JUDGMENT : SANJAY K. AGRAWAL, J. 1. The disposal of this appeal would also govern the disposal of M.A. (C) No. 1004/2008, Branch Manager v. Sarafraj Khan as both have arisen out of one accident and common award dated 30-4-2008 passed by the 1st Additional Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh (for short 'the Claims Tribunal') in claim case No. 328/2007. Since common question of fact & law are involved, therefore, they were heard together and being decided by this common judgment. However, for the sake of convenience, M.A. (C) No. 1023/2008 is taken-up as the lead case. 2. Appellant/claimant has filed M.A. (C) No. 1023/2008 seeking enhancement, where- as, Insurance Company has filed M.A. (C) No. 1004/2008 setting aside the award imposing liability upon him. Facts : 3. Facts leading to filing of the lead case, i.e. M.A. (C) No. 1023 of 2008 may briefly be noted thus : 3.1 Claimant Sarfaraz Khan filed claim petition No. 328/2007 seeking compensation stating inter alia that on the date of accident i.e. on 23-5-2007, at 11.30 p.m. he was returning from Raipur to Bilaspur on Truck bearing registration No. CG-04/J/1884, which was owned by Ramesh Kumar Kashyap and insured with the New India Insurance Company Limited, when he reached near Indrapuri Hirri Mines, a Truck bearing registration No. CG-10/C/8786, which was driven by Mohd. Laik, owned by Aadil Ahmed Qureshi and insured with the Oriental Insurance Company Limited, rashly and negligently, dashed his Truck, by which, he suffered severe injuries and was hospitalized and subsequently suffered amputation of the left leg above knee. He filed an application under Section 163-A of the M.V. Act and claimed compensation to the extent of Rs. 16,20,000/- from the owner, driver and insurer of both the vehicles jointly and severally along with interest. 3.2 The New India Insurance Company filed his written statement and opposed the application filed by the claimant stating inter alia that claimant-Sarfaraz Khan (driver of Truck No. CG-04/J/1884) was himself negligent in driving the vehicle and he did not possess valid and effective licence to drive the Truck. 3.3 Learned Claims Tribunal on a close scrutiny of the evidence, partly granted the application and recorded following findings that : (i) This is not a case of contributory negligence. 3.3 Learned Claims Tribunal on a close scrutiny of the evidence, partly granted the application and recorded following findings that : (i) This is not a case of contributory negligence. (ii) Claimant-Sarfaraz Khan being the driver has become permanent disabled to the extent of 75% and his loss of earning capacity is 100 per cent. (iii) Claimant was entitled for total sum of Rs. 6,73,000/- along with 6% interest. (iv) Truck No. CG-04/J/1884 was owned by Ramesh Kumar Kashyap and duly insured with the New India Insurance Company Limited, therefore, driver, owner and Insurance Company is liable to make payment of compensation. 4. Mr. R. K. Jain, learned counsel appearing for the claimant would submit that towards medical expenses, claimants has filed and proved the medical bills of Rs. 1,50,000/-, whereas, the Claims Tribunal has only awarded a sum of Rs. 15,000/- and thus, he is entitled for Rs. 1,35,000/- in addition of amount already awarded. 5. Per contra, Mr. Pankaj Agrawal, learned counsel appearing for die New India Insurance Company Limited would submit that the claim petition framed and filed under Section 163(A) of the M.V. Act was not maintainable, as the claimant/driver was himself negligent in driving the vehicle and he ought to have filed claim under the provision of Employee's Compensation Act, 1923. He would further submit that the permanent disability and percentage of loss of earning capacity has wrongly been taken as 100 per cent, and award is liable to be set aside. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered the rival submission made herein and perused the record of the Claims Tribunal. M.A. (C) No. 1023/2008 : 7. The claimant filed claim petition under Section 163-A of the M.V. Act and claimed medical expenses of Rs. 1,50,000/-. Section 163-A of M.V. Act is special provision as to payment of compensation on structured formula. The second schedule has been enacted under Section 163-A of the M.V. Act, which also provides for general damages in case of injuries and disabilities as under : 4. General Damages in case of Injuries and Disabilities : (i) Pain and sufferings (a) Grievous injuries Rs. 5,000 (b) Non-grievous injuries Rs. 1,000 (ii) Medical expenses-actual expenses incurred supported by bills/vouchers but not exceeding as one time payment Rs. 15,000 8. General Damages in case of Injuries and Disabilities : (i) Pain and sufferings (a) Grievous injuries Rs. 5,000 (b) Non-grievous injuries Rs. 1,000 (ii) Medical expenses-actual expenses incurred supported