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2013 DIGILAW 336 (CHH)

Neelima Verma v. Dileshwar Kenwat

2013-11-25

SANJAY K.AGRAWAL

body2013
JUDGMENT : SANJAY K. AGRAWAL, J. 1. This order shall govern disposal of above two appeals, as they arise out of one and the same accident, claim case and award and common questions of law and facts are involved therein. The appeals were heard analogously and being decided by this common order. Feeling dissatisfied with the impugned award dated 11.4.2013 passed by First Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Bilaspur (henceforth 'the Claims Tribunal') in Claim Case No. 210 of 2010, Miscellaneous Appeal (C) No. 781 of 2013 has been filed by National Insurance Co. Ltd. challenging the liability fastened upon it, whereas Miscellaneous Appeal (C) No. 684 of 2013 has been filed by the claimants challenging the finding of contributory negligence as well as seeking enhancement of the amount awarded under the impugned award. 2. The facts in nutshell, necessary for adjudication of the appeals, are as under: 2.1. In a motor accident occurred on 10.11.2009, Utkarsh Verma lost his life. On the fateful day, he was driving his car bearing registration No. CG 04-H 0708 on Raipur-Bilaspur National Highway 200. His mother, late Anupama Verma, was also sitting in the car. On the way, near a petrol pump before Simga (Bilaspur), a goods truck bearing registration No. CG 10-A 9844, which was being driven rashly and negligently by respondent driver Dileshwar Kenwat, dashed the car. As a result of the accident, Utkarsh Verma and his mother sustained injuries and died instantaneously. The truck was owned by the respondent Nileshwar Soni and insured with National Insurance Co. Ltd. A report of the accident was lodged in Police Station Simga, District Raipur, where an offence u/s 304A of the Indian Penal Code was registered against the respondent driver and a charge-sheet was filed against him in the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Simga, for the said offence, which is pending consideration before the jurisdictional criminal court. 2.2. Neelima Verma and Bhuma Verma, the widow and the minor daughter of the deceased Utkarsh Verma, claimed compensation u/s 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (henceforth 'the Act', 1988) stating, inter alia, that on account of rash and negligent driving of the offending truck by the respondent driver, the accident took place in which Utkarsh Verma sustained grievous injuries and died on the spot. The offending truck was owned by respondent Nileshwar Soni and insured with National Insurance Co. The offending truck was owned by respondent Nileshwar Soni and insured with National Insurance Co. Ltd. It was further pleaded that the deceased was one of the renowned legal practitioners in the High Court of Chhattisgarh and he had been a Deputy Government Advocate for a fairly long period and they were fully dependent upon him. They are entitled to a compensation to the tune of Rs. 1,92,50,000/- from the driver, owner and insurer of the offending truck, jointly and severally. 2.3. The owner and driver of the offending truck filed a joint written statement before the Claims Tribunal and pleaded that the driver had a valid and effective licence to drive the offending truck on the date of accident and the truck was duly insured with the insurance company, therefore, liability of indemnification, if any, was to be fastened upon the insurance company. 2.4. The insurance company filed a separate written statement and opposed the claim petition stating, inter alia, that deceased Utkarsh Verma was contributory negligent in driving the car and the driver of the offending truck did not have a valid and effective licence to drive the truck and, thus, the insurance company disowned liability to indemnify. 2.5. During the course of trial, claimants, in support of their case, examined five witnesses and exhibited documents, Exhs. P1 to P24. The driver and owner of the offending truck neither filed any document nor adduced any evidence before the Claims Tribunal to support their case. The insurance company examined the driver of the offending truck as their witness. The insurance company also examined San-deep Kumar Sinha, NAW-3/2. Assistant Manager of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. to prove that the claim for damages of the car of the deceased was pending consideration. No document was filed by the insurance company in support of its case. 2.6. The Claims Tribunal, by the impugned award, partly allowed the claim application finding that deceased Utkarsh Verma was contributory negligent to the accident to the extent of 25 per cent. The Claims Tribunal assessed total compensation to the tune of Rs. 21,04,392/- and after making deduction towards contributory negligence of the deceased, awarded compensation to the tune of Rs. 15,78,294/- along with interest at the rate of 6 per cent from the date of filing the claim application. 3. Mr. Abhishek Sinha and Mr. The Claims Tribunal assessed total compensation to the tune of Rs. 21,04,392/- and after making deduction towards contributory negligence of the deceased, awarded compensation to the tune of Rs. 15,78,294/- along with interest at the rate of 6 per cent from the date of filing the claim application. 3. Mr. Abhishek Sinha and Mr. G.S. Patel, learned counsel appearing for the claimants in both the appeals, would submit that the finding of the Claims Tribunal holding deceased Utkarsh Verma contributory negligent to the extent of 25 per cent is illegal as there is no evidence on record to hold that the deceased was contributory negligent in driving the car. They would further submit that no compensation has been awarded under the head of loss of future income. They would also submit that the finding regarding damage to property (car) is also illegal. Therefore, they would claim that their appeal deserves to be allowed. 4. Mr. Qamrul Aziz and Mr. G.V.K. Rao, learned counsel appearing for the insurance company in both the appeals, apart from opposing the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for the claimants, in support of the appeal filed by the appellant insurance company, would submit that the quantum of compensation assessed and awarded by the Claims Tribunal is shockingly high and deserves to be reduced suitably. 5. I have heard and considered the rival submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for the parties and have perused the record of the claim case. 6. In view of the factual and legal submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, the following questions would arise for adjudication of the appeals: (1) Whether the finding recorded by the Claims Tribunal that the deceased was contributory negligent to the extent of 25 per cent is just and proper? (2) Whether the insurance company is entitled to challenge the quantum of compensation and that too in absence of any permission u/s 170 of the Act, 1988? (3) Whether the claimants are entitled for enhancement towards loss of future income/prospects? (4) Whether the claimants are entitled for any amount for the damage caused to the car of the deceased in the accident? (5) Actual/enhanced compensation to which the claimants are entitled? Answer to First Question: 7.1. (3) Whether the claimants are entitled for enhancement towards loss of future income/prospects? (4) Whether the claimants are entitled for any amount for the damage caused to the car of the deceased in the accident? (5) Actual/enhanced compensation to which the claimants are entitled? Answer to First Question: 7.1. The claimants have pleaded in their claim petition that respondent driver, while driving the offending truck rashly and negligently, dashed the car of the deceased and caused the accident, as a result of which the deceased and his mother sustained grievous injuries and died instantaneously on the spot. F.I.R. was lodged against the respondent driver of the offending truck and charge-sheet was filed against him with a specific allegation that he drove the offending truck rashly and negligently and thereby caused the accident in which the deceased died. The owner and driver of the offending truck filed their joint written statement before the Claims Tribunal, but they did not take any such plea of contributory negligence on the part of the deceased. However, the insurance company took the plea of contributory negligence of the deceased in its written statement specifically and pleaded no liability to make payment of compensation. 7.2. Abid Nawaz, AW 2, who was travelling behind the car of the deceased on the date of accident, has clearly deposed that the offending truck was being driven rashly and negligently in an excessive/high speed which resulted into dashing the car of the deceased by the truck. In cross-examination, in para. 7, he clearly deposed that the offending truck swirled and dashed the car from opposite direction. He denied the suggestion that there was a head-on collision between the two vehicles and also denied any negligence on the part of the deceased car driver. He is also a listed prosecution witness in the criminal case pending against the driver of the offending truck in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Simga for offence u/s 304A, Indian Penal Code. The driver and the owner of the offending truck were duly represented before the Claims Tribunal and had ample opportunity to cross-examine the eyewitness Abid Nawaz, AW 2, regarding negligence on the part of the deceased car driver, but they did not do so. The driver and the owner of the offending truck were duly represented before the Claims Tribunal and had ample opportunity to cross-examine the eyewitness Abid Nawaz, AW 2, regarding negligence on the part of the deceased car driver, but they did not do so. Apart from this, the evidence of eyewitness Abid Nawaz, AW 2, that the driver of the offending truck rashly and negligently drove the truck stood corroborated by registration of the offence against the driver of the truck u/s 304A, Indian Penal Code and filing of the charge-sheet against him with specific allegation of sole rash and negligent act on his part. 7.3. The driver of the offending truck, Dileshwar Kenwat, has appeared in the witness-box as a witness of the insurance company. The demeanour of this witness was noted by the Claims Tribunal that he was not interested in giving evidence before the Claims Tribunal. However, he simply stated about the accident. He did not depose specifically with regard to any negligence on the part of deceased Utkarsh Verma. 7.4. Taking into consideration the demeanour of the driver of the offending truck as observed by the Claims Tribunal, the fact that the challan has been filed against him for the offence u/s 304A, Indian Penal Code, with the specific allegation of rash and negligent act on his part and the evidence of eyewitness Abid Nawaz, AW 2, who is a prosecution witness in the criminal case registered against the driver of the offending truck, I am of the considered opinion that the sole negligence on the part of the driver of the offending truck stands established. 7.5. It is well settled that the insurance company, taking a plea of contributory negligence on the part of the victim, must lead evidence with regard thereto and unless such evidence is led by the insurance company, the insurance company's plea with regard to the contributory negligence cannot succeed. The insurance company must state specifically that there was some causal connection of the deceased with the damage suffered by him to hold that the conduct of the deceased amounted to contributory negligence. Similarly, there had to be some connection on the part of the deceased showing absence of reasonable care for his own safety which contributed to the damage. 7.6. Similarly, there had to be some connection on the part of the deceased showing absence of reasonable care for his own safety which contributed to the damage. 7.6. In the Law of Torts by Justice G.P. Singh, following propositions of law regarding contributory negligence have been stated: "It is to be noted that negligence of the plaintiff which can be described as contributory negligence must have causal connection with the damage suffered by him. The question simply is whether the plaintiff or the deceased (in case of claims arising out of death) had failed to take reasonable care of his own safety which had contributed to the damage." 7.7. In 2004 (54) ALR 427 (SC), the Supreme Court held as under: "(6) ...Where an accident is due to the negligence of both parties, substantially there would be contributory negligence and both would be blamed. In a case of contributory negligence, the crucial question on which the liability depends would be whether either party could, by exercise of reasonable care, have avoided the consequence of other's negligence. Whichever party could have avoided the consequence of other's negligence would be liable for the accident. If a person's negligent act or omission was the proximate and immediate cause of death, the fact that the person suffering injury was himself negligent and also contributed to the accident or other circumstances by which the injury was caused would not afford a defence to the other. Contributory negligence is applicable solely to the conduct of a plaintiff. It means that there has been an act or omission on the part of the plaintiff which has materially contributed to the damage, the act or omission being of such a nature that it may properly be described as negligence, although negligence is not given its usual meaning. [See Charlesworth on Negligence, 3rd Edn., para. 328], It is now well settled that in the case of contributory negligence, courts have power to apportion the loss between the parties as seems just and equitable. Apportionment in that context means that damages are reduced to such an extent as the court thinks just and equitable having regard to the claim shared in the responsibility for the damage. But in a case where there has been no contributory negligence on the part of the victim, the question of apportionment does not arise." 7.8. In Pramodkumar Rasikbhai Jhaveri Vs. But in a case where there has been no contributory negligence on the part of the victim, the question of apportionment does not arise." 7.8. In Pramodkumar Rasikbhai Jhaveri Vs. Karmasey Kunvargi Tak and Others, (2002) 6 SCC 455 , the Apex Court held as under: "(8) We do not think that these two reasons given by the High Court fully justify the accepted principles of contributory negligence. The question of contributory negligence arises when there has been some act or omission on the claimant's part, which has materially contributed to the damage caused, and is of such a nature that it may properly be described as 'negligence'. Negligence ordinarily means breach of a legal duty to care, but when used in the expression 'contributory negligence' it does not mean breach of any duty. It only means the failure by a person to use reasonable care for the safety of either himself or his property, so that he becomes blameworthy in part as an 'author of his own wrong'. (9) Subject to non-requirement of the existence of duty, the question of contributory negligence is to be decided on the same principle on which the question of defendant's negligence is decided. The standard of reasonable man is as relevant in the case of plaintiff's contributory negligence as in the case of defendant's negligence. But the degree of want of care, which will constitute contributory negligence, varies with the circumstances and the factual situation of the case. The following observation of the High Court of Australia in Astley v. Austrust Ltd., (1999) 73 ALJR 403, is worthy of quoting: 'A finding of contributory negligence turns on a factual investigation whether the plaintiff contributed to his or her own loss by failing to take reasonable care of his or her person or property. What is reasonable care depends on the circumstances of the case. In many cases, it may be proper for a plaintiff to rely on the defendant to perform its duty. But there is no absolute rule. The duties and responsibilities of the defendant are a variable factor in determining whether contributory negligence exists and, if so, to what degree. What is reasonable care depends on the circumstances of the case. In many cases, it may be proper for a plaintiff to rely on the defendant to perform its duty. But there is no absolute rule. The duties and responsibilities of the defendant are a variable factor in determining whether contributory negligence exists and, if so, to what degree. In some cases, the nature of the duty owed may exculpate the plaintiff from a claim of contributory negligence; in other cases, the nature of the duty may reduce the plaintiff's share of responsibility for the damage suffered; and in yet other cases the nature of the duty may not prevent a finding that plaintiff failed to take reasonable care for the safety of his or her person or property. Contributory negligence focuses on the conduct of the plaintiff. The duty owed by the defendant, although relevant, is only one of many factors that must be weighed in determining whether the plaintiff has so conducted itself that it failed to take reasonable care for the safety of its person or property'." 7.9. In a recent decision in Minu Rout and Another Vs. Satya Pradyumna Mohapatra and Others, (2013) 10 SCC 695 , the plea of contributory negligence was taken by the insurance company, but neither driver nor any independent witness was examined to prove the allegation of contributory negligence. The Supreme Court, while setting aside the finding of contributory negligence, held as under: "(12) ... The Tribunal ought to have seen that non-production of F.I.R. has no consequence for the reason that charge-sheet was filed against the truck driver for the offences punishable u/s 279 read with section 304A of Indian Penal Code read with the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act. The insurance company, though claimed permission u/s 170(b) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, from the Tribunal to contest the proceedings by availing the defence of the owner of the offending vehicle, it did not choose to examine either the driver of truck or any other independent eyewitness to prove the allegation of contributory negligence on the part of the deceased Susil Rout on account of which the accident took place as he was driving the car in a rash and negligent manner. In the absence of rebuttal evidence adduced on record by the Tribunal, the Tribunal should not have placed reliance on the charge-sheet, Exh. In the absence of rebuttal evidence adduced on record by the Tribunal, the Tribunal should not have placed reliance on the charge-sheet, Exh. 1, in which the deceased driver was mentioned as an accused and on his death, his name was deleted from the charge-sheet. The Tribunal has referred to certain stray answers elicited from the evidence of PW 2 and PW 3 in their cross-examination and placed reliance on them to record the finding on issue No. 1. For the aforesaid reasons, the findings and reasons recorded by the Tribunal on the contentious issue No. 1 holding that there is contributory negligence on the part of the deceased driver in the absence of legal evidence adduced by the insurance company to prove the plea taken by it that accident did not take place on account of rash and negligent driving of the truck driver are erroneous in law." 7.10. Thus, applying the decision of the Apex Court to the facts of the instant case, the insurance company has not led any evidence except the evidence of the driver of the offending truck, who was clearly uninterested in deposing before the Claims Tribunal the true facts as observed by the Claims Tribunal and further the eyewitness Abid Nawaz, AW 2, has clearly stated the rash and negligent act on the part of the respondent driver and in absence of examination of independent witness by the insurance company to establish the plea of contributory negligence on the part of the deceased, the finding recorded by the Claims Tribunal that the deceased Utkarsh Verma was contributory negligent appears to be erroneous in the facts and law. Therefore, for the aforesaid reasons, the finding recorded that deceased was contributory negligent to the extent of 25 per cent is erroneous for want of proper pleading and evidence. It is held that deceased Utkarsh Verma was not negligent to the extent of 25 per cent while driving his car. It is further held that the respondent driver of the offending truck was solely negligent in driving the offending truck on the date of accident. It is held that deceased Utkarsh Verma was not negligent to the extent of 25 per cent while driving his car. It is further held that the respondent driver of the offending truck was solely negligent in driving the offending truck on the date of accident. Apart from the fact that no permission u/s 170 of the Act, 1988 was granted to the insurance company to contest on the ground of negligence, therefore, even otherwise, the plea of contributory negligence was not available to the insurance company, therefore, insurance company was not entitled to question the negligence and its defence was confined to section 149(2) of the Act, 1988. Accordingly, the finding of contributory negligence on the part of deceased Utkarsh Verma is illegal and, therefore, it is set aside. It is held that the deceased Utkarsh Verma was not contributory negligent in driving his car and his death occurred due to the sole negligence of respondent driver Dileshwar Kenwat. The first question is answered accordingly. Answer to Second Question: 8.1. Mr. Qamrul Aziz and Mr. G.V.K. Rao, the learned counsel appearing for the insurance company in the appeal filed by the insurance company, would submit that the award passed by the Tribunal granting compensation in the sum of Rs. 15,78,294 is strikingly high and it deserves to be reduced suitably. Replying to the afore stated submission, Mr. Abhishek Sinha and Mr. G.S. Patel, learned counsel appearing for the claimants, would submit that the application of the insurance company u/s 170 of the Act, 1988 to contest on merits was rejected by the Claims Tribunal, therefore, the appeal preferred by the insurance company is not maintainable. 8.2. In order to appreciate the controversy, it would be pertinent to notice section 170 of the Act, 1988, which runs thus: "170. 8.2. In order to appreciate the controversy, it would be pertinent to notice section 170 of the Act, 1988, which runs thus: "170. Impleading insurer in certain cases.--Where in the course of any inquiry, the Claims Tribunal is satisfied that-- (a) there is collusion between the person making the claim and the person against whom the claim is made, or (b) the person against whom the claim is made has failed to contest the claim, it may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, direct that the insurer who may be liable in respect of such claim, shall be impleaded as a party to the proceeding and the insurer so impleaded shall thereupon have, without prejudice to the provisions contained in sub-section (2) of section 149, the right to contest the claim on all or any of the grounds that are available to the person against whom the claim has been made." 8.3. A bare perusal of the above-quoted provision would show that section 170 of the Act, 1988 lays down that where in the course of any inquiry, the Claims Tribunal is satisfied that there is collusion between the claimants and the person against whom the claim is made or where the person against whom the claim is made fails to contest the claim, it can direct the insurer to be impleaded as a party for reasons to be recorded in writing if that insurer may be liable in respect of such claim. The insurer so impleaded will have the right to contest the claim on all or any of the grounds that are available to the person against whom the claim has been made. Failure to obtain permission u/s 170 of the Act, 1988 was uniformly held by law to be making any appeal by the insurer against the quantum of compensation incompetent and this incompetence is without prejudice to the provisions of section 149(2) of the Act, 1988. Section 149(2) of the Act, 1988 gives a right to the insurer to defend any claim or action on the ground of breach of specified conditions of the insurance policy enumerated in the provisions or on the ground of the policy being void due to having been obtained by non-disclosure of a material fact or by a representation of fact which was false in some material particular. Section 170 of the Act, 1988, due to which it becomes disabled from questioning the quantum of compensation in the revisions and the appeals, though it has a right to question liability on the ground of infringement of specified terms and conditions of the insurance policy in the light of section 149(2) read with section 170 of the Act, 1988. 8.4. Now, admittedly, the application filed by appellant insurance company seeking permission u/s 170 of the Act, 1988 to contest on merits was rejected by the Claims Tribunal by order dated 9.9.2011 by a speaking order, recording reasons as the driver and the owner of the offending vehicle were duly represented before the Claims Tribunal. The appellant insurance company has not challenged the legality and validity of the order dated 9.9.2011 rejecting its application u/s 170 of the Act, 1988 before this court, though the appeal has been filed by the appellant insurance company challenging the legality and validity of the impugned award. Thus, the order dated 9.9.2011 has attained finality. 8.5. In National Insurance Co. Ltd., Chandigarh Vs. Nicolletta Rohtagi and Others, (2002) 7 SCC 456 , the Supreme Court held as under: "(15) It is relevant to note that Parliament, while enacting sub-section (2) of section 149, only specified some of the defences which are based on conditions of the policy and, therefore, any other breach of conditions of the policy by the insured which does not find place in sub-section (2) of section 149 cannot be taken as a defence by the insurer. If Parliament had intended to include the breach of other conditions of the policy as a defence, it could have easily provided any breach of conditions of insurance policy in sub-section (2) of section 149. If we permit the insurer to take any other defence other than those specified in sub-section (2) of section 149, it would mean we are adding more defences to the insurer in the statute which is neither found in the Act nor was intended to be included." 