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2013 DIGILAW 331 (KAR)

Management of BHEL v. H. N. Chikkalah

2013-03-13

K.L.MANJUNATH, RAVI MALIMATH

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JUDGMENT Ravi Malimath, J—Aggrieved by the order dated 10th February, 2009, passed by the learned Single Judge in WP. No. 16025/2008 the petitioner has filed the present appeal. The case made out is that the respondent-workman was suspended from service on the ground that criminal proceedings were initiated by the police for offences punishable under Sections 143, 147, 148, 149, 201 and 302 of IPC. When the matter was pending before the learned Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bangalore, in S.C. No. 125/1996, invoking the provisions of the Standing Orders, the respondent-workman was suspended. However, no enquiry was held. Subsequently by the Judgment dated 27.1.2000 the workman was acquitted. In pursuance to the acquittal, the respondent has sought for payment of wages during the period of suspension which was denied to him. The tribunal while considering the provisions of Section 37(8) of the Standing Orders held that Clause 37(8) having been deleted, that the respondent-workman is entitled for wages during the period of suspension. Aggrieved by the same, the management filed the instant writ petition which came to be dismissed. Hence this appeal. 2. Sri Subramanyam, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant-management contends that the ground on which the management was directed to pay the entire arrears of wages ever since the date of suspension till the date of acquittal is erroneous. He contends that so far as the period of suspension is concerned the workman will not be entitled to any back-wages. 3. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent defends the impugned order. He contends that there is no error committed by the learned single Judge that calls for interference. That the writ appeal is liable to be rejected. On hearing the learned counsels we are of the considered view that the order passed by the Tribunal as well as the learned single Judge calls for interference. The Tribunal held that the management was not justified in treating the suspension period as not on duty and in denying the back-wages etc payable to him even after he was acquitted by the Criminal Court. It directed the management to pay his back-wages, with all service benefits etc. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the appellant relies on the Judgment in the case of Baldev Singh Vs. It directed the management to pay his back-wages, with all service benefits etc. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the appellant relies on the Judgment in the case of Baldev Singh Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, AIR 2006 SC 531 and with particular reference to para 7 which reads as follows:-- 7. As the factual position noted clearly indicates, the appellant was not in actual service for the period he was in custody. Merely because there has been an acquittal does not automatically entitle him to get salary for the period concerned. This is moreso, on the logic of 'no work no pay'. It is to be noted that the appellant was terminated from service because of the conviction. Effect of the same does not get diluted because of subsequent acquittal for the purpose of counting service. The aforesaid position was clearly stated in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore Vs. Superintendent Engineer, Gujarat Electricity Board, Himmatnagar, (Gujarat) and another, (1996) 8 AD SC 547 . Therefore he contends that only because he has been acquitted does not automatically entitle him to get salary for the said period. That this is moreso, on the logic that "no work no pay". On considering the contentions we are of the view that so far as the payment of entire back-wages is concerned, the same is erroneous. Therefore the award passed by the Tribunal granting the entire back-wages shall stand deleted. So far as the period from the date of suspension till the date of acquittal, the workman will not be entitled to any of the amounts for the said period other than the subsistence allowance that is already been paid to him. Notwithstanding the interim order passed by this Court on 21.4.2009, the appellant is permitted to recover any excess amount that would have been paid to the workman. Writ appeal is disposed off accordingly.