by bills/vouchers but not exceeding as one time payment Rs. 15,000 8. A bare perusal of the aforesaid provision, it would clear that legislature has fixed ceiling of 15,000/- towards medical expenses, if the actual expenses incurred are supported by bills and vouchers, but not exceeding Rs. 15,000/-. Thus, the Claims Tribunal has rightly granted only Rs. 15,000/- towards medical expenses. The finding recorded by the Claims Tribunal that claimant is not entitled for medical expenses more than Rs. 15,000/- is a finding based on material available on record and no interference is called for. Thus, M.A. (C) No. 1023/2008 filed by claimant seeking enhancement on the head of medical expenses deserves to and accordingly dismissed. M.A. (C) No. 1004/2008 : 9. In order to consider the plea of Insurance company that application filed by claimant under Section 163-A of M.V. Act was not maintainable, it would relevant to notice Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, which reads thus : 163-A. Special provisions as to payment of compensation on structured formula basis. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force or instrument having the force of law, the owner of the motor vehicle or the authorised insurer shall be liable to pay in the case of death or permanent disablement due to accident arising out of the use of motor vehicle, compensation, as indicated in the Second Schedule, to the legal heirs or the victim, as the case may be. Explanation. For the purposes of this sub-section, "permanent disability" shall have the same meaning and extent as in the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923). (2) In any claim for compensation under sub-section (1), the claimant shall not be required to plead or establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act ore neglect or default of the owner of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other person. (3) The Central Government may, keeping in view the cost of living by notification in the Official Gazette, from time to time amend the Second Schedule.) 10. (3) The Central Government may, keeping in view the cost of living by notification in the Official Gazette, from time to time amend the Second Schedule.) 10. The use of non obstinate clause in Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act is quite significant. In the present case, the application seeking compensation had been filed specifically under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. The provision contained in Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act indicates that notwithstanding anything contained in Motor Vehicles Act or in any other law for the time being in force or instrument having the force of law, the owner of the motor vehicle or the authorised insurer shall be liable to pay in the case of death or permanent disablement due to accident arising out of the use of motor vehicle, compensation, as indicated in the second schedule, to the legal heirs or the victim, as the case may be. 11. Section 163-A of the Act was considered by the Supreme Court in a decision in Deepal Girishbhai Soni v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Baroda, (2004) 5 SCC 385 , it held thus : 64. It is not in dispute that the claim of compensation irrespective of the death or bodily injury may arise under other statutes as, for example, Workmen's Compensation Act, Factories Act, Fatal Accidents Act and other Acts governing various industries including hazardous industries. 66. We may notice that Section 167 of the Act provides that where death of, or bodily injury to, any person gives rise to claim of compensation under the Act and also under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, he cannot claim compensation under both the Acts. The Motor Vehicles Act contains different expressions as, for example, "under the provision of the Act", "provisions of this Act", "under any other provisions of this Act" or "any other law or otherwise". In Section 163-A, the expression "notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force" has been used, which goes to show that Parliament intended to insert a non obstinate clause of wide nature which would mean that the provisions of Section 163-A would apply despite the contrary provisions existing in the Act covers cases where even negligence is on the part of the victim. It is by way of an exception to Section 166 and the concept of social justice has been duly taken care of. 12. The Ratio laid down in a decision Deepal Girishbhai Soni, AIR 2004 SC 2107 (supra), squarely and the injured claimant is entitled to invoke Section 163-A of the M.V. Act, claiming compensation from permanent disability suffered by him arising out of the use of motor vehicle and negligence of the victim is irrelevant and application under Section 163-A of the Act would be maintainable. Thus, the finding recorded in this regard by the Claims Tribunal is just and proper and same is hereby affirmed. 