8.6. Likewise, recently, in Josphine James v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., 2013 ACJ 2418 (SC), the Supreme Court held as under: "(17) The said order was reviewed by the High Court at the instance of the appellant in view of the aforesaid decision on the question of maintainability of the appeal of the insurance company. Likewise, recently, in Josphine James v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., 2013 ACJ 2418 (SC), the Supreme Court held as under: "(17) The said order was reviewed by the High Court at the instance of the appellant in view of the aforesaid decision on the question of maintainability of the appeal of the insurance company. The High Court, in the review petition, has further reduced the compensation to Rs. 4,20,000/- from Rs. 6,75,000/- which was earlier awarded by it. This approach is contrary to the facts and law laid down by this court. The High Court, in reducing the quantum of compensation under the heading of loss of dependency of the appellant, was required to follow the decision rendered by three-Judge Bench of this court in Nicolletta Rohtagi's case, 2002 ACJ 1950 (SC) and earlier decisions wherein this court after interpreting section 170(b) of the M.V. Act, has rightly held that in the absence of permission obtained by the insurance company from the Tribunal to avail the defence of the insured, it is not permitted to contest the case on merits. The aforesaid legal principle is applicable to the fact situation in view of the three-Judge Bench decision referred to supra though the correctness of the aforesaid decision is referred to larger Bench. This important aspect of the matter has been overlooked by the High Court while passing the impugned judgment and the said approach is contrary to law laid down by this court." 8.7. In a recent decision in Rekha Jain and Another Vs. National Insurance Company Ltd., (2013) 12 SCC 202 , the Supreme Court again held that statutory defences which are available to the insurer to contest a claim are confined to what are provided in sub-section (2) of section 149 of the Act, 1988 and not more and for that reason if an insurer is to file an appeal, the challenge in the appeal would confine to only those grounds in absence of permission from the Claims Tribunal to avail the defence on behalf of the insured as required u/s 170(b) of the Act, 1988. 8.8. 8.8. As afore stated, the appellant insurance company has been refused permission u/s 170 of the Act, 1988 by the order dated 9.9.2011 to contest on merits and same has attained finality, therefore the defence of the appellant insurance company is confined to the statutory defence as provided in section 149(2) of the Act, 1988 and the appellant insurance company is not entitled to challenge the quantum of compensation in absence of permission u/s 170 of the Act, 1988 and the appeal filed by appellant insurance company challenging quantum of compensation is not entertainable and as such it is dismissed as not maintainable. Thus, the second question is answered accordingly. Answer to Third Question: 9. Mr. Abhishek Sinha and Mr. G.S. Patel, learned counsel appearing for the claimants, placing reliance on the decision in Smt. Sarla Verma and Others Vs. Delhi Transport Corporation and Another, (2009) 6 SCC 121 , would submit that the Claims Tribunal has committed legal error in not awarding compensation for the loss of future income/prospects as deceased Utkarsh Verma was a renowned legal professional. They would further submit that appropriate multiplier applicable in the instant case would be 16. 9.1. In reply, Mr. Qamrul Aziz and Mr. G.V.K. Rao, learned counsel appearing for the insurance company, would submit that the decision in Smt. Sarla Verma and Others Vs. Delhi Transport Corporation and Another, (2009) 6 SCC 121 , is confined to the salaried employee and it would not be applicable to the instant case as the deceased in the instant case was an advocate by profession, therefore, no addition towards future income/prospects is permissible in favour of the claimants. 9.2. In Smt. Sarla Verma and Others Vs. Delhi Transport Corporation and Another, (2009) 6 SCC 121 , the Supreme Court held as under: "(11) In General Manager, Kerala State Road Transport Corporation, Trivandrum Vs. Mrs. Susamma Thomas and others, (1994) 2 SCC 176 , this court increased the income by nearly 100 per cent in Smt. Sarla Dixit and another Vs. Balwant Yadav and others, (1996) 3 SCC 179 , the income was increased only by 50 per cent and in Abati Bezbaruah Vs. Dy. Director General Geological Survey of India and Another, (2003) 3 SCC 148 , the income was increased by a mere 7 per cent. Balwant Yadav and others, (1996) 3 SCC 179 , the income was increased only by 50 per cent and in Abati Bezbaruah Vs. Dy. Director General Geological Survey of India and Another, (2003) 3 SCC 148 , the income was increased by a mere 7 per cent. In view of the imponderables and uncertainties, we are in favour of adopting as a rule of thumb, an addition of 50 per cent of actual salary to the actual salary income of the deceased towards future prospects, where the deceased had a permanent job and was below 40 years. [Where the annual income is in the taxable range, the words 'actual salary' should be read as 'actual salary less tax']. The addition should be only 30 per cent if the age of the deceased was 40 to 50 years. There should be no addition where the age of the deceased is more than 50 years. Though the evidence may indicate a different percentage of increase, it is necessary to standardize the addition to avoid different yardsticks being applied or different methods of calculation being adopted. Where the deceased was self-employed or was on a fixed salary (without provision for annual increments, etc.), the courts will usually take only the actual income at the time of death. A departure there from should be made only in rare and exceptional cases involving special circumstances." 9.3. In Santosh Devi Vs. National Insurance Company Ltd. and Others, (2012) 6 SCC 421 , the Apex Court further considered the decision rendered in Smt. Sarla Verma and Others Vs. Delhi Transport Corporation and Another, (2009) 6 SCC 121 and made it applicable to the sell-employed persons also, as under: "(11) We have considered the respective arguments. Although the legal jurisprudence developed in the country in last five decades is somewhat precedent-centric, the judgments which have bearing on socio-economic conditions of the citizens and issues relating to compensation payable to the victims of motor accidents, those who are deprived of their land and similar matters need to be frequently revisited keeping in view the fast changing societal values, the effect of globalization on the economy of the nation and their impact on the life of the people. (14) We find it extremely difficult to fathom any rationale for the observation made in the judgment in Smt. Sarla Verma and Others Vs. (14) We find it extremely difficult to fathom any rationale for the observation made in the judgment in Smt. Sarla Verma and Others Vs. Delhi Transport Corporation and Another, (2009) 6 SCC 121 , that where the deceased was self-employed or was on a fixed salary without provision for annual increment, etc., the courts will usually take only the actual income at the time of death and a departure from this rule should be made only in rare and exceptional cases involving special circumstances. In our view, it will be naive to say that the wages or the total emoluments/income of a person who is self-employed or who is employed on a fixed salary without provision for annual increments, etc., would remain the same throughout his life. Rise in the cost of living affects everyone across the board. It does not make any distinction between rich and poor. As a matter of fact, the effect of rise in prices which directly impacts the cost of living is minimal on the rich and maximum on those who are self-employed or who get fixed income/emoluments. They are the worst affected people. Therefore, they put in extra efforts to generate additional income necessary for sustaining their families. Salaries of those employed under the Central and State Governments and their agencies/instrumentalities have been revised from time to time to provide a cushion against the rising prices and provisions have been made for providing security to the families of the deceased employees. The salaries of those employed in private sectors have also increased manifold. Till about two decades ago, nobody could have imagined that salary of class IV employee of the government would be in five figures and total emoluments of those in higher echelons of service will cross the figure of Rs. 1,00,000/-. Although the wages/income of those employed in un-organised sectors has not registered a corresponding increase and has not kept pace with the increase in the salaries of the government employees and those employed in private sectors, but it cannot be denied that there has been incremental enhancement in the income of those who are self-employed and even those engaged on daily basis, monthly basis or even seasonal basis. We can take judicial notice of the fact that with a view to meet the challenges posed by high cost of living, the persons falling in the latter category periodically increase the cost of their labour. In this context, it may be useful to give an example of a tailor who earns his livelihood by stitching clothes. If the cost of living increases and the prices of essentials go up, it is but natural for him to increase the cost of his labour. So will be the cases of ordinary skilled and unskilled labour, like barber, blacksmith, cobbler, mason, etc. Therefore, we do not think that while making the observations in the last three lines of para. 11 of Sarla Verma's judgment, the court had intended to lay down an absolute rule that there will be no addition in the income of a person who is self-employed or who is paid fixed wages. Rather, it would be reasonable to say that a person who is self-employed or is engaged on fixed wages will also get 30 per cent increase in his total income over a period of time and if he/she becomes the victim of accident then the same formula deserves to be applied for calculating the amount of compensation." 9.4. Thus, the submission of learned counsel appearing for the insurance company deserves to be rejected that 30 per cent increase for future income/prospects is not applicable to the self-employed person. Thus, applying the ratio of law laid down by the Apex Court in Smt. Sarla Verma and Others Vs. Delhi Transport Corporation and Another, (2009) 6 SCC 121 and in Santosh Devi Vs. National Insurance Company Ltd. and Others, (2012) 6 SCC 421 , considering the evidence available on record with regard to future income/prospects as the deceased was an advocate by profession and he had been a Deputy Government Advocate in the office of Advocate General, Government of Chhattisgarh, Bilaspur for the period from 14.12.2005 to 30.4.2007 and also considering the documents filed and duly proved before the Claims Tribunal with regard to payment of income tax by the deceased, I am of the considered opinion that the claimants would be entitled for addition of 30 per cent of the actual income towards future income/prospects of the deceased while computing the annual income of the deceased. The third question is answered accordingly. Answer to Fourth Question: 10. Mr. The third question is answered accordingly. Answer to Fourth Question: 10. Mr. Abhishek Sinha and Mr. G.S. Patel, learned counsel appearing for the claimants, have made a submission that no amount has been awarded towards the damage caused to the property (car of the deceased) in the accident on the ground that report of authorised valuer of the Central Government with regard to the damage of the car has not been filed and proved and filing of the document, Exh. P23, is unreliable. 10.1. The appellant insurance company examined Sandeep Kumar Sinha, NAW 3/2, the Assistant Manager of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. with which the car of the deceased was insured. Sandeep Kumar Sinha, NAW 3/2, has deposed that some formalities were yet to be completed by the claimants and upon completing the formalities, damages towards the car would be paid to the claimants. I find no reason to disbelieve the statement of Sandeep Kumar Sinha, NAW 3/2. The claimants are at liberty to pursue their claim before Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. and if they get dissatisfied with the ultimate order/result thereof, they shall be at liberty to proceed in accordance with law. Thus, the claimants are not entitled for any damage to the car by this court. The finding arrived at by the Claims Tribunal in this regard is hereby affirmed. The fourth question is answered accordingly. Answer to Fifth Question: 11. This takes me to the last question as to the compensation, which the claimants are entitled to. The Claims Tribunal has, after deduction of income tax, assessed annual income of the deceased as Rs. 1,95,880/-. Claimants are entitled for addition of 30 per cent for future prospects. After the addition, total sum comes to [Rs. 1,95,880 + (Rs. 1,95,880 x 30 per cent)] Rs. 2,54,644/-. 1/3rd of Rs. 2,54,644/- has to be deducted for personal and living expenses of the deceased which he would have spent had he remained alive. After the deduction of amount of Rs. 84,881/- (1/3rd of Rs. 2,54,644/-) from the amount of Rs. 2,54,644/-, the balance comes to Rs. 1,69,763/-, which is held as annual dependency of the claimants. Looking to the age of the deceased, appropriate multiplier applicable in this case would be 16. Thus, the loss of future income/prospects comes to (Rs. 1,69,763/- x 16) Rs. 27,16,208/-. I also award a sum of Rs. 2,54,644/-) from the amount of Rs. 2,54,644/-, the balance comes to Rs. 1,69,763/-, which is held as annual dependency of the claimants. Looking to the age of the deceased, appropriate multiplier applicable in this case would be 16. Thus, the loss of future income/prospects comes to (Rs. 1,69,763/- x 16) Rs. 27,16,208/-. I also award a sum of Rs. 25,000/- under the head of loss of consortium, a sum of Rs. 25,000/- under the head of loss of love and affection, a sum of Rs. 10,000/- under the head of loss to estate and a sum of Rs. 15,000 under the head of funeral expenses. The break-up of compensation awarded today is thus: 11.1. Thus, the claimants are entitled for and are awarded total compensation of Rs. 27,91,208/-. Claimants are also awarded simple interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum on the amount of Rs. 27,91,208/- from the date of filing the claim application till realization of the full compensation. The amount of Rs. 27,91,208/- along with interest shall be deposited before the Claims Tribunal within a period of 3 months from today. The amount, if any, deposited under the impugned award shall be adjustable. The fifth question is answered accordingly. Consequently, Miscellaneous Appeal (C) No. 684 of 2013 preferred by the claimants is allowed and Miscellaneous Appeal (C) No. 781 of 2013 preferred by the insurance company is dismissed. The impugned award is modified to the extent indicated above and rest thereof shall remain unchanged. No order as to costs.