally received a stab blow. Despite request of the wife of the deceased, he was not given immediate medical attention as a result of which the injured died. The absconding accused Promodini and Banambar were not at all present in the village on the said day. The accused A-1 did not give stab blow to the deceased as alleged and accused persons were falsely and maliciously implicated in the case due to previous enmity. The defence also disputed the place of occurrence and the presence of light at the spot. 4. In support of their plea, defence examined the wife of the deceased as D.W. 1. It was also alleged by the defence that there was a criminal case pending between the parties for the offence under Sections 143/323/325 IPC and also a proceeding u/s 107 Cr.P.C. 5. P.W. 9 was the doctor. 4. In support of their plea, defence examined the wife of the deceased as D.W. 1. It was also alleged by the defence that there was a criminal case pending between the parties for the offence under Sections 143/323/325 IPC and also a proceeding u/s 107 Cr.P.C. 5. P.W. 9 was the doctor. In the post-mortem report (Ext. 26), he indicated that the death of the deceased was homicidal and the injuries were ante-mortem in nature. He stated that there was a spindle shaped incised stab wound of 4 cm. x 2 cm. x abdominal cavity deep over the left upper abdomen and that stab wound on the abdomen was fatal in ordinary course of nature. He also stated that external wound and corresponding internal wound could have been possible with the weapon like Bhali (M.O. I). The cause of death of the deceased was due to shock as a result of internal hemorrhage resulting in the injuries stated below. P.W. 9 found the following external and internal injuries on the dead body of the deceased which are extracted below: EXTERNAL INJURIES: 1. Abrasion 1 x 1/4 x 1" above the right eye brow on the midline. 2. Abrasion 1" x 1/2" over right occipital region. 3. One spindle shaped incised stab wound 4 cm x 2 cm x abdominal cavity deep over the left upper abdomen obliquely across 5" below the left nipple and 3" away from the midline. INTERNAL INJURIES: 1. The peritoneal cavity contained fluid blood and the stomach contained fluid blood and blood clots, small intestine was injured at three places and the large intestine at low place due to the external stab wound. 6. The trial court first discussed the evidence of D.W. 1 and came to the conclusion that her statement seemed overall biased the accused persons under the facts and circumstances of the case and did not spring from mere sense of justice and fair-play. He did not rely on any of the points deposed by D.W. 1 and held that her evidence was not trustworthy. Then, he discussed with regard to the place of occurrence and held that the evidence of P.Ws. 4, 5 and 6 was quite clear that the accused persons came out from the house of accused A-1 and went into that house after the occurrence. Then, he discussed with regard to the place of occurrence and held that the evidence of P.Ws. 4, 5 and 6 was quite clear that the accused persons came out from the house of accused A-1 and went into that house after the occurrence. The spot of occurrence was in front of the house of A-1 and P.Ws. 4, 5 and 6, who were eye witnesses to the occurrence, were partisan witnesses in view of previous rivalry between the parties. He also recorded that P.W. 9 stated that repairing of injury would have been required major surgery. Since the death was undoubtedly caused by the stab injury, it was immaterial whether the deceased could have been survived by resorting to proper remedies and skillful treatment. Thus, the person who gave the stab injury must be held to be guilty of homicide. He also referred to page-35 of the case diary and found that 161 statement of the informant was recorded by P.W. 7, the police officer, who received the FIR at Bhejiput Out Post on 16.10.1991 at 11 P.M. But the very first line of the FIR showed that the informant gave a written report at 11 P.M. on 16.10.1991. The endorsement of the ASI revealed that he had received it at 12.45 A.M. on 17.10.1991. If 12.45 A.M. was taken to be the time, when the report was presented, then there was a delay of about 5 hours. Delay per se in lodging the FIR would not result in throwing out the prosecution case but if such delay resulted in a colourful version or concoction, the prosecution case might be disbelieved as a result of that he drew an inference that earlier FIR was suppressed. On such findings, the trial court disbelieved the prosecution case and passed an order of acquittal. 7. Learned Addl. Government Advocate for the State submitted that the accused persons were specifically charged u/s 148/302/149 IPC. The trial court did not assign any reason in the entire judgment while acquitting the accused persons from those charges. He submitted that the charges were under Sections 148/302/149 IPC read with Section 336/337 IPC. However, so far as charges under Sections 336/337 IPC are concerned, there was no discussion made by the trial court and without assigning any reason, he acquitted the accused persons from the said charges. He further submitted that P.Ws. He submitted that the charges were under Sections 148/302/149 IPC read with Section 336/337 IPC. However, so far as charges under Sections 336/337 IPC are concerned, there was no discussion made by the trial court and without assigning any reason, he acquitted the accused persons from the said charges. He further submitted that P.Ws. 4, 5 and 6, who were eye witnesses, consistently stated regarding the overt act committed by A-1 which has not been taken into consideration by the trial court. Therefore, the order of acquittal is liable to be reversed as the trial court has treated them as partisan witnesses. The evidence of P.Ws. 4, 5 and 6 and the opinion of the Doctor (P.W. 9) coupled with the post-mortem report, the only irresistible conclusion is that A-1 committed the murder none else. Hence, the order of acquittal is liable to be set aside. He further submitted that the findings of the trial court that earlier FIR was suppressed is not sustainable as neither prosecution nor defence ever raised such point during course of trial inasmuch as nothing was suggested to P.Ws. 7 and 8 during their cross-examinations about the suppression of earlier FIR and about the discrepancy in the date and time put in 161 statement of the informant by P.W. 7. Therefore, the said findings are non est in the eye of law and is liable to be interfered with. In support of his contention, he has cited the decisions of the apex Court in the cases of State of A.P. Vs. S. Rayappa and Others, State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Mansingh and Others, and Bheru Lal and Others Vs. State of Rajasthan, wherein the apex Court has held that where the eye witnesses are interested and partisan, their statements shall not be discarded out rightly; rather their evidence are to be dealt with carefully and cautiously and in case the trial court judgment is perverse, interference is warranted. 8. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the trial court considered the defence case that there was prior enmity and free fight between the parties. He further submitted that the proceedings u/s 107 Cr.P.C. and G.R. Case No. 225 of 1991 were initiated on 25.6.1991. The accused persons also lodged an FIR at Khallikote P.S. on the very day, i.e. on 16.10.1991 as there was a case and counter case filed. He further submitted that the proceedings u/s 107 Cr.P.C. and G.R. Case No. 225 of 1991 were initiated on 25.6.1991. The accused persons also lodged an FIR at Khallikote P.S. on the very day, i.e. on 16.10.1991 as there was a case and counter case filed. Therefore, the order of acquittal passed by the trial court need not be interfered with. He further submitted that the FIR was a manipulated one as in the FIR it was written that the informant lodged the FIR at 11 P.M. but the A.S.I. made an endorsement in the said FIR at 12.45 A.M. When the informant reported regarding murder of the deceased, the A.S.I. should have reduced the same into writing immediately instead of asking the informant to get a written copy. As the informant stated that he had received the copy of the FIR from P.W. 7 which was not correct because P.W. 8 in his deposition stated that he handed over the FIR copy to the informant. All these discrepancies created a doubt in the mind of the trial court regarding suppression of the original FIR. The same has been discussed by the trial court in the judgment. As the FIR was a concocted version and all the evidences available on record were dealt with by the trial court, the impugned judgment does not warrant interference. In support of his contentions, he has cited the decisions of the apex Court in the case of Lakshmi Singh and Others Vs. State of Bihar, and Ghurey Lal Vs. State of U.P., and this Court in the cases of Krushna Podha and three others v. State of Orissa, (1992) 5 OCR 529 and State of U.P. Vs. Punni and Others, wherein it has been held that where the decision of the trial court is based on erroneous view of law, contrary to the evidence of documents on record, the finding is manifestly unjust and unreasonable and perverse, in such case interference is warranted. However, while dealing with a case the court may reach at a different conclusion that where two views are possible, the view in favour of the accused need not be interfered with. 9. From the rival submissions of the parties, after going through the materials available on record and the prosecution case as described in the above paragraphs, it reveals that P.Ws. 9. From the rival submissions of the parties, after going through the materials available on record and the prosecution case as described in the above paragraphs, it reveals that P.Ws. 4, 5 and 6 have categorically stated that A-1 assaulted the deceased by means of Bhali (MO-I), the weapon of offence. P.W. 9, the doctor, who conducted postmortem examination over the dead body of the deceased also corroborated the said facts. Since the evidence of P.Ws. 4, 5 and 6 was inconsistent with regard to the action of A-2, the aforesaid contradiction does not brush aside the prosecution case totally. These are minor discrepancies regarding suppression of FIR. It reveals that P.W. 4, the informant, categorically stated that he along with others brought the deceased and other injured persons to Bhejiput Out Post and lodged the FIR. They along with the Thana Babu took the injured to Khallikote Hospital for treatment, where the doctor declared the deceased dead. Therefore, the irregularity appeared in the time reflected by A.S.I. (P.W. 7) in the FIR and the time of lodging the FIR by P.W. 4 has been well explained instead of completing the formality after receiving the written report. P.W. 7 took immediate steps to give treatment to the injured and the timing regarding 161 statement made by the A.S.I. has been well explained from the record. Since the defence did not put any question to P.Ws. 7 and 8 regarding suppression of the FIR, the trial court should not have come to a conclusion that the original FIR was suppressed and it should not have passed the order of acquittal. 10. Further, law is well settled that merely because the witnesses are interested and partisan, their evidence cannot be rejected entirely; rather it is the duty of the court to find out in case those eye witnesses are not allowed to be examined, the real culprit will go unpunished. If the answer is negative then the court may rely on them coupled with other materials available on record. 11. The appellate court may review the evidence in appeal against order of acquittal. Its power of reviewing evidence is wide and the appellate court can review the trial court's conclusion with respect to both facts and law. The accused is to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. The accused possessed this presumption when he was before the trial court. 11. The appellate court may review the evidence in appeal against order of acquittal. Its power of reviewing evidence is wide and the appellate court can review the trial court's conclusion with respect to both facts and law. The accused is to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. The accused possessed this presumption when he was before the trial court. The trial court's acquittal confirms the said presumption. Therefore, due and proper weight and consideration must be given to the trial court's decision. There must also be substantial and compelling reasons for holding that the trial court was wrong. The appellate court may only overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal if it has found that the trial court's judgment is likely to result in "grave miscarriage of justice". 12. The evidence of interested witnesses should be thrown out at the behest or should not be relied upon for convicting an accused in the absence of any independent witness. What the law requires is that where the witnesses are interested, the court should approach their evidence with care and caution in order to exclude the possibility of false implication. The evidence of interested witnesses is not like that of an approver which is presumed to be tainted and requires corroboration but the said evidence is as good as any other evidence. In a faction ridden village, it will really be impossible to find out independent persons to come forward and give evidence. In a large number of such cases only partisan witnesses would be natural and probable witnesses. Once it is found by the court, on an analysis of the evidence of an interested witness that there is no reason to disbelieve him then the mere fact that the witness is interested cannot be persuade the court to reject the prosecution case on that ground alone. 13. The apex Court in Mansingh's case (supra) has held that merely because there was some change in time of lodging of FIR that does not per se render the prosecution version vulnerable. At the most, the requirement was a careful analysis of evidence. 14. The apex Court in the case of Yanab Sheikh @ Gagu Vs. 13. The apex Court in Mansingh's case (supra) has held that merely because there was some change in time of lodging of FIR that does not per se render the prosecution version vulnerable. At the most, the requirement was a careful analysis of evidence. 14. The apex Court in the case of Yanab Sheikh @ Gagu Vs. State of West Bengal, has held that a second First Information Report about the same occurrence between the same persons and with similarity of scope of investigation cannot be registered and by applying the test of similarity, it may then be hit by the proviso to Section 162 Cr.P.C. An FIR normally should give the basic essentials in relation to the commission of a cognizable offence upon which the investigating officer can get immediate start his investigation in accordance with the provisions of Section 154, Chapter XII of the Cr.P.C. Therefore, it is not possible to accept the contention that the FIR subsequently registered was a second FIR with regard to the same occurrence with similar details and was hit by Section 162. Section 134 of the Evidence Act provides that no particular number of witnesses shall in any case be required for the proof of any fact. It is not always the quantity but the quality of the prosecution evidence that weighs with the court in determining the guilt of the accused or otherwise. The prosecution is under the responsibility of bringing its case beyond reasonable doubt and cannot escape that responsibility. In order to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, the evidence produced by the prosecution has to be qualitative and may not be quantitative in nature. The court is primarily concerned and has to satisfy itself with regard to the evidence being reliable, trustworthy and of a definite evidentiary value in accordance with law. Moreover, whatever one of the witnesses had stated in his cross-examination, to some extent supported the case of the prosecution if P.Ws. clearly supported the case of the prosecution. Their statements, examined in conjunction with the statements of the doctor and the investigating officer, clearly establish the case of the prosecution beyond any reasonable doubt and in order to examine some of the witnesses will not fatal to the prosecution case. 15. clearly supported the case of the prosecution. Their statements, examined in conjunction with the statements of the doctor and the investigating officer, clearly establish the case of the prosecution beyond any reasonable doubt and in order to examine some of the witnesses will not fatal to the prosecution case. 15. If the discrepancy of the evidence of the witnesses goes to the very root of the matter touching the core of the material aspects of the incident, then the court will consider such discrepancy. However, if the discrepancy is minor, it would be sufficient if it contains a gist of the incident committing the material aspects of it. The evidence of such witnesses is trustworthy and reliable. 16. The trial court has given a finding that the evidence of P.Ws. 4, 5 and 6 was quite clear that the accused persons came out from the house of the accused A-1 and went into that house after the occurrence. The prosecution did not change the spot of occurrence. The occurrence took place in front of the house of accused A-1. Accused A-1 gave a stab blow to the deceased by means of Bhali. The allegations made against all other accused persons except A-1 were omnibus in nature and the role played by other accused persons had some minor discrepancies. However, as P.Ws. 4 and 5 belonged to the informant group, they should not have been considered as partisan witnesses and assault and stab injuries on the deceased by A-1 should not have been discarded by the trial court, which amounts to miscarriage of justice. P.Ws. 4, 5 and 6 are consistent regarding material part, i.e., the stab blow made by A-1. P.Ws. 4 and 5 also categorically stated that the accused persons threw brickbats as a result of which one Laxmi Swain wife of Krushna Swain received injury on her face and Kailash Sahu received injury on his lip. The defence has not cross-examined the said witnesses on the said point. Accordingly, we set aside the judgment dated 15.3.1994 passed by the learned 1st Addl. Sessions Judge, Berhampur in Sessions Trial No. 9/92 (S.C. No. 40/92 GDC) and find Santosh Kumar Swain (A-1) guilty for the offence u/s 302 IPC and for the offence under Sections 148/149/336/337 IPC. The defence has not cross-examined the said witnesses on the said point. Accordingly, we set aside the judgment dated 15.3.1994 passed by the learned 1st Addl. Sessions Judge, Berhampur in Sessions Trial No. 9/92 (S.C. No. 40/92 GDC) and find Santosh Kumar Swain (A-1) guilty for the offence u/s 302 IPC and for the offence under Sections 148/149/336/337 IPC. Therefore, we sentence Santosh Kumar Swain (A-1) to undergo R.I. for life under Sections 302 IPC and R.I. for one year under Sections 148/149/336/337 IPC and direct that both the sentences shall run concurrently. So far as respondent nos. 2 to 14 are concerned, we find them guilty for the offence under Sections 148/149/336/337 IPC and sentence them to undergo R.I. for one year under the aforesaid sections. The accused persons are directed to surrender to custody to serve the sentences. The Government Appeal is accordingly allowed. Dr. B.R. Sarangi, J. I agree Final Result : Allowed