13. The next submission urged by Mr. Agrawal that Tribunal has committed legal error in holding 100 per cent, loss of earning capacity of the claimant by amputation of his left leg above knee. 14. In a decision in Pratap Narain Singh Deo v. Shrinivas Sabata, AIR 1976 SC 222 , the Carpenter suffered amputation of left hand above elbow, the Supreme Court held loss of earning capacity 100 per cent, by following findings : 5. The expression "total disablement" has been defined in Section 2(1) of the Act as follows : (1) "Total disablement" means such disablement, whether of a temporary or permanent nature, as incapacitates workman for all work which he was capable of performing at the time of the accident resulting in such disablement." It has not been disputed before us that the injury was of such a nature as to cause permanent disablement to the respondent, and the question for consideration is whether the disablement incapacitated the respondent for all work which he was capable of performing at the time of the accident. The Commissioner has examined the question and recorded his finding as follows : "The injured workman in this case is carpenter by profession By loss of the left hand above the elbow, he has evidently been rendered unfit for the work of carpenter as the work of carpentry cannot be done by one hand only." This is obviously a reasonable and correct finding. Counsel for the appellant has not been able to assail it on any ground and it does not require to be corrected in this appeal. Counsel for the appellant has not been able to assail it on any ground and it does not require to be corrected in this appeal. There is also no justification for the other argument which has been advanced with reference to Item 3 of Part II of Schedule I, because it was not the appellant's case before the Commissioner that amputation of the arm was form 8" from tip of acromion to less than 4Vi below the tip of olecranon. A new case cannot therefore be allowed to be set up on facts which have not been admitted or established. 15. In a decision in S. Suresh v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., 2010 ACJ 487, the driver of truck suffered amputation of right leg just below knee, the Supreme Court held, loss of earning capacity would be 100 per cent, by following findings :- In our view, the ratio of the said judgment is squarely applicable to the facts at hand. We are of the opinion that on account of amputation of his right leg below knee, he is rendered unfit for the work of a driver, which he was performing at the time of the accident resulting in the said disablement. Therefore, he has lost 100 per cent, of his earning capacity as a lorry driver, more so, when he is disqualified from even getting a driving licence under the Motor Vehicles Act. 16. In a decision in K. Janardhan v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., 2008 ACJ 2039 , the Supreme Court held that Tanker driver suffered amputation of right leg up to knee joint and loss of earning capacity would be 100 per cent, by following findings :- Applying the ratio of the cited judgment to the facts of the present case, we are of the opinion that the appellant herein has also suffered a 100 per cent, disability and incapacity in earning his keep as a tanker driver as his right leg had been amputated from knee. Additionally, a perusal of Sections 8 and 9 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, would show that the appellant would now be disqualified from even getting a driving licence. 17. Additionally, a perusal of Sections 8 and 9 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, would show that the appellant would now be disqualified from even getting a driving licence. 17. In the instant case the Claimant is driver by profession and he has suffered amputation of his left leg above knee, he is rendered unfit for the work of a driver, which he was performing at the time of the accident resulting in the said disablement. Thus by applying the ratio of decisions Pratap Narain Singh Deo, AIR 1976 SC 222 , S. Suresh, AIR 2010 SC (Supp) 368 and K. Janardhan, AIR 2008 SC 2384 (supra) and the facts of the instant case, I find that the Claims Tribunal has not committed any error in holding the loss of earning capacity of claimant would be 100 per cent, and the finding so recorded in this regard is hereby affirmed. Thus, M.A. (C) No. 1004/2008 filed by the Insurance Company deserves to and accordingly dismissed. 18. In the result, the appeal fails and the same is dismissed. The award of the Tribunal is confirmed without any modification. However, there shall be no order as to costs in this appeal. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed.