JUDGMENT The petitioner has approached this Court seeking quashing of order dated 30th April, 1998, whereby he has been reverted from the post of Librarian/Library Assistant to the post of Peon and for a further direction upon the respondents to absorb the petitioner to the post of Librarian/Library Assistant in the State Institute of Rural Development at Ranchi. 2. The brief facts of the case can be summarized by recording that the petitioner was appointed on 01.12.1972 as Peon in the Bihar Institute of Rural Development and he worked as Clerk from 01.12.1972 to 30.11.1977. The petitioner started working as Librarian/Library Assistant from 12.09.1986 and he was promoted to the post of Librarian/Library Assistant by Office Order dated 23.08.1988. However, by order dated 03.09.1991, he was reverted to the post of Peon, and therefore, he approached the High Court in C.W.J.C. No. 1978 of 1991 (R). The respondents did not file any counter affidavit, however, a plea was raised during the course of hearing that since the posting of the petitioner on the post of Librarian/Library Assistant was temporary in nature, no substantial right had accrued to the petitioner. The High Court rejected the argument on behalf of the respondents and quashed the order of reversion dated 03.09.1991 with all consequential benefits to the petitioner. 3. Vide Office Order dated 04.09.1992, the petitioner was again posted on the post of Librarian/Library Assistant from 29.08.1991. The petitioner continued to work as Librarian/Library Assistant till 30th April, 1998, when the order of his reversion from the post of Librarian/Library Assistant to the post of Peon was passed again. On the same day, another order was passed, whereby the petitioner was directed to discharge the duties of Librarian/Library Assistant for further period of six months. In the aforesaid facts, the petitioner has approached this Court by filing the present writ petition. 4. A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondent no.3, in which, it has been admitted that the petitioner has taken training of Library Science in the year 1984 and since the post of Librarian/Library Assistant was vacant, the petitioner was appointed on the said post on 23.08.1988. It has also been admitted in the counter affidavit and affirmed by the counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No.3 that the post of Librarian/Library Assistant is still vacant. 5. Heard counsel for both the parties and perused the documents on record. 6. It has also been admitted in the counter affidavit and affirmed by the counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No.3 that the post of Librarian/Library Assistant is still vacant. 5. Heard counsel for both the parties and perused the documents on record. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner is eligible for appointment on the post of Librarian/Library Assistant and that is the reason, he was appointed on the said post on 23.08.1988, when the post of Librarian/Library Assistant fell vacant. However, for extraneous reasons, the petitioner has been reverted from the post of Librarian/Library Assistant to the post of Peon, although he has been asked to continue to discharge the duties of Librarian/Library Assistant even after the order of reversion dated 30th April, 1998. The learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that the petitioner has been illegally denied the promotion on the post of Librarian/Library Assistant and the pay scale for the said post. By order dated 30th April, 1998, the petitioner has been granted allowances of only 20% of the pay-scale for the post of Peon, which is not justified. 7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent No.3 has contended that although the post of Librarian/Library Assistant is still vacant, but the petitioner cannot be promoted on the said post, because such post is a reserved post and the petitioner is not eligible for appointment on the post of Librarian/Library Assistant. It has further been contended on behalf of the counsel for the respondent No.3 that in terms of Rule 103 (B) of the Bihar Service Code, the petitioner is being paid 20% extra of his pay scale for officiating on the post of Librarian/Library Assistant. He has further submitted that by order dated 23.08.1988, the petitioner was informed that he would not claim any appointment/promotion on the basis of his appointment on the post of Librarian/Library Assistant and the petitioner, having accepted the said condition, cannot claim promotion on the post of Librarian/Library Assistant as a matter of right. 8. It is an admitted fact that on 23.08.1988, the petitioner was appointed on the post of Librarian/Library Assistant and since then, even though an order of reversion dated 30th April, 1998 has been passed, the petitioner has continued to work on the post of Librarian/Library Assistant and the post of Librarian/Library Assistant is still vacant. 8. It is an admitted fact that on 23.08.1988, the petitioner was appointed on the post of Librarian/Library Assistant and since then, even though an order of reversion dated 30th April, 1998 has been passed, the petitioner has continued to work on the post of Librarian/Library Assistant and the post of Librarian/Library Assistant is still vacant. The contentions raised on behalf of the respondents, in so far as, qualification of the petitioner for appointment on the post of Librarian/Library Assistant and the post of Librarian/Library Assistant being a reserved post are concerned, I am of the opinion that such contentions have been raised in desperation. This is an admitted fact that the post of Librarian/Library Assistant is a single post, and therefore, it cannot be a reserved post particularly, when the matter relates to public employment. In so far as the eligibility of the petitioner for appointment on the post of Librarian/Library Assistant is concerned, I find that no such plea has been taken in the counter affidavit. In the proceeding of C.W.J.C. No.1978 of 1991 (R) also, no such plea was raised on behalf of the respondents. The petitioner has been illegally denied his promotion on the post of Librarian/Library Assistant and the consequential benefits, which would have accrued to him. The provision contained in Rule 103 (B) of the Service Code is not intended for a situation in which a person would be forced to work on a higher post merely by paying 20% extra of his pay scale. This appears to me is a form of forced labour. Forced labour would not be ceased to be shown in the mere payment of 20% extra of the pay scale in terms of Rule 103 (B) of the Service Code. 9. Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment of the Constitution of United States of America contains the following provision: (1) “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.” 10. Similar provisions are incorporated in the constitutions of several Republics such as Burma, Japan, Cyprus, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, the Republic of Korea, etc. Similar provisions are incorporated in the constitutions of several Republics such as Burma, Japan, Cyprus, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, the Republic of Korea, etc. Article 19 of the Constitution of Burma, 1948 reads, “(i) Traffic in human beings, and (ii) Forced labour in any form and involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall be prohibited. Explanation.— Nothing in this section shall prevent the State from imposing compulsory service for public purpose without any discrimination on grounds of birth, race, religion or class.” 11. During the making of our Constitution, the Advisory Committee adopted Clause 11 of the chapter for Fundamental Rights, which reads as under, 11. “(a) Traffic in human beings, and (b) forced labour in any form including begar and involuntary servitude except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, are hereby prohibited and any contravention of this prohibition shall be an offence. Explanation.—Nothing in this sub clause shall prevent the State from imposing compulsory service for public purposes without any discrimination on the ground of race, religion, caste or class.” 12. The Constituent Assembly, after a full debate, adopted Clause 11 in the form, in which Article 23 of the Constitution is today, which reads as under, 23. “Prohibition of traffic in human beings and forced labour (1) Traffic in human beings and begar and other similar forms of forced labour are prohibited and any contravention of this provision shall be an offence punishable in accordance with law. (2) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from imposing compulsory service for public purposes, and in imposing such service the State shall not make any discrimination on grounds only of religion, race, caste or class or any of them.” 13. In a case, in which a legislation enacted by the Alabama State providing that when a person with intent to injure or defraud his employer enters into a contract in writing for the purpose of any service and obtains money or other property from the employer and without refunding the money or the property refuses or fails to perform such service, he will be punished with a fine, was challenged, the Supreme Court of United States upheld the challenge. In the case of “Baily Vs. Alabama”, reported in (219 US 219), Mr. In the case of “Baily Vs. Alabama”, reported in (219 US 219), Mr. Justice Hughes while declaring the legislation unconstitutional delivered the opinion as under, “The fact that the debtor contracted to perform the labour which is sought to be compelled does not withdraw the attempted enforcement from the condemnation of the statute. The full intent of the constitutional provision could be defeated with obvious facility if through the guise of contracts under which advances had been made, debtors could be held to compulsory service. It is the compulsion of the service that the statute inhibits, for when that occurs, the condition of servitude is created which would be not less involuntary because of the original agreement to work out the indebtedness. The contract exposes the debtor to liability for the loss due to the breach, but not to enforce labour.” 14. Similar is the view taken by the Supreme Court of United States in the case of “Pollock Vs. Williams”, reported in (322 US 4). 15. In the case of “People's Union for democratic rights & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors.”, reported in (1982) 3 SCC 235 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that there would be a breach of Article 23 of the Constitution of India if a person provides labour or service and is paid less than the minimum for it. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under, 13. “..... It is therefore clear that even if a person has contracted with another to perform service and there is consideration for such service in the shape of liquidation of debt or even remuneration he cannot be forced, by compulsion of law or otherwise, to continue to perform such service, as that would be forced labour within the inhibition of Article 23. This article strikes at every form of forced labour even if it has its origin in a contract voluntarily entered into by the person obligated to provide labour or service (vide Pollock v. Williams). The reason is that it offends against human dignity to compel a person to provide labour or service to another if he does not wish to do so, even though it be in breach of the contract entered into by him. There should be no serfdom or involuntary servitude in a free democratic India which respects the dignity of the individual and the worth of the human person. There should be no serfdom or involuntary servitude in a free democratic India which respects the dignity of the individual and the worth of the human person. Moreover, in a country like India where there is so much poverty and unemployment and there is no equality of bargaining power, a contract of service may appear on its face voluntary but it may, in reality, be involuntary, because while entering into the contract, the employee, by reason of his economically helpless condition, may have been faced with Hobson's choice, either to starve or to submit to the exploitative terms dictated by the powerful employer. It would be a travesty of justice to hold the employee in such a case to the terms of the contract and to compel him to serve the employer even though he may not wish to do so. That would aggravate the inequality and injustice from which the employee even otherwise suffers on account of his economically disadvantaged position and lend the authority of law to the exploitation of the poor helpless employee by the economically powerful employer. Article 23 therefore says that no one shall be forced to provide labour or service against his will, even though it be under a contract of service. 14. Now the next question that arises for consideration is whether there is any breach of Article 23 when a person provides labour or service to the State or to any other person and is paid less than the minimum wage for it. It is obvious that ordinarily no one would willingly supply labour or service to another for less than the minimum wage, when he knows that under the law he is entitled to get minimum wage for the labour or service provided by him. It may therefore be legitimately presumed that when a person provides labour or service to another against receipt of remuneration which is less than the minimum wage, he is acting under the force of some compulsion which drives him to work though he is paid less than what he is entitled under law to receive.” 16. It may therefore be legitimately presumed that when a person provides labour or service to another against receipt of remuneration which is less than the minimum wage, he is acting under the force of some compulsion which drives him to work though he is paid less than what he is entitled under law to receive.” 16. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has further held as under, “We are therefore of the view that where a person provides labour or service to another for remuneration which is less than the minimum wage, the labour or service provided by him clearly falls within the scope and ambit of the words “forced labour” under Article 23. Such a person would be entitled to come to the court for enforcement of his fundamental right under Article 23 by asking the court to direct payment of the minimum wage to him so that the labour or service provided by him ceases to be “forced labour” and the breach of Article 23 is remedied. It is therefore clear that when the petitioners alleged that minimum wage was not paid to the workmen employed by the contractors, the complaint was really in effect and substance a complaint against violation of the fundamental right of the workmen under Article 23.” 17. Dealing with the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that at the time of his appointment as Librarian/Library Assistant in the year 1988, the petitioner had accepted the condition that he would not claim any promotion/appointment on the basis of his posting on the post of Librarian/Library Assistant, I find that such a condition is not sustainable. The petitioner has continued to work on the post of Librarian/Library Assistant for more than 25 years, and therefore, his posting cannot be said to be a temporary arrangement or/and stop gap arrangement, and therefore, the condition mentioned in the letter of posting dated 23.08.1988 cannot be enforced against the petitioner. 18. In the case of “Secretary-cum-Chief Engineer, Chandigarh Vs. Hari Om Sharma & Ors.”, reported in (1998) 5 SCC 87 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with a similar contention, has held as under:- 8. 18. In the case of “Secretary-cum-Chief Engineer, Chandigarh Vs. Hari Om Sharma & Ors.”, reported in (1998) 5 SCC 87 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with a similar contention, has held as under:- 8. “Learned counsel for the appellant attempted to contend that when the respondent was promoted in stopgap arrangement as Junior Engineer I, he had given an undertaking to the appellant that on the basis of stopgap arrangement, he would not claim promotion as of right nor would he claim any benefit pertaining to that post. The argument, to say the least, is preposterous. Apart from the fact that the Government in its capacity as a model employer cannot be permitted to raise such an argument, the undertaking which is said to constitute an agreement between the parties cannot be enforced at law. The respondent being an employee of the appellant had to break his period of stagnation although, as we have found earlier, he was the only person amongst the non-diploma-holders available for promotion to the post of Junior Engineer I and was, therefore, likely to be considered for promotion in his own right. An agreement that if a person is promoted to the higher post or put to officiate on that post or, as in the instant case, a stopgap arrangement is made to place him on the higher post, he would not claim higher salary or other attendant benefits would be contrary to law and also against public policy. It would, therefore, be unenforceable in view of Section 23 of the Contract Act, 1872.” 19. In view of the aforesaid discussion, it is apparent that the respondents have acted arbitrarily and their action is not in consonance with “fair play in action”. The petitioner while working on the post of Librarian/Library Assistant had a legitimate expectation that he would be given regular promotion on the post of Librarian/Library Assistant. He was compelled to perform the duty of Librarian/Library Assistant without adequate remuneration. 20. Impugned order dated 30th April, 1998 is quashed and the respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner on the post of Librarian/Library Assistant w.e.f. 30th April, 1998. The petitioner would be entitled for the pay-scale of the post of Librarian/Library Assistant since 30th April, 1998. He was compelled to perform the duty of Librarian/Library Assistant without adequate remuneration. 20. Impugned order dated 30th April, 1998 is quashed and the respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner on the post of Librarian/Library Assistant w.e.f. 30th April, 1998. The petitioner would be entitled for the pay-scale of the post of Librarian/Library Assistant since 30th April, 1998. Respondents are further directed to make payment of arrears of salary to the petitioner within a period of six weeks from the date a copy of the order is served upon the respondents. 21. In the result, the present writ petition is allowed and disposed of in the aforesaid